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PREFACE 
In February 1995 the European Parliament Secretariat's set up a working party 
to monitor all the preparatory stages of the Intergovernmental Conference (1996 
IGC Task Force). 
The task force reports directly to the Secretary-General and, ultimately, to the 
President of Parliament, Klaus Hansch; it is administrative in nature and its 
role is basically to coordinate the work of the various departments within 
Parliament most directly concerned with the Intergovernmental Conference; its 
other tasks are to locate, gather, analyse and summarize all IGC-related 
proposals and studies, not just from the various Community institutions and the 
official bodies of the Member States but also, and most importantly from civil 
society. 
So far the Task Force has concentrated its efforts on drawing up a whole series 
of documents on the Intergovernmental Conference. These include a comprehensive 
memo on the positions of the various Member States and another on the state of 
considerations in the national parliaments; the production of over 30 briefing 
papers on the major topics to be dealt with at the Conference; the drawing up 
of an IGC-related bibliography by source and by topic; the preparation of a 
selection of bibliographic references to periodicals and a compilation of 
summaries on the same topic, and the coordination of a single periodical 
containing press reports relating to the IGC (Info CIG/96). All these documents 
are regularly updated and the Working Party has also commissioned and supervised 
a series of studies produced outside Parliament (simplification of the Treaties, 
European citizenship, position of the national political parties, division of 
powers and responsibilities between the Union and the Member States, etc.). It 
has ensured that this constant flow of valuable information is widely 
distributed, both within the Union institutions and within the Member States and 
public organizations and associations. In particular a constant supply of 
information on computer has been provided since mid-1995 by means of the OVIDE 
system and will soon be available on the Internet. 
To provide more systematic information on the IGC, the Task Force has decided 
to compile a White Paper on the Intergovernmental Conference in three volumes. 
The first volume contains the most important official positions so far adopted 
by the institutions and bodies of the European Union; the second volume brings 
together and summarizes the Member States' positions and viewpoints and the 
third volume is a collection of the briefings prepared by the Secretariat's Task 
Force on the main topics that will be on the agenda for the Intergovernmental 
Conference. 
There is no doubt that 1996 IGC will be a defining moment for the future of 
European integration. This review cannot and must not take place without the 
active involvement of European citizens, who will be the main players in shaping 
the destiny of the Community. 
The European Parliament is fully aware of this and its position as the directly 
elected representative of the people of Europe gives it the confidence to assume 
a central role in encouraging ever wider participation and greater understanding 
of the negotiating process and of the very real challenges facing the 
Intergovernmental Conference. 
In Parliament's op1n1on, the Community must emerge from the review of the Treaty 
as a more democratic, fairer, more interdependent, more prosperous and more 
equal Europe. If the White Paper helps to bring about a better understanding of 
the Community, and even contributes only minimally to the achievement of these 
objectives, the work which has gone into preparing it will not have been in 
vain. 
Enrico VINCI 
The Secretary-General 
Luxembourg, January 1996 
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2. 
3. 
Presidency conclusions - Brussels, 10 and 11 December 1993 
ANNEX m· 
THE PLACE OF THE APPLICANT COUNTRIES 
IN THE INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES 
THE COMMISSION 
Number of members 
-
Belgium 1 Luxembourg 1 
Denmark 1 Netherlands 1 
- Germany 2 Norway 1 
-
Greece 1 Austria 1 
-
Spain 2 Portugal 1 
-
France 2 Finland 1 
-
lr~land 1 Sweden 1 
-
Italy 2 United Kingdom 2 
TOTAL 21 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Number of members 
-
Belgium 25 Luxembourg 6 
-
Denmark 16 Netherlands 31 
-
Germany 99 Norway 15 
- Greece 25 Austria 20 
. Spain 64 Portugal 25 
France 87 Finland 16 
Ireland 15 Sweden 21 
. Italy 87 United Kingdom 87 
TOTAL 639 
COURT OF JUSTICE 
- Each Member State will propose one Judge for appointment. In addition, should an even 
number of States accede, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom will take part 
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4. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE 
Each Member State will propose one member for appointment. 
5. THE COURT OF AUDITORS 
Each Member State will propose one member for appointment. 
6. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
Number of members 
-
Belgium 12 Luxembourg 
-
Denmark 9 Netherlands 
Germany 24 Norway 
-
Greece 12 Austria 
- Spain 21 Ponugal 
- France 24 Finland 
-
Ireland 9 Sweden 
Italy 24 United Kingdom 
TOTAL 
7. THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 
i-.Jumber of members 
Belgium 12 Luxembourg 
Denmark 9 Netherlands 
-
Germany 24 Norway 
- Greece 12 Austria 
- Spain 21 Ponugal 
-
France 24 Finland 
Ireland 9 Sweden 
Italy 24 United Kingdom 
TOTAL 
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Presidency conclusions- Brussels, 10 and 11 December 1993 
8. THE COUNCIL 
(a) Rotation of the Presidency 
(i) Article 146 of the Treaty will be amended as follows: 
"The Council shall consist of a representative of each Member State at ministerial 
level, authorized to commit the Government of that Member State. 
The office of President shall be held in turn by each Member State in the Council 
for a term of six months in the order decided by the Council acting unanimously." 
(ii) When the Accession Treaty enters into force the Council will adopt the following 
Decision ( 11: 
"The office of President of the Council shall be held: 
for the first six months of 1995 by France; 
for the second six months of 1995 by Spain; 
- for the subsequent periods of six months by the following countries in turn 
·in the following order: 
-Italy 
-Ireland 
- Netherlands 
-Luxembourg 
- United Kingdom 
-Austria 
-Norway 
-Germany 
-Finland 
-Portugal 
-France 
-Sweden 
-Belgium 
-Spain 
i -Denmark 
-Greece. 
( 1 ) This Decision will be adjusted if enlargement involves fewer than four countries. 
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The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Member States concerned, may 
decide that a Member State may hold the Presidency during a period other than that 
resulting from the above order." 
(b) Weighting of votes within the Council 
- Present Member States 
Austria, Sweden 
Norway, Finland 
9. OFFICIAL LANGUAGES 
current weighting maintained 
4 votes per country 
3 votes per country 
The official languages of the Union after enlargement will be the nine existing official languages, 
to which will be added on accession Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish. 
0 
0 0 
The following declaration will appear in the official record of the Conference: 
"In adopting the institutional provisions of the Accession Treaty, the Member States and the 
applicant countries agree that, as well as examining the legislative role of the European 
Parliament and the other matters envisaged in the Treaty on European Union, the 
Intergovernmental Conference to be convened in 1996 will consider the questions relating 
to the number of members of the Commission and the weighting of the votes of the 
Member States in the Council. It will also consider any measures deemed necessary to 
facilitate the work of the Institutions and guarantee their effective operation." 
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Presidency conclusions - Corfu 24 and 25 June 1994 
IV. PREPARATION OF THE 1996 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 
The European Council, following the loannina Agreement, hereby establishes 
a Reflection Group to prepare for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
consisting of representatives of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member 
States and the President of the Commission. It will be chaired by a person 
appointed by the Spanish government and begin its work in June 1995 . Two 
European Parliament representatives will participate in the work of the 
Reflection Group. The Group will also have exchanges of views with the other 
institutions and organs of the European Union. 
The Institutions are invited to establish before the start of the work of the 
Reflection Group reports on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union 
which will provide an input for the work of the Group. 
The Reflection Group will examine and elaborate ideas relating to the provisions 
of the Treaty on European Union for which a revision is foreseen and other 
possible improvements in a spirit of democracy and openness, on the basis of 
the evaluation of the functioning of the treaty as set out in the reports. It will 
also elaborate options in the perspective of the future enlargement of the Union 
on the institutional questions set out in the conclusions of the European 
Council in Brussels and in the loannina agreement. (weighting of votes, the 
threshold for qualified majority decisions, number of members of the 
Commission and any other measure deemed necessary to facilitate the work 
of the Institutions and guarantee their effective operation in the perspective of 
enlargement.) 
The Secretary General of the Council will make the necessary arrangements for 
the secretariat of the Reflection Group in agreement with its president. 
The Reflection Group will report in time for the meeting of the European 
Council at the end of 1995. The procedure laid down in the Treaty relating to 
revision will apply to the next phase. 
SN 150/94 EN 
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Presidency Conclusions - Cannes, 26 and 27 June 1995 
IV - PREPARATION FOR THE 1996 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 
The European Council notes with satisfaction that preparations for the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference are now well under way. The Reflection Group of 
personal representatives of the Foreign Affairs Ministers and of the President of the 
Commission, with two representatives of the European Parliament also taking part, 
was set up in Messina on 2 June 1995. The Group has received reports fr$m the 
institutions on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union, which will provide 
an input for its work. It has drawn up its programme of work. 
The European Council confirms that, in line with its conclusions at Corfu, the 
Reflection Group will examine and elaborate suggestions relating to the provisions 
of the Treaty on European Union due for review and other possible improvements 
in a spirit of democracy and openness, on the basis of the evaluation of the 
functioning of the Treaty as set out in the reports. It will elaborate options in the 
run-up to the future enlargement of the Union on the institutional questions set out 
in its Brussels conclusions and in the loannina agreement (weighting of votes, the 
threshold for qualified majority decisions, number of members of the Commission 
and any other measure deemed necessary to facilitate the work of the institutions 
and guarantee their effective operation with a view to enlargement). 
Furthermore, in view of the lessons which may be learnt more than a year and a 
half after the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union and of the 
challenges and risks linked in particular to the prospect of a further enlargement, 
the European Council considers that thoughts should now focus on a number of 
priorities to enable the Union to respond to its citizens' expectations: 
- to analyse the principles, objectives and instruments of the Union, with the new 
challenges facing Europe; 
- to strengthen common foreign and security policy so that it can cope with new 
international challenges; 
- to provide a better response to modern demands as regards internal security, 
and the fields of justice and home affairs more generally; 
- to make the institutions more efficient, democratic and open so that they are 
able to adjust to the demands of an enlarged Union; 
SN 211/95- PART A EN 
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- to strengthen public support for the process of European integration by meeting 
the need for a form of democracy which is closer to the citizens of Europe, who 
are concerned at employment and environment questions; 
- to put the principle of subsidiarity into practice more effectively. 
Lastly, the Group will bear in mind the advantages of seeking improvements in the 
working of the Institutions that do not require any amendment to the Treaties and 
can thus enter into force without delay. 
As part of the strategy for preparing for the associated countries' accession to the 
Union, the necessary procedures should be established to ensure that they are kept 
fully informed of developments in the discussions at the Intergovernmental 
Conference, bearing in mind their status as future members of the Union. 
The Heads of State and Government will continue discussing this matter at their 
informal meeting in Majorca on 22 and 23 September 1995 and the European 
Council will receive a full report from the Reflection Group for its meeting in Madrid 
in December 1995. 
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PART A 
SN 400/95 hip/JW/mn EN 
INTRODUCTION 
The European Council, meeting in Madrid on 15 and 16 December 1995, took decisions 
on employment, the single currency, the Intergovernmental Conference and enlargement 
to bring in countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. 
The European Council considers that job creation is the principal social, economic and 
political objective of the European Union and its Member States, and declares its firm 
resolve to continue to make every effort to reduce unemployment. 
The European Council adopted the scenario for the changeover to the single currency, 
confirming unequivocally that this stage will commence on 1 January 1999. 
The European Council decided to name the currency, to be used from 1 January 1999, 
the "Euro". 
The European Council continued its deliberation on the future of Europe, which was 
launched in Essen and continued in Cannes and Formentor. 
In this connection, having welcomed the Reflection Group's report, the European Council 
decided to launch the Intergovernmental Conference on 29 March 1996 in order to 
establish the political and institutional conditions for adapting the European Union to 
present and future needs, particularly with a view to the next enlargement. 
SN 400/95 hip/JW/mn EN 
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It is essential that the Conference achieve results sufficient to enable the Union to bring 
added value to all its citizens and to shoulder its responsibilities adequately, both internally 
and externally. 
The European Council notes with satisfaction some significant achievements in the area of 
external relations which have occurred since its last meeting and in which the European 
Union has played a decisive role: 
- the signing in Paris of the Dayton Agreement, which puts an end to the terrible war 
in former Yugoslavia and builds on considerable European efforts over the preceding 
months in military, humanitarian and negotiating terms. The European Council 
recognizes the decisive contribution made by the United States at a crucial moment; 
-the New Transatlantic Agenda and the Joint EU-US Action Plan signed at the Madrid 
Summit on 3 December 1995, which are major joint commitments with the United 
States to revitalize and strengthen our association; 
-the signing in Madrid of the Inter-Regional Framework Agreement between the 
European Union and Mercosur, the first agreement of this type to be concluded by 
the European Union; 
- the Barcelona Declaration, launching a new, comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean 
association which will promote peace, stability and prosperity throughout the 
Mediterranean through a permanent process of dialogue and cooperation; 
-the signing in Mauritius of the revised Lome IV Convention by the European Union 
and the ACP States, which will consolidate the association between the two sides; 
- the European Parliament's assent to the customs union between the European Union 
and Turkey, which opens the way for the consolidation and strengthening of a 
political, economic and security relationship crucial to the stability of that region. 
SN 400/95 hip/JW/mn EN 
Presidency Conclusions - Madrid, 15 and 16 December 1995 
The European Council began its proceedings by exchanging ideas with Mr Klaus HANSCH, 
President of the European Parliament, on the main subjects for discussion at this meeting. 
Finally, a meeting took place today between the Heads of State and Government and the 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
including the Baltic States (CCEE), as well as Cyprus and Malta. There was a broad 
exchange of views on these conclusions, matters concerning the pre-accession strategy 
and various issues relating to international policies. 
SN 400/95 hip/JW/mn EN 
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IV 
LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE EUROPE OF THE FUTURE 
THE POLITICAL AGENDA FOR EUROPE 
The European Council identified the challenges which the Member States of the European 
Union must meet in order to prepare Europe for the 21st century. In the next five years, 
we must: 
- carry out adjustments to the Treaty on European Union; 
- make the transition to a single currency in line with the timetable and conditions set; 
- prepare for and carry out the enlargement negotiations with the associated countries of 
Central, Eastern and Southern Europe which have applied for membership; 
- determine, in parallel, the financial perspective beyond 31 December 1999; 
- contribute to establishing the new European security architecture; 
- actively continue the policy of dialogue, cooperation and association already under way 
with the Union's neighbouring countries, and in particular with Russia, Ukraine, Turkey 
and the Mediterranean countries. 
Success in all these tasks will mean that a large community enjoying the benefits of 
freedom, prosperity and stability can be set up Europe-wide. 
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 
1 . The European Council received with great interest the Report by the Reflection Group, 
chaired by Mr Westendorp (Annex 15), which had been instructed by the 
European Council to prepare for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. It considers 
that the guidelines distilled within the Group, following a thorough analysis of the 
internal and external challenges facing the Union and the possible 
SN 400/95 wad/AM/kjf EN 
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responses, constitute a sound basis for the work of the Conference. 
2. The Intergovernmental Conference will have to examine those provisions of the Treaty 
on European Union review of which is expressly called for in the Treaty, as well as 
those questions which it was decided should be discussed by the Conference, both in 
the Brussels and Corfu European Council conclusions and in declarations adopted at the 
time of interinstitutional agreements. The European Council also reaffirms the 
guidelines laid down at its Cannes meeting. The Intergovernmental Conference will, in 
general, have to examine the improvements which will have to be made to the Treaties 
to bring the Union into line with today's realities and tomorrow's requirements, in the 
light of the outcome of the Reflection Group's proceedings. 
3. The European Council agrees that the formal review procedure stipulated in Article N of 
the Treaty will be carried out as quickly as possible so that the Conference can be 
officially opened in Turin on 29 March. The European Council takes note of the 
intention of the forthcoming Italian Presidency to adopt appropriate measures for 
preparing the Conference. 
4. The Conference will meet regularly, in principle once a month, at the level of Foreign 
Affairs Ministers, who will have responsibility for all proceedings; preparations will be 
conducted by a working party made up of a representative of each Member State's 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and of the President of the Commission. 
SN 400/95 wad/AM/kjf EN 
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The Secretary-General of the Council will make the necessary arrangements to provide 
secretarial support for the Conference. 
5. The European Parliament will be closely associated with the work of the Conference so 
that it is both briefed regularly and in detail on the progress of the discussions and can 
give its point of view, where it considers this necessary, on all matters under 
discussion. The detailed arrangements for such association will be determined by the 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs in line with the provisions which apply to the review of the 
Treaties. 
6. The representatives of those countries of Central and Eastern Europe which have 
concluded Europe Agreements, and of Malta and Cyprus, will be briefed regularly on 
the progress of discussions and will be able to put their points of view at meetings 
with the Presidency of the European Union to be held, in principle, every two months. 
The European Economic Area and Switzerland will also be briefed. 
SN 400/95 wad/AM/kjf EN 
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ANNEX 15 
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 
A STRATEGY FOR EUROPE 
For six months, the members of the Reflection Group have been working on the European Council 
mandate to pave the way for the revision of the Treaty at the 1996 Conference and any other 
improvements in the Union's operation, in a spirit of openness and democracy. 
We feel it has been our task not only to establish an annotated agenda for the Conference but also 
to set in motion a process of public discussion and explanation regarding the thrust of the changes 
to be made. 
THE CHALLENGE 
Men and women of Europe today, more than ever, feel the need for a common project. And yet, 
for a growing number of Europeans, the rationale for Community integration is not self-evident. 
This paradox is a first challenge. 
When the European Communities were established some forty years ago, the need for a common 
design was clear because of the awareness of Europe's failure over the first half of this century. 
Now, almost half a century later, the successive enlargements of the Union, the expansion of its 
tasks, the very complexity of its nature and the magnitude of the problems of our times, make it 
very difficult to grasp the true significance of, and the continuing need for, European integration. 
Let us accept that complexity is the price that Europe pays to protect our plural identity. But we 
firmly believe that this creation of Europe's political ingenuity, which cannot take the place of but 
is now an inseparable counterpart to the Union's Member States, from which its main political 
legitimacy flows, has been making an invaluable contribution of its own: peace and prosperity 
based on a definition of common interests and action that is the result not of power politics but of 
a common body of law agreed by all. 
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Today Europe has changed, partly because of the Union' success. All those European nations 
rediscovering their freedom wish to join, or to cooperate more closely with, the European Union. 
Yet, in Western Europe there is a growing sense of public disaffection despite the Union's 
contribution to an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity. 
We therefore need to explain clearly to our citizens why the Union, which is so attractive to others 
in Europe, remains necessary for us too. 
One reason is that the world outside Europe has also changed. Goods, capital and services 
nowadays flow globally in an increasingly competitive market. Prices are set worldwide. The 
prosperity of the Europe of Today and Tomorrow depends on its ability to succeed in the global 
marketplace. 
The end of the cold war may have increased the overall security of Europe. But it has also brought 
greater instability in Europe. 
Furthermore, high levels of unemployment, external migratory pressures, increasing ecological 
imbalances and the growth of international organised crime have stimulated a public demand for 
greater security that cannot be satisfied by Member States acting alone. 
In an increasingly interdependent world, that reality poses new challenges and opens up new 
opportunities for the Union. 
THE RESPONSE 
However, we are not starting from scratch. Over the last five years, Europe has adjusted 
successfully to changing times. In 1990, the Community welcomed in the 17 million Germans who 
had been living on the other side of the Berlin Wall. 
The Maastricht Treaty succeeds in mapping out the path of adjustment by the Community to 
changing times: it establishes a European Union closer to its citizens, setting out the principle of 
subsidiarity; it establishes the path towards a single currency and puts forward a strategy of 
economic integration based on price stability that strengthens competitiveness and makes for 
growth in our economy. It reinforces social and economic cohesion and provides for high 
standards of environmental protection. It opens the way for a common foreign and security policy 
and attempts to bring about an area of freedom and of public security. 
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Since then, in very difficult economic circumstances, the European Union has been able to take 
timely decisions on progress in line with its new needs: it has agreed to the outcome of the 
Uruguay Round, it has managed to reach agreement on the Union's finances up to 1999 and it has 
been enlarged to bring in three new members. 
Yet that is not enough. European Heads of State or Government have already identified the steps 
necessary to develop Europe's strategy for these changing times: the 1996 Conference, the 
transition to a single currency, the negotiation of a new financial agreement, the possible revision 
or extension of the Brussels Treaty setting up the WEU and, lastly, the most ambitious target, 
enlarging the Union to bring in associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the 
Baltic States, Cyprus and Malta. 
That next enlargement provides a great opportunity for the political reunification of Europe. Not 
only is it a political imperative for us, but it represents the best option for the stability of the 
continent and for the economic advancement not just of the applicant countries but for this Europe 
of ours as a whole. That enlargement is not an easy exercise. Its impact upon the development of 
the Union's policies will have to be assessed. It will require efforts both by applicants and present 
Union members that will have to be equitably shared. It is therefore not only a great chance for 
Europe but also a challenge. We must do it, but we have to do it well. 
The Union cannot tackle all the steps in that European strategy at once, but it does not have any 
time to waste. The Heads of State or Government have personally taken responsibility for 
agreeing on a European agenda for carrying out this plan, which will only become a reality if it 
finds democratic backing from Europe's citizens. 
THE 1996 CONFERENCE 
The 1996 Conference is an important, but just one step in this process. 
The Maastricht Treaty already foresees that a Conference should be convened in 1996 with a 
limited scope. This scope has subsequently been enlarged at various European Councils. 
The Heads of State or Government have identified the need to make institutional reforms as a 
central issue of the Conference in order to improve the efficiency, democracy and transparency of 
the Union. 
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In that spirit, we have tried to identify the improvements needed to bring the Union up to date and 
to prepare it for the next enlargement. 
We consider that the Conference should focus on necessary changes, without embarking on a 
complete revision of the Treaty. 
Against this background, results should be achieved in three main areas: 
- making Europe more relevant to its citizens; 
- enabling the Union to work better and preparing it for enlargement; 
- giving the Union greater capacity for external action. 
I. The citizen and the Union 
The Union is not and does not want to be a super-state. Yet it is far more than a market. It is 
a unique design based on common values. We should strengthen these values, which all 
applicants for membership also wish to share. 
The Conference must make the Union more relevant to its citizens. The right way for the Union 
to regain the commitment of its citizens is to focus on what needs to be done at European level 
to address the issues that matter to most of them such as greater security, solidarity, 
employment and the environment. 
The Conference must also make the Union more transparent and closer to the citizens. 
Promoting European values 
Europe's internal security rests on its democratic values. As Europeans we are all citizens of 
democratic States which guarantee respect for human rights. Many of us think that the Treaty 
must clearly proclaim these common values. 
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Human rights already form part of the Union's general principles. For many of us they should, 
however, be more clearly guaranteed by the Union, through its accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The idea of a catalogue of rights has 
also been suggested, and a provision allowing for the possibility of sanctions or even 
suspending Union membership in the case of any state seriously violating human rights and 
democracy. Some of us take the view that national governments already provide adequate 
safeguards for these rights. 
Many of us think it important that the Treaty should clearly proclaim such European values as 
equality between men and women, non-discrimination on grounds of race, religion, sexual 
orientation, age or disability and that it should include an express condemnation of racism and 
xenophobia and a procedure for its enforcement. 
One of us believes that the rights and responsibilities we have as citizens are a matter for our 
nation states: reaching beyond that could have the opposite effect to that intended. 
Some of us also thought it worthwhile to examine the idea of establishing a Community service 
or European "peace corps" for humanitarian action, as an expression of Union solidarity; such a 
service could also be used in the event of natural disasters in the Union. Furthermore, some of 
us recommend that the Conference should examine how to better recognize in the Treaty the 
importance of access to public service utilities ("services publics d'interet general"). 
We believe that Europe also shares certain social values which are the foundation of our 
coexistence in peace and progress. Many of us take the view that the Social Agreement must 
become part of Union law. on·e of us believes that this would only serve to reduce 
competitiveness. 
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Freedom and internal security 
The Union is an area of free movement for people, goods, capital and services. Yet people's 
security is not sufficiently protected on a European scale: while protection remains essentially a 
national matter, crime is effectively organized on an international scale. Experience of the 
implementation of the Maastricht Treaty over the last few years shows that opportunities for 
effective European action are still very limited. Hence, the urgency for a common response at 
European level, following a pragmatic approach. 
We all agree that the Conference should strengthen the Union's capacity to protect its citizens 
against terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, exploitation of illegal immigration and 
other forms of internationally organized crime. This protection of citizens' security at European 
level must not diminish individual safeguards. For many of us, this requires further use of 
common Institutions and procedures, as well as common criteria. It is also for national 
parliaments to exercise political scrutiny over those who administer such common action. 
Many of us take the view that, in order to act more efficiently, we need to put fully under 
Community competence matters concerning third country nationals, such as immigration, 
asylum and visa policy, as well as common rules for external border controls. Some would also 
like to extend Community competence to combating drug addiction and fraud on an 
international scale, and to customs cooperation. 
For some of us, however the key to success has to be found in a combination of political will 
and more effective use of existing intergovernmental arrangements. 
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Employment 
We know that job creation in an open society is based on sound economic growth and on 
business competitiveness, which must be fostered by initiatives at local, regional and national 
levels. We believe that, in the European Union, the main responsibility of ensuring the 
economic and social well being of citizens lies within the Member States. In an integrated 
economic area such as ours, however, the Union also has a responsibility for setting the right 
conditions for job creation. It is already doing so by the completion of the internal market and 
the development of other common policies, with a joint growth, competitiveness and 
employment strategy which is achieving positive results, and with its plan for Economic and 
Monetary Union. 
We all agree that the provisions on the single currency which were agreed at Maastricht and 
ratified by our parliaments must remain unchanged. 
While we are all aware that jobs will not be created simply by amendments to the Treaty, many 
of us want the Treaty to contain a clearer commitment on the part of the Union to achieving 
greater economic and social integration and cohesion geared to promote employment, as well 
as provisions enabling the Union to take coordinated action on job creation. Some of us advised 
against writing into the Treaty provisions which arouse expectations, but whose delivery 
depends primarily on decisions taken at business and state-level. In any case, most of us stress 
the need for stronger coordination of economic policies in the Union. 
Environment 
In essence, the environment has crossborder effects. Protection of the environment is an 
objective involving our survival not only as Europeans but also as inhabitants of the planet. 
Therefore the Conference should examine how to improve the capacity of the Union to act 
more efficiently and to identify whenever that action should remain within the Member State. 
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A more transparent Union 
Citizens are entitled to be better informed about the Union and how it functions. 
Many of us propose that the right of access to information be recognized in the Treaty as a 
right of the citizens of the Union. Suggestions have been made on how to improve the public 
access to Union's documents which should be examined by the Conference. 
Prior to any substantial legislative proposal, information should be duly gathered from the 
sectors concerned, experts and society in general. The studies leading up to the proposal should 
be made public. 
When such a proposal is made, national parliaments should be duly informed and documents 
supplied to them in their official languages and in due time to allow proper discussion from the 
beginning of the legislative process. 
We all agree that the Union law should be more accessible. The 1996 Conference should result 
in a simpler Treaty: 
Subsidiarity 
The Union will be closer to the citizen if it focuses on what should be its tasks. 
This means that it must respect the principle of subsidiarity. This principle must therefore not 
be construed as justifying the inexorable growth of European powers nor as a pretext for 
undermining solidarity or the Union's achievements. 
We believe it necessary to reinforce its proper application in practice. The Edinburgh 
Declaration should be the basis for that improvement and some of us believe that its essential 
provisions should be given Treaty status. 
II. Enabling the Union to work better and preparing it for enlargement 
The Conference should examine the ways and means to improve the efficiency and democracy 
of the Union. 
The Union must also preserve its decision-making ability after further enlargement. Given the 
number and variety of the countries involved, this call for changes to the structure and 
workings of the institutions. It may also mean that flexible solutions will have to be found, fully 
respecting the single institutional framework and the "acquis communautaire". 
The European Council, consisting of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States 
and the President of the Commission, is the highest expression of the Union's political will and 
defines its general political guidelines. Its importance is bound to increase in view of the 
Union's political agenda. 
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Improving democracy in the Union means both fair representation in each of the institutions, 
and enhancing the European Parliament, within the existing institutional balance, and the role 
of national parliaments. In this context, it is recalled that, according to the Treaty, a uniform 
electoral procedure for the European Parliament should be established. Many of us believe that 
the European Parliament's procedures are too numerous and complex and therefore favour 
reducing them to three: consultation, assent and codecision. 
The current codecision procedure is over-complicated and we propose that the Conference 
simplify it, without altering the balance between the Council and the European Parliament. 
Many of us also propose that the Conference should extend the scope of the codecision 
procedure. One member believes, however, that the European Parliament gained extensive new 
powers at Maastricht and therefore should grow into these powers before seeking more. 
National parliaments should also be adequately involved. This does not imply that they have to 
be incorporated into the Union's institutions. For many of us its decision-making procedures 
should be organised in a way which allows national parliaments adequately to scrutinise and 
influence the positions of their respective governments in the decision-making of the Union. 
Some of us suggest a more direct involvement of national parliaments: in this context, the idea 
of a newly established advisory committee has been suggested by one of us. Cooperation 
among national parliaments and between them and the European Parliament should also be 
fostered. 
The decision-making processes and working methods of the Council of Ministers will need 
review. The Union must be able to take timely and effective decisions. But efficient decision-
making does not necessarily mean easy decision-making. The Union's decisions must have 
popular support. Many of us believe greater efficiency would be enhanced by more qualified 
majority voting in the Council, which, according to many, should become the general procedure 
in the enlarged Community. Some of us believe that this should only be countenanced, if 
democratic legitimacy is improved by a reweighting of votes to take due account of population. 
One of us opposes extension on principle. 
We consider the role of the Council Presidency to be crucial for the efficient management of the 
Union's business and we support the principle of rotation. But the present system applied to an 
enlarged Union could become increasingly disjointed. Alternative approaches combining 
continuity and rotation should be examined further. 
We agree that the Commission should retain its three fundamental functions: promotion of the 
common interest, monopoly of legislative initiative and guardianship of Community law. Its 
legitimacy, underlined by its parliamentary approval, is based on its independence, its 
credibility, its collegiality and its efficiency. The composition of the Commission was designed 
for a Community of six. We have identified options for its future composition in order to 
preserve the Commission's ability to fulfil its functions in view of an enlarged Union that may 
extend to more than twice the number of Member States having negotiated the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
Broadly, one view within the Group is to retain the present system for the future, reinforcing its 
collegiality and consistency as required. This option would allow all members to have at least 
one Commissioner. Another view is to ensure that greater collegiality and consistency be 
attained by reducing the Commissioners to a lesser number than Member States and enhancing 
their independence. Procedures should be established to select those members on grounds of 
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qualification, and commitment to the general interest of the Union. When deciding the future 
composition of the Commission, the Conference may also examine the possibility of 
establishing senior and junior Commissioners. 
Some of us believe that the Committee of the Regions has to play an important role in 
Community legislation and that the consultative role of this body should be better used. 
Europe's achievements depend on its ability to take decisions together and then to comply with 
them. An improvement in the clarity and quality of Community legislation would contribute to 
this, as would better financial management and a more effective fight against fraud. The 
Conference should also improve the key role of the Court of Justice especially in ensuring 
uniform interpretation of and compliance with Community law. 
Ill. Giving the Union greater capacity for external action 
The Maastricht Treaty has established the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. In 
our opinion, this was the right decision at the right time, at a time with the end of the cold war 
increasing the burden of responsibility on the European Union to lay the foundations of peace 
and progress in Europe and elsewhere. 
The current possibilities offered by the Treaty have provided some positive results. We believe, 
however, that the time has come to provide this common policy with the means to function 
more effectively. 
The Union today needs to be able to play its part on the international stage as a factor for 
peace and stability. Although an economic power today, the Union continues to be weak in 
political terms, its role accordingly often confined to financing decisions taken by others. 
Common Foreign Policy 
We think that the Conference must find ways and means of providing the Union with a greater 
capacity for external action, in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. It must be capable of 
identifying its interests, deciding on its action and implementing it effectively. Enlargement will 
make this task more difficult, but also makes it even more imperative. 
This means that the Union must be able to analyse and prepare its external action jointly. With 
that in mind, we propose the establishment of a common foreign policy analysis and planning 
unit. For most of us, this unit should be answerable to the Council. Many of us also think that it 
should be recruited from Member States, Council Secretariat and Commission and be 
established within the institutional framework of the Union. It has been suggested by some 
that the head of the unit, whose functions could eventually merge with those of the Secretary 
General of the WEU, should be the Secretary General of the Council. 
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It also calls for the capacity to take decisions. To that end, we propose that the Conference 
examines how to review decision-making and financing procedures in order to adapt them to 
the nature of foreign policy, which must reconcile respect for the sovereignty of States with the 
need for diplomatic and financial solidarity.lt should be commonly agreed whether and if so how 
to provide for the possibility of flexible formulae which will not prevent those who feel it 
necessary for the Union to take joint action from doing so. Some members favour the extension 
of qualified majority voting to CFSP and some others propose to enhance the consultative role 
of the European Parliament in this area. 
The Union must be able to implement its external actions with a higher profile. We have 
examined several possible options for ensuring that the Union is able to speak with one voice. 
Some of us have suggested the idea of a High Representative for the CFSP, so as to give a face 
and a voice to the external political action of the Union. This person should be appointed by the 
European Council and would act under precise mandate from the Council. Many of us have 
stressed the need for a structured cooperation between the Council, its Presidency and the 
Commission, so that the different elements of the external dimension of the Union they are 
responsible for function as a coherent whole. 
This greater political role for the Union in the world should be consistent with its current 
external economic influence as the premier trading partner and the premier humanitarian aid 
donor. The Conference will have to find ways of ensuring that the Union's external policy is 
visible to its citizens and the world, that it is representative of its Member States and that it is 
consistent in its continuity and globality. 
European security and defence policy 
The multifaceted challenges of the new international security situation underline the need for an 
effective and consistent European response, based on a comprehensive concept of security. 
We therefore believe that the Conference could examine ways to further develop the European 
identity, including in the security and defence policy field. This development should proceed in 
conformity with the objectives agreed at Maastricht, taking into consideration the Treaty 
provisions that the CFSP shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, 
including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a 
common defence. 
The Conference will have to take account of the reality that, in the view of NATO members, 
such a development should also strengthen the European "pillar" of the Atlantic Alliance and 
the transatlantic link. The Alliance continues to guarantee the collective defence of its 
members and plays a fundamental role in the security of Europe as a whole. Equally, the right 
of States which are not members of the Alliance to take their own defence decisions must be 
respected. 
Many of us feel that the Conference should consider how to encourage the development of 
European operational capabilities, how to promote closer European cooperation in the field of 
armaments and how to ensure greater coherence of action in the military field with the political, 
economic or humanitarian aspects of European crisis management. 
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Against this background, many of us want to further strengthen relations between the EU and 
the Western European Union (WEU). which is an integral part of the development of the Union. 
In this regard, several options for the future development of this relationship have already been 
suggested within the Group. One option advocates a reinforced EU/WEU partnership while 
maintaining full autonomy of WEU. A second option suggests that a closer link should be 
established enabling the Union to assume a directing role over WEU for humanitarian, 
peacekeeping and other crisis management operations (known as Petersberg tasks). A third 
option would be the incorporation of these Petersberg tasks into the Treaty. As a fourth 
option, the idea of a gradual integration of WEU into the EU has been supported by many of us: 
this could be pursued either by promoting EU/WEU convergence through a WEU commitment to 
act as implementing body of the Union for operational-military issues, or by agreeing on a series 
of steps leading to a full EU/WEU merger. In the latter case, the Treaty would incorporate not 
only the Petersberg tasks but also a collective defence commitment, either in the main body of 
the Treaty or in a Protocol annexed to it. 
In this context, the idea that the IGC examines the possibility of including in the revised Treaty 
a provision on mutual assistance for the defence of the external borders of the Union has been 
put forward by some members. 
It will be for the Conference to consider these and other possible options. 
Europe and democracy are inseparable concepts. To date, all the steps in the construction of 
Europe have been decided by common accord by the democratic governments of its Member 
States, have been ratified by the national parliaments and have received popular support in our 
countries. This is also how we shall construct the future. 
We realize that this reflection exercise by the Group is only one step in a public debate initiated 
and guided by the European Council. We hope that this public and joint exercise between our 
nations will lead to renewed support for a project which is more than ever necessary for Europe 
today. 
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EUROPEAN UNION 
TilE COUNCIL 
Brussels, 30 March 1994 
(OR.F) 
6064/94 
RESTREJNT 
CAB 15 
ELARG 5 
COUNCIL DECISION 
of 29 March 1994 
concerning the taking of decision by qualified 
majority by the Council 
TilE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
DECIDES: 
Anicle 1 
If Members of the Council representing a total of 23 to 26 votes indicate their intention to oppose 
the adoption by the Council of a decision by qualified majority, the Council will do all in its 
power to reach, within a reasonable time and without prejudicing obligatory time limits laid down 
by the.Treaties and by secondary law, such as in Articles 189 Band 189 C of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, a satisfactory solution that could be adopted by at least 68 
votes. During this period, and always respecting the Rules of Procedure of the Council, the 
President undertakes, with the assistance of the Commission, any initiative necessary to facilitate a 
wider basis of agreement in the Council. The members of the Council lend him their assistance. 
Anicle 2 
The present decision shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities. 
Done at Brussels, 29 March 1994. 
6064/94 
For the Council 
The president 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. Following the agreement reached in March 1994 by the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the 
Member States of the European Union, the European Council agreed at Corfu to set up 
a Reflection Group to prepare for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, and to ask 
the Institutions to contribute to the Group's proceedings by drawing up reports on the 
functioning of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (1). 
This report is to be seen in the context of Article N.2 of the TEU (2), 
augmented (3) by the Corfu conclusions as follows: 
"The Reflection Group will examine and elaborate ideas relating to the provisions of 
the Treaty on European Union for which a revision is foreseen and other possible 
improvements in a spirit of democracy and openness, on the basis of the 
evaluation of the functioning of the Treaty as set out in the reports. It will also 
elaborate options in the perspective of the future enlargement of the Union on the 
institutional questions set out in the conclusions of the European Council in 
Brussels and in the loannina agreement (weighting of votts, the threshold for 
qualified majority decisions, number of members of the Commission and any other 
measure deemed necessary to facilitate the work of the Institutions and guarantee 
their effective operation in the perspective of enlargement)." 
See Annex l(a) for Section IV of the conclusions of the Presidency of the 
European Council meeting on 24 and 25 June 1994 at~. and the terms of the 
agreement reached in loannina, as contained in a statement in the minutes of the 
Accession Conferences, and an extract from the conclusions of the Presidency of the 
European Council meeting on 10 and 11 December 1993 in Brussels. 
Article N.2 of the TEU states that "a conference of representatives of the governments 
of the Member States shall be convened in 1996 to examine those provisions of this 
Treaty for which revision is provided, in accordance with the objectives set out in 
Articles A and B." 
The provisions expressly concerned are the following: 
1 . Civil protection, energy and tourism (Declaration No 1 annexed to the TEU 
Final Act) 
2. Extension of the scope of the "co-decision" procedure (Article 189b(8)) 
3. Security/defence (Article J.4(6)} and more generally CFSP (Article J.1 0) 
4. Hierarchy of Community acts (Declaration No 16 annexed to the TEU Final Act) 
The texts of Articles A and B of the TEU will be found in Annex Hbl. 
You are also reminded that the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
considered, in a statement attached to the Interinstitutional Agreement 
of 29 October 1993, that "the budgetary procedure provisions of the Treaty, including 
the arrangements relating to compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure, should be 
reviewed at the Intergovernmental Conference scheduled for 1996 in order to achieve 
interinstitutional cooperation on a partnership basis" (OJ of the European Communities 
No C 331, 7 .12.1993, page 1 0). These three institutions also recorded in the modus 
vivendi approved on 20 December 1994 that "the problems of the implementing 
measures for acts adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189b 
of the EC Treaty, when such measures are entrusted to the Commission, will be 
examined in the course of the revision of the Treaties planned for 1996, at the request 
of the European Parliament, the Commission and several Member States." 
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In response to the European Council's request, the Council herewith submits this 
contribution, prefaced by the following remarks. 
2. The aim of this report is not to examine the general functioning of the European Union 
but to present a factual account of the functioning of the TEU insofar as it breaks new 
ground compared with the treaties that preceded it. It therefore takes stock of the 
·innovations made by the Treaty in certain areas. It also seemed appropriate to extend 
the report to cover decisions by the Institutions in the area of public information and 
transparency. These decisions have no direct link with the provisions of the TEU but 
originated with the public debate that arose when the TEU was ratified. 
The TEU came into force on 1 November 1993, and so the experience of its operation 
refers to a relatively short period (16 months}, which is even shorter in the case of the 
three States that joined the Union on 1 January 1995. Given this Jack of distance, and 
the fact that some of the new provisions - sometimes major ones - have not worked 
through in their entirety, or have not yet been invoked, the scope of the exercise is 
inevitably restricted, and a degree of caution is called for when assessing the initial 
findings. 
In accordance with the terms of reference, the report seeks to do no more than present 
the experience gained in implementing the TEU as objectively and as factually as 
possible. Care has been taken not to anticipate the discussions of the 
Reflection Group, and no value judgments are offered other than those arising from a 
straightforward account of the facts. The report does not present any long-term 
considerations concerning possible reforms. 
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I. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE TREATY 
A. Single institutional framework 
3. According to Article A of the TEU, the European Union is founded on the 
European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation 
·established by the Treaty, i.e. the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and 
cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs (JHA). 
4. The TEU provided the European Union with a single institutional framework (Article C), 
which is also competent to deal with the three "pillars" and is responsible for ensuring 
the consistency and continuity of the action pursued by the constituent parts of the 
Union. 
The single institutional framework - established in accordance with the arrangements 
laid down in the Council's conclusions of 12 May 1992 and in the report of the General 
Affairs Council to the European Council meeting on 29 October 1993 - is designed to 
enable all the Institutions to perform to the full the roles assigned to them in the TEU. 
This applies especially in the case of the Council, which has to deliberate under the 
same conditions both on Community matters and on CFSP or JHA matters. In 
accordance with Article 151 of the EC Treaty, Core per's integra tory function and the 
new role of the General Secretariat, made possible by the unity of its organization, 
enable the Council's proceedings to be prepared on a unified basis. 
Some bodies have, however, had more difficulty in adapting to the single institutional 
framework, which makes it less easy, in the areas covered by Titles V and VI, to 
achieve the integration required and, as regards JHA, also limits the use made of the 
new instruments provided for in the TEU (joint action, common positions, conventions). 
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This weakness at the preparatory level- which will be analyzed in more detail in the 
chapters on the CFSP and JHA - is partly explained by the fact that the new system is 
still at an early stage. But the single institutional framework will not play its full part 
unless all steps are taken to ensure its smooth operation. 
·B. Subsidiarity 
5. The TEU establishes new principles of major importance, among them subsidiarity. 
The principle is applied in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Edinburgh 
European Council (Annex I to Part A of the Presidency's conclusions). Its importance 
has been emphasized several times by the European Council and has been the subject 
of an agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. It 
has been put into practice at all stages of the legislative process. 
The Commission has made a systematic study of the Community legislation that 
existed or was being proposed to the Council when the TEU came into force. It has 
withdrawn a number of proposals and proposed the simplification or repeal of a number 
of acts. The initial results of this exercise, which will have to be continued were 
presented to the European Council at its meeting in Essen. 
The Commission has undertaken to justify each of its new proposals in the light of the 
subsidiarity principle. It makes more regular use of "Green Papers" and "White Papers", 
prompting broad public debate, before new proposals are submitted. 
The Commission's application of the subsidiarity principle has been accompanied by a 
reduction in the number of legislative proposals (see Annex II). 
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Subsidiarity is one of the criteria applied by the Council when considering any new 
proposal. The sometimes excessively detailed nature of Community acts has in the 
past, however, also been due to the negotiations in the Council. 
The TEU's provisions on new areas of competence (such as education, culture and 
health) specifically limit the Community's action to complementarity measures (support 
programmes, to the exclusion of any form of harmonization). These provisions have 
been strictly observed by the legislators and have enabled a clearer distinction to be 
made between the respective fields of action of the Community and the 
Member States. 
The introduction of the subsidiarity principle has thus been a positive step. Admittedly, 
first experience shows that the institutions and the Council are occasionally having 
difficulties in agreeing how it is to be evaluated and applied. But this ought not to lead 
to the Community "acquis" being called into question. There is still scope for further 
progress in this area, however. 
II. THE CITIZEN AND THE UNION 
6. "Bringing Europe closer to the people" has been perceived as a necessity over the years 
and especially during the procedures for ratifying the TEU, if the people's support for 
the European venture is to be increased. The TEU has contributed to this end in several 
ways, in particular by defining the foundations for a citizenship of the Union and, more 
indirectly, by provoking a debate that has highlighted the need to render the functioning 
of the Union more transparent and more comprehensible by keeping the public better 
informed. The TEU also enshrines the general principle of respect for "fundamental 
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms [. .• ] and as they result from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, as general principles of Community .Jaw" 
(TEU Article F(2)). (4) 
(4 ) On 25 April 1994, the Council requested, in accordance with Article 228(6) of the 
EC Treaty, the opinion of the Court of Justice on whether an agreement which provided 
for the accession of the European Community to the European Convention on Human 
Rights would be compatible with the EC Treaty. 
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A. Citizenship 
7. The Council has taken the necessary decisions to implement the Treaty provisions on 
"citizenship of the Union", which give Member States' nationals additional rights and 
protection without in any way supplanting national citizenship. The necessary 
arrangements have been made concerning the right to vote and the protection of 
citizens abroad. The legal framework does exist, therefore, even if these new rights are 
not yet fully enjoyed by the citizens. 
8. In compliance with the time limits specified in Article 8b of the EC Treaty, and despite 
genuine difficulties, provisions have been adopted to ensure that in municipal elections 
and elections to the European Parliament every citizen is entitled to vote and to stand 
for election in the Member State where he resides, under the same conditions as 
nationals of that State. During the European Parliament elections in June 1994 all 
citizens of the Union were able to exercise these rights in their Member State of 
residence on the basis of the Directive adopted by the Council on 
6 December 1993 (5}. 
Under the Council Directive of 19 December 1994, which has to be incorporated into 
national law by the end of 1995 (6), it will be possible for the same rights to be 
exercised in municipal elections. 
9. Article Sc of the EC Treaty provides that every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory 
of a third country in which the Member State of which he is a national is not 
represented, be entitled to protection by the consular authorities of any Member State, 
on the same conditions as nationals of that State. 
(5} OJ No L 329, 30.12.1993, p. 34. 
(6} OJ No L 368, 31.12.1994, p. 38. 
5082/95 EN 
c. 
Member States have agreed on guidelines concerning the conditions under which such 
protection is to be provided. While the guidelines are still incomplete, they mark a 
significant step in the application of this right. 
1 0. Article 138e of the EC Treaty makes provision for an Ombudsman, who would receive 
complaints from citizens concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of 
the Community Institutions or bodies. He would perform his duties in complete 
independence, which would have to be preserved. The regulations and conditions 
governing the performance of the Ombudsman's duties have been adopted by the 
European Parliament c7>: it is now a matter of urgency that the Parliament should 
appoint someone to the post. 
11 . Article Sa of the EC Treaty confirms the basic principle that every citizen of the Union 
has the right to move and reside within the territory of any Member State. 
In practical terms, this principle - which is closely linked to the idea of membership of 
the Union- has been widely implemented by the Community. 
However, to date it has not been possible to agree on the inclusion of third-country 
nationals or on the agreement on external borders, or indeed on the European 
Information System or on back-up measures. The conditions are not yet right for the 
principle of freedom of movement to be fully applied between all the Member States 
with due regard for the internal security of the Union. 
12. Article 8e of the EC Treaty offers the possibility of supplementing the rights of 
citizenship, with the Council acting to this end on the basis of a report by the 
Commission on the application of the provisions of this part of the Treaty, which report 
has to take account of the development of the Union. The Commission submitted an 
interim report at the end of 1993. 
el Decision of the European Parliament of 9 March 1994, OJ No L 113, 4.5. 1994, p. 1 5. 
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B. Transparency 
13. While not covered by specific provisions, this topic was particularly emphasized during 
the debate at the time of the TEU's ratification. Following the political impetus given 
by the European Council at its meetings in Birmingham, Edinburgh, Copenhagen and 
Corfu, the Institutions adopted several specific measures aimed at greater transparency 
and better provision of information so that the role and the functioning of the Union 
could become better known and better understood by the general public. 
The successive juxtaposition of treaties and the amendments to them, with the ensuing 
consequences in terms of the texts' readability (8 ), has increased the impression of 
complexity and adversely affected the way in which the Union and its functioning are 
understood. 
14. In accordance with the Edinburgh conclusions, the Institutions have sought to make 
secondary legislation more readable and more accessible, especially with the important 
agreement established recently by the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission on an accelerated method for consolidating Community law. The Council 
has also laid down criteria for improving the quality ci drafting of the legislation it 
adopts (9 ). 
15. At the Council, the effort to improve information and openness has been reflected in 
the amendment of certain operating rules (10). The following points may be noted: 
Since they were signed, the Treaties establishing the European Communities have 
undergone a number of amendments, notably with the Merger Treaty, the Treaties 
amr iing certain budgetary and financial provisions, the Single European Act, the TEU 
anc 1e Acts of Accession. Not counting these last, the number of founding treaties 
existing today is ten. 
See Council Resolution of 8 June 1993 on the quality of drafting of Community 
legislation (OJ No C 166, 17.6.1993, p. 1 ). 
See the Council's new Rules of Procedure adopted on 6 December 1993 (OJ No L 304, 
10.12.1993, p. 1), as amended on 6 February 1995 (OJ No L 31, 10.2.1995, p. 14}. 
5082/95 eii/PT/ptm EN 
n 
The Council regularly holds discussions, relayed audiovisually, on the six-month 
work programmes presented by the Presidency, and on major topics of Community 
interest or important legislative proposals. Twenty-one discussions have already 
been held (see Annex IJI(a)). 
The Council now systematically publishes the results of its votes when acting as 
legislator (see Annex lll(b)). It is possible for any explanations of votes to be 
published as well. In the same vein, the Council systematically publishes in the 
Official Journal any common positions it adopts under the procedures referred to in 
Articles 189b and 189c together with the relevant explanatory memoranda. 
- The Council allows greater access to its documents. On the basis of its Decision 
of 20 December 1993 (11 ), a large number of requests for access have been 
made, and the bulk of these have been granted (see Annex lll(c)). 
- The Council is seeking to ensure that the context and the results of its deliberations 
are presented to the public and the press more effectively. 
The practical arrangements for applying the principle of transparency are still the 
subject of differences of assessment among Member States as to the best way of 
ensuring a balance between the confidentiality required for any negotiation to be 
effective and the need for the proceedings to be transparent, especially in the 
legislative field. However, some progress is possible in this area. 
<
11 ) OJ No L 340, 31.12.1993, p. 43. This Decision implements, in respect of the 
Council, the principles established in the code of conduct approved by the Council and 
the Commission on 6 December 1993 (OJ No L 340, 31.12.1993, p. 41), and is in 
line with Declaration No 17 annexed to the TEU Final Act concerning the right of 
access to information. 
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Ill. INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
A. Democracy and efficiency 
16. The changes made by the TEU reflect the desire to reinforce the democratic legitimacy 
· of the institutional system while making the decision-making process more efficient. 
It is in the light of this twofold objective that the experience of the first few months of 
application of the Treaty's new institutional provisions must be assessed. 
The new provisions introduced by the TEU, especially those on increasing the powers 
of the European Parliament, sought to establish a firmer basis for the Union's 
democratic character. The European Parliament's role in this context is an essential 
one; but democratic legitimacy must be the expression of the Union's institutional 
system as a whole. On the question of efficiency, the continued extension of 
qualified-majority voting is a positive factor. However, the juxtaposition of a large 
number of procedures sometimes makes it difficult for the functioning of the Union to 
be properly understood by the outside world. 
It is believed in some quarters that the lack of a real hierarchy of laws (12) is 
affecting the decision-making process. 
(12) In accordance with Declaration No 16 annexed to the TEU Final Act, the 
1996 Intergovernmental Conference will have to consider to what extent it might be 
possible to review the classification of Community acts with a view to establishing an 
appropriate hierarchy between the different categories of act. 
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B. European Council/Council 
17. The European Council is an important element in the functioning of the institutional 
system of the European Union. In fulfilling its new responsibilities under the TEU, the 
European Council has further emphasized its role as a provider of political impetus and 
· synthesis. 
18. The Council also helps to ensure respect for the democratic functioning of the system, 
insofar as each of its members is politically responsible to the national parliament 
before which he answers for the positions adopted at Union level. This is particularly 
so in view of the increased-interest shown by national parliaments in the working of 
the Union. Some Member States' constitutions have been amended to allow their 
parliaments to monitor the Union's activities more effectively. 
19. The TEU confirmed the Council in its political and its legislative role, with the 
Parliament now being closely involved with the latter through the co-decision 
procedure. At the same time, the TEU sought to increase the Council's 
decision-making capacity by the extension of qualified-majority voting, which now 
covers a large proportion of the Community's areas of action; however, unanimity is 
still required in a large number of cases (see list in Annex V (a)). 
Independently of its other aspects, the possibility of qualified-majority voting is a 
factor helping to speed up the decision-making process, not only because it offers a 
way out of certain deadlock situations, but also because the prospect of being placed 
in a minority is often a spur to seeking the necessary compromises. 
Bearing in mind this last point, the relatively small number of decisions actually taken 
by a qualified majority- as shown in the table in Annex IV- does not fully show the 
part played by qualified-majority voting as a factor for efficiency in the implementation 
of Community policies. 
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20. The way in which the Council and its subordinate bodies have coped with the 
demands of the new co-decision procedure may be regarded as generally satisfactory. 
Fears had been expressed as to the Council's ability to adjust to the new procedure. 
In particular, the drawing up of practical arrangements for the smooth conduct of the 
· conciliation phase means that the Council can preserve throughout the procedure the 
balance achieved when a common position is adopted, while at the same time seeking 
constructive compromises with the European Parliament. To ensure that this 
procedure works properly it is necessary that, each for its own part, the Council and 
the European Parliament should always be able to act in a consistent manner. 
21. On a more general level, recent experience of the functioning of the Council confirms 
that the continued efficiency and consistency of its activities also depends on curbing 
more effectively the growing number of meetings and effectively coordinating its 
various formations. 
C. European Parliament 
22. The TEU reinforced the role of the European Parliament in two ways: greater 
involvement in the legislative power, and increased powers of political control. The 
European Parliament has sometimes tended to give a very broad interpretation to its 
powers under the Treaty. 
23. The European Parliament's involvement in the legislative process has been reinforced 
by the introduction of the co-decision procedure, the extension of the sphere of 
application of the cooperation procedure and the extension of assent to the adoption 
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of legislative acts (see table in Annex V(b) illustrating the respective spheres of 
application of these procedures). 
24. The co-decision procedure develops further the cooperation procedure of the Single 
European Act, in particular by introducing a conciliation phase between 
· representatives of the two Institutions in cases where the Council does not accept all 
the amendments made by the European Parliament on second reading, and the 
possibility for the Parliament ultimately to reject the act passed by the Council. 
Under this new procedure, some twenty legislative acts have been adopted within 
reasonable periods of time, laid down by the Treaty as from the second reading. In 
one case, the European Parliament was unable to adopt the joint text drawn up by the 
Conciliation Committee, and in another case the Parliament rejected, on third reading, 
the act passed by the Council. The table in Annex V(cl shows the results of the 
co-decision procedure. 
25. Apart from the difficulties relating to the starting-up phase, the application of the new 
procedure has been complicated by: 
- the linkage which was initially established with other matters (including committee 
procedure (13) and amounts deemed necessary), which has held up the adoption 
of several texts; 
the complexity of the procedure laid down in Article 189b, [ ... ] despite the practical 
arrangements that were agreed for it; 
( 13) Process for the adoption of measures implementing legislative acts, whereby such 
measures are adopted by the Commission assisted by a committee of experts from the 
Member States. A modus vivendi on the subject of committee procedure was recently 
established by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. 
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- the demand sometimes made by the European Parliament's representatives in the 
Conciliation Committee that amendments rejected by the European Parliament in 
plenary session (i.e. outside the normal conciliation sphere} should be incorporated; 
- the relationship between the Conciliation Committee and the Parliament meeting in 
plenary session. 
26. Generally speaking, the increase in the number of procedures has made the 
decision-making process more complex (see Annex V(d) for a list of the various 
decision-making procedures arising from the TEU). 
27. The assent procedure, originally designed for the conclusion of international 
agreements, was extended by the TEU to areas (such as economic and social cohesion) 
which fall under the heading of legislative activity, for which it does not appear to be 
appropriate. A list of the assents given by the Parliament since the TEU came into force 
will be found in Annex V(e). 
28. The European Parliament's powers of political control were increased by its involvement 
in the appointment of the Commission (Article 158 of the EC Treaty), by the possibility 
of setting up temporary committees of inquiry (Article 138c of the EC Treaty) (not yet 
used) and receiving petitions (Article 138d of the EC Treaty). by the power (not yet 
exercised) to appoint the Ombudsman after laying down the regulations governing him 
(Article 138e of the EC Treaty), and by the possibility, not yet used by the Parliament, 
of asking the Commission to submit legislative proposals (second paragraph of 
Article 138b of the EC Treaty). The Parliament's powers of budgetary control were 
also increased (Article 206 of the EC Treaty). 
29. The TEU provides for the European Parliament to be more irvolved in the conclusion 
of agreements between the Community and cr,e or more S: •. ·~es or international 
organizations (Article 228 of the EC Treaty). Provision is made for consulting and 
informing the European Parliament on CFSP and JHA matters {TEU Articles J.7 
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and K.6 respectively). This takes place mainly at hearings of the Presidency held by the 
relevant Parliamentary Committees. 
30. By a Council Decision of 1 February 1993, the number of Members of the European 
Parliament was altered to take account of the unification of Germany and with a view 
to enlargement. With the accession of Finland, Austria and Sweden, the European 
Parliament now has 626 Members (14). 
D. Commission 
31. The new Commission was appointed in accordance with the procedure introduced by 
the TEU, which provides that the President and the other Members appointed shall be 
subject as a body to a vote of approval by the European Parliament before being 
appointed by the representatives of the Governments of the Member States. The 
procedure took seven months and involved individual hearings, by specialized 
committees of the European Parliament, of the persons nominated; it was felt in some 
quarters that this was too long. 
32. Under the Treaties, the independence of the Commission, vis-a-vis both the European 
Parliament and the Council, is an essential element in the institutional balance. In this 
connection, the recent code of conduct concluded between the European Parliament 
and the Commission, which also directly affects the Council, has given rise to some 
questioning. 
33. With enlargement, the number of Commissioners has risen from 17 to 20. 
In accordance with the Corfu conclusions, the Reflection Group will draw up, with 
future enlargement of the Union in mind options concerning the number of members of 
the Commission. 
( 14) See Council Decision (95/1/EC, Euratom, ECSC) of 1 January 1995 adjusting the 
instruments concerning the accession of new Member States (OJ No L 1, 1.1.1995, 
p. 1 ). 
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E. Interinstitutional relations 
34. In the context of implementing the TEU, interinstitutional dialogue has made it possible 
to establish certain arrangements concerning, among other things, the application of the 
subsidiarity principle, an accelerated method of consolidation and budgetary discipline. 
(See list of interinstitutional texts in Annex V(f)). The European Parliament has 
suggested extending this approach to other agreements (on the application of Titles V 
and VI of the TEU, on EMU, on social policy and on transparency), a course of action 
which the Council has not seen fit to embark upon. 
35. The TEU's first months of application have seen the persistence of institutional 
conflicts, some of which it has proved possible to settle, at least provisionally, as in the 
case of measures implementing acts adopted by co-decision (committee procedure) or 
the inclusion of financial provisions in legislative acts; others have resulted in referral to 
the Court of Justice (reclassification of agricultural expenditure. The European 
Parliament has sometimes sought to use its budgetary powers (which no-one is 
questioning) to influence the formulation of policies as well. 
F. National parliaments 
36. Declaration No 13 annexed to the TEU Final Acts speaks of the importance of 
encouraging greater involvement by national parliaments in the activities of the 
European Union, in particular through stepping up contacts between them and the 
European Parliament and ensuring national parliaments "receive Commission proposals 
for legislation in good time for information or possible examination". 
In this connection, Declaration No 14 annexed to the TEU Final Act establishes the 
practice of joint meetings between the European Parliament and national parliaments. 
These two declarations have had some partial results, and meetings have taken place 
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between national-parliament bodies responsible for European affairs and the Europe:m 
Parliament. The Conference of Parliaments, however, has not met since the Treaty 
came into force. 
G. Other institutions and bodies 
Court of Justice 
37. The TEU gave new means of action to the Court of Justice, in particular providing for 
the possibility, at the Commission's request, of requiring Member States which did not 
conform to its judgments to pay a lump sum or penalty: the Commission has not yet 
made use of this possibility. 
The TEU confirmed and enlarged the role of the Court of First Instance (15), with the 
exception of referrals for preliminary rulings. The Court of First Instance now deals 
with a very large number of cases and its workload is bound to increase further with 
the litigation concerning intellectual property. 
Court of Auditors 
38. The Court of Auditors, which has become an Institution, plays an increasing role and 
will henceforth be able to provide the European Parliament and the Council with the 
statement of assurance provided for in Article 188c of the EC Treaty. 
( 1 5 ) See in Annex VII statistics on the progress of cases before the Court of Justice and the 
Court of First Instance and on the average length of proceedings. 
5082/95 eii/PT/jl 
:J, 6 2 
EN 
17 
Committee of the Regions 
39. The Committee of the Regions, the new body representing regional and local authorities 
which was set up by the TEU, has begun its advisory activities, details of which are 
given in Annex VI. The establishment of the arrangements for the common 
organizational structure with the Economic and Social Committee, as provided for in 
Protocol No 1 6 to the TEU, has given rise to some difficulties and will have to be 
further clarified. 
Economic and Social Committee 
40. The Economic and Social Committee, whose prerogatives were reinforced by the TEU, 
plays a significant role in developing the social dialogue at Community level. 
H. Other aspects 
41. The TEU inserted into the EC Treaty the means to ensure greater efficiency in terms of 
financial management. 
Hence, in the interests of budgetary discipline, the Commission must ensure, in 
accordance with Article 201 a of the EC Treaty, that resources are available before 
making legislative proposals or adopting implementing measures likely to have 
appreciable implications for the Community budget. 
The protection of the financial interests of the Community is the subject of a proposal 
for a Regulation and of a draft Convention which are currently being studied by the 
Council. 
Finally, major initiatives have been taken pursuant to Article 209a of the EC Treaty, 
which stipulates that Member States shall take the same measures to counter fraud 
affecting the financial interests of the Community as they take to counter fraud 
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affecting their own financial interests. In view of Article 209a, it is. moreover, for each 
Member State to adopt the necessary internal measures. 
42. Certain factors are of importance for assessing the functioning of the Treaty, even 
though they do not directly concern the application of the TEU. For example, it is 
essential that everyone should be able to communicate with the Institutions of the 
Union in one of its official languages and that all acts should in due course be published 
in all of these languages. This point will not be dealt with in the present report. 
IV. THE INTERNAL POWERS OF THE COMMUNITY 
43. Taking account of the objectives set in its Article 8, the TEU gave a more ambitious 
dimension to some of the Community's internal powers and conferred new ones. 
Where precise time limits were set (for example, Economic and Monetary Union, 
cohesion, citizenship of the Union), they have been observed. In other areas in which 
the TEU broke new ground by opening up further possibilities for Community action, 
results vary according to sector. A number of important factors are mentioned below, 
although it has to be understood that in these areas many decisions have been taken 
which do not concern the functioning of the Treaty. 
EMU 
44. The second phase of Economic and Monetary Union began, as planned, on 
1 January 1994. All the measures necessary for implememing the second phase and 
relating, firstly, to the operation of the European Monetary Institute (EM(} and, secondly, 
to definitions for the application of certain specific provisions (prohibition of privileged 
access and monetary financing, excessive deficit procedure) were adopted as soon as 
the TEU entered into force. 
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A few weeks after the entry into force of the TEU, the Council adopted, on the basb of 
European Council conclusions, the first broad guidelines of the economic policies of the 
Member States and of the Community, further guidelines being adopted by the same 
procedure in July 1994 (16); in this context, the multilateral surveillance procedure 
was applied in 1994, marking, with the review of convergence programmes, increased 
coordination of economic policies. The Council also applied, for the first time, the new 
budgetary surveillance procedure in Member States aimed at avoiding excessive public 
deficits. 
Economic and social cohesion 
45. The Cohesion Fund provided for in Article 130d of the EC Treaty was set up in 
July 1994 (17), despite certain difficulties connected with the European Parliament 
assent procedure. The new provisions on economic and social cohesion also served as 
a framework for redefining the procedures for providing assistance under the Structural 
Funds {18). 
Social policy 
46. The TEU causes two legal bases to co-exist: the social chapter of the EC Treaty and the 
Protocol on social policy, which makes it possible to adopt Community acts valid for 
fourteen Member States. 
See Council recommendations of 22.12.1993 (OJ No l 7, 11. 1 .1994, p. 9) 
and 11 July 1994 (OJ No l 200, 3.8.1994, p. 38). 
Council Regulation No 1164/94 of 16.5.1994 (OJ No L 130, 25.5.1994, p. 1 ). 
Previously, pending the entry into force of the TEU, a financial cohesion instrument was 
introduced in March 1993 (Council Regulation No 792/93 of 30 March 1993, 
OJ No L 79, 1.4.1993, p. 74). 
See the various Regulations adopted by the Council on 20 July 1993 (OJ No L 193, 
31.7.1993). 
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The Agreement annexed to the Protocol on social policy has been used in two cases 
(Directive on European Works Councils and Resolution on the prospects for social 
policy); the dialogue between social partners at Community level, which some believe 
comes too late in the procedure, has not yet resulted in the conclusion of Europe-wide 
agreements. 
Environment 
47. Within the framework of the new legislative procedures introduced by the TEU, 
important progress was made with the adoption of measures concerning, for example, 
substances that deplete the ozone layer (cooperation) and the limitation on emissions of 
volatile organic compounds and packaging and packaging waste (co-decision). The 
Council attempted to promote a high level of protection and an integrated approach, 
tlmphasizing that the environment cut across different sectors; some delegations 
considered that these efforts were inadequate even to fulfil the commitments entered 
into at the UN Conference on Environment and Development. 
Other policies 
48. The TEU laid new foundations for Community action in the areas of trans-European 
networks, education, vocational training and youth, culture, public health, consumer 
protection and Industry. 
Most of these new legal bases have already been used. Major texts have been adopted 
in the form of action programmes on education and vocational training; others,_ relating 
particularly to trans-European networks, are in the process of being adopted. 
In the past, the Community based its action in some of these areas on Article 235 of 
the EC Treaty; that Article Is still being used for other purposes (see Annex VIII). 
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V. THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE UNION 
49. The European Union's external action is divided into two major aspects: the traditional 
area of external economic relations, which is the province of the European Community, 
and the new area of the CFSP. The Council and the Commission are responsible for 
ensuring the coherence of all the Union's external action within the framework of its 
policies on external relations, security, economy and development, which these 
Institutions implement, each according to its powers (Article C of the TEU). 
A. External relations of the Community 
50. The TEU reorganized the substantive provisions relating to common commercial policy: 
it also clarified and regrouped in a single Article- Article 228 of the EC Treaty, 
reworded - the procedures for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements between 
the Community and one or more States or international organizations, in particular 
extending the scope of the European Parliament's assent. 
In a recent judgment (19) the Court of Justice clarified the interpretation of certain 
provisions concerning the extent of the Commission's negotiating powers. 
51. Opinion 1/94, delivered on 15 November 1994 by the Court of Justice in the context of 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round agreements, helped to clarify the matter of the 
division of powers between the Community and its Member States and stressed the 
need to harmonize the position to be adopted by the Community and its Member 
States. The Council, the Commission and the Member States will have to resolve the 
<
19) See judgment of the Court of 9 August 1994 in Case C-327/91 (France v. 
Commission). 
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problem of the Union's representation in the framework of the new World Trade 
Organization and vis-~-vis third countries. 
52. Community action in the area of development cooperation, formerly based mainly on 
Article 235 of the EC Treaty, now has a specific legal basis in the provisions of new 
Title XVII of the Treaty (Articles 130u et seq.). It is on that basis that the Community's 
cooperation agreements with developing countries are concluded; however, 
interpretation of these new provisions of the Treaty gives rise to differences of opinion, 
which have already led in one case to referral to the Court of Justice. 
53. A specific legal basis - Article 228a - was inserted into the EC Treaty for Community 
action (economic sanctions) provided for in the context of joint action or a common 
position adopted within the meaning of the CFSP (see also Article 73g( 1) of the 
EC Treaty). A list of these measures is given in Annex IX. Following a "running-in" 
period, this procedure is operating satisfactorily, subject to clarification of certain 
points. 
B. Common foreign and security policy 
Initial assessment 
54. Extrapolating from the experience of European Political Cooperation (hereinafter 
called EPC), which was set up by the Single European Act- the TEU provides, among 
the objectives of the Union, for "the implementation of a common foreign and security 
policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy .... " and creates new 
instruments -joint action and common positions - for the achievement of that policy. 
Hence, the aim of Title V of the TEU, as compared with EPC, is to introduce greater 
consistency in framing policies, greater "capacity to act" (and not simply to 
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"react" to events) and to give the European Union a "higher profile" vis-a-vis the outside 
world. 
55. During the first period of application of the TEU, the Council defined eleven common 
positions - mostly of a technical nature and, in certain cases (Rwanda, Ukraine, 
Burundi) of considerable political importance - and adopted fifteen joint actions of 
variable political significance, several of a technical nature (see Annex X fa) and (b)). 
Some of these acts were connected with the adoption by the Community of economic 
sanctions, to which they were a forerunner. The remainder covered areas as varied as 
the definition of overall strategies towards Rwanda and Ukraine, the sending of 
observers to the parliamentary elections in Russia, the Stability P~ct, the process of 
transition to democracy in South Africa and the Middle East peace process, 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, former Yugoslavia, including the convoying of 
humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and especially, in this context, the support 
provided by the Union to the administration of the town of Mostar in accordance with 
procedures laid down by the Council (administrator, Presidency, Advisory Working 
Party). Measures were adopted to harmonize the procedures and criteria for the export 
of dual-use goods; these measures constitute the first example of action combining 
legal bases from the EC Treaty and Title V of the TEU. 
The results produced by the CFSP are not limited to defining common positions and 
adopting joint action but encompass, in addition to a hundred or so political statements, 
the many contacts and approaches which are an integral part of conducting a foreign 
policy. The Union has also evolved strategies towards groups of countries (countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean) 
and organized a conference with the countries of Southern Africa. Annex X contains ~­
detailed review of the implementation of the provisions on the CFSP. 
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56. The first application of the provisions on the CFSP was the subject of particularly close 
appraisal, including appraisal by the public, among whom the CFSP had at the same 
time raised many expectations (as regards its potential) and called forth a great deal of 
criticism (in view of its achievements). Both the expectations and the criticisms were, 
no doubt, sometimes exaggerated; the provisions of the Treaty cannot alone provide 
ready-made solutions to problems, but only the means to tackle them. The political will 
to act is a determining factor in the proper use of the instruments of the Treaty. 
Assessments of the initial performance of the CFSP differ. Some point to not 
inconsiderable results, not only in terms of quantity, but also of quality, and consider 
that a "running-in" period is normal in an area which is at the heart of national 
sovereignty. Others, on the other hand, referring in particular to former Yugoslavia, say 
they are disappointed by the results obtained so far, which they regard as falling short 
of initial ambitions, and question the effectiveness of the means offered by the Treaty, 
but the European Union originated the peace plan which is still the only overall plan for 
resolving the conflict. 
Foreign policy 
57. Experience of implementation of Title V of the TEU may be analyzed at the various 
stages of conducting a foreign policy: planning, decision-making and implementation. 
- Planning and formulating policy 
58. Neither the Council as such nor its General Secretariat has direct access to information; 
however, direct access, which would require support from capitals and embassies of 
Member States abroad, and the assistance of the Commission, is necessary for the 
planning and formulation of foreign policy. The processing and summarizing of 
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information, which are of crucial importance in this context, also leave something to be 
desired. 
59. The provisions of Articles J.5(3), J.8(3) and J.9 enable the Commission to play an 
important role in implementing Title V. 
60. The Political Committee plays an essential role in planning and formulating the Union's 
foreign policy. 
61 . Recourse to the instruments provided for by Title V took place in the context of the 
necessary adjustment to the new mechanisms and certain differences of opinion on the 
scope of the instruments. Hence. for example, the scope and respective roles of the 
instruments provided for in Article J.2 (common positions} and J.3 (joint action) gave 
rise to some differences. It is necessary to clarify and respect the functions of the 
various instruments: statement, common position and joint action. 
62. The question arose, when the strategies on Rwanda and Ukraine were defined, whether 
a common position designed to establish an overall approach for the Union's policy 
towards a third country could take account of and mention all aspects of relations with 
that country on which the Community would be competent to adopt specific measures. 
This question elicited a response, considered by many necessary to ensure consistency 
of the Union's action, in the form of "instructions" for the application of Article J.2 of 
the TEU, which underlined the need for the powers of the Community and the 
responsibilities of the Commission to be fully respected. 
- Decision-making 
63. As regards preparation for decision-making, it is necessary for the bodies and structures 
of the old EPC to be properly integrated into the single institutional framework provided 
for by the TEU. The role of Coreper in the preparation of the Council's proceedings, the 
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importance of genuine merging of Working Parties, which is still far from complete, and 
the important role of the Working Party of CFSP Counsellors should also be stressed in 
. this context, as well as the general coordinating role played by the Council's General 
Secretariat under the aegis of the Presidency. 
64. Despite progress already made, the procedures are still at an early stage and must be 
improved. The use of the COREU procedure should be further defined. COREU is very 
useful as a means of exchanging information, but the preparation and adoption of legal 
texts by COREU causes difficulties. 
Unanimity has been the rule. Neither the qualified majority, use of which is made 
possible by Article J.3(2) of the TEU, nor the possibility allowed for in Article J.3(7), 
has been used. 
65. The level of involvement of the European Parliament in defining the CFSP {limited by 
the TEU to consultation and information) remains a subject of disagreement between 
the Council and the Parliament, which wanted to adopt procedures additional to those 
in the Treaty by means of an interinstitutional agreement. 
- Implementation 
66. The implementation of the common foreign policy may be analyzed in terms of 
"capacity to act" and "high profile". The TEU states that the Presidency is responsible 
for the implementation of joint action and expresses the Union's position vis-a-vis the 
outside world; it represents the Union in matters relating to the CFSP. The Presidency 
therefore has considerable room for manoeuvre, if necessary with the assistance of the 
Troika and under the Council's control, and also in full association with the Commission. 
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There has to be proper continuity in the Union's external representation. The order in 
whi"ch the Presidency of the Council is held was fixed by the Council's decision of 
1 January 1995. 
67. With the implementation of the CFSP, the increasing burdens on the Presidency and the 
proliferation of meetings at all levels with ever more numerous partners give rise to 
·problems which have clarified the respective roles of the Presidencyffroika on the one 
hand, and the General Secretariat of the Council on the other, in the "administration" of 
the CFSP as well as the role of the Commission. 
68. Monitoring of the implementation of the CFSP could be further systematized and made 
more effective, particularly through better use of the General Secretariat of the Council, 
without prejudice to the powers of the Presidency or the Commission. 
69. Since the TEU did not explicitly assign legal personality to the Union, it must act 
through the Community and/or its Member States, particularly as regards legal 
commitments to the outside world. This has given rise to difficulties for which certain 
solutions are currently being considered. 
70. The experience gained in the area of CFSP financing shows up the discrepancy between 
the European Parliament's powers of political control and its budgetary powers :: the 
Parliament tries to increase its involvement in the CFSP by exercising its budgetary 
powers. The funding of the CFSP has given rise to controversy and has not yet been 
resolved. 
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Security and defence 
71 . The positive outcome of negotiations on the Stability Pact, which has been entrusted to 
the supervision of the OSCE, Is a significant achievement in the field of preventive 
diplomacy. At the same time. the Union has helped to improve the OSCE's system of 
. crisis prevention and its capacity for crisis management. 
72. The first joint action in the area of security was preparation for the Conference of the 
States party to the Treaty on the Non·Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
73. Before the entry into force of the TEU. the European Union called on the Western 
European Union (WEU) to participate in several operations including the monitoring of 
the embargo against Serbia/Montenegro on the Danube and in the Adriatic. It did the 
same, after the entry into force of the TEU. for the administration of Mostar, although 
the new possibility offered by Article J.4{2) (implementation by the WEU of decisions 
and actions of the Union which have defence implications) was not used as such. 
The relationship between the General Secretariats of the Council of the European Union 
and of the WEU is still under discussion. 
50S2t95 eH/PT/jl 
''"; ~ l. 
EN 
VI. COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS 
Initial assessment 
74. Before the TEU was signed, the Member States of the European Communities 
cooperated, at intergovernmental level, in areas concerning freedom of movement and 
·the security of persons (Coordinators' Group, CELAO, TREVI), customs cooperation 
(MAG) and judicial cooperation (within the framework of the old EPC). 
The aim of the provisions of Title VI of the TEU, which govern cooperation in the fields 
of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), is to strengthen and insert the action which has 
been taken by Member States for several years now into the framework of 
intergovernmental cooperation, allowing greater consistency of action, providing 
Member States with new instruments for action (joint action and joint positions) and 
placing these in the single institutional framework of the Union. In this field, too, the 
political will to act is a decisive factor in the full use of the instruments provided for in 
the TEU. 
75. The initial results of the application of these provisions are inadequate although it is 
emphasized that the matters covered by this Title (asylum, border controls, immigration, 
combating international crime, and police cooperation) are very sensitive and time has 
been very short to allow a true assessment. The action plan approved by the European 
Council in Brussels in December 1993 has not yet been fully applied. 
76. Extremely limited use has been made of the new instruments provided for in Title VI. 
The Council has, on the other hand, made considerable use of traditional instruments 
(statements, recommendations and resolutions), as shown in the list in Annex Xl(a}). 
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Two joint actions - relating to travel facilities for school pupils originating in 
third countries and residing in a Member State and to the Europol Drugs Unit - were 
adopted and a convention on simplified extradition procedures signed. The Europol 
Convention should be finalized before the end of June 1995; the Convention on external 
borders is held up because of a problem unconnected with the provisions of 
the TEU (20). The "recommendations" adopted on asylum and immigration have, 
however, led to genuine effort to harmonize national laws. 
Progress has also been made on the exchange of information, especially as regards the 
fight against drugs, forgery of documents and organized crime. 
Attention should also be drawn to the-importance of the work of the Consultative 
Commission on Racism and Xenophobia. 
77. Leaving aside the particularly sensitive nature of the subjects covered, the difficulties 
encountered in applying Title VI also have to do with the imprecise demarcation of the 
Community's own powers and the multiplicity of structures used hitherto. Moreover, 
Title VI of the Treaty has not laid down any precise objectives or binding deadlines in 
these areas, except for Europol. 
(20) A list of the draft conventions prepared under TEU Title VI and currently being 
examined by the Council is given in Annex Xl(b). 
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The dual EC/JHA approach 
78. Title VI, the provisions of which relate both to the freedom of movement and the safety 
of persons, covers some subjects which are very closely associated with Community 
powers and others- such as police- which are at the heart of national sovereignty. 
·In the dual EC/JHA approach - illustrated by sectors such as external borders/visas and 
the protection of the Community's financial interests- the line between the respective 
spheres is somewhat blurred. The TEU also provided for the possibility of 
"communitarizing", by means of the bridging provisions in Article K.9 of the TEU and 
Article 100c of the EC Treaty, action relating to areas covered by Title VI, such as 
asylum policy, controls at external borders, immigration policy, combating drug 
dependence and international fraud and judicial cooperation in civil matters. No use has 
been made of that possibility. 
A Regulation laying down a uniform format for visas has been adopted by the Council 
on the basis of Article 1 OOc of the EC Treaty. 
79. While Title VI is, generally speaking, excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities, Article K.3(2){c) of the TEU states that 
conventions drawn up in this framework may nevertheless provide that the Court has 
jurisdiction to interpret their provisions and to give judgment in disputes on their 
application; this possibility, which has been mentioned in connection with every draft 
convention prepared within .the framework of Title VI, is the subject of differences of 
opinion between the Member States and it has not been possible to apply it hitherto. 
Some feel that, if the Court of Justice is not given such powers, the uniform application 
provided for in the conventions will remain inadequate for want of a common 
interpretation. Others hold that it is not necessary to give the Court such powers. 
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Instruments and structures 
80. The use made of the instruments provided for in Article K.3 of the TEU (joint positions, 
joint action, conventions) has been very limited, perhaps because of the Member States' 
continuing differences of opinion on the nature and the legal effects of such 
implements. 
More traditional, and normally not legally binding, instruments such as 
recommendations and resolutions have been favoured in preference to the more 
operational instruments of Title VI; examination of the content of the texts adopted 
shows, however, that they sometimes contain specific undertakings which bind 
Member States without offering the guarantees which a legal instrument would provide. 
Here too, due regard must be had to the functions of the various instruments laid down 
by the Treaty. 
No use has been made of the possibility offered by the Treaty of qualified majority 
~ 
voting. 
81. The five-level structure - Council, Coreper, K.4 Committee, Steering Groups and 
Working Parties - has proved very cumbersome and has slowed down the 
decision-making process. 
The K.4 Committee sometimes has difficulty in playing the role assigned to it by the 
Treaty; the function of its dependent steering groups and working parties should be 
reassessed. 
82. The provisions of Articles K.3(2) and K.4(2) of the TEU offer the Commission the 
possibility of playing an important part in the implementation of Title VI. 
83. There are still differences of opinion between the Council and the European Parliament 
on the degree of involvement of the European Parliament in the implementation of 
Title VI (limited by the TEU to consultation and information); the Parliament wanted to 
adopt specific procedures on the subject by means of an interinstitutional agreement. 
Some Member States feel strongly that the subject-matter covered by Title VI requires 
greater parliamentary control. The question of funding the implementation of Title VI is 
similar to that of funding the CFSP. 
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ANNEX l(a} 
CONCLUSIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE CORFU EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
(24 and 25 JUNE 1994) 
IV. PREPARATION OF THE 19961NTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 
The European Council, following the loannina Agreement, hereby establishes a 
Reflection Group to prepare for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference consisting of 
representatives of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States and the 
President of the Commission. It will be chaired by a person appointed by the Spanish 
Government and begin its work in June 1995. Two European Parliament 
representatives will participate in the work of the Reflection Group. The Group will 
also have exchanges of views with the other Institutions and organs of the European 
Union. 
The Institutions are invited to establish before the start of the work of the Reflection 
Group reports on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union which will provide 
an input for the work of the Group. 
The Reflection Group will examine and elaborate ideas relating to the provisions of the 
Treaty on European Union for which a revision is foreseen and other possible 
improvements in a spirit of democracy and openness. on the basis of the evaluation of 
the functioning of the Treaty as set out in the reports. It will also elaborate options in 
the perspective of the future enlargement of the Union on the institutional questions 
set out in the conclusions of the European Council in Brussels and in the loannina 
Agreement (weighting of votes, the threshold for qualified majority decisions, number 
of members of the Commission and any other measure deemed necessary to facilitate 
the work of the Institutions and guarantee their effective operation in the perspective 
of enlargement). 
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The Secretary-General of the Council will make the necessary arrangements for the 
secretariat of the Reflection Group in agreement with its president. 
The Reflection Group will report in time for the meeting of the European Council at the 
end of 1995. The procedure laid down in the Treaty relating to revision will apply to 
the next phase." 
• • 
• 
"DECLARATION OF THE TWELVE PRESENT MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION" 
IN THE MINUTES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR 
THE ACCESSION OF NORWAY (1). AUSTRIA. SWEDEN 
AND FINLAND TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 
"The representatives of the twelve States referred to above have adopted the following 
Declaration at the end of the Conferences having elaborated the text of the Treaty on 
Accession of Norway, Austria, Sweden and Finland to the European Union: 
(a) The twelve present Member States of the European Union have agreed that, in the 
hypothesis where four new Member States will join the Union, the threshold necessary 
for a qualified majority required by the Treaties shall be fixed at 64 votes. They have 
also agreed that the question of the reform of the Institutions, including the weighting 
<1) This Declaration has to be seen in the light of the outcome of the Norwegian referendum, 
which led Norway not to become a member of the European Union. 
The figures regarding voting should therefore read as follows: 
- in paragraph (a): " ... the threshold necessary for a qualified majority required 
by the Treaties shall be fixed at 62 votes" (in accordance with 
Decision 95/1/EC, Euratom, ECSC of the Council of the European Union of 
1 January 1995 adjusting the instruments concerning the accession of new 
Member States to the European Union, OJEC No L 1, 1.1.1995, p. 1 ); 
- in paragraph (c): 
= second line: " ... a total of 23 to 25 ... " 
= seventh line: " ... at least 65 votes ... " 
(in accordance with Decision 95/C/1/01 of the Council of the European Union of 
1 January 1995 amending the Council Decision of 29 March 1994 concerning the 
taking of decisions by qualified majority by the Council, OJEC No C 1, 1.1.1995, 
p. 1 ). 
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of votes and the threshold of the qualified majority in the Council, shall be examined 
during the Conference of Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
which shall be convened in 1996, in accordance with Article N(2) of the Treaty on 
European Union. 
(b) Besides, they have agreed to invite the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission to establish a report on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union. 
These reports will provide input for the work of a Reflection Group of Representatives 
of the Foreign Ministers which should be created by the European Council in Corfu and 
start its work mid-1995. This Group will work in association with the European 
Parliament. It will, inter alia, prepare options based on the positions and arguments of 
all Member States on the weighting of votes and on the threshold of qualified-majority 
decisions, taking into account future enlargement. 
(c) They have taken note that the Council has decided that, if Members of the Council 
representing a total of 23 to 26 votes indicate their intention to oppose the adoption by 
the Council of a decision by qualified majority, the Council will do all in its power to 
reach, within a reasonable time and without prejudicing obligatory time limits laid down 
by the Treaties and by secondary law, such as in Articles 189b and 189c of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, a satisfactory solution that could be adopted by 
at least 68 votes. During this period, and always respecting the Rules of Procedure of 
the Council, the President undertakes, with the assistance of the Commission, any 
initiative necessary to facilitate a wider basis of agreement in the Council. The 
Members of the Council lend him their assistance. 
(d) They have finally agreed that the different elements of the present Declaration shall 
continue to be in operation until entry into force of an amendment to the Treaties, 
following the 1996 Conference." 
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Extract from Annex Ill 
BRUSSELS EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
10 AND 11 DECEMBER 1993 
CONCLUSIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY 
Declaration for the official record of the Accession Conference 
"In adopting the institutional provisions of the Accession Treaty, the Member States and the 
applicant countries agree that, as well as examining the legislative role of the European 
Parliament and the other matters envisaged in the Treaty on European Union, the 
Intergovernmental Conference to be convened in 1996 will consider the questions relating to 
the number of Members of the Commission and the weighting of the votes of the 
Member States in the Council. It will also consider any measures deemed necessary to 
facilitate the work of the Institutions and guarantee their effective operation." 
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ANNEX ICbJ 
Text of TEU Articles A and B: 
"Article A 
By this Treaty, the HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES establish among themselves a 
EUROPEAN UNION, hereinafter called "the Union". 
This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen. 
The Union shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and 
forms of cooperation established by this Treaty. Its task shall be to organize, in a manner 
demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the Member States and 
between their peoples. 
Article B 
The Union shall set itself the following objectives: 
to promote economic and social progress which is balanced and sustainable, in 
particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the 
strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through the establishment of 
economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single currency in accordance with 
the provisions of this Treaty; 
to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation 
of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common 
defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence; 
to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its 
Member States though the introduction of a citizenship of the Union; 
to develop close cooperation on justice and home affairs; 
to maintain in full the "acquis communautaire" and build on it with a view to 
considering, through the procedure referred to in Article N(2), to what extent the 
policies and forms of cooperation introduced by this Treaty may need to be revised with 
the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions of the 
Community. 
The objectives of the Union shall be achieved as provided in this Treaty and in accordance 
with the conditions and the timetable set out therein while respecting the principle of 
subsidiarity as defined in Article 3b of the Treaty establishing the European Community." 
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SOURCE: figures provided by the Commission. 
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COUNCIL 
ECONOMIC/FINANCIAL AFFAIRS 
GENERAL AFFAIRS 
ECONOMIC/FINANCIAL AFFAIRS 
GENERAL AFFAIRS 
ECOFIN 
ECOFIN 
GENERAL AFFAIRS 
ECOFIN 
. -~ .... 
GENERAL AFFAIRS 
ECOFIN 
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LIST OF POLICY DEBATES PUBLICLY RETRANSMITTED BY AUDIOVISUAL MEANS 
(Article 6(1) of the Council's Rules of Procedure) 
DATE ITEM 
15.11.93 Programme of the Danish Presidency 
1 9.VII.93 Presentation of the Belgian Presidency's programme 
13.1X.93 Presentation of the Belgian Presidency's work programme 
7.11.94 Presentation of the Greek Presidency's work programme 
14.11.94 Presentation of the Greek Presidency's work programme 
11.V11.94 Presentation of the German Presidency's work programme 
18.V11.94 Presentation of the German Presidency's work programme 
16.1.95 Presentation of the French Presidency's programme 
ANNEX lll(a) 
23.1.95 Presentation of the Frenrh Presidency's work programme and tribute 
20.11.95 
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GENERAL AFFAIRS 
AGRICULTURE 
GENERAL AFFAIRS 
INTERNAL MARKET 
SOCIAL AFFAIRS 
INDUSTRY 
LIST OF OTHER DEBATES ON IMPORTANT ISSUES AFFECTING THE INTERESTS OF THE UNION 
PUBUCL Y RETRANSMITTED BY AUDIOVISUAL MEANS 
(Article 6(2) of the Council's Rules of Procedure) 
COUNCIL DATE ITEM 
1 .II .93 
-
Danish Presidency's work programme 
- Opening of accession negotiations 
10.11.93 Proposal on agricultural prices and related measures 
(1993/1994) - Presentation by the Commission 
5.1V.93 Opening of negotiations with Norway 
5.1V.93 Sutherland Report 
6.1V.93 Employment situation 
3.V.93 Industrial competitiveness and environmental protection 
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 25.V.93 Run-up to 2000 
INTERNAL MARKET 
ENVIRONMENT 
AGRICULTURE 
AGRICULTURE 
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' 11.XI.93 
2/3.XII.93 
21.11.94 
21.11.95 
Strengthening the competitiveness of SMEs and craft enterprises and 
developing employment in the Community 
Green Paper on civil liability (discussed on 3. 12. 1993) 
Proposals on the prices of agricultural products and related measures 
for 1994!1995 - Presentation by the Commission 
Proposals on prices for agricultural products and related measures 
(1 995/1996) - Presentation by the Commission 
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ANNEX lll(b) 
PUBLICATION OF VOTES CAST IN THE COUNCIL 
I. Under the Council's Rules of Procedure, votes cast in the Council are automatically 
published when the Council acts as legislator, unless the Council decides otherwise, 
which has never been the case. 
The Annex to the Council's Rules of Procedure states that the Council "acts as 
legislator within the meaning of the first indent of Article 7{5) when it adopts rules 
which are legally binding in or for the Member States whether by means of 
regulations, directives or decisions, on the basis of the relevant provisions of 
the Treaties, in particular on the basis of Article 43 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community or in the framework of the procedures in Article 189b and 
Article 189c of that Treaty, with the exception of discussions leading to the adoption 
of internal measures, administrative or budgetary acts, acts concerning 
interinstitutional or international relations or non-binding acts such as conclusions, 
recommendations or resolutions. Votes shall not be made public in the case of 
discussions leading to indicative votes or the adoption of preparatory acts." 
Votes are also published: 
when votes are cast by members of the Council or their representatives in the 
Conciliation Committee set up by Article 189b of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community; 
when the Council acts under Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union, by 
a unanimous Council decision taken at the request of one of its members; 
in other cases, by a Council decision taken at the request of one of its members. 
II. Votes cast in the Council are published in press releases. 
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ANNEX IIHcl 
PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
1 . References 
Code of conduct concerning public access to Council and Commission 
documents 
(OJ No L 340/93, p. 41 ). 
Council Decision 93/731/EC of 20 December 1993 on public access to Council 
documents {OJ No L 340, p. 43). 
2. Applications as at 31 March 1995 
Number of Number of Number Number of Number of 
applications totaJi9sitive of partially negative referrals to the 
submitted responses positive responses Court of Justic 
responses e 
77 (1) 25 20 22 1 
(1) This number corresponds to the applications admissible under Decision 93/731/EC. In 
some cases the applications for access concerned a non-existent or unfinalized 
document, or a document which did not originate with the Council or could not be 
identified because the applicant had not supplied enough information. 
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ANNEX IV 
Total votes (per area) 
for legislative acts (2) adopted 
between 6 December 1993 and 31 March 1995 
.. •' 
.T . , .. 
Agriculture 114 17 10 
Fisheries 51 4 7 
Internal market 50 11 6 
Environment 9 4 1 
Transport 8 3 
Social affairs 3 2 
Research 27 1 1 
Education 4 1 
European citizenship 2 1 
Consumer protection 1 1 
Transparency 2 2 
Other 12 
TOTAL 283 40 32 
T = total number of legislative acts adopted 
N = number of acts adopted with negative votes being cast (or with negative votes and 
abstentions) 
A = number of acts adopted with abstentions only 
(2) As defined in the Annex to the Council's Rules of Procedure. Where a common position 
was followed by the adoption of a definitive act, the same votes have not been counted 
twice. The same applies to the Decision and the code of conduct concerning public 
access to documents. 
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ANNEX VCal 
LIST OF LEGAL BASES REQUIRING UNANIMITY WITHIN THE COUNCIL 
OR COMMON ACCORD OF THE MEMBER STATES 
EC Treaty 
Article 8a 
Article 8b 
Article 8e 
Article 45(3) 
Article 51 
Article 57(2) 
Article 73c 
Article 93 
Article 99 
Article 100 
Article 100c 
Article 103a 
Article 104c(14) 
Article 1 05(6) 
Article 1 06(5) 
Article 109(1) and (4) 
Article 1 09a(2) 
Article 1 09f(1) 
Article 1 09f(7) 
Articles 1 09k(5) and 
1 091(4) and (5) 
Article 121 
Article 128 
Article 130 
Article 130b 
Article 130d 
Article 1 30i 
Article 130o 
Article 130s 
Article 136 
Article 138(3) 
Article 145 
Article 151 (2) 
Article 157(1) 
Article 158(2) 
Article 159 
Articles 165 and 166 
Article 167 
Article 168a(2) and (4) 
Article 188 
Article 188b 
Article 189a 
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- right of movement and residence save as otherwise provided in the 
Treaty 
- right to vote in EP and municipal elections 
- additional rights of citizenship 
- compensatory aid for imports of raw materials 
- social security (coordination of arrangements) 
- amendment of principles laid down by law governing the professions in 
a Member State 
- measures which constitute a step back as regards liberalization of 
capital movements 
- State aid 
taxation 
- approximation of laws for the common market where Article 1 OOa is not 
applicable 
- list of countries whose nationals require visas (until 1996) 
- financial assistance for a Member State and economic measures in the 
event of severe difficulties 
- excessive deficits 
- tasks for the ECB 
- amendments to the Statute of the ESCB 
- agreements on an exchange-rate system 
- appointment of the members of the Executive Board of the ECB 
(common accord of the Member States) 
- appointment of the President of the EMI (common accord of the 
Member States) 
- European Monetary Institute 
- EMU: institutional provisions 
- social security for migrant workers: assignment to the Commission of 
powers for implementation of common measures 
- culture 
- industry 
- specifi~ action outside the Structural Funds 
Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund 
- adoption of the framework research programme 
- setting-up of joint undertakings 
- certain environmental provisions 
- overseas countries and territories 
- adoption of a uniform electoral procedure for the EP 
- conferral of implementing powers 
- appointment of the Council's Secretary-General 
- alteration of the number of Members of the Commission 
- appointment of the Members of the Commission (common accord of the 
Member States) 
- non-replacement of a Member of the Commission 
- increase in members of the CJ and Advocates-General 
- appointment of Judges and Advocates-General (common accord of the 
Member States) 
- Court of First Instance (composition, proceedings, approval of Rules of 
Procedure) 
- amendment of Title Ill of the Statute of the CJ; approval of Rules of 
Procedure of the CJ 
- Court of Auditors: appointment of members 
- amendment of a Commission proposal 
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Article 189b(3) 
Article 189c(d) and (e) 
Article 194 
Article 198a 
Article 198b 
Article 201 
Article 209 
Article 216 
- second reading in co-decision procedure 
- second reading in cooperation procedure 
- appointment of members of the ESC 
- Committee of the Regions: appointment of members 
- Committee of the Regions: approval of Rules of Procedure 
- provisions relating to the own resources system 
- Financial Regulations 
- determination of the seat of the institutions (common accord of the 
Member States} 
- rules governing languages 
- interests of the security of the Member States, trade in arms 
- geographical scope of the Treaty 
- conclusion of certain agreements 
Article 217 
Article 223 
Article 227 
Article 228(2) 
Article 235 - objective of the Community without provision for the necessary powers 
CFSP (ref. declaration No 27 annexed to the TEU) 
Article J.3 in conjunction with Article J.8 - adoption of joint action 
Article J.2(2) in conjunction with Article J.8 - defining of common positions 
Article J.11 - decision to charge CFSP operational expenditure to 
(for the record) Declaration No 27 TEU 
Article K.3 (in conjunction with Article K.4) 
Article K.8 
Article K.9 
PROTOCOLS 
Articles 1 2 and 45 (see Article 165 ECT) 
Article 37 
Article 41 (1) 
Article 13 
Article 6 
Article 2(3) and Article 4 
FINAL PROVISIONS OF TEU 
Article N(1) TEU 
Article 0 TEU 
5082/95 
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the Community budget 
- joint positions, joint action, conventions, etc. 
- charging to the Community budget of operational 
expenditure 
- crossover to Article 1 OOc 
- Protocol on the Statute of the CJ of the EC 
- Protocol No 3 (Statute of the ESCB/ECB): seat of 
the ECB (common accord of the Member States) 
- Protocol No 3 (Statute of the ESCB/ECB): revision of 
the Statute 
- Protocol No 4 (Statute of the EMI): seat of the EMI 
(common accord of the Member States) 
- Protocol No 6 on the convergence criteria referred to 
in Article 1 09j of the EC Treaty 
- Protocol No 14 on social policy 
- amendment of the Treaties (common accord of the 
Member States} 
- accession of new Member States 
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AN;:.;~ 
Article 189b (•) 
Scope 
Co-decision and qualified-majority voting in the Council 
Article 49 
Article 54(2) 
Article 56(2), second sentence 
Article 57(1) 
Article 57(2), third sentence 
Article 66 
Article 1 OOa 
Article 1 OOb 
Article 126 
Article 129 
Article 129a 
Article 129d 
Article 130s(3) 
Co-decision and unanimity 
Article 128 
Article 130i 
free movement of workers 
right of establishment 
idem 
idem 
idem 
services 
internal market 
idem 
education (encouragement measures) 
health (encouragement measures) 
consumers 
trans-European networks (guidelines) 
environment: general action programme 
Culture (except recommendations ·) 
Research (framework programme) 
(> The procedure referred to in Article 189b does not apply to the conclusion of 
international agreements (see first subparagraph of Article 228(3) of the EC Treaty) 
· Unanimity but not co-decision 
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Article 6 
Article 75(1) 
Article 84 
Article 103(5) 
Article 1 04a(2} 
Article 1 04b(2) 
Article 1 05a{2) 
Article 125 
Article 127 
Article 129d 
Article 130e 
Article 130o{1} and (3) 
Article 130s 
Article 130w 
Article 118a 
Article 2(2) 
of the Agreement 
annexed to the Protocol 
on social policy 
Article 189c ( ·) 
Scope 
non-discrimination on the basis of nationality 
transport 
transport 
rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure 
arrangements for applying Article 1 04a{ 1) 
arrangements for applying Article 104 
harmonization measures on the circulation of coins 
Social Fund 
vocational training 
trans-European networks (except guidelines) 
economic and social cohesion 
research 
environment 
development cooperation 
social policy 
minimum requirements 
() The procedure referred to in Article 189c does not apply to the conclusion of 
international agreements (see first subparagraph of Article 228(3) of the EC Treaty) 
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Article 8a(2) 
Article 1 05(6) 
Article 1 06(5) 
Article 130d 
Article 138(3) 
Article 228(3) 
TEU Article 0 
ASSENT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Scooe 
citizenship 
specific tasks of the ECB 
amendments to the Statute of the ESCB/ECB 
Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund 
uniform electoral procedure () 
certain international agreements 
accession of new Member States(> 
() Except in the case of accession and the case of the uniform electoral procedure, 
where the Parliament acts by an absolute majority of its component members, 
Parliament's assent is attair.ed by an absolute majority of the votes cast. 
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(i) General table 
STATISTICS RELATING 
TO ARTICLE 189b 
Number of proposed acts subject to co-decision 
Number of common positions of the Council 
Number of common positions for which there has been a conciliation 
procedure 
(ii) Details concerning the 15 cases of conciliation 
Number of cases where conciliation has led to the adoption of a joint text 
Number of cases where it has not led to a joint text (the Council confirming its 
position, the European Parliament rejecting it) 
- voice telephony 
Number of cases where the joint text has not led to a final decision (the 
European Parliament rejecting the conciliation joint text in plenary session) 
-
biotechnology 
Number of cases awaiting a third reading 
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ANNEX Vfdl 
LIST OF DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES 
1. LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 
(a) without consultation of the European Parliament: 
- by a simple majority in the Council (e.g. Article 213 of the EC Treaty}, or 
- by a qualified majority in the Council (e.g. measures provided for in Article 228a 
of the EC Treaty}, or 
- on the basis of unanimity (e.g. Articles 1 03a, 194 and 198a of the EC Treaty),· 
(b) with consultation of the European Parliament: 
- by a qualified majority in the Council (Article 43 of the EC Treaty}, or 
- on the basis of unanimity (Articles 8b(1J and (2) or 99 and 100 of the 
EC Treaty); 
(c) in cooperation with the European Parliament; 
(d) in co-decision with the European Parliament: 
- by a qualified majority in the Council, or 
- on the basis of unanimity in the Council (culture, research framework 
programme); 
(e) after obtaining the European Parliament's assent: 
- by a simple majority in the EP (e.g. Article 8a(2) of the EC Treaty), or 
- by a majority of the EP's component members (second subparagraph of 
Article 138(3) of the EC Treaty or Article 0 of the TEUJ; 
(f) by common accord with the European Parliament and the Commission 
(Article 138c of the EC Treaty). 
2. BUDGETARY PROCEDURE 
- with variants, depending whether CE or NCE are involved. 
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3. PROCEDURE FOR INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
(a) without consultation of the European Parliament (agreements referred to in 
Article 113(3) of the EC Treaty); 
(b) with consultation of the European Parliament (first subparagraph of Article 228(3); 
(c) after obtaining the European Parliament's assent (second subparagraph of 
Article 228(3). 
4. PROCEDURES FOR TITLES V AND VI OF THE TEU 
(a) on a proposal from/at the initiative of the Commission; 
(b) on a proposal from/at the initiative of a Member State. 
5. OTHER PROCEDURES 
(a) without any Commission proposal (e.g. some EMU cases and Article 213 of the 
EC Treaty); 
(b) on a recommendation from the Commission (a number of EMU cases); 
(c) on recommendations from the Commission and the Council, with decisions by the 
Council, meeting in the composition of Heads of State or Government (entry into 
the third stage of EMU); 
(d) by common agreement of the Governments of the Member States (appointment of 
Members of the Commission and of the Court of Justice and location of 
institutions); 
(e) by common agreement of the Governments of the Member States, meeting in the 
composition of Heads of State or Government (appointment of the President, 
Vice-President and members of the Executive Board and location of the ECB). 
Consultation of other institutions or bodies of the European Union (Court of Auditors, 
Economic and Social Committee, Committee of the Regions, European Central Bank, 
Monetary Committee, European Monetary Institute, Political Committee and 
Article K.4 Committee) is provided for on either a mandatory or an optional basis under the 
above procedures. 
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ANNEX V(e) 
External relations 
ASSENTS GIVEN BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
from 1 November 1993 to 28 February 1995 
Regulation on certain procedures for applying the Agreement on the European Economic 
Area (EEA) 
Agreement on the European Economic Area -interim "acquis" 
Applications from Austria, Norway, Finland and Sweden for membership of the EU 
Conclusion of the agreements resulting from the Uruguay Round multilateral trade 
negotiations (1986-1994) 
Development 
Conclusion of the Protocol on financial and technical cooperation between the EC and the 
Syrian AR 
Environment 
Substances that deplete the ozone layer - conclusion of an international agreement (Montreal 
Protocol) 
Regional policy 
Regulation establishing a Cohesion Fund 
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ANNEX VCfJ 
Interinstitutional texts concerning implementation of the Treatv on European Union 
1. Texts approved at the interinstitutional meeting in Luxembourg on 25 October 1993 
(OJ No C 329, 6.12.1993, pp. 132 et seq.) 
(a) Interinstitutional Declaration on democracy, transparency and subsidiarity 
(b) Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission on procedures for implementing the principle of subsidiarity 
(c) Arrangements for the proceedings of the conciliation committee under 
Article 189b of the EC Treaty 
2. Interinstitutional Agreement of 29 October 1993 between the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary 
procedure (OJ No C 331, 7 .12.1993, p. 1) 
3. Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 December 1994 between the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission on an accelerated working method for official 
consolidation of legislative texts 
Interinstitutional text required by Article 138c of the Treaty on European Union 
4. Decision of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the detailed 
provisions governing the exercise of the European Parliament's right of inquiry 
(Article 138c of EC Treaty). 
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ANNEX VI 
CASES BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CFI 
AND AVERAGE DURATION OF PROCEEDINGS 
A. COURT OF JUSTICE (•J 
1990 
• 
• 
Year 
Cases registered 
Graph 1 - Cases before the Court 
1991 
Preliminary rulings 
Appeals 
1992 
Table 1 
• 
• 
1993 
Direct appeals · 
Other cases 
1994 
Nature of 1990 1991 1992 1993 
proceedings 
Preliminary rulings 141 186 162 204 
Direct appeals 222 140 251 265 
Appeals 16 14 25 17 
Total 379 340 438 486 
Other cases 5 5 4 4 
I TOTAL I 384 I 345 I 442 I 490 
1994 
203 
125 
13 
341 
13 
I 354 
If the milk-quota cases registered in 1992 and 1993 are excluded, the number of cases 
brought before the Court is seen to be constant. 
It may be noted that 57,3% of the cases concern preliminary rulings. 
(•) SOURCE: Court of Justice 
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Nature of 
Graph 2 - Cases disposed of '21 
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• 
• 
Preliminary rulings 
Opinions 
Year 
1990 
• Direct eppeals • Appeals 
Special proceedings 
Table 2 
1991 1992 1993 
proceedings 
Preliminary rulings 162 131 157 196 
Direct appeals 125 142 171 132 
Appeals - 11 13 11 
Opinions - 1 1 1 
Special proceedings 4 4 3 2 
I TOTAL I 302 I 289 I 345 I 342 I 
1994 
163 
100 
20 
1 
9 
293 
The number of cases disposed of includes those settled by a judgment (provided it is not 
interlocutory) or by an order terminating the proceedings (for example, when a case is 
removed from the register, does not proceed to judgment, or is inadmissible). 
I 
There was a slowing-down in the Court's judicial activities in 1994. A comparison of input 
and output statistics shows that the Court settles fewer cases than it receives over the same 
period. 
121 excluding the cases transferred to the CFI on 27 September 1993. 
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Graph 3 - Cases pending 
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Nature of 
proceedings 
Preliminary rulings 
Direct appeals 
Appeals 
Opinions 
Special proceedings 
TOTAL 
• 
• 
Year 
Preli:ninary rulin~• 
Appeals 
Table 3 (1) 
1990 1991 
197 (209) 217 (264) 
343 (356) 335 (353) 
16(16) 19 (19} 
- 1 (1) 
2 (2} 2 (2) 
558 (583) 574 (639} 
• 
., .. 
Direct appeals 
Olher CISU 
1992 1993 
232 (269) 240 (277) 
405 (433) 109 (115) 
31 (31) 36 (37) 
2 (2) 1 ( 1) 
1 (1) 3 (3) 
671 (736) 389 (433) 
1994 
259 (317) 
134 (140} 
29 (30) 
3 (3) 
4 {4) 
429 (494) 
<
1) The figures in brackets indicate the total number of cases after splitting the joined cases 
counted singly in the figure outside the brackets. 
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Average duration of proceedings before the Court 
Graph 4 - Duration of proceedings (in months) 
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Nature of 
proceedings 
Preliminary rulings 
Direct appeals 
Appeals 
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Year 
1990 
17.4 
25.5 
-
Table 4 
1991 1992 1993 
18.2 18.8 20.4 
24.2 25.8 22.9 
15.4 17.5 19.2 
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B. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE 
CFI CASES 
up to 31 December 1994. 
~ ... 1 I 
~I I I I I I I 
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I - - i j 
... _-___ -----
·- ·-· 
. .., .. , 
l --i1-- Cases pending - e- -·Casu disposed of :.-+- Cues registered 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 (31 . 12) 
Cases registered 169 
Cases disposed of 1 
Cases pending 168 
SOURCE: CFI; provisional figures. 
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Average duration of proceedings before the CFI 
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE 
Duration of proeeedlnge Un monthel - JUDGMENTS 
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1m 
• Appulc by officials . 
Year 
Nature of 
proceedings 
Appeals by 
officials 
Direct appeals 
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1990 
17.9 
17.6 
1\"n IWI IOU 
. " 
Direct nppenle 
1991 1992 1993 
21.9 17.0 17.0 
42.9 36.6 23.3 
1994 
16.9 
23.0 
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Duretion of proceedinga - ORDERS 
"' L .... ·-- .. ,-.... · · I l . 
110 : -"'-.. ·l-:::-··-: I . I 1-...... I~ -1 I ------ ...... ,, l 
t)01 -·.-,---':"·"'--~--- .... , 
too-:- ·I ·-1 1--'..r~,....c..-i 
" .; ... -. i- -~- .. ,-1---+-. -~re----t 
lO i ·-· .. I - _.. . -1 I ·-t-1 _) •• 
qi'' ,_1_: .. _, i =Ej-IO·i- ·.-!- I ,- I ---f---1 
oo., ___ l .. . --"'---:. 
lVII 
""' '"' 
. .,. 
• " 
Direct appeal• J 
Year 
Nature of 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
proceedings 
Appeals by 12.6 5.8 
officials 
Direct appeals 14.5 12.7 
10.8 8.0 
11.7 14.1 
11.0 
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ANN, . : VIlla) 
NUMBER OF OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 
(up to 31 March 1995) 
on referral by the Council 
on referral by the Commission 
own initiative 
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REF. 
CDR 16/94 
CDR 42/94 
CDR 43/94 
CDR 44/94 
CDR 45/94 
CDR 46/94 
CDR 48/94 
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OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 
(referral by the Council) 
SUBJECT 
Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a Cohesion Fund and proposal for a Council Regulation 
establishing a cohesion financial instrument 
Commission communication on the development of the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) as 
a trans-European network 
Proposal for a Council Decision on a series of guidelines for the development of ISDN as a 
trans-European network 
Proposal for a Council Decision adopting a multiannual Community action concerning the 
development of ISDN as a trans-European network (TEN-ISDN) 
Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Community 
Action Programme SOCRATES 
Proposal for a Decision of the Council and the Ministers for Health of the Member States, meeting 
within the Council, concerning the extension to the end of 1994 of the 1991-1993 plan of action in 
the framework of the •Europe against AIDs· programme 
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Decision establishing Phase Three of the ·vouth for 
Europe• programme designed to promote the development of exchanges among young people and of 
youth activities in the Community 
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Decision laying down a series of guidelines on 
trans-European energy networks 
Proposal for a Council Decision laying down a series of measures aimed at creating a more 
favourable context for the development of trans-European networks in the energy sector 
Proposal for a Council Decision on a series of guidelines for trans-European data communications 
networks between administrations 
Proposal for a Council Decision adopting a multiannual Community programme to support the 
implementation of trans-European networks for the interchange of data between 
administrations (IDA) 
rke/MM/ptm 
DOCUMENT 
COM(93)699 
COM(93)347 
COM(93) 708 -
94/0001 COD 
COM(93)453 
COM(93) 523 -
COD 474 
COM(93) 685 
COM(93) 69 
DATE 
5, 6 April 94 
17, 18 May 94 
17, 18 May 94 
17, 18 May 94 
17, 18 May 94 
17, 18 May 94 
17, 18 May 94 
EN 
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REF. 
CDR 176/94 
CDR 177/94 
CDR 181/94 
CDR 182/94 
CDR 183/94 
CDR 244/94 
CDR 245/94 
CDR 246/94 
CDR 248/94 
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SUBJECT 
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Decision on Community guidelines for the development of 
the trans-European transport network 
Proposal for a Council Directive on the interoperability of the European high speed train network 
Proposal for a Council Directive laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and 
to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which 
they are not nationals 
Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the quality of bathing water 
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Decision adopting an action plan 1995-1999 to combat 
cancer within the framework for action in the field of public health 
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Decision establishing 1996 as the European Year of lifelong 
Learning 
Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 85/337 /EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain 
public and private projects on the environment 
Programme of Community action on health promotion, information, education and training within the 
framework for action in the field of public health 
Programme of Community action on the prevention of drug dependence within the framework for action in 
the field of public health 
rke/MM/ptm 
DOCUMENT DATE 
COM(94) 106 27, 28 September 94 
COM(94) 107 27, 28 September 94 
COM(94) 38 27, 28 September 94 
COM(94) 36 27, 28 September 94 
COM(94) 83 27, 28 September 94 
COM(94) 264 15, 16 November 94 
COM(93) 575 15, 16 November 94 
COM(94) 202 15, 16 November 94 
COM(94) 223 15, 16 November 94 
EN 
65 
REF. 
CDR 39/94 
CDR 40/94 
CDR 41/94 
CDR 47/94 
CDR 49/94 
CDR 231/94 
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OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 
(referral by the Commission) 
SUBJECT 
The future of Community initiatives under the Structural Funds 
Community initiative concerning urban areas (URBANI 
Community initiative on the modernization of the textile and clothing industry in Portugal 
Green paper on the access of consumers to justice and the settlement of consumer 
disputes in the single market 
Proposal for a Council Regulation (ECl laying down general rules for the granting of 
Community financial aid in the field of trans-European networks 
Europe's way to the Information Society 
-- . 
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DOCUMENT 
COM(94) 46 
COM(94) 61 
COM(94) 82 
COM(94) 676 
COM(94) 62 
COM(94) 347 
DATE 
17, 18 May 94 
17, 18 May 94 
17, 18 May 94 
17, 18 May 94 
17, 18 May 94 
2 February 96 
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REF. 
CDR 171/94 
CDR 178/94 
CDR 179/94 
CDR 242/94 
CDR 243/94 
CDR 249/94 
CDR 18/95 
CDR 19/95 
CDR 20/95 
CDR 22/95 
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OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 
(own initiative) 
SUBJECT 
Commission communication on the White Paper wGrowth1 Competitiveness and Employmentw 
Green Paper on strategy options to strengthen the European programme industry in the 
context of the audiovisual policy of the European Union 
Green Paper on a common approach in the field of mobile and personal communications in the 
European Union 
Proposal for a Council Regulation (ECI on reform of the common organization of the market in 
wine 
White Paper on European Social Policy - A way forward for the Union 
Effects of the use of bovine somatotropin on milk production in the regions of the European 
Union 
Integrated programme in favour of SMEs 
Development of rural tourism 
Charging of EAGGF expenditure 
Energy and economic and social cohesion 
rke/MM}Ji 
DOCUMENT 
COM(94) 700 
COM(94) 96 
COMI94) 145 
COM(94) 117 
COM (94) 333 
COM (94) 207 
COM (93) 645 
DATE 
27 I 28 September 94 
27 I 28 September 94 
27 I 28 September 94 
151 16 November 94 
151 16 November 94 
15, 16 November 94 
1 February 95 
2 February 95 
2 February 95 
2 February 95 
EN 
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NUMBER OF OPINIONS ISSUED 
BY THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
on referral by the Council 
on referral by the Commission 
own initiative 
additional opinions 
information reports 
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(up to 31 March 1995) 
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138 
39 
31 
11 
2 
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ANNEX VIII 
OVERALL FIGURES CONCERNING RECOURSE 
TO TEC ARTICLE 235 AS A LEGAL BASIS 
FOR COMMUNITY ACTS 
Decisions Regulations Recommendations Directives TOTAL 
1992 17 14 4 35 
1993 13 8 1 22 
1994 15 12 27 
Jan/Mar 2 2 
1995 
Since the Treaty on European Union came into force, Article 235 has been used for the 
adoption of Regulations establishing a number of bodies (European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction, Translation Centre for the bodies of the Union, the European 
Training Foundation, the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, the European 
Cer)tre for the Development of Vocational Training, the Trade Mark Office and the Office for 
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, the International Science and Technology Centre). 
It has also been used for the adoption of Decisions and/or Regulations in the financial field 
(establishment of a Guarantee Fund for external action, financial contributions by the 
Community to the International Fund for Ireland, macro-financial assistance for Albania and 
Moldova, further macro-financial assistance for Romania, interest subsidies for SMUs, 
Community guarantee to the EIB in the event of losses resulting from loans granted for 
projects carried out by the CCEE). 
It has been used for the adoption of Decisions and Regulations in areas as varied as the 
consolidation of existing Community legislation on the definition of the ecu after the entry 
into force of the TEU, the introduction of Community plan variety rights, the Community 
trade mark, the continuation of the Handynet system and budgetary discipline. 
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1992 
1993 
1994 
Jan/Mar 
1995 
BREAKDOWN OF FIGURES ON THE USE 
OF ARTICLE 235 
ACCORDING TO WHETHER IT WAS THE SOLE LEGAL BASIS 
OR COMBINED WITH OTHER BASES 
235 alone 
Decisions Regulations Recommendations Directives 
9 14 4 
9 5 1 
12 12 
2 
235 + other legal bases 
TOTAL 
27 
15 
24 
2 
Decisions Regulations Recommendations Directives TOTAL Other legal bases 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Jan/Feb 
1995 
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8 113 
7 51-113-1 28-
130R-1 30S-203 
3 203-43 
Multiple basis 
chosen for the 
Decision 
concluding the 
Uruguay Round 
EN 
70 
Country 
FRY (1) 
Haltl 
FRY (11 
Boenia 
(under 
Soenien 
Serb 
control) 
F~Y (1) 
Haiti 
Lillye 
IMPLEMENTATION IN EU LEGISLATION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTIONS ON SANCTfONS 
BASED ON ARTICLE 228a 
UN Security Preeidenc:y Common Convninion Legal base 
Counoil proposal position adopted propotal for 
resolution for (Procedure) Community 
common Implementing 
potition leglllletlon 
970(95) 13.1.95 23.1.95 Text before 
12.1.95 meeting doc. (·A- item! Council 
conaidtrod to be 
formql 
propotal t• 1 
Regulation 228a 
944(84) 11.10.94 14.10.94 l3. 10.94 ,., 
29.9.94 BON 1525 Cor11u written Regulation 228a 
prooeduro 
943(941 29.9.94 10.10.94 10.1o.s4 c·t 
23.9.94 meeting doc. ("A• item) Rogul•lion 22Ss 
942(94) 29.9,94 10.10.94 10.10.94 ,., 
23.9.94 meeting doc. (·A~ iteml Regulation 22811+73g 
Regulation 228a 
757(92) 26.5.94 13.6.94 24.6.93 ,., 
30.5.92 meeting doc. rA" item) Regulation 228a 
917(94) 20.5.94 30.5.94 19.5.94 , •• 
6.5.94 SEC 605 ("A"Item) Regulation 228e 
Regulation .Z28e+73g 
Recommendation 73g 
883(93) 12.11.93 22.11.93 23.1 1.93 (•) 
11.11.93 BRU 1290 ("A- item! Regulation 228u 
Regulation .228e 
(*} It should be noted that in certain cases, a decision by the Representatives of 
ANNEX IX 
Implementing 
legialatiun 
adopted 
(Procedure) 
23.1.95 
(• A. "ltoml 
19.10.94 
(written 
procedure) 
10.10.94 
t•A• ltoml 
10.10.94 
(•A• item) 
11.7.94 
("A• item) 
30.5.94 
("A"Item) 
29.11.93 
the governments of Member States meeting within the Council was also required 
for ECSC products. 
( 1} Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
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ACTS BASED ON ARTICLE 228a OF THE EC TREATY 
Libya 
Council Regulation No 3274/93 of 29 November 1993 preventing the supply of certain goods 
and services to libya (OJ No L 295, 30.11.1993, p. 1) 
Council Regulation No 3275/93 of 29 November 1993 prohibiting the satisfying of claims 
with regard to contracts and transactions the performance of which was affected by the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 883 (1993) and related resolutions 
Former Yugoslavia 
Council Regulation No 1733/94 of 11 July 19S": prohibiting the satisfying of claims with 
regard to contracts and transactions the performance of which was affected by the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 75 7( 1992) and related resolutions (OJ No L 1 82, 
16.7.1994) 
Council Regulation No 24 71 /94 of 1 0 October 1994 introducing a further discontinuation of 
the economic and financial relations between the European Community and the areas of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces (OJ No L 266, 15.10.1994, 
p. 1) 
Council Regulation No 24 72/94 of 10 October 1994 suspending certain elements of the 
embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia {Serbia and Montenegro) (OJ No L 266, 
15.10.1994, p. 8) 
Council Regulation No 109/95 amending Regulation No 2472/94 suspending certain elements 
of the embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) {OJ No L 20, 
27.1.1995, p. 1) 
Haiti 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1263/94 of 30 May 1994 introducing a discontinuation of certain 
economic and financial relations with Haiti (OJ No L 139, 2.6.1994, p. 1) 
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Council Regulation CEC) No 1264/94 of 30 May 1994 prohibiting the satisfying of claims by 
the Haitian authorities with regard to contracts and transactions the performance of which 
was affected by the measures imposed by or pursuant to United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 917(1994), 841(1993), 873{1993) and 875(1993) {OJ No L 139, 2.6.1994, 
p. 4) 
Council Recommendation of 30 May 1994 concerning a discontinuation of certain economic 
and financial relations with Haiti (OJ No L 139, 2.6.1994, p. 7) 
Council Regulation {EC) No 2543/94 of 19 October 1994 repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1263/94 introducing the discontinuation of certain economic and financial relations with 
Haiti {OJ No L 271,21.10.1994, p. 1) 
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LIST OF COMMON POSITIONS 
ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL SINCE THE ENTRY 
INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 
( 1 NOVEMBER 1993) 
TITLE 
1. FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
Council Decision on the common position, 
defined on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty 
on European Union and concerning the 
prorogation of the suspension of certain trade 
restrictions with the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia {Serbia and Montenegro) 
Council Decision on the common position defined 
on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on 
European Union end concerning the reduction of 
economic and financial relations with those parts 
of the territory of the Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina under the control of the 
Bosnian Serb forces 
Council Decision concerning the common 
position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of the 
Treaty on European Union and regarding the 
suspension of certain restrictions on trade with 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) 
Council Decision on the common position defined 
by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the 
Treaty on European Union concerning prohibition 
of the satisfaction of the claims referred to in 
paragraph 9 of the UN Security Council 
Resolution No 757 (1992) 
2. UKRAINE 
Common position defined by the Council on the 
basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European 
Union on the objectives and priorities of the 
European Union towards Ukraine 
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DATE 
23.01.1995 
10.10., 994 
10.10.1994 
13.6.1994 
28.11.1994 
rke/MM/jl 
:119 
DECISION No 
95/140/CFSP 
94/672/CFSP 
94/673/CFSP 
94/366/CFSP 
94n79/CFSP 
ANNEX XCal 
OFFICIAL 
JOURNAL 
L 21 
(28.01.95) 
L 266 
(1 5.1 0.1994) 
L 266 
(15.10., 994) 
L 165 
(1.7.1994) 
L 313 
(6.12.1994) 
EN 
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TITLE 
3. HAITI 
Council Decision concerning the common 
position defined on the basis of Article J.2 
of the Treaty on European Union regarding 
the termination of the reduction of 
economic relations with Haiti 11! 
Council Decision concerning the common 
position defined on the basis of 
Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union 
regarding the reduction of economic 
relations with Haiti 
4. RWANDA 
Council Decision on the common position 
adopted by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.2 of the Treaty on European 
Union concerning the objectives and 
priorities of the European Union towards 
Rwanda 
5. SUDAN 
Council Decision on the common position 
defined on the basis of Article j.2 of 
the Treaty on European Union concerning 
the imposition of AN embargo on arms, munitions 
end military equipment on Sudan 
6. LIBYA 
Council Decision on the common position 
defined on the basis of Article J.2 of 
the Treaty on European Union with regard 
to the reduction of economic relations with 
Libya 
7. BURUNDI 
Council Decision on the Common position 
defined on the basis of Article J.2 of 
the treaty on European Union relative to 
Burundi 
(1 J Only the French text is authentic. 
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DATE 
14.10.1994 
30.5.1994 
24.10.1994 
15.3.1994 
22.11.1993 
24.03.95 
rke/MM/jl 
12 (~ 
DECISION No 
94/681/CFSP 
94/31 5/CFSP 
94/697/CFSP 
94/1 65/CFSP 
93/614/CFSP 
OFFICIAL 
JOURNAL 
L 271 
(21.10.1994) 
L 139 
(2.6.1994) 
L 283 
(29. 1 0.1994) 
L 75 
(17 .3.1994) 
L 295 
(30., 1.1993) 
L72 
(1.4.1995) 
EN 
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LIST OF JOINT ACTIONS 
ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL SINCE THE ENTRY 
INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 
(1 NOVEMBER 19931 
1. FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
Council Decision supplementing 
Decision 94/790/CFSP concerning the joint 
action, adopted by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on 
continued support for European Union 
administration of the town of Moster 
Council Decision concerning the joint action, 
adopted by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on 
continued support for European Union 
administration of the town of Moster 
Council Decision extending the application of 
Decision 93/603/CFSP concerning the joint 
action decided on by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union on 
support for the convoying of humanitarian aid in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Supplementing Decision concerning the joint 
action decided on by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union on 
support for the convoying of humanitarian aid in 
Bosnia end Herzegovina 
Council Decision adapting end extending the 
application of Decision 93/603/CFSP concerning 
the joint action decided on by the Council on the 
basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European 
Union on support for the convoying of 
humanitarian aid in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Council Decision extending the application of 
Decision 93/603/CFSP concerning the joint 
action decided on by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union on 
support for the convoying of humanitarian aid in 
Bosnia end Herzegovina 
Council Decision supplementing the joint action 
for the convoying of humanitarian aid in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Council Decision concerning the joint action 
decided on by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union on 
support for the convoying of humanitarian aid in 
Bosnia end Herzegovina 
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06.02.1995 
12.12.1994 
12.12.1994 
27.07.1994 
16.5.1994 
7.3.1994 
20.12.1993 
8.11.1993 
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95/23./CFSP 
94/790/CFSP 
94/789/CFSP 
94/51 0/CFSP 
94/308/CFSP 
94/158/CFSP 
93/729/CFSP 
93/603/CFSP 
ANNEX Xfb} 
L 33 {13.2.1995) 
L 326 (17.12.19941 
L 326 (1 7 .12.1994) 
L 205 (8.8.1994)) 
L 134 (30.5.1994) 
L 70 (1 2.3.19941 
L 339 (31.12.1993) 
L 286 (20.11.1993) 
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·:DATE 
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2. SOUTH AFRICA 
Council Decision on a joint action adopted by the 6.12.1993 
Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty 
on European Union concerning support for the 
transition towards a democratic and multi-racial 
South Africa 
3. STABILITY PACT 
Council Decision on the continuation of the joint 
action adopted by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union on 
the inaugural conference on the stability pact 
Council Decision concerning the joint action by 
the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the 
.. Treaty on European Union on the inaugurel 
conference on the stability pact 
_ 4. MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 
14.6.1994 
20.12.1993 
Council Decision on a joint action adopted by the 1 9.4. 1 994 
Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty 
on European Union, in support of the Middle East 
peace process 
5. NON-PROLIFERATION 
Council Decision concerning the joint action 
adopted by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union 
regarding preparation for the 1995 Conference 
of the States parties to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
6. RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY 
ELECTIONS 
Council Decision concerning the joint action 
decided on by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union 
concerning the dispatch of a team of observers 
for the Parliamentary elections in the Russian 
Federation 
7. DUAL-USE GOODS 
Council Decision on the joint action adopted by 
the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the 
Treaty on European Union concerning the control 
of exports of dual-use goods 
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25.7.1994 
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DECISION No 
93/678/CFSP 
94/367/CFSP 
93/728/CFSP 
94/276/CFSP 
94/509/CFSP 
93/604/CFSP 
94/942/CFSP 
::· .. :=···=··~::OFFICIAL··:=.:~:·-.;:· 
., , · .:::··JoURNAL .. · .. ' = 
L 316 (17.12.1993) 
L 165 (1.7.1994) 
L 339 (31.12.1993) 
L 11917.5.19941 
L 205 (8.8. 1 9941 
L 286 (20.11.1993) 
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ANNEX X(c) 
1993 CFSP STATEMENTS - after entry into force of TEU (1.11.93) 
Statement No 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
, 10 
111 
112 
113 
114 
1, 5 
116 
TOTAL: 
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15 
Subject 
ECOMSA BRIEF 
NAGORNO-KARABAKH 
KEMPTON PARK NEGOTIATIONS 
CONGO 
NIGERIA 
JUDICIAL PROCESS AT TIRASPOL 
YEMEN 
PHILIPPINES 
INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
GEORGIA 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
RUSSIAN ELECTIONS 
INDIA 
KAZAKHSTAN 
rke/MM/jl 
date 
4.11.93 
9.11.93 
18.11.93 
18.11.93 
18.11.93 
25.11.93 
25.11.93 
26.11.93 
30.11.93 
30.11.93 
11.12.93 
11.12.93 
16.12.93 
20.12.93 
22.12.93 
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1994 CFSP STATEMENTS 
Statement No 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
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Subject 
CONGO 
AZERBAIJAN 
USA/RUSSIA/UKRAINE AGREEMENT 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
YEMEN 
LESOTHO 
AFGHANISTAN 
RUSSIA 
UKRAINE 
SARAJEVO 
BURUNDI 
APPOINTMENT OF AYALA LASSO TO THE UN 
SUDAN 
YEMEN 
HEBRON 
NIGERIA AND CAMEROON 
TOGO 
NAMIBIA 
SOUTH AFRICA 
SKRUNDA 
SOMALIA 
MIDDLE EAST 
-
ACCESSION OF KAZAKHSTAN TO THE NPT 
AFGHANISTAN 
BALTIC COUNTRIES 
LIBERIA 
TOGO 
MOLDOVA 
BURUNDI 
FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH LITHUANIA 
rke/MM/jl 
date 
12.1.94 
17.1.94 
18.1.94 
21.1.94 
31.1.94 
3.2.94 
7.2.94 
7.2.94 
7.2.94 
7.2.94 
11.2.94 
21.2.94 
21.2.94 
24.2.94 
26.2.94 
28.2.94 
28.2.94 
2.3.94 
2.3.94 
3.3.94 
4.3.94 
8.3.94 
9.3.94 
17.3.94 
18.3.94 
22.3.94 
23.3.94 
24.3.94 
25.3.94 
30.3.94 
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31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
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TURKEY - HUMAN RIGHTS 
NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR ISSUE 
SOUTH AFRICA 
ISRAEL 
RWANDA AND BURUNDI 
RWANDA 
BOSNIA 
UKRAINE 
GEORGIA 
SOUTH AFRICA 
RWANDA 
UGANDA 
ESTONIA 
GAZA-JERICHO 
RWANDA 
SOUTH AFRICA 
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN LATVIA AND RUSSIA 
YEMEN 
GUATEMALA 
RWANDA 
TAJIKISTAN 
CRIMEA 
SOUTH AFRICA 
MALAWI 
HAITI 
CROATIAN/SERBIAN/MOSLEM AGREEMENT 
MOSTAR 
LATVIAN CITIZENSHIP 
ETHIOPIA 
NIGERIA - ARREST OF MOSHAAD ABIOLA 
ANGOLA 
GUATEMALA 
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125 
31.3.94 
31.3.94 
7.4.94 
8.4.94 
12.4.94 
18.4.94 
18.4.94 
19.4.94 
22.4.94 
22.4.94 
25.4.94 
25.4.94 
3.5.94 
4.5.94 
6.5.94 
6.5.94 
10.5.94 
6.5.94 
11.5.94 
16.5.94 
17.5.94 
22.5.94 
27.5.94 
27.5.94 
27.5.94 
10.6.94 
15.6.94 
21.6.94 
24.6.94 
30.6.94 
30.6.94 
7.7.94 
EN 
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63 
64 
65 
66 
67-
CANCELLED 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
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VISIT OF ARAFAT TO GAZA AND JERICHO 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
EAST TIMOR 
YEMEN 
RWANDA 
GUINEA-BISSAU - ELECTIONS 
GAMBIA 
HUSSEIN/RABIN MEETING 
BURUNDI 
ZAIRE 
TAJIKISTAN 
RUSSO-SAL TIC RELATIONS 
ACCESSION OF KYRGYZSTAN TO THE NPT 
NAGORNO-KARABAKH 
LESOTHO 
NIGERIA 
WITHDRAWAL FROM LATVIA AND ESTONIA OF 
TROOPS FROM THE FORMER USSR 
NAGORNO-KARABAKH 
LESOTHO 
HAITI 
ALGERIA 
BURUNDI 
IRAQ 
GAMBIA 
HAITI 
ISRAEL 
JORDAN/ISRAEL 
MOZAMBIQUE 
NIGER 
SUDAN 
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE 
rke/MM/jl 
7.7.94 
18.7.94 
18.7.94 
19.7.94 
22.7.94 
22.7.94 
25.7.94 
26.7.94 
27.7.94 
27.7.94 
28.7.94 
28.7.94 
29.7.94 
5.8.94 
24.8.94 
25.8.94 
31.8.94 
15.9.94 
16.9.94 
19.9.94 
26.9.94 
5.10.94 
11.10.94 
13.10.94 
15.10.94 
20.10.94 
26.10.94 
27.10.94 
27.10.94 
31.10.94 
3.11.94 
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95 GAMBIA 
96 ANGOLA 
97 MOZAMBIQUE 
98 CHILE-ARGENTINA CONCERNING LAGUNA DEL 
DESIERTO 
99 INDONESIA - SENTENCING OF MUCHT AR 
PAKPAHAN 
100 ANGOLA - PEACE 
101 MEETING OF APEC LEADERS - BOGOR, 15.11.94 
102 MOLDOVA 
103 ACCESSION OF UKRAINE TO THE NPT -
POSITION OF UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT 
104 SRI LANKA 
105 MOLDAVA 
106 RWANDA 
107 UKRAINE - ACCESSION TO THE NPT 
108 TURKEY - SENTENCING OF 8 FORMER MEMBERS 
OF THE TURKISH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
109 FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
110 NAMIBIA - ELECTIONS 
111 NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN LITHUANIA AND 
RUSSIA - MILITARY TRANSIT TO AND FROM 
KALININGRAD 
TOTAL: 110 
Information supplied by the Press Office on 31 March 1995. 
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3.11.94 
21.11.94 
12.12.94 
22.11.94 
22.11.94 
23.11.94 
29.11.94 
30.11.94 
29.11.94 
28.11.94 
28.11.91 
8.12.94 
9.12.94 
10.12.94 
14.12.94 
22.12.94 
EN 
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REFERENCE 
P.001 (4060/95 Presse 001) 
P.002 (4215/95 Presse 011) 
P.003 (4377/95 Presse 016) 
P.004 (4380/95 Presse 019) 
P.005 (4382/95 Presse 021 I 
P.006 (4384/95 Presse 023) 
P.007 (4385/95 Presse 024) 
P.008 (4386/95 Presse 025) 
P.009 (4545/95 Presse 026) 
P.010 (4546/95 Presse 027) 
P.011 (4549/95 Presse 030) 
P.012 (4550/95 Presse 031) 
P.013 (4552/95 Presse 033) 
P.014 (4553/95 Presse 034) 
P.015 (4554/95 Presse 035) 
P.016 (4717/95 Presse 037) 
P.017 (4 720/95 Presse 040) 
5082!95 
(ANNEX X) 
CFSP STATEMENTS MADE UNDER THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY 
DATE SUBJECT 
05/01/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the situation in the Palestinian 
Territories 
17/01/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union concerning Chechnya 
20/01/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union concerning Somalia 
23/01/95 Declaration by the European Union on the attack in Netanya 
23/01/95 Declaration by the European Union on Algeria 
23/01/95 Statement by the European Union on the former Yugoslavia 
23/01/95 Declaration by the European Union on Chechnya 
30/01/95 Statement by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on accession of Algeria to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
30/01/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the situation in Sri Lanka 
30/01/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Afghanistan 
01/02/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Frontier Conflict between 
Ecuador and Peru 
01/02/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the attack In Algiers on 
30 January 
06/02/95 Declaration by the European Union following the Cairo Summit 
06/02/95 Declaration by the European Union on former Yugoslavia 
06/02/95 Declaration by the European Union on Chechnya 
07/02/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the legislative elections in 
Niger 
13/02/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the situation of the trade 
union leader, Mr Pakpahan 
rke/MM/jl E~ 
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P.018 (4721/95 Presse 041) 13/02/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Sixth Anniversary of the 
Iranian Fatwa against Salman Rushdie 
P.019 (4 723/95 Presse 043) 14/02/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Sferra leone 
P.020 (4724/95 Presse 044) 15/02/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the release of members of the 
OMONIA movement 
P.021 (4947/95 Presse 050) 21/02/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Angola 
········ 
(4948/95 Presse 051) 1"1 22/02/95 Statement by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the occasion of the publication 
of the Anglo-Irish framework document on Northern Ireland 
P.022 (4949/95 Presse 052) 23/02/95 Statement by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the accession of Argentina to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
P.023 (4952/95 Presse 055) 28/02/95 Statement by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union concerning Pakistan 
P.024 (5215/95 Presse 060) 02/03/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union regarding the situation in the 
South China Sea 
P.025 (5218/95 Presse 063) 03/03/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union concerning North Korea 
P.026 (5426/95 Presse 072) 13/03/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union concerning the situation in Burma 
P.027 (5430/95 Presse 076) 19/03/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Union's objectives and 
priorities regarding Burundi 
P.028 (5740/95 Presse 079) 20/03/95 Statement by the President on behalf of the European Union on the constitutional situation in 
Kazakhstan 
P.029 (5746/95 Presse 085) 21/03/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union concerning the Gambia 
P.030 (5747/95 Presse 086) 20/03/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union regarding Sri lanka 
P.031 (5956/95 Presse 089) 22/03/95 Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union concerning Nigeria 
Information supplied by the Press Office on 31 March 1995. 
1
"1 This is not a CFSP statement. 
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LEVEL OF DIALOGUE 
HEADS OF STATE 
MINISTERS 
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COUNTRY 
CANADA 
CYPRUS 
JAPAN 
RUSSIA 
UNITED STATES 
ALBANIA 
AUSTRALIA 
A SEAN 
BALTIC STATES 
EEA 
CENTRAL AMERICA 
CHINA 
CYPRUS 
GULF CO-OPERATION 
COUNCIL 
INDIA 
JAPAN 
LEBANON 
POLITICAL DIALOGUE COMMITMENTS 
LIST OF MEETINGS HELD UP TO 31.03.1995 
FORMAT FREQUENCY 
PRES + CION REGULARLY 
- NOT SPECIFIED 
- ONCE A YEAR 
- TWICE A YEAR 
PRES + CION ONCE PER PRESIDENCY 
NOT SPECIFIED REGULARLY 
TROIKA OR PRES + CION NOT SPECIFIED 
COUNCIL TWICE A YEAR 
TROIKA + CION ONCE A YEAR 
NOT SPECIFIED REGULARLY 
NOT SPECIFIED TWICE A YEAR 
COUNCIL IN MARGINS OF UNGA 
SAN JOSE MINISTERIAL MEETING ONCE A YEAR 
TROIKA + CION IN MARGINS OF UNGA 
PRES+ CION NOT SPECIFIED 
ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ONCE A YEAR 
CO-OPERATION COUNCIL ONCE A YEAR 
COUNCIL IN MARGINS OF UNGA 
TROIKA + CION NOT SPECIFIED 
TROIKA + CION ONCE PER PRESIDENCY 
MINISTERS (16 + 1) NOT SPECIFIED 
CO-OPERATION COUNCIL 
rke/MM/jl 
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DATE 
06.07.94 
23.06.94 
06.07.93 
11.11.93 
11.01.94 
12.07.94 
14.02.94 (PRES + CION) 
23.09.93 
17.01.94 (PRES + CION) 
23.09.93 
26.07.94 
17.05.94 
28.09.94 (TROIKA + CION) 
06.03.95 
29.09.94 
26.03.94 
26.09.94 
15.12.94 
18.04.94 
07.05.94 
28.09.94 
08.02.94 
28.09.94 
06.03.95 
EN 
85 
LEVEL OF DIALOGUE 
POLITICAL DIRECTORS 
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COUNTRY 
MALTA 
NON ALIGNED 
RIO GROUP 
RUSSIA 
TURKEY 
UKRAINE 
UNITED STATES 
MULTILATERAL CCE 
BALTIC STATES 
CANADA 
JAPAN 
PAKISTAN 
RUSSIA 
TURKEY 
UNITED STATES 
MULTILATERAL CCE 
FORMAT 
PRES+ CION 
TROIKA +CION 
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 
COUNCIL 
TROIKA + CION 
ASSOCIATION COUNCIL 
TROIKA + CION 
COUNCIL 
PRES+ CION 
COUNCIL 
PRES + CION 
PRES+ CION 
TROIKA + CION 
TROIKA + CION 
TROIKA + CION 
. ·-
TROIKA + CION 
TROIKA + CION 
15 + CION (1) 
rke/MM/jl 
FREQUENCY 
WHENEVER NECESSARY 
ONCE A YEAR 
ONCE A YEAR 
IN MARGINS OF UNL- :. 
. .. 
AD HOC 
ONCE A YEAR 
AD HOC 
ONCE PER PRESIDENCY 
AD HOC 
ONCE PER PRESIDENCY 
REGULARLY 
ONCE PER PRESIDENCY 
ONCE PER PRESIDENCY 
NOT SPECIFIED 
TWICE A YEAR 
NOT SPECIFIED 
ONCE PER PRESIDENCY 
ONCE PER PRESIDENCY 
DATE 
07.04.94 
28.09.94 
22.04.94 
27.09.94 
18.02.94 
29.09.94 
19.12.94 
10.03.94 
04.10.94 
29.09.94 
31.01.94 
19.04.94 
31.10.94 
06.09.94 (TROIKA + CION) 
22.11.94 (TROIKA + CION) 
03.12.93 
18.04.94 
23.11.94 
07.11.94 
04.11.93 
06.06.94 
12.07.94 
18.05.94 
21.11.94 
20.01.95 
03.06.94 
25.10.94 
EN 
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POLITICAL DIALOGUE COMMITMENTS !AS STANDING ON 31.12.94) 
COUNTRY FORMAT FREQUENCY B GR GER FR 
ALBANIA 
HOS .... . ... . ... . ... . ... 
MIN NOT SPECIFIED REGULAR .... PR+CION . ... 
14.2.94 
PO PRES+CION REGULAR .... . ... . ... 
BASIS JOINT DECLARATION ISSUED AT SIGNATURE OF COOPERATION AGREEMENT 11.05.92 
AUSTRALIA 
HOS .... . ... .... . ... . ... 
MIN TROIKA OR PRES +CION NOT SPECIFIED PR+CION PR+CION .... 
23.9.93 17.1.94 
PO PRES+CION ONCE PER PRESIDENCY .... . ... . ... 
BASIS COUNCIL DECISION OF 7 .5.90 
ASEAN 
,, 
HOS .... .... .... . ... . ... 
MIN COUNCIL EVERY 2 YEARS .... .... 23.09.94 
TR +CION !ASEAN PMCI ONCE PER YEAR 26.7.93 .... 26.07.94 
ASEAN REG.FORUM TR+CION BACK TO BACK ASEAN PMC .... . ... 25.07.94 
PD/SEN.OFFICIALS TR +CION (ASEAN PMC SOMI ONCE PER YEAR 20.5.93 .... .... 
BASIS EC/ASEAN MINISTERIAL DECISIONS OF NOVEMBER 1978 AND OCTOBER 1992 
PROPOSAL FOR ARF MEETING WAS MADE AT ASEAN PMC OF 26.07.93 
PROPOSAL FOR ASEAN PMC SOM WAS MADE ON 08.01.93 
BAI :·~oo: 
~ ·~ "'!'..,. 
Hm. .... .... . ... . ... . ... 
MIN NOT SPECIFIED REGULAR .... TR+CION TR+CION . 
17.05.94 28.09.94 
- ·-·-
PO PRESIDENCY+ CION REGULAR .... . ... TR+CION 
I 06.09.94 
. _. 
il BASIS JOINT DECLARATION ISSUED AT SIGNATURE OF COOPERATION AGREEMENT 11.05.92 
5082/95 rke/MM/jl EN 
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COUNTRY FORMAT FREQUENCY B GR GER FR 
CANADA 
HOS PRES+CION REGULARLY .... . ... 08.07.94 
MIN PRES+CION ONCE PER PRESIDENCY .... . ... . ... 30.5.95 
PO PRES+CION ONCE PER PRESIDENCY .... . ... 22.11.94 14.03.95 
TR+CION 
BASIS DECLARATION ON EU/CANADA RELATIONS (22. 11.901 
CENTRAL AMERICA 
HOS .... .... .... . ... . ... 
MIN COUNCIL IN MARGIN OF UNGA 30.9.93 .... 29.9.94 . ... 
SAN JOSE MINISTERIAL ONCE PER YEAR .... 28.3.94 . ... 23.02.95 
PO .... .... . ... . ... . ... 
BASIS SAN JOSE MINISTERIAL: FINAL ACT LUXEMBOURG CONF. 12.1 1.85 
CHINA 
:tJ:··: ····n 
HOS .... .... . ... .... . ... 
MIN TROIKA +CION IN MARGIN OF UNGA 27.9.93 .... 26.09.94 
TROIKA+ CION IRREGULAR .... . ... 
HOM BEIJING +CH.M.F.A ONCE PER PRESIDENCY .... .... 
PR + CH AMB TO PRESIDENCY ONCE PER PRESIDENCY .... .... 
PO/S.OFF. TROIKA +CION IRREGULAR .... . ... 
BASIS EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN EU AND CHINA IN MAY 1994 
CYPRUS 
HOS PRES+CION NOT SPECIFIED .... PR+CO .... 
23.6.94 
MIN PRES+CION NOT SPECIFIED .... . ... 15.12.94 
ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ONCE PER YEAR 18.4.94 .... 
PO PRES+CION SEMI-ANNUAL .... .... . ... 
BASIS COUNCIL DECISION 18.07.1988 +DECISION ASSOCIATION COUNCIL21.12.92 
....... ,. 
5082/95 rke/MM/jl EfJ 
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COUNTRY 
GULF COOPERATION 
COUNCIL 
HOS 
MIN 
PO 
BASIS 
HOS 
MIN 
PO 
BASIS 
HOS 
MIN 
PO 
BASIS 
HOS 
MIN 
PO 
BASIS 
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INDIA 
JAPAN 
MALTA 
FORMAT FREQUENCY 
.... .... 
COOPERATION COUNCIL ONCE PER YEAR 
COUNCIL IN THE MARGIN OF UNGA 
.... .... 
.... . ... 
TROIKA +CION NOT SPECIFIED 
.... .... 
EU/INDIA POLITICAL STATEMENT 20.12.93 
PRES+CION ONCE PER YEAR 
TROIKA+ CION ONCE PER PRESIDENCY 
TROIKA+ CION ONCE PER PRESIDENCY 
---
EU/JAPAN JOINT DECLARATION 18.07.91 
.... .... 
ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ONCE PER YEAR 
PRES+CION AS NECESSARY 
PRES+CION ONCE PER PRESIDENCY 
EXCHANGE OF LETTERS 29.04.88 
rke/MM/jl 
B GR 
.... .... 
.... 7.5.94 
30.9.93 .... 
. ... .... 
.... . ... 
.... 8.2.94 
.... . ... 
8.7.93 .... 
29.9.93 .... 
UNGA 
3.12.93 18.4.94 
.... .... 
.... .... 
.... 7.4.94 
.... .... 
GER 
. ... 
.... 
28.9.94 
. ... 
. ... 
. ... 
. ... 
. ... 
28.9.94 
UNGA 
23.11.94 
.... 
. ... 
. ... 
.... 
FR 
29.5.95 
. ... 
24.5.95 
30.8.95 
. ... 
EN 
89 
COUNTRY FORMAT FREQUENCY B GR GER FR 
NEW ZEALAND 
HOS .... . ... . ... . ... . ... 
MIN PRES+CION AS NECESSARY .... . ... . ... 
TROIKA +CION ASEAN PMC 27.7.93 .... . ... 
PO PRES+CION ONCE PER PRESIDENCY .... . ... . ... 
BASIS DECISION OF POLITICAL COMMITTEE 06.09.90 
NON-ALIGNED 
HOS .... . ... . ... . ... . ... 
MIN TROIKA +CION ONCE PER YEAR (UNGA) 29.9.93 .... 28.9.94 
PO .... . ... .... . ... . ... 
BASIS DECISION BY POLITICAL COMMITTEE 05.09.90 
~--· 
PAKISTAN 
HOS .... . ... .... . ... . ... 
MIN .... . ... . ... . ... . ... 
POIOEPUTY PO TROIKA+ CION NOT SPECIFIED 4.12.94 .... 7.11.94 
BASIS DECISION OF POLITICAL COMMITTEE 12.02.92 
RIO GROUP 
,. ... ... 
HOS .... .... . ... . ... . ... 
MIN MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ONCE PER YEAR .... 22.4.94 . ... 17.3.95 
COUNCIL IN THE MARGIN OF UNGA 29.9.93 .... 27.9.94 . ... 
PO .... .... .... . ... . ... 
BASIS DECLARATION OF 20.12.90 
5082/95 rke/MM/ji EN 
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COUNTRY 
RUSSIA 
HOS 
MIN 
PD/SEN.OFF 
BASIS 
SOUTH KOREA 
HOS 
MIN 
PD 
BASIS 
SRI LANKA 
HOS 
MIN 
PD/SEN.OFF 
BASIS 
TURKEY 
HOS 
MIN 
PO 
BASIS 
So82;95 
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FORMAT FREQUENCY 
PRES+CION TWICE PER YEAR 
COOPERATION COUNCIL ONCE PER YEAR 
TROIKA+CION AD HOC 
TROIKA+ CION TWICE PER YEAR 
PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT 24.08.94 
.... .... 
PRES+CION AD HOC 
TROIKA +CION MARGIN ASEAN PMC 
PRES +CION REGULARLY 
DECISION OF POLITICAL COMMITIEE 06.06.89 
.... .... 
TROIKA +CION NOT SPECIFIED 
TROIKA+ CION NOT SPECIFIED 
EUISRI LANKA POLITICAL STATEMENT 16.05,94 
PRES+CION AS NECESSARY 
ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ONCE PER YEAR 
TROIKA+ CION SEMESTER WHEN NO 
ASS.COUNCIL 
TROIKA+ CION NOT SPECIFIED 
ASSOCIATION COUNCIL DECISION 09.1 1.92 
rke/MM/jl 
B GR 
11.11.93 .... 
.... . ... 
29.9.93 18.2.94 
(12 + 6) 
UNGA 
4.11.93 6 6.94 
-··""' 
. ... . ... 
.... .... 
28.7.93 .... 
.... .... 
.... .... 
.... .... 
.... .... 
.... .... 
8.11.93 .... 
.... .... 
15.9.93 .... 
GER 
. ... 
. ... 
29.9.94 
(18 + 8) 
UNGA 
. ... 
. ... 
. ... 
. ... 
. ... 
.... 
. ... 
. .... 
19.12.94 
. ... 
12.7.94 
FR 
. ... 
9.3.95 
30.1.95 
. ... 
23.3.95 
27.2.95 
EN 
91 
COUNTRY FORMAT FREQUENCY 
UKRAINE 
HOS NOT SPECIFIED AS NECESSARY 
MIN COOPERATION COUNCIL ONCE PER YEAR 
TROIKA+ CION AD HOC 
PO/SENIOR NOT SPECIFIED REGULARLY 
OFFICIALS 
BASIS EU/UKRAINE COOPERATION AGREEMENT 14.06.94 
USA 
HOS PRES+CION ONCE PER PRESIDENCY 
MIN COUNCIL ONCE PER PRESIDENCY 
PRES+CION AD HOC 
PO TROIKA +CION ONCE PER PRESIDENCY 
BASIS EU/US DECLARATION 23.11.90 
EEA 
HOS PRES COUNCIL+ PRES CION NOT SPECIFIED 
MIN TWICE PER YEAR 
PO NOT SPECIFIED 
BASIS EXCHANGE OF LETTERS TO BE FINALIZED 
LEBANON 
,...... 
MIN 16 + 1 NOT SPECIFIED 
PD 
BASIS COOPERATION COUNCIL 
-·-
5682/95 rke/MM/jl 
B GR 
.... . ... 
.... . ... 
.... 10.3.94 
.... . ... 
.... 11.1.94 
28.9.93 .... 
UNGA 
16.7.93 31.1.94 
28.10.93 18.5.94 
GER 
.... 
4.10.94 
18 +CION 
12.7.94 
29.9.94 
UNGA 
21.11.94 
FR 
. ... 
20.6.95 
5.1.95 
TROIKA 
30.5.95 
26.1.95 
20.1.95 
6.3.95 
6.3.95 
EN 
Q? 
COUNTRY FORMAT FREQUENCY J GEA FR 
CCE 
.. 
_, --
HOS COUNCIL NOT SPECIFIED j (MUL TILATERALI PRES+CION ONCE PER YEAR 
_J 
HOS (BILATERAL) NOT SPECIFIED (IN FRAMEWORK OF NOT SPECIFIED I 
HUNGARY ASSOCIATION COUNCIL) 
-. 
HOS (BILATERAL) PRES+ CION liN THE FRAMEWORK OF AS NECESSARY 
BU +PO+ RO+Sl+CZ ASSOCIATION COUNCIL) ! 
MIN (MULTILATERAL) COUNCIL ONCE PER PRESIDENCY I 19.4.9;t 31.10.94 10.4.95 
TROIKA+ CION AS NECESSARY 
' 
·. 
MIN (BILATERAL) IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ASSOCIATION ONCE PER YEAR 
COUNCILI 
PD CMUL TILATERALI 15 +CION 1"1 ONCE PER PRESIDENCY 
-~ 
~.6.9<t- 25.10.94 3.4.95 
TROIKA+ CION AS NECESSARY ... !~ 
PO (BILATERAL) PRES+CION NOT SPECIFIED 
BASIS COPENHAGEN SUMMIT 22.08.93 COUNCIL DECISION 08.03.94 
(•) PREFERABLY IN THE RUN-UP TO EACH REGULAR EUROPEAN COUNCIL. 
In principle, the EU holds Association or Cooperation Councils once a year with the following Ct•Jntr!e~i l!gypt, Israel, lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia (although 
there has never been a Cooperation Council with lebanon and the first Cooperation Council wit Sy~ia t!)ok PliJp~ on 28.11.94). In the framework of these councils, 
political dialogue issues are usually referred to by both parties in their respective Rpositions• ano are olso ffiscuut~d informally over dinner. 
5082!95 
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Furthermore, political dialogue meetings are held, in the margin of UNGA, with Egypt and Israel. 
(a) Egypt : Troika+ Cion 27.09.94 
(b) Israel : Troika+ Cion 27.09.93 and 29.09.94 (meetings at Political qirectors' level have also bgen hqld on 13.07.93 and 08.06.94). 
rke/MM/jl 
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JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS 
(a) TABLE OF TEXTS ADOPTED 
Joint actions 
SUBJECT REFERENRJi 
Decision 94-795/JAI on a joint action adopted Publication OJ N~ !- a-l-7, 19.12.1994 
by the Council on the basis of Article K.3(2)(b) 
of the Treaty on European Union concerning 
travel facilities for school pupils from third 
countries· resident in a-Member State 
Joint action concerning the Europol Drugs Unit Publication OJ No L 62, 20.3.1995, 
on the basis of Article K.3(2)(b) of the Treaty p. , 
on European Union 
-~ .. 
Convention 
SUBJECT 
t:onvention on.simplifisd-extradifto1,- otocedure 
between tne Memoer ~\Cil~~ u1 tY··· c:uru~~ca11 
Union 
REFERENCE 
I 
Resolutions 
SUBJECT REFERENCE 
Resolution on the interception of Pres.-; release 10550/93 
telecommunications (Presse 209) 
Resolution on fraud on an international scale - Press release 10550/93 
protection of the financial interests of the {Presse 209) 
European Union 
Resolution on limitations on admission of Press release 7760/94 
third-country nationals to the Member States (Presse 128-G) 
for employment 
Resolution relating to the limitations on the Press release 11321/94 
admission of third-country nationals to the (Presse 252-G) 
Member States for the purpose of pursuing 
activities as self-employed persons 
Resolution on the admission of third-country Press release 11 321/94 
nationals to the territory of the Member States (Presse 252-G) 
of the EU for study purposes 
Resolution on the legal protection of the Publication in OJ No C 355, 
financial interests of the Communities 14.12.1994 
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Recommendations 
SUBJECT 
Fight against money laundering 
Recommendation on the responsibility of 
organizers of sporting events 
Recommendation on environmental crime 
Recommendation on the organization of a 
training module on the operational analysis of 
crime 
Recommendation for the exchange of 
information on the occasion of major events or 
meetings 
Recommendation concerning the adoption of a 
standard travel document for the expulsion of 
third-country nationals 
Council Recommendation on a specimen 
bilateral re-admission agreement between an EU 
Member State and a third country 
Council Recommendations (5) on the fight 
against trade in human beings for the purposes 
of prostitution 
Decisions 
SUBJECT 
Forwarding to the European Parliament of 
documents on international organized crime 
- Recommendations to the Council and report 
of the ad hoc workinft party 
EOU/Europol 
Appointment of Mr STORBECK as coordinator 
of the Europol Drugs Unit, extension of the 
term of office of Mr BRUGGEMANN as 
caretaker deputy coordinator until the end 
of 1994 
EDU/EUROPOL staff 
Appointment from 1.1.1995 for three years or 
until the entry into force of the Convention of 
two assistant coordinators and two members of 
the Steering Committee 
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Statements 
SUBJECT REFERENCE 
Financing of terrorism Press release 10550/93 
(Presse 209) 
Statement on extradition Press release 10550/93 
(Presse 209) 
Conclusions 
SUBJECT 
Conclusions on racism and xenophobia 
Conclusions on international organized crime 
Conclusions on the application of Article K.9 of 
the TEU to asylum policy 
Text on evidence in the context of the Dublin 
Convention 
Form of laissez-passer for the transfer of an 
asylum applicant from one Member State to 
another 
Procedure for drawing up joint reports on the 
situation in third countries 
CIREA - Distribution and confidentiality of joint 
reports on the situation in certain third 
countries 
Standard form for determining the State 
responsible for examining an application for 
asylum 
Conclusions on the Commission communication 
on immigration and asylum 
Conclusions on conditions for the readmission 
of persons who are illegally resident in a 
Member State but who hold a residence permit 
for another Member State (Article 8(2) of the 
draft External Frontiers Convention) 
Enlarged and strengthened relations with third 
countries, in particular the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe 
- exchanges of information in the area of 
international sports events 
Conclusions of the EU Council on the operating 
procedures and development of the Centre for 
Information, Discussion and Exchange on the 
crossing of frontiers and immigration (CIREFI) 
Conclusions on the implementation of 
Article K.5 of the TEU: 
- expression of common approaches in 
international organizations and conferences 
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(Presse 209) 
Official communication to the EP 
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(Presse 1 28-G) 
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SUBJE~T REFERENCE 
Conclusions concerning a contribution to Press release 1 1321/94 
the development of a strategic plan of the (Presse 252-G) 
Union to combat fraud in the internal 
market 
Conclusions of the JHA Council on relations Press release 1 1 321/94 
with third countries in the JHA field (Presse 252-G) 
Racism and xenophobia. Adoption of the adopted on 10.3.1995 
contribution of the JHA Council 
Other 
SUBJECT REFERENCE 
1994 programme of joint surveillance Press release 5044/94 
operations on air and sea traffic (Presse 24-G> 
Guidelines for joint reports on third Press release 7760/94 
countries (Presse 128-G) 
Second report on CIREA's activities Press release 7760/94 
(Presse 128-G) 
List of honorary consuls already Press release 7760/94 
empowered to issue visas who, as a (Presse 128-G) 
transitional measure, will be empowered to 
issue uniform visas (viz. certain honorary 
consuls of Denmark and the Netherlands 
who are to qualify for this exemption from 
the rule precluding honorary consuls from 
having power to issue uniform visas) 
Assessment of the terrorist threat; Press release 7 7 60/94 
document relating to the internal and (Presse 128-G) 
external threat to Member States of the 
Union 
Interim report to the Council on money Press release 7760/94 
laundering (Presse 128-Gl 
Guidelines for the training of instructors Press release 11321/94 
(Presse 252-G) 
European Council report on the Press release 11321/94 
implementation of the action plan in the (Presse 252-G) 
field of Justice and Home Affairs in 
December 1993 
EDU/EUROPOL activities report Press release 5423/94 
( 1. 1.1994/31.12. 1994) (Presse 69-G) 
EDU/EUROPOL work programme Press release 5423/94 
(January to June 1995) (Presse 69-G) 
Strategy to combat drugs Press release 5423/94 
(Presse 69-G) 
Report on organized crime in the European Press release 5423/94 
Union in 1993 (Presse 69-G) 
Customs strategy at external frontiers Press release 5423/94 
(Presse 69-G) 
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ANNEX XHbl 
DRAFT CONVENTIONS UNDER EXAMINATION 
1. Draft Convention on the crossing of the external frontiers 
2. Draft Convention setting up a European Information System (EIS) 
3. Draft Convention on the establishment of Europol 
4. Draft Convention on the uses of information technology for customs purposes (CIS) 
5. Draft Convention on the protection of the Communities' financial interests 
6. Draft Convention on extradition between the Member States of the European Union 
7. Draft Agreement between the Member States of the European Union on the enforcement 
of driving disqualifications 
8. Draft Convention on scope, jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgements in matrimonial 
matters (Brussels Convention II) 
9. Draft Convention on the service in the States of the European Union of Judicial and 
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters 
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Proposal for amendment of the Treaties 
on which the European Union is founded 
It is proposed to convene a conference of representatives of the governments of the 
Member States under Article N(1) of the Treaty on European Union. 
In accordance with the objectives set out in Articles A and B of the Treaty on European 
Union, the intergovernmental conference is to examine those provisions of the Treaty for 
which revision is provided. The Conference will also be examining certain topics mentioned 
in the conclusions of the European Councils meeting in Brussels ( 1 0 and 11 December 
1993) and Corfu (24 and 25 June 1994), in the loannina agreement and in certain 
interinstitutional texts. 
The intergovernmental conference will have to examine the improvements and 
amendments which need to be made to the Treaties on which the European Union is 
founded in order to bring the Union into line with today's realities and tomorrow's 
requirements, bearing in mind, in accordance with the conclusions of the European Council 
meeting in Madrid on 15 and 16 December 1995, the outcome of the Reflection Group's 
proceedings and the following objectives: 
bringing Europe closer to its citizens; 
enabling the Union to function better and preparing it for enlargement; 
endowing the Union with a greater capacity for external action. 
147 
148 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
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C) REFLECTION GROUP 
REPORT OF 5 DECEMBER 1995 
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FIRST PART: A STRATEGY FOR EUROPE 
For six months, the members of the Reflection Group have been working on the 
European Council mandate to pave the way for the revision of the Treaty at the 1996 
Conference and any other improvements in the Union's operation, in a spirit of openness 
and democracy. 
We feel it has been our task not only to establish an annotated agenda for the 
Conference but also to set in motion a process of public discussion and explanation 
regarding the thrust of the changes to be made. 
THE CHALLENGE 
Men and women of Europe today, more than ever, feel the need for a common project. 
And yet, for a growing number of Europeans, the rationale for Community integration is 
not self-evident. This paradox is a first challenge. 
When the European Communities were established some forty years ago, the need for 
a common design was clear because of the awareness of Europe's failure over the first 
half of this century. 
Now, almost half a century later. the successive enlargements of the Union, the 
expansion of its tasks, the very complexity of its nature and the magnitude of the 
problems of our times, make it very difficult to grasp the true significance of, and the 
continuing need for, European integration. 
Let us accept that complexity is the price that Europe pays to protect our plural identity. 
But we firmly believe that this creation of Europe's political ingenuity, which cannot take 
the place of but is now an inseparable counterpart to the Union's Member States, from 
which its main political legitimacy flows, has been making an invaluable contribution of 
its own: peace and prosp~rity based on a definition of common interests and action that 
is the result not of power politics but of a common body of law agreed by all. 
Today Europe has changed, partly because of the Union' success. All those European 
nations rediscovering their freedom wish to join, or to cooperate more closely with, the 
European Union. Yet, in Western Europe there is a growing sense of public disaffection 
despite the Union's contribution to an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity. 
We therefore need to explain clearly to our citizens why the Union, which is so attractive 
to others in Europe, remains necessary for us too. 
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One reason is that the world outside Europe has also changed. Goods, capital and 
services nowadays flow globally in an increasingly competitive market. Prices are set 
worldwide. The prosperity of the Europe of Today and Tomorrow depends on its ability 
to succeed in the global marketplace. 
The end of the cold war may have increased .the overall security of Europe. But it has 
also brought greater instability in Europe. 
Furthermore, high levels of unemployment, external migratory pressures, increasing 
ecological imbalances and the growth of international organised crime have stimulated 
a public demand for greater security that cannot be satisfied by Member States acting 
alone. 
In an increasingly interdependent world, that reality poses new challenges and opens 
up new opportunities for the Union. 
THE RESPONSE 
However, we are not starting from scratch. Over the last five years, Europe has adjusted 
successfully to changing times. In 1990, the Community welcomed in the 17 million 
Germans who had been living on the other side of the Berlin Wall. 
The Maastricht Treaty succeeds in mapping out the path of adjustment by the 
Community to changing times: it establishes a European Union closer to its citizens, 
setting out the principle of subsidiarity; it establishes the path towards a single currency 
and puts forward a strategy of economic integration based on price stability that 
strengthens competitiveness and makes for growth in our economy. It reinforces social 
and economic cohesion and provides for high standards of environmental protection. It 
opens the way for a common foreign and security policy and attempts to bring about an 
area of freedom and of public security. 
Since then, in very difficult economic circumstances, the European Union has been able 
to take timely decisions on progress in line with its new needs: it has agreed to the 
outcome of the Uruguay Round, it has managed to reach agreement on the Union's 
finances up to 1999 and it has been enlarged to bring in three new members. 
Yet that is not enough. European Heads of State or Government have already identified 
the steps necessary to develop Europe's strategy for these changing times: the 1996 
Conference, the transition to a single currency, the negotiation of a new financial 
agreement, the possible revision or extension of the Brussels Treaty setting up the WEU 
and, lastly, the most ambitious target, enlarging the Union to bring in associated 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic States, Cyprus and Malta. 
That next enlargement provides a great opportunity for the political reunification of 
Europe. Not only is it a political imperative for us, but it represents the best option for 
the stability of the continent and for the economic advancement not just of the applicant 
countries but for this Europe of ours as a whole. That enlargement is not an easy 
exercise. Its impact upon the development of the Union's policies will have to be 
assessed. It will require efforts both by applicants and present Union members that will 
have to be equitably shared. It is therefore not only a great chance for Europe but also 
a challenge. We must do it, but we have to do it well. 
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The Union cannot tackle all the steps in that European strategy at once, but it does not 
have any time to waste. The Heads of State or Government have personally taken 
responsibility for agreeing on a European agenda for carrying out this plan, which will 
only become a reality if it finds democratic backing from Europe's citizens. 
THE 1996 CONFERENCE 
The 1996 Conference is an important, but just one step in this process. 
The Maastricht Treaty already foresees that a Conference should be convened in 1996 
with a limited scope. This scope has subsequently been enlarged at various European 
Councils. 
The Heads of State or Government have identified the need to make institutional 
reforms as a central issue of the Conference in order to improve the efficiency, 
democracy and transparency of the Union. 
In that spirit, we have tried to identify the improvements needed to bring the Union up 
to date and to prepare it for the next enlargement. 
We consider that the Conference should focus on necessary changes, without embarking 
on a complete revision of the Treaty. 
Against this background, results should be achieved in three main areas: 
- making Europe more relevant to its citizens; 
- enabling the Union to work better and preparing it for enlargement; 
- giving the Union greater capacity for external action. 
I. The citizen and the Union 
The Union is not and does not want to be a super-state. Yet it is far more than a 
market. It is a unique design based on common values. We should strengthen these 
values, which all applicants for membership also wish to share. 
The Conference must make the Union more relevant to its citizens. The right way for the 
Union to regain the commitment of its citizens is to focus on what needs to be done at 
European level to address the issues that matter to most of them such as greater 
security, solidarity, employment and the environment. 
The Conference must also make the Union more transparent and closer to the citizens. 
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Promoting European values 
Europe's internal security rests on its democratic values. As Europeans we are all 
citizens of democratic States which guarantee respect for human rights. Many of us 
think that the Treaty must clearly proclaim these common values. 
Human rights already form part of the Union's general principles. For many of us they 
should, however, be more clearly guaranteed by the Union, through its accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The idea of a 
catalogue of rights has also been suggested, and a provision allowing for the possibility 
of sanctions or even suspending Union membership in the case of any state seriously 
violating human rights and democracy. Some of us take the view that national 
governments already provide adequate safeguards for these rights. 
Many of us think it important that the Treaty should clearly proclaim such European 
values as equality between men and women, non-discrimination on grounds of race, 
religion, sexual orientation, age or disability and that it should include an express 
condemnation of racism and xenophobia and a procedure for its enforcement. 
One of us believes that the rights and responsibilities we have as citizens are a matter 
for our nation states: reaching beyond that could have the opposite effect to that 
intended. 
Some of us also thought it worthwhile to examine the idea of establishing a Community 
service or European "peace corps" for humanitarian action, as an expression of Union 
solidarity; such a service could also be used in the event of natural disasters in the 
Union. Furthermore, some of us recommend that the Conference should examine how 
to better recognize in the Treaty the importance of access to public service utilities 
("services publics d'interet general"). 
We believe that Europe also shares certain social values which are the foundation of our 
coexistence in peace and progress. Many of us take the view that the Social Agreement 
must become part of Union law. One of us believes that this would only serve to reduce 
competitiveness. 
Freedom and internal security 
The Union is an area of free movement for people, goods, capital and services. Yet 
people's security is not sufficiently protected on a European scale: while protection 
remains essentially a national matter, crime is effectively organized on an international 
scale. Experience of the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty over the last few years 
shows that opportunities for effective European action are still very limited. Hence, the 
urgency for a common response at European level, following a pragmatic approach. 
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We all agree that the Conference should strengthen the Union's capacity to protect its 
citizens against terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, exploitation of illegal 
immigration and other forms of internationally organized crime. This protection of 
citizens' security at European level must not diminish individual safeguards. For many 
of us, this requires further use of common Institutions and procedures, as well as 
common criteria. It is also for national parliaments to exercise political scrutiny over 
those who administer such common action. 
Many of us take the view that, in order to act more efficiently, we need to put fully 
under Community competence matters concerning third country nationals, such as 
immigration, asylum and visa policy, as well as common rules for external border 
controls. Some would also like to extend Community competence to combating drug 
addiction and fraud on an international scale, and to customs cooperation. 
For some of us, however the key to success has to be found in a combination of 
political will and more effective use of existing intergovernmental arrangements. 
Employment 
We know that job creation in an open society is based on sound economic growth and 
on business competitiveness, which must be fostered by initiatives at local, regional and 
national levels. We believe that, in the European Union, the main respottsibility of 
ensuring the economic and social well being of citizens lies within the Member States. 
In an integrated economic area such as ours, however, the Union also has a 
responsibility for setting the right conditions for job creation. It is already doing so by 
the completion of the internal market and the development of other common policies, 
with a joint growth, competitiveness and employment strategy which is achieving 
positive results, and with its plan for Economic and Monetary Union. 
We all agree that the provisions on the single currency which were agreed at Maastricht 
and ratified by our parliaments must remain unchanged. 
While we are all aware that jobs will not be created simply by amendments to the Treaty, 
many of us want the Treaty to contain a clearer commitment on the part of the Union 
to achieving greater economic and social integration and cohesion geared to promote 
employment, as well as provisions enabling the Union to take coordinated action on job 
creation. Some of us advised against writing into the Treaty provisions which arouse 
expectations, but whose delivery depends primarily on decisions taken at business and 
state-level. In any case, most of us stress the need for stronger coordination of economic 
policies in the Union. 
Environment 
In essence, the environment has crossborder effects. Protection of the environment is 
an objective involving our survival not only as Europeans but also as inhabitants of the 
planet. Therefore the Conference should examine how to improve the capacity of the 
Union to act more efficiently and to identify whenever that action should remain within 
the Member State. 
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A more transparent Union 
Citizens are entitled to be better informed about the Union and how it functions. 
Many of us propose that the right of access to information be recognized in the Treaty 
as a right of the citizens of the Union. Suggestions have been made on how to improve 
the public access to Union's documents which should be examined by the Conference. 
Prior to any substantial legislative proposal, information should be duly gathered from the 
sectors concerned, experts and society in general. The studies leading up to the proposal 
should be made public. 
When such a proposal is made, national parliaments should be duly informed and 
documents supplied to them in their official languages and in due time to allow proper 
discussion from the beginning of the legislative process. 
We all agree that the Union law should be more accessible. The 1996 Conference should 
result in a simpler Treaty. 
Subsidiarity 
The Union will be closer to the citizen if it focuses on what should be its tasks. 
This means that it must respect the principle of subsidiarity. This principle must therefore 
not be construed as justifying the inexorable growth of European powers nor as a pretext 
for undermining solidarity or the Union's achievements. 
We believe it necessary to reinforce its proper application in practice. The Edinburgh 
Declaration should be the basis for that improvement and some of us believe that its 
essential provisions should be given Treaty status. 
II. Enabling the Union to work better and preparing it for enlargem~fl.! 
The Conference should examine the ways and means to improve the efficiency and 
democracy of the Union. 
The Union must also preserve its decision-making ability after further enlargement. 
Given the number and variety of the countries involved, this call for changes to the 
structure and workings of the institutions. It may also mean that flexible solutions will 
have to be found, fully respecting the single institutional framework and the "acquis 
communautaire". 
The European Council, consisting of the Heads of State or Government of the Member 
States and the President of the Commission, is the highest expression of the Union's 
political will and defines its general political guidelines. Its importance is bound to 
increase in view of the Union's political agenda. 
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Improving democracy in the Union means both fair representation in each of the 
institutions, and enhancing the European Parliament, within the existing institutional 
balance, and the role of national parliaments. In this context, it is recalled that, 
according to the Treaty, a uniform electoral procedure for the European Parliament 
should be established. Many of us believe that the European Parliament's procedures are 
too numerous and complex and therefore favour reducing them to three: consultation, 
assent and codecision. 
The current codecision procedure is over-complicated and we propose that the 
Conference simplify it, without altering the balance between the Council and the 
European Parliament. Many of us also propose that the Conference should extend the 
scope of the codecision procedure. One member believes, however, that the European 
Parliament gained extensive new powers at Maastricht and therefore should grow into 
these powers before seeking more. 
National parliaments should also be adequately involved. This does not imply that they 
have to be incorporated into the Union's institutions. For many of us its decision-making 
procedures should be organised in a way which allows national parliaments adequately 
to scrutinise and influence the positions of their respective governments in the decision-
making of the Union. Some of us suggest a more direct involvement of national 
parliaments: in this context, the idea of a newly established advisory committee has been 
• 
suggested by one of us. Cooperation among national parliaments and between them and 
the European Parliament should also be fostered. 
The decision-making processes and working methods of the Council of Ministers will 
need review. The Union must be able to take timely and effective decisions. But 
efficient decision-making does not necessarily mean easy decision-making. The Union's 
decisions must have popular support. Many of us believe greater efficiency would be 
enhanced by more qualified majority voting in the Council, which, according to many, 
should become the general procedure in the enlarged Community. Some of us believe 
that this should only be countenanced, if democratic legitimacy is improved by a 
reweighting of votes to take due account of population. One of us opposes extension 
on principle. 
We consider the role of the Council Presidency to be crucial for the efficient management 
of the Union's business and we support the principle of rotation. But the present system 
applied to an enlarged Union could become increasingly disjointed. Alternative 
approaches combining continuity and rotation should be examined further. 
We agree that the Commission should retain its three fundamental functions: promotion 
of the common interest, monopoly of legislative initiative and guardianship of Community 
law. Its legitimacy, underlined by its parliamentary approval, is based on its 
independence, its credibility, its collegiality and its efficiency. The composition of the 
Commission was designed for a Community of six. We have identified options for its 
future composition in order to preserve the Commission's ability to fulfil its functions in 
view of an enlarged Union that may extend to more than twice the number of Member 
States having negotiated the Maastricht Treaty. 
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Broadly, one view within the Group is to retain the present system for the future, 
reinforcing its collegiarttv 11nd consistency as required. This option would allow all 
members to have at least one Commissioner. Another view is to ensure that greater 
collegiartty and consistency be attained by reducing the Commissioners to a lesser 
number than Member States and enhancing their independence. Procedures should be 
estabrashed to select those members on grounds of qualification. and commitment to the 
general interest of the Union. When deciding the future composition of the Commission. 
the Conference may also examine the possibility of establishing senior and junior 
C~missi~. . 
··some of us believe that the Committee of the Regions has to play an Important 
role in Community legislation and that the consultative role of this body should be better 
used. 
Europe's achievements depend on its ability to take decisions together and then to 
comply with them. An improvement in the clarity and quality of Community legislation 
would contribute to this, as would better financial management and a more effective 
fight against fraud. The Conference should also improve the key role of the Court of 
Justice especially in ensuring uniform interpretation of and compliance with Community 
law. 
Ill. Givina the Union greater capacitv for external action 
The Maastricht Treaty has established the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
In our opinion, this was the right decision at the right time, at a time with the end of the 
cold war increasing the burden of responsibility on the European Uniorf to lay the 
foundations of peace and progress in Europe and elsewhere. 
The current possibilities offered by t~e Treaty have provided some positive results. We 
believe, however. that the time has come to provide this common policy with the means 
to function more effectively. 
The Union today needs to be able to play its part on the international stage as a factor 
for peace and stability. Although an economic power today. the Union continues to be 
weak in political terms. its role accordingly often confined to financing decisions taken 
by others . 
Common Foreign Policy 
We think that the Conference must find ways and means of providing the Union with a 
greater capacity for external action. in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. It must 
be capable of identifying its interests. deciding on its action and implementing it 
effectively. Enlargement will make this task more difficult. but also makes it even more 
imperative. 
This means that the Union must be able to analyse and prepare its external action jointly. 
With that in mind, we propose the establishment of a common foreign policy analysis 
and planning unit. For most of us. this unit should be answerable to the Council. Many 
of us also think that it should be recruited from Member States. Council Secretariat and 
Commission and be established within the institutional framework of the Union. It has 
been suggested by ·some that the head of the unit. whose functions could eventually 
merge with those of the Secretary General of the WEU. should be the Secretary General 
of the Council. 
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It also calls for the capacity to take decisions. To that end, we propose that the 
Conference examines how to review decision-making and financing procedures in order 
to adapt them to the nature of foreign policy, which must reconcile respect for the 
sovereignty of States with the need for diplomatic and financial solidarity .It should be 
commonly agreed whether and if so how to provide for the possibility of flexible 
formulae which will not prevent those who feel it necessary for the Union to take joint 
action from doing so. Some members favour the extension of qualified majority voting 
to CFSP and some others propose to enhance the consultative role of the European 
Parliament in this area. 
The Union must be able to implement its external actions with a higher profile. We have 
examined several possible options for ensuring that the Union is able to speak with one 
voice. Some of us have suggested the idea of a High Representative for the CFSP, so as 
to give a face and a voice to the external political action of the Union. This person should 
be appointed by the European Council and would act under precise mandate from the 
Council. Many of us have stressed the need for a structured cooperation between the 
Council, its Presidency and the Commission, so that the different elements of the 
external dimension of the Union they are responsible for function as a coherent whole. 
This greater political role for the Union in the world should be consistent with its current 
external economic influence as the premier trading partner and the premier humanitarian 
aid donor. The Conference will have to find ways of ensuring that the Union's external 
policy is visible to its citizens and the world, that it is representative of its Member 
States and that it is consistent in its continuity and globality. 
European security and defence policy 
The multifaceted challenges of the new international security situation underline the need 
for an effective and consistent European response, based on a comprehensive concept 
of security. 
We therefore believe that the Conference could examine ways to further develop the 
European identity, including in the security and defence policy field. This development 
should proceed in conformity with the objectives agreed at Maastricht, taking into 
consideration the Treaty provisions that the CFSP shall include all questions related to 
the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, 
which might in time lead to a common defence. 
The Conference will have to take account of the reality that, in the view of NATO 
members, such a development should also strengthen the European "pillar" of the 
Atlantic Alliance and the transatlantic link. The Alliance continues to guarantee the 
collective defence of its members and plays a fundamental role in the security of Europe 
as a whole. Equally, the right of States which are not members of the Alliance to take 
their own defence decisions must be respected. 
Many of us feel that the Conference should consider how to encourage the development 
of European operational capabilities, how to promote closer European cooperation in the 
field of armaments and how to ensure greater coherence of action in the military field 
with the political, economic or humanitarian aspects of European crisis management. 
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Against this background, many of us want to further strengthen relations between the 
EU and the Western European Union CWEU), which is an integral part of the 
development of the Union. 
In this regard, several options for the future development of this relationship have already 
been suggested within the ·Group. One option advocates a reinforced EU/WEU 
partnership while maintaining full autonomy of WEU. A second option suggests that a 
closer link should be established enabling the Union to assume a directing role over WEU 
for humanitarian, peacekeeping and other crisis management operations (known as 
Petersberg tasks). A third option would be the incorporation of these Petersberg tasks 
into the Treaty. As a fourth option, the idea of a gradual integration of WEU into the EU 
has been supported by many of us: this could be pursued either by promoting EU/WEU 
convergence through a WEU commitment to act as implementing body of the Union for 
operational-military issues, or by agreeing on a series of steps leading to a full EU/WEU 
merger. In the latter case, the Treaty would incorporate not only the Petersberg tasks 
but also a collective defence commitment, either in the main body of the Treaty or in a 
Protocol annexed to it. 
In this context, the idea that the IGC examines the possibility of including in the revised 
Treaty a provision on mutual assistance for the defence of the external borders of the 
Union has been put forward by some members. 
It will be for the Conference to consider these and other possible options. 
Europe and democracy are inseparable concepts. .To date, all the steps in the 
construction of Europe have been decided by common accord by the democratic 
governments of its Member States, have been ratified by the national parliaments and 
have received popular support in our countries. This is also how we shall construct the 
future. 
We realize that this reflection exercise by the Group is only one step in a public debate 
initiated and guided by the European Council. We hope that this public and joint 
exercise between our nations will lead to renewed support for a project which is more 
than ever necessary for Europe today. 
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SECOND PART: 
AN ANNOTATED AGENDA 
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I. REFORM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: A COMMITMENT TO THE FUTURE 
A. WHY REFORM?: MANDATE AND CHALLENGES 
1. In addition to the mandate contained in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the 
commitments subsequently entered into by the Council and the European Councils, all 
of which were aimed either at completing the work of Maastricht or at dealing with 
specific institutional issues raised as a result of the most recent enlargement or 
preparing adequately for the next one, there are further substantive reasons for 
holding the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC 96). 
The Group has identified two fundamental reasons, namely improving the functioning 
of the Union on the one hand, and, on the other, creating the conditions to enable it 
to cope successfully with the internal and external challenges facing it, and notably 
the next enlargement. 
The mandate of the Conference 
2. The mandate of the 1996 Conference, the legal basis for which is Article N of 
the TEU, was in part set by the Treaty itself and its accompanying Declarations. 
Hence: 
• The fifth indent of Article B makes clear that, to maintain in full the "acquis" 
communautaire and build on it, the Conference will have to analyse to what extent 
"the policies and forms of cooperation introduced by this Treaty may need to be 
revised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the 
institutions of the Community"; 
• Article 189b(8) provides for a possible extension of the co-decision procedure to 
other areas; 
• Article J.4(6) and Article J.1 0 provide for possible revision of the CSFP "with a 
view to furthering the objective of this Treaty and having in view the 1998 
deadline laid down in the modified Brussels Treaty of the WEU". 
• Declaration No 1 sets out the possibility of introducing energy, tourism and civil 
protection as new titles into the Treaty establishing the European Community; 
• Finally, Declaration No 16 requests that consideration be given to the question of 
introducing a hierarchy of Community acts into the TEU. 
3. In the framework of the negotiations for the accession of Austria, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden, various institutional issues arose which were dealt with at the Brussels 
European Council, in the "loannina compromise" and at the Corfu European Council. 
All those issues (reform of the institutions in general, including the weighting of votes 
and the number of vote~ for a qualified majority in the Council, the number of 
members of the Commission and "any other measures necessary to facilitate the work 
of the institutions in a spirit of democracy and openness and guarantee their effective 
operation with a view to enlargement") will also have to be dealt with at the IGC 96. 
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As a result of inter-institutional agreements between the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission, questions relating to budgetary discipline and procedure 
and the implementation of Community acts (committee procedure) have been added 
to the Conference agenda. 
4. It goes without saying that this planned agenda is likely to be supplemented, in 
accordance with Article N, by other topics raised by the member States or the 
institutions. Notwithstanding that possibility, in the light of the experience acquired 
after the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, and taking into account the 
challenges and difficulties posed in particular by the prospect of further enlargement, 
the Cannes European Council felt that the discussion in the Reflection Group should 
focus on a number of priorities to enable the Union to respond to its citizens' 
expectations. These priorities are: 
to analyse the principles, objectives and instruments of the Union, with the new 
challenges facing Europe; 
to strengthen common foreign and security policy so that it can cope with new 
international challenges; 
to provide a better response to modern demands as regards internal security, and 
the fields of justice and home affairs more generally; ' 
to make the institutions more efficient, democratic and open so that they are able 
to adjust to the demands of an enlarged Union; 
to strengthen public support for the process of European integration by meeting 
the need for a form of democracy which is closer to the citizens of Europe, who 
are concerned about employment and environment questions; 
to put the principle of subsidiarity into practice more effectively. 
The new challenges facing Europe 
Internal challenges 
5. A key challenge facing the Union internally is the need to ensure that European 
construction becomes a venture to which citizens can relate. 
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Most Europeans consider that community integration is an invaluable asset, assuring 
peace in an increasingly unstable continent and prosperity in a global market. 
Nevertheless, the growing popular dissatisfaction with public matters in general 
affects also the European construction, partly due to economic, social, political and 
institutional reasons: a high level of unemployment, which is particularly serious in the 
case of young people and .the long-term unemployed; environmental degradation: 
social rejection and exclusion; major changes in our demographic structures, which 
undermine the European social model; the crisis in the political contract between 
representatives and those represented; the European Union's growing complexity and 
the lack of information on, and understanding of, its raison d'etre; finally, the worrying 
phenomenon of organized crime (drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism). 
As a result, there is a growing call for public security that cannot be met by States 
acting alone, and that is not receiving a satisfactory response from the Union. This 
is due to the gaps or shortcomings in the Union's mechanisms and to the lack of 
political will to remedy these. 
External challenges 
6. Other major challenges are a result of the profound changes taking place outside the 
Union as the end of the century approaches. 
The magnitude of some of the challenges which can only be met by adopting an 
equally broad, global approach is demonstrated by questions such as major political 
instability in the European region following the end of the cold war, despite greater 
overall security; strong migratory pressures which are particularly acute in Europe; 
risks of ecological imbalances which the Union and the member States cannot afford 
to ignore, etc., and an increasing globalization of the economy which highlights 
Europe's loss of some of the comparative advantages gained through its social and 
technological innovations. 
The challenge of enlargement 
7. The next enlargement represents both a political imperative and a new opportunity for 
Europe, but at the same time it presents the Union with a major challenge requiring 
an adequate response: 
firstly, in the framework of the Intergovernmental Conference, through the reforms 
designed to improve the Union's functioning in general and institutional reform in 
particular; 
secondly, in view of the impact which enlargement will have on applicant 
countries and on the Union. 
The next enlargement will be a great opportunity for Europe and will also be different 
from the previous ones because of the large number of applicant countries and the 
heterogeneity of their political, economic and social situations. To ensure that the 
next enlargement does not weaken, change the nature of or actually break up the 
Union, the reforms needed to cope with the challenges involved must first be made. 
The enlargement negotiations cannot begin until the 1996 Conference has been 
concluded satisfactorily. The success of the former thus depends on the success of 
the latter. 
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The responses 
8. As we have just seen, the new situation inside and outside Europe raises questions 
and requires the European Union and the Member States to provide responses which 
will ensure greater political stability while simultaneously allowing economic 
development and the proper· social climate to be maintained within an open, global and 
competitive economy. In other words, responses which will enable the European Union 
to continue acting as a crucial factor for peace and prosperity on our continent. 
Some of Europe's responses to these challenges have already been identified, as in the 
case of Economic and Monetary Union, achievement of which is a priority for Europe, 
as agreed in the Maastricht Treaty and ratified by the national parliaments. The Group 
strongly feels that the EMU should carry on its process of implementation in 
accordance with what was agreed. 
9. The next enlargement also constitutes a response to the challenges of security and 
political and economic stability in Europe. However, in order to achieve it, reforms of 
the Union are required in some areas and, very significantly, in the Union's institutions. 
Other possible responses have already been formulated, as stated in the introduction, 
by the Treaty itself or by subsequent European Councils. It is the Reflection Group, 
however, that has been given the task of identifying and producing. concrete 
proposals. The Group shares the points which follow. 
10. As stated above, the Union's principal internal challenge is to reconcile itself with its 
citizens. Therefore, enhancing its legitimacy in their eyes has to be the prime task of 
the coming reform. 
The achievement of this aim will depend on a clear definition of the Union's objectives, 
i.e. the joint goals sought, the credibility of common policies and the cooperation 
machinery designed to attain those objectives (or, to put it another way, the suitability 
of the instruments for the purpose of achieving the objectives set) and the 
preservation of the Union's internal cohesion. 
• The Group has come to the conclusion that the coming reform must equip 
the Union with the necessary means to give priority to the problems which are 
of the greatest concern to the citizens of Europe. A majority of personal 
representatives include unemployment, social exclusion, Jack of internal security 
and environmental degradation among the problems to be tackled as a matter of 
urgency. 
A further response to the challenge posed by citizens' alienation from the Union 
must be sought in a correct and systematic application of the principles of 
democracy, efficiency. transparency, subsidiarity and solidarity in the 
European Union. 
SN 520/95 (REFLEX 21) EN 
- 4 -
Those principles should be put into practice through concrete measures, such as 
improved application of the subsidiarity principle ("who does what?"); Community 
legislation concentrating on essentials; promotion of competitiveness on a 
European scale; simplification (of texts and procedures); effective enforcement of 
the rights of the Union's citizens; promotion of equality between men and women; 
greater political responsibility for the Institutions combined with increased 
accountability on their part; the fight against fraud; greater transparency in the 
functioning of the Institutions, which should be given the means to take decisions 
with the broadest possible backing from citizens; and closer involvement of 
national parliaments in the Union's tasks. 
The mechanisms for maintaining solidarity and cohesion within the Union must 
also be adapted and reinforced. 
11 . On the other hand, the responses to the challenges posed by the profound changes 
which have taken place outside the Union, in the political and security context as well 
as in the economic and commercial sphere, need to be based on reinforcement of the 
instruments set up to achieve the highest possible levels of external stability and 
security. 
The key task here, therefore, is to take all the steps necessary to provide 
the Union with a genuine, external identity that will enable it to promote its values 
and defend its interests. This will clearly only be possible if the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy really functions, with full consistency being ensured between 
the political and economic aspects of the Union's external action. 
In view of the new challenges that have arisen with regard to security in Europe, 
it is also necessary to enable the Union to continue moving towards the eventual 
framing of a common defence policy. which might in time lead to a common 
defence. 
B. PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES 
The objective to be achieved 
12. A prime objective to be achieved can be established from a mere enumeration of the 
challenges and the responses to them: maintenance of strong European integration 
and cooperation in this new end-of-the-century context, as, together with the 
organizations responsible for European security and national policies, they are both a 
guarantee of peace and prosperity for the citizens of the Union. 
The Group emphasizes that this guarantee of prosperity and peace is not perpetual and 
that it would be a grave error to underestimate the Community's main contribution to 
the Member States and their citizens, namely a shared view of life that has ruled out 
war as a means of settling differences and has decided to follow resolutely the path 
of growth respecting the environment, competitiveness and employment, promoting 
stringency in public finances and in combating inflation as the best way to meet 
citizens' demands. The Group accordingly feels that the Conference must endorse and 
reinforce the Union's common objectives, which aim at peace and freedom, internal 
and external security, democracy, protection of the human rights and prosperity for 
the citizens of Europe and solidarity between them. 
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Flexibility, its rationale and its limits 
13. The success of this ever-closer Union among the peoples of Europe depends, as we 
have seen, on its ability to meet citizens' demands. However, it must also be based 
on common principles which must be reaffirmed. They inspire the common core 
which characterizes the Community as an entity based on the rule of law, and in 
particular involve: 
maintenance and development of the "acquis communautaire" as a whole, as 
provided for by Article B of the Treaty. Maintenance of the "acquis 
communautaire" should not however prevent the necessary adjustments from 
being made in order to respond to new situations. Neither, as we shall see below, 
should it prevent flexible formulae from being found on a case-by-case basis and 
where necessary to enable new stages of integration to be entered upon at 
different paces, without the objectives of a common project being jeopardized in 
any circumstances; 
consolidation of a single institutional framework as the best guarantee for the 
consistency of the Union's action and a means of enabling the citizen to clearly 
identify those responsible for areas where the decisions taken clearly affect him. 
It should be emphasized that respect for these two principles should constitute an 
adequate response to the growing need for consistency of action by the Union as a 
whole, irrespective of the outcome of the Conference on the options of a bicephalous 
Union/Community structure, division into Treaty "pillars", or unification. 
14. On the basis of this common core, the prospect of enlargement and the existence in 
the Union of differentiated integration arrangements, raises the question of flexibility 
and its limits in relation to the outcome of the Conference and the approach to be 
adopted to enlargement. An unequivocal answer to the question "What do we want 
to accomplish together?" will clarify what the reform is expected to achieve. If a 
common will is ultimately found to be lacking, that should not prevent those who wish 
and even need to make the Union progress from doing so subject to clear limits. It will 
have to be considered on a case-by-case basis and when necessary what should be 
the allowed flexibility that will make it possible for the Union to manage diversity 
without jeopardizing the "acquis" and the common objectives. 
15. Therefore, the Group rejects any formula which could lead to an a Ia carte Europe. As 
regards the guidelines to allow flexibility, there is a large majority view sharing the 
following criteria: 
flexibility should be allowed only when it serves the Union's objectives and if all 
other solutions have been ruled out and on a case-by-case basis; 
differences in the degree of integration should be temporary; 
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no-one who so desires and fulfils the necessary conditions previously adopted by 
all can be excluded from full participation in a given action or common policy; 
provision should be made for ad hoc measures to assist those who want to take 
part in a given action or policy but are temporarily unable to do so; 
when allowing flexibility the necessary adjustments have to be made to maintain 
the "acquis", and a common basis should be preserved to prevent any sort of 
retreat from common principles and objectives; 
a single institutional framework has to be respected, irrespective of the structure 
of the Treaty. 
Several members, while agreeing with most of the above, stress that such flexible 
arrangements in the Union should only be possible when agreed by all, as in the past. 
Some members believe that, whereas such arrangements should in principle be 
temporary, they need not always be so, especially where they do not concern "core 
disciplines" of the EC. 
16. It should be pointed out however that the degrees of flexibility admissible are different 
both under each of the three "pillars" and also in the case of the present Member 
States and those acceding on next enlargement: 
Whereas derogations must not be allowed in the Community "pillar" if they 
jeopardize the internal market and create discriminatory conditions for 
competitiveness, CFSP and some Justice and Home Affairs issues enable a greater 
degree of flexibility (see below, when treating those subjects ). 
The formulae applicable to the acceding countries should in principle be transitional 
arrangements based on consideration of their specific circumstances and can only 
be more closely defined when their respective accessions are negotiated. 
Nevertheless, a "critical mass" of "acquis" essential for accession has to be 
preserved in spite of any flexible arrangement. 
C. CONTEXT AND TIMETABLE 
1 7. The Conference is not an isolated event. It forms part of a broader context parallel to 
the Conference in some respects and subsequent to it in others. This context 
includes, inter alia, the following elements which will form Europe's agenda up to the 
end of the century: 
analysis of the impact of enlargement on policies and resources; 
renegotiation of the own resources system and the financial perspective for 2000 
and beyond, depending on the previous point among other things; 
transition to the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union; 
debate on the WEU bearing in mind the 1998 deadline; 
negotiations on enlargement and its ratification. 
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18. The comprehensive examination of the best way to manage Europe's agenda up to the 
end of the century has been taken on personally by the members of the European 
Council, i.e. Europe's highest level of political leadership. All the above points, 
although having their own momentum, are clearly linked in one way or another to the 
reform of the Union; it will therefore be necessary to consider the relationship between 
them, so that they can be achieved without obstructing one another. 
To sum up, only once the 1996 Conference has reached a satisfactory conclusion will 
it be possible for the other tasks to be tackled on more solid bases, although this does 
not prevent appropriate preparatory work from being carried out at the same time. 
The Group therefore considers that the Conference should start and conclude its 
proceedings in good time in order to enable the other important elements on the 
schedule to be dealt with properly. 
19. We have already seen that enlargement is a response by the Union to the new 
challenges facing the continent of Europe. However, as we shall see below, it is also 
a challenge in itself. This is because of its threefold impact on an institutional system 
conceived for the six founding States, on the internal and external security of the 
Union and on the need to preserve and strengthen the Community as an entity based 
on the rule of law. It is furthermore possible that enlargement will also have a definite 
impact on Community policies and give a new dimension to the problem of the Union's 
resources. 
20. Therefore, the Group above all agrees in stressing that enlargement must take place 
but it has to be duly prepared so that it is successfully achieved. To avoid 
enlargement or have it miscarry would create a serious crisis not only in the applicant 
countries but also in the present Union. 
Who will be acceding to the Union when enlargement takes place? It is clear that 
accession should be open to all European countries wishing to accede which comply 
with the criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council. Each case must be 
dealt with on its own merits during the negotiations. However, the aim of the 
Reflection Group is to identify the reforms desirable and sufficient to enable the Union 
to incorporate associated Central and Eastern European countries, including the Baltic 
States, Cyprus and Malta. 
When? In accordance with the conclusions of the Essen European Council, 
negotiations with the associated States of Central and Eastern Europe, including the 
Baltic States which fulfil the above criteria, can only start after the Conference has 
ended. In accordance with those of the Cannes European Council, Cyprus and Malta 
will start six months after the end of the Conference taking into account its outcome. 
How? The next enlargement will have to combine a global approach to meet common 
demands with flexible adjustment structures which make it possible in each case to 
adopt an appropriate time scale for the process of full incorporation of applicants into 
the present Union's common policies. 
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21 . The question of whether and if so how common policies should be revised in the light 
of enlargement is not within the Group's mandate. There is, however, agreement on 
the need to maintain the "acquis communautaire" and build on it (Articles Band N) as 
a basic principle for the pres.ent Member States and as a major guide for the applicant 
countries. This should not prevent progressive implementation of the "acquis" by the 
applicant countries. 
A broad majority of members of the Group favours the separation of the Conference 
exercise from the study of the impact of enlargement in relation to future development 
of common policies, for the following three reasons: firstly I a revision of policies does 
not require amendment of their respective legal bases; secondly I the effect of 
enlargement on common policies will not be immediate but will be spread over time 
in accordance with the model for enlargement which in general seems possible for the 
next set of applicants; finally I it is not appropriate to combine two such politically 
sensitive exercises. 
Some members consider that the analysis of the impact of the enlargement on policies 
and resources should be developed simultaneously with IGC. One member stresses 
that, each of the EU's major tasks from now until the end of the century are aspects 
of the same overall strategy, the results of which will be judged with an assessment 
of all the efforts, concessions and opportunities involved in the common project. 
D. WHAT KIND OF CONFERENCE? 
The scope of the Conference. The need for transparency 
22. The Group considers that the Conference should formulate adequate responses to the 
above challenges. This means that on top of improving the present functioning of the 
Union it must make the reforms necessary to incorporate into the Union a greater 
number of Member States than was the case in earlier enlargements. The forthcoming 
enlargement will make the Union much more heterogeneous than at present as regards 
differences in size of countries, variety of languages, disparity of income levels and 
differing sensitivities with regard to Foreign Policy or Justice and Home Affairs. 
The Maastricht Treaty foresees a specific scope for the Conference. As seen above, 
this scope has subsequently been enlarged at various European Councils. The Heads 
of State or Government have identified the need to make institutional reforms as an 
important issue of the Conference in order to improve the efficiency, democracy and 
transparency of the Union. According to these elements, the Group has convened that 
the scope of the Conference should be targeted to deliver the necessary results 
without opening a general revision of the Treaty. 
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23. The Group favours comprehensive treatment of all the Conference issues as part of 
a single exercise. A single Conference keeping a general vision of the essential issues 
and which is not split seems the most appropriate method of achieving consistent 
results able to cope with challenges facing the Union. 
24. It should also be emphasized that the necessary results can be achieved by amending 
the Treaties and·also by improving the Union's procedures and working methods. The 
Cannes European Council has recommended the Group to bear in mind the advantages 
of seeking improvements in the working of the Institutions that do not require any 
amendment to the Treaties and can thus enter into force without delay. It should be 
pointed out, however, that in the report often the proposals for practical 
improvements refer to matters that, according to alternative options, should be subject 
to Treaty reforms. The choice between them is not of technical but political nature, 
since they express a different level of political ambition for the Union. 
25. It is also considered that the proceedings of the 1996 IGC should be as transparent 
as possible. The concerns of the Institutions, the organizations representing civil 
society and the future applicants must be given an appropriate hearing. The public 
must also be provided with all important information enabling it to follow closely a 
discussion which is directly relevant to citizens' fundamental concerns. This is 
essential, not only so that citizens can feel that they are participating in the 
construction of Europe but also because their opinions are essential for c~rrying out 
the reform. 
26. The Group is aware that, if citizens consider the reform inappropriate or insufficient 
or feel that they were not involved in it by means of adequate information, it will run 
the risk of not being approved. As the reforms resulting from the Conference are an 
essential part of Europe's agenda until the end of the century, the Group stresses the 
importance of holding a Conference the content and course of which meets the 
expectations on the basis of which it was convened. We consider that there is 
therefore an obligation to achieve sufficient results, and this obligation must be met 
by the Parties to the Conference. 
27. In the light of the above points and of its mandate, the Group considers that the 
Conference should confine itself to its own specific aims, namely realizing the (legal 
or practical) reforms to enable the Union to meet the current challenges facing Europe, 
continuing and building on the achievements of Maastricht and preparing the ground 
for the forthcoming enlargement. 
The Conference will moreover form part of an open process. It is an important step 
in the process but will certainly not be the last. The Union will continue to develop 
in the future after the 1996 Conference. 
28. Against this background, the Group without seeking to limit the Conference's 
sovereign power, recommends that results should be achieved in three main areas: 
Making Europe more relevant to its citizens; 
Enabling the Union to work better and preparing it for enlargement; 
Giving the Union greater capacity for external action. 
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II. THE CITIZEN AND THE UNION 
29. The Group considers that a key element, not only for an understanding of the reasons 
for reform of the Treaty but also in order to guarantee the success of the Conference, 
is to place the citizen at the centre of the European venture by endeavouring to meet 
his expectations and concerns, that is to say, to make Europe the affair of its citizens. 
Therefore, serving the citizens interests and perspectives for the future should be the 
main guiding principle for the envisaged reform. 
30. The Group believes that there are European common values that the Union should 
protect and promote. They are the basis of our democracies, of our security and are 
also present in the feeling of belonging in the citizens. Essential elements are to be 
found in respect for fundamental rights, non-discrimination, clarification of the rights 
and obligations of both citizens of the Union and third-country nationals in the Union. 
Furthermore, the citizens' concern about greater security, employment, environment, 
transparency and a Union closer to them should be properly taken into account by the 
Union. This is all developed under this heading. 
A. PROMOTING EUROPEAN VALUES 
Human rights and fundamental rights 
31. A basic approach in this area would, in the first place, consist in spelling out the 
general principle of respec for fundamental rights laid down in Article F.2 and making 
it more workable. This P•· .:iple clearly applies "erg a omnes", i.e. covers all persons 
within the Union whether citizens of the Union or citizens of third countries. 
32. In this connection reference has been made by some to the possibility of expressly 
including in Article F2 an obligation of the Member States to respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and add that non-compliance would prompt the Union to take 
suitable action. Such an explicit statement would enhance the Union's image as a 
community of sh;:,• ed values. It is important to ensure this both for present members 
and for those t"ff!O will accede at the next enlargement. 
33. It is generally felt within the Group that during the current process of European 
construction, and above all in the run-up to enlargement, there is an urgent need to 
ensure full observance of fundamental rights, both in relations between the Union and 
the Member States and between States and individuals. The majority opinion within 
the Group is that an Article should be inserted into the Treaty providing for penalties 
which could go as far as suspension of the rights inherent in membership in the case 
of any State which commits a serious and repeated breach of fundamental human 
rights or basic democratic principles. Reference was even made to the possibility of 
expulsion. 
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However, most representatives were wary about agreeing to such a possibility as they 
thought it would be unnecessary if suspension of rights achieved the desired effects 
and felt there might be a danger that this would call into question the irreversibility of 
membership of the Union. 
34. As for the possibility of complaints by individual natural persons concerning human 
rights, the great majority of members of the Group makes the point that there is at 
present an inconsistency in the fact that, while the Member States are subject to the 
monitoring mechanisms of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Institutions 
of the Union and Community law remain exempt from such control. The protection 
of individual human rights has hitherto been ensured solely by the Court of Justice in 
Luxembourg. 
It is a widely held view within the Group that the Union, if it takes on legal personality, 
or the Community at any rate, should accede to the European Convention on Human 
Rights. It is recalled here that the Court of Justice has been asked for an opinion on 
this question. 
Opposing this majority feeling, some members regard Union or Community accession 
to the European Convention on Human Rights as unnecessary. 
35. Independently of the above, some members point out the advantages of including a 
Bill of Rights, either in the enacting terms or in an Annex or in the Preamble. The 
Group has looked at a comparative study of fundamental rights guaranteed in the 
Member States, which was made by the Council Secretariat and shows the technical 
difficulties of such an exercise despite the fact that all Member States guarantee the 
protection of human rights on their territory. 
At European Union level, from the point of view of individual protection, it is felt by 
those members that only accession by the Community to the European Convention 
and/or inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the enacting terms would confer additional 
protection either by the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts in the first case, or only 
by the Luxembourg Court in the second. 
It has also been noted that the implications for the Union of the various proposals in 
relation to fundamental rights will need to be carefully studied by the Conference. 
Some members do not see the usefulness of including a Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in the Treaty, since all Member States already guarantee such rights on their 
territory. 
An intermediate view would accept inclusion in the preamble to the Treaty - thereby 
producing no direct legal effects but obtaining a high political profile - of a catalogue 
of the rights and obligations of the citizen compiled by bringing together all those 
scattered throughout the various provisions of the Treaty. 
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36. A large majority of the Group stresses the need to incorporate in title VIII of the EC 
Treaty the Social Agreement as an expression of common european values so that a 
proper social climate may accompany economic integration. One member will not 
agree with that incorporation, since he believes it will reduce competitiveness. 
37. Some members of the Group referred to other forms of recognition in this area. 
Among such ideas was the possibility of including in the Treaty socio-economic rights 
and more specifically incorporating the European Social Charter, the right to 
employment, the right to a healthy environment. Even the idea of including in the 
Treaty the prohibition of the death penalty has been suggested by some members. 
38. Various representatives also proposed that the citizens of third countries established 
in the Union be given a special status with certain rights (right of free movement and 
right of residence). Some members have made it conditional upon the existence of a 
common immigration policy. 
Non-discrimination 
39. With a view to the Union embodying European common values further, the Group 
analysed the following possibilities: 
. 
• A general clause prohibiting discrimination (in addition to the one prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of nationality in Article 6) extending beyond nationality 
notably to grounds of gender, race, religion, disability, age and sexual orientation. 
• The strengthening and extension to all areas not just of equal pay for equal work 
pursuant to Article 119, but also of the general principle of equality between men 
and women, which should be formulated positively in the Treaty and not simply 
as a result of prohibiting discrimination. In this context some members favour a 
reference in the Treaty regarding the integration of a gender perspective in all 
policies and programmes in the Union. 
• Express condemnation in the Treaty of racism and xenophobia (including explicit 
reference to anti-semitism) and intolerance by means of a provision similar to the 
one proposed in 1993 by the European Parliament. 
• Special consideration for disabled persons both by referring to them in the 
non-discrimination clause in Article 6 of the TEU and by a provision in one of its 
chapters. In the latter case, some feel that a safeguard clause should be provided 
making it possible to limit any disproportionate economic consequences which 
might derive from such a provision. 
All these options received majority support within the Group subject to a more detailed 
assessment of their legal and economic implications by the Conference. One member, 
however, felt that new or increased Community references in these sensitive areas 
were unnecessary, and that such rights were best secured in a national context. 
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Citizenship of the Union 
40. The Group notes that introduction into the TEU of the principle of citizenship of the 
Union -in addition to and not instead of national citizenship- by Article 8, 
third indent, and its development in Articles 8 to 8e was intended as a response to the 
need to involve citizens more closely in the process of European construction. 
However, it also recognizes that this purpose was viewed differently in the various 
Member States; while in most of them the concept of citizenship increased the feeling 
of belonging to the Union, in some, by contrast, it was not readily understood that 
citizenship of the Union was intended to be complementary to, rather that to replace 
national citizenship. 
41. It is logical that this variety of situations should be reflected in the Group's attitudes. 
The broad majority of the Group regards citizenship of the Union as an essential 
aspect of making the Treaty acceptable to European public opinion, and they 
therefore strongly support its development. This could be achieved, for example, 
by deepening the specific rights of citizens of the Union already included in the 
Treaty (achieving unrestricted freedom of movement and residence, completing 
diplomatic and consular protection in third countries), by the inclusion of new 
rights, and also through simplification of the Treaty articles relating to citizenship. 
A specific right to information on Union's matters and how it functions should be 
granted to the citizens. 
- ·Opposing this majority view, some members point out that citizenship of the Union 
is perceived as a threat to national identity in some Member States and that they 
do not think it appropriate to develop either the content or the essence of the 
concept. 
The Group suggests that the Treaty should make even more clearly that citizenship 
of the Union does not replace national citizenship. 
42. Some members have drawn the Group's attention to the positive effects on the feeling 
of belonging which would be achieved by abolishing use of the passport for the 
purpose of crossing its internal borders. 
43. The Group also discussed the idea of a European voluntary-service "peace corps" for 
humanitarian actions. A sizeable majority of the representatives favour this in principle 
and note that it would foster a feeling of solidarity and belonging to the Union among 
young people. A proposal was also made by some Members that the peace-corps' 
tasks include assisting Member States to deal with major natural disasters in the Union 
(floods, fires, earthquakes, etc.). The point is, however, made that the procedure for 
implementing such an idea might raise difficulties which would have to be resolved but 
which the Group could not discuss in detail. 
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Public service utilities 
44. 
B. 
A majority is in favour to consider during the IGC the reinforcement of the concept of 
public service utilities ("services publics d'interet general") as a principle 
supplementing market criteria. It has been pointed out that in modern economies, a 
number of services (such as the supply of electricity and water, postal services, 
education, telephone and some forms of public transport) are supplied on the basis 
that they must meet certain criteria such as universal availability which should be 
guaranteed irrespectively of the public or private nature of the supplier. Therefore it 
is the consumer's access that should be protected instead of the nature of the 
supplier .. According to some members the Treaty should contain better and more 
complete provisions concerning the role of public services and services of general 
interest so as to garantee tha tl:ae naeEt fer aA i~pre'leEI ee~petiti'lanes& acd 
raaseRable sest does Aet affect t e availability, the quality and the universality of the 
services provided to the citizen. 0 hers believe that the general interest would best be 
served by maintaining the existing revisions of the Treaty which, they believe, ensure 
an appropriate balance between mpetition policy and the need for public service 
utilities. 
FREEDOM AND INTERNAL SECURITY 
General considerations 
45. Consolidation of internal security within an area of free movement without internal 
frontiers is one of the principal challenges currently facing the Union. Accordingly, as 
requested by the Cannes European Council, the Group has given priority to this 
aspect. Thus: 
the Group considers that there is a clear demand on the part of the public for 
greater security for citizens within the Union in the face of phenomena such as 
terrorism and other forms of organized crime (drug trafficking and others); 
it is also felt that, in the context of a single market, an open society and the 
abolition of the Union's internal frontiers in accordance with the Treaty, the State, 
acting in isolation, cannot fully guarantee the internal security of its citizens since 
such phenomena clearly have an international dimension. There is an obvious 
contradiction between the effective international organization of such crime and 
the national character of the main instruments used to combat it, which explains 
their limited effectiveness; 
citizens are also calling for better handling of the challenge posed to the Union by 
the growing migratory pressures to which it is subject, and whose size and 
diversity demands common management. The exploitation of illegal immigrants 
is a problem which should be countered by action on a European scale; 
finally, the prospect of forthcoming enlargement implies a qualitative change in the 
need to guarantee the internal security of citizens of the Union more effectively. 
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Critical analysis of cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs 
46. In view of the above, the Group has analysed the provisions and operation of Title VI 
of the Treaty and, whilst recognizing that JHA cooperation has been in force for a very 
short time and has been a step forward compared with the previous situation, it has 
concluded unanimously that the magnitude of the challenges is not matched by the 
results achieved so far in re·sponse to them. 
4 7. A broad majority, while admitting the influence of a lack of running-in of this new 
Title and of the largely inter-governmental component of the matters regulated by it, 
consider that neither these nor the alleged lack of political will alone explain the scant 
results in this area. The problem is rather that some provisions of this Title are 
inadequate and clearly deficient in operation, as stated in the reports by the 
Commission and the European Parliament on the operation of the Treaty. 
However, some members referring to political difficulties in giving up national 
sovereignty in this area have pointed out that the lack of progress is not necessarily 
attributable to the intergovernmental nature of cooperation and that improvements in 
the present complex structure could solve many of the present problems. 
48. For the great majority there is a threefold explanation for this state of affairs: 
Lack of objectives and of a timetable for achieving them. Instead 'Of placing 
emphasis on consolidation of an area of freedom and security in which there are 
no internal frontiers and where persons can move freely - the goal at which all 
action should be targeted - Article K.1 merely lists areas of common interest. 
Definition of the objectives pursued would allow the specification of needed 
means and actions with greater accuracy. This would clarify for citizens any 
doubt which might currently exist on action contemplated or on the final goal 
sought. Furthermore, the limits of the various common interest areas are not 
clearly differentiated from Community powers aimed at the same objective (e.g. 
free movement of persons). This entails an overlapping of actions and a risk of 
"contamination" between "pillars". The possibilities for improvement ("passerelle") 
have proved ineffective. In fact, the unanimity rule and the need for national 
ratification make the "passerelle" very difficult to use. 
Neither are the instruments of this Title, which are similar to those of Title V 
except that the nature of the subject matter is very different, regarded as 
appropriate: external policy is rarely normative and requires flexibility of action, 
whereas matters relating to the security of citizens require legal protection and, 
therefore, a legislative framework. Still, some members consider that joint action 
may prove a specially useful instrument in certain cases. Others state that 
directives could adapt well to the JHA sector. It is also pointed out that 
Conventions are put through an extremely slow approval procedure and that it 
would be helpful if they could enter into force between Member States that have 
ratified them once a certain number of ratifications has occurred. 
Finally. the same majority considers that a true institutional driving mechanism is 
lacking. Complex working structures, spread out over five different negotiating 
levels - one sometimes being superimposed on the other. thereby contributing 
towards the blocking of decisions - are not - and here the view coincides with 
that of the minority group -the most appropriate instruments for making progress 
in this area. 
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Ways of achieving greater efficiency 
49. For the large majority, the Conference should improve the objectives and the 
instruments in this area of the Treaty. Many members favour a pragmatic approach 
in order to identify where there is need of further use of common institutions and 
criteria (Commission's non-exclusive right of initiative, control by the European 
Parliament and the Court of Justice, use of the majority rule in some instances, 
without prejudice to the appropriate use of unanimity in particularly sensitive areas) 
and where the full use of Community competence is required: 
These members consider that the field of police and judicial cooperation, both civil 
and criminal, must be developed by means of closer intergovernmental 
cooperation, at least for a certain period. In the meantime, within the Union 
serious consideration should be given as to whether it should henceforth be 
considered admissible to exempt "political" crime from extradition between 
Member States and it might be useful to lighten the procedure provided for in 
Article K.9 ("crossover"). There has also been a suggestion that a specific legal 
basis be incorporated in the Treaty to enable actions to combat drug trafficking. 
It has further been pointed out that it would be desirable for Member States' 
penal codes to include a harmonized rule classifying fraud against the Community 
budget as an offence punishable by comparable penalties. 
Better cooperation on those lines requires improvements to legal instruments 
(conventions can be too unwieldy; in some cases, they should be replaced or 
allowed to enter into force once ratified by a majority) or to the role of the 
Institutions (generalized - but shared - initiative for the Commission, consultation 
of the European Parliament and judicial control by the Court of Justice). 
Also; within this tendency, many members agree in identifying, as an area which 
ought to be brought under Community competence, everything to do with the 
crossing of external frontiers: arrangements for aliens, immigration policy, asylum 
(ruling out asylum among citizens of the Union) and common rules for external 
border controls. Moreover, since other aspects of the crossing of external 
frontiers, such as the format for visas and the common visa list, are already 
addressed under the first "pillar". it is thought that introduction of Community 
control would give greater coherence of the Union's external action in this area. 
an essential requisite for effectiveness in these matters. 
50. Others believe that the current separation of "pillars" is essential in order to respect 
intergovernmental management of these matters that are so closely linked with 
national sovereignty. For them, consequently, the principle way of improving the 
operation of Title VI is to find practical improvements which reinforce cooperation. 
51. The entire Group agrees on the need to reduce the number of preparatory levels, and 
many also urge the need to strengthen the General Secretariat of the Council in these 
areas. 
52. The idea has been put forward that the European Union should explore ways of 
cooperating on more structured basis with Council of Europe in the fight against 
drugs. 
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53. The Group agrees that the national parliaments and the European Institutions should 
intensify their relations on justice and home affairs. It has been suggested in this 
connection that COSAC or an ad hoc interparliamentary commission could facilitate 
the exchange of parliamentary information on the subject. The idea of a High 
Consultative Council made up of two representatives of each of the national 
parliaments was also presented as having a special value for this area. 
54. Various members of the Group propose the incorporation of Schengen into the 
European Union by means flexible arrangements (see above, chapter I.Bl. Others 
consider this to be examined in view of the Conference progress on Justice and Home 
Affairs. 
55. As regards the arrangements for aliens, some members, as indicated in the previous 
section, would like to see the Union introduce a common status for legally resident 
third-country nationals, whilst others point out that this would require the precondition 
of an overall common immigration policy. 
C EMPLOYMENT 
56. The Group stresses the urgent need to meet the challenge of job creation, in response 
to a pressing demand from Europe's citizens. 
57. Increased competitiveness- which is encouraged by Europe's integration- is the key 
to job creation. However it must be acknowledged that, on the one hand, this takes 
place above all through enterprises located at local level; on the other hand, States 
continue to be the bodies mainly responsible for ensuring economic and social 
cohesion and helping people living on the fringe of society. This being so, the Union 
cannot ignore the economic and social effects of national policies. Although the Union 
sees no miraculous cure for unemployment, it can coordinate and mobilize efforts in 
a common direction. The Group therefore considers that it must continue to follow 
the course set out in the White Paper on Competitiveness and in the process for 
examining the employment problems which was initiated after the Essen European 
Council and which has already been the main item on the agenda of the latest 
European Council meetings. 
It is also agreed that employment is not nowadays a sectoral policy but an objective 
which must be strengthened and also the global result of the Community's policies. 
In this context, Article 2 of the TEC states that the task of the single market, EMU and 
all policies is to promote a high level of employment and of social protection. There 
are currently several policies which may make a particular contribution to that 
endeavour, in particular policy on competition, the environment, structural funds, 
education and research. • 
It is therefore considered appropriate that the Commission, ECOFIN and the Social 
Affairs Council should continue to follow the recommendation that they devote special 
attention to this subject. Their monitoring, coordinating and commonly reporting work 
should result in a framework for common strategies and strengthening of the Union's 
economic and social features, reflected in the broad guidelines of economic policies 
as referred to in Article 1 03 of the TEC. 
Some members suggest that competitiveness should be mentioned in Article B of the 
Treaty. 
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58. A large maJOrity of the Group propose that the objective of job creation be 
strengthened in the legal bases for the above mentioned policies. In any case, many 
members consider that the Community should carry out an efficiency audit of its 
proposals and of the implementation of its policies to determine their job-creating 
capacity in accordance with Article 2. 
For some members, job creation should be included among the tasks refered to in 
Article 3 of the Treaty. 
59. Several members go further and support inclusion in the TEU of a chapter on 
employment policy.ln this view, according to some a Committee on Employment with 
the same rank as the Monetary Committee should be created to monitor the effect of 
Union policies and funds with regard to the impact on employment. This would imply 
the development of the Union's economic and social integration in full respect to the 
EMU provisions. 
60. From an opposite view, some members do not consider that introducing new 
employment policy provisions into the Treaty is either necessary or that it would help 
to improve competitiveness or job creation; they underline that job creation is the 
result of greater competitiveness, flexibility of the economy and reducing bureaucratic 
burdens. They further believe that employment policy is a matter for Member States 
to decide in the light of their individual circumstances. In this view, at the Unic:-'s 
level, job creation should be a matter for practical improvements of the ways and 
means to coordinate national policies. 
D THE ENVIRONMENT 
61 . With regard to the environment, the Group stresses the pressure being brought by 
public opinion for greater respect for the limits imposed by the environment and 
sustainable development. 
62. Some members have pointed to the need to state more clearly that environment and 
sustainable development are priority objectives of the Union. Hence, environmental 
considerations should be integrated with other sectoral policies, e.g. agriculture in 
terms of environmental conservation. The Group thinks priority should be given in the 
Conference to taking account of the environmental dimension in Community policies. 
63. A number of possible proposals have been made within the Group in this context: 
incorporation in the Treaty of the agreements reached at the Rio Conference so that 
Community policies are geared to a sustainable development; possible inclusion of the 
environment in Article 36 of the Treaty (restrictions on imports), Article 39 (objectives 
of the common agricultural policy), Article 74 (transport), Article 129b and the 
following Articles (trans-European networks), and consideration of extending the 
possibilities offered to the Member States by Article 1 00a(4) for laying down higher 
national standards; more involvement of the EP through co-decisions on these matters; 
inclusion in each proposal of an environmental impact assessment. 
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64. From another point of view, it has been pointed out that a large part of environmental 
legislation in each Member State is of Community origin and that in the first place the 
considerable body of legislation already in force should be properly implemented. 
Means to strengthen implementation and enforcement should be considered, without 
necessarily reforming the Treaty. In particular, the Conference should examine how 
to improve the capacity of the Union to act more efficiently and to identify whenever 
that action should remain within the Member States. 
65. A majority of members is prepared to consider extensions of qualified majority voting 
system in this area. However, some members pointed to the limits which application 
of the principle of sufficient means should impose if the exceptions to qualified 
majority voting in this area were to be abandoned. Stress was also laid on the 
quasi-constitutional nature of such exceptions in that they affect areas highly sensitive 
for the sovereignty of the Member States or have major financial implications at 
national level. 
66. In connection with the environmental concern, one member suggested the idea of 
strengthening the nuclear safety provisions of the Euratom Treaty. One member 
suggested the inclusion in the Treaty of a reference to the gradual phasing out of the 
use of nuclear energy. However, It was noted by others that nuclear energy actually 
provided up to 75% of some member States' energy supply and that it is seen by 
many of their citizens as the cleanest way of producing energy. 
E A MORE TRANSPARENT UNION 
67. The Group agrees on the need to make Union affairs more accessible and 
comprehensible to the general public. The concept of "transparency" serves that 
purpose and covers different aspects (many of which do not require any amendment 
to the Treaties): 
• The Group has examined the possible simplification and clarification of the 
workings of the Institutions and recommends that institutions make better use of 
publicity, information and consultation methods, paying special attention to 
facilitating the work of national parliaments. There should be more advanced 
notice of Commission proposals. The Group favours the practice of issuing "Green 
Papers". It is further thought that the increasingly frequent use of Interinstitutional 
Agreements, which are recognized by all to be useful, should be accompanied by 
appropriate general dissemination and public notification of their contents. 
• Application of the principle of subsidiarity contributes to increase transparency. 
(see below). 
• Changes in the Council's organization and working methods will have to take into 
account, inter alia, the aim of greater transparency. Here, in addition to the 
question concerning the publicizing of the Council's activity, it is recommended 
that individuals be allowed more information and the clarity and quality of 
legislative texts be improved. Various members have referred to recommendations 
on this point in the Koopmans Report which they feel to be relevant. 
• Some representatives are in favour of inclusion in the TEU of the general principle 
of access to documents of the Union. They think that guaranteeing this principle 
by secondary legislation or political undertakings would not be sufficient and that 
there is a need for a legal basis in the Treaty so that citizens and national 
parliaments are assured of more direct access to such documents. Others prefer 
to maintain and develop this principle through a Commission and Council Code of 
Conduct. 
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68. The Group also feels in general that it is necessary to simplify as far as possible the 
actual text of the Treaty so that its contents are clearer, easier to understand and 
therefore accessible to citizens interested in examining and studying it. To this end, 
the Secretary General of the Council has upon request of the Group presented a paper 
on possible ways of simplifying and clarifying the text of the Treaty without altering 
its contents. 
An initial examination of this interesting report has led the Group to the following 
tw~ conclusions: 
On the scope of the operation to be carried out, all representatives could agree, 
on a minimal simplification process involving deletion of all obsolete provisions and 
the renumbering of Articles. Some members do not think it advisable or 
appropriate to go beyond such simplification, as it seems unlikely that this could 
be achieved without altering the substance or balance of the Treaty. However, 
the majority favours more sweeping options which deliver as a result a simpler 
Treaty. Those options mean a reform of the structure of the Treaty that only the 
Conference can decide. 
Therefore, the discussion on simplification of the Treaty is not a technical matter 
which can be separated from a decision on its contents. However, a working party 
answerable to the Conference could examine the issue of formal simplification, 
and its conclusions together with those on the substance could be the subject of 
final agreement at the Conference. 
Some memt·~rs insist that if there is to be that working party, its mandate should 
be decidea dS soon as possible. 
F SUBSIDIARITY 
69. The Group stresses the importance of correct application of the principle of 
subsadiarity and proportionality enshrined in Article 3b of the Treaty and confirmed by 
an lntsrinstitutional Agreement on its implementation. 
Subsidiarity imposes not only a legal but also a behavioural obligation. 
Correct application of this principle must avoid two misuses: that of subsidiarity 
remaining an abstract principle without practical effect and that of it becoming 
in practice an instrument for systematically limiting the powers of the Union. It is felt 
that the principle of subsidiarity should serve as a guide to the proper exercise of the 
powers shared between the Community and the Member States and avoid their 
misuse either to excess or the contrary. Subsidiarity cannot be used as an excuse for 
lack of solidarity or for the renationalization of common policies. Nor can it be an alibi 
for systematically increasing the Community's tasks. For these reasons, most 
members of the Group do not feel it advisable to amend Article 3b of the Treaty but 
think it necessary to ensure that it is properly exercised in practice. 
70. It is also thought by some members that there is a need for more effective control 
over application of this principle by those Institutions responsible for watching over 
the Treaties: the Commission by "ex-ante" control and the Court of Justice by 
"ex-post" control. 
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In this sense various representatives have insisted that on the basis of the Edinburgh 
Declaration a Protocol on subsidiarity should be incorporated to the Treaty. 
Also, one member proposes stepping up control on subsidiarity through a new legal 
procedure for the national P.arliaments before the Court. Others favour further political 
supervision. In this context, it has been suggested to increase the "ex-ante" control 
through the consultation of a High-Level Advisory Committee consisting of two 
members of each national parliament, which would report on whether subsidiarity is 
being correctly applied. Furthermore, the idea was recalled that when the Council 
receives Commission proposals and before it examines the substance, it should first 
decide whether the proposal correctly applies subsidiarity, but, the majority of 
members consider thatthe Council's decision-taking mechanism should not differ from 
that applied to the substance of the proposal. 
One member has suggested introducing into the Treaty a prov1s1on limiting any 
regulatory excesses and providing for more systematic use of clauses which expressly 
limit Community powers, as is at present the case with education, health and cultural 
affairs. 
71 . A very large maJority within the Group is opposed to the request made by the 
Committee of the Regions in its report that it be authorized to bring pr.oceedings 
before the Court of Justice for incorrect application of the principle of subsidiarity. 
They believe that it is not a task for the Committee of Regions to interpret the 
application of the principle of subsidiarity to the powers shared between the Union and 
the States. 
7 2. Various members have put forward the need to strengthen the principle of sufficient 
means in the Treaty as a way of moderating the exercise of the Community's powers. 
This principle does not pursue Community financing for every Community decision 
which creates costs for one of its Members but should imply "ex-ante" control of 
proposals so as to prevent the Union from deciding intolerable financial obligations 
against the will of those States which would be obliged to fund them from their 
national budgets. The principle of sufficient means looks for consistency between the 
ambitions of the Union's proposal and the constraints on the Member State provider 
of funds. 
73. Some members have stressed that correct application of subsidiarity and appropriate 
recognition of the principle of sufficient means could facilitate the transition from 
unanimity to qualified majority in areas such as education, environment or social 
policy. 
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Ill. AN EFFICIENT AND DEMOCRATIC UNION 
74. The objective of the 1996 reform, as defined in the terms of reference and given the 
challenge of enlargement, is to ensure that the Union functions efficiently and with 
legitimacy; in short, the purpose is to improve the quality of the way the Union works. 
To this end it will be necessary to clarify its objectives and refine the instruments that 
serve those objectives, bearing in mind that in future the intention is not that the 
Union should necessarily have more powers but that it should perform its tasks better. 
75. The instruments of the Union, that is to say its institutions, rules, resources and 
policies, are not ends in themselves but are there to serve the objectives and tasks of 
the Union. The aim of the reform must be to ensure that the adjustments decided at 
the Conference will enable the instruments of the Union to operate according to the 
criteria of efficiency, democracy, solidarity. transparency and subsidiarity. 
76. The richness of the Union's natural diversity, transparency and greater participation 
by national parliaments, and the legal security of a Community on the rule of law 
require strict observance of equal treatment of the Union's official languages on the 
part of the institutions. This behaviour obligation should be reinforced without 
amendment of the treaties. 
77. The 1996 reform must adjust the instruments of the Union so as to guarantee the 
improvement in their operation in the Union as it is now and in the Union that emerges 
from next enlargement. The reform is already necessary now, but the prospect of 
enlargement makes it imperative. The results of the Conference will have to be judged 
in this light. 
A. THE INSTITUTIONS 
General considerations 
78. The Group considers it necessary that the institutional reform should consolidate the 
single institutional framework throughout the Union Treaty, whatever its structure may 
be. It is also the common view of the Group that the Union does not need to create 
new Institutions. 
79. The Group also considers that the reform of the institutions must observe the overall 
institutional balance, in accordance with the specific character of the European Union. 
This is consistent with the adaptation of the institutions to new circumstances and 
needs - especially to the increase in the number of Member States - after 
enlargement, with their strengthening and with a better definition of their respective 
functions. 
80. The prospect of the forthcoming enlargement makes it a matter of urgency that 
institutions designed for the six founding States of the Community be adapted, so that 
they can emerge from the Conference with renewed legitimacy: the more efficient and 
transparent the institutions of the Union are, the more support they receive from our 
citizens, the greater the benefits of all kinds that will flow from the Union to Europe 
and its citizens. An inappropriate or inadequate reform, on the other hand, would 
imperil the very nature of European integration. For this reason the negotiations for 
the accession of the applicant countries should not commence until the Conference 
has been concluded, as the European Council has pointed out. 
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The European Parliament 
81 . Composition: It seems appropriate to fix a maximum number of seats. A majority 
accept a maximum of 700 in an enlarged Union, as the European Parliament itself 
proposes in its report. It has also been suggested by some members that there should 
be at least enough members to ensure that major political forces of each Member 
State have the possibility to be represented. 
82. Uniform electoral procedure: It has been recalled by the Group that Article 138(3) 
provides for the establishment of such a procedure in all Member States. Some 
members propose that this legal basis should be changed to help achieve this objective 
and that a final date be established for its application. Others do not consider such 
amendments necessary. 
legislation: 
83. The EP's legislative initiative: The Group considers thatthe right of request established 
in Article 138b is broadly sufficient. Some members nevertheless point out that this 
Article should require the Commission to reply to the European Parliament's request. 
84. Legislative procedures: The Group is in favour of reducing the variety of procedures 
currently in force under the Treaty, and a large majority proposes its reduction to 
three: co-decision, assent and consultation. Some members note that this ~hould not 
imply a change of the present institutional balance. 
85. Some members propose that assent should be applied where the Council decides with 
unanimity, specially in Treaty changes (article N), own resources, article 235 and Third 
Countries' agreements. 
86. The Group feels it is appropriate to improve and simplify the codecision procedure 
without changing its nature. A large majority is in favour of extending it. Most would 
extend it to all legislation adopted by the Council by qualified majority. Another view 
focus extension to the matters currently dealt with by the cooperation procedure, 
whereas others suggest a case by case approach. 
One member, in principle, opposes any extension. 
87. Budgetary function: (see below under Resources) 
88. Political control: As regards the role of the EP in the appointment of the Commission, 
several members see that the current approval procedure of Article 158, applied for 
the first time to the present Commission, represents a satisfactory balance that should 
not be changed. Others would prefer the EP to elect the President of the Commission 
from a list proposed by the European Council. (As regards political control of the 
Commission, see below Commission). 
89. Executive control: A distinction should be made here between executive powers 
exercised by the Commission and those exercised by the Member States in 
implementation of Community law. Most members consider it appropriate to increase 
the EP's and the Ombudsman's powers in combating fraud and, in general, in 
monitoring the executive powers of the institutions. 
90. Role of the EP under Titles V and VI: (see under "Freedom and Internal Security" and 
"Common Foreign Policy"). 
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National parliaments 
91. The Group considers that the national parliaments' principal role in relation to EU 
decision-making lies in the monitoring and control that each parliament exercises over 
its government's action in the Council. The procedures for exercising these powers 
are not a matter for the Union but are for each State to organize. 
9 2. The Group also recommends that the role of national parliaments be fully 
respected. Therefore, national parliaments should be provided with all the necessary 
information of the Union and its institutions. The Group feels that the Community 
and the Union must not act "by surprise". Rather, an improved process of prior 
consultation and transparency is required, the central pivot of which must be respect 
for the role played by each national parliament in shaping the will of each Member 
State in regard to Union matters. In consequence, the institutions, specially the 
Commission and the Council, should conduct their work so as to facilitate the task of 
national parliaments. This could be reinforced by amending the Treaty and/or adopting 
an appropriate code of conduct, so that each national parliament receives clear and 
complete documentation in its official language adequately in advance (four weeks has 
been mentioned) on every substantial Commission legislative proposal enabling each 
parliament to examine and discuss it before it is discussed and decided on by the 
Council. 
93. As for relations between the European Parliament and the national parliaments, the 
points contained in Declaration No 13 of the Treaty are especially apt. Some members 
referred to the possibility of giving Treaty force to some elements of Declaration 
No. 13. 
The experience of the last few years favours a formula which has been operating 
adequately, namely COSAC, a conference composed of representatives of the 
European Affairs Committees of the national parliaments together with a delegation 
from the European Parliament. 
The Group nevertheless has doubts about the wisdom of making this conference more 
institutionalized as its success is perhaps due to its informal nature. At all events, it 
is a body for the exchange of information and should not take decisions or replace the 
expression of the will of the people in each of the parliaments for which this 
conference is a coordinating body. Another formula is that of the growing number of 
contacts between specialist committees of national parliaments and of the European 
Parliament, especially for matters such as Foreign Affairs or Justice and Home Affairs. 
In this context, the idea of the creation of a High Consultative Council made up of two 
representatives of each of the national parliaments has been put forward by one 
member. Such a body could, be consulted on Union matters outside Community 
competence. It could also advice the Commission on the proper application of the 
subsidiarity principle when preparing a proposal. 
The Group shares the view that closer association of national parliaments should not 
result in the creation of a new institution or a permanent organ with its own staff and 
premises. 
The majority in the Group does not recommend as a general rule the convening of 
Conferences of the Parliaments as referred to in Declaration No 14 on the Treaty, in 
the light of the experience of using this arrangement, which is not very practical. 
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94. Among the practical improvements that might facilitate the role of the national 
parliaments, some members feel it would be worthwhile for Commissioners to appear 
before national parliaments whenever circumstances warrant this. An idea was 
advanced by some representatives that the members of the Court of Auditors could 
also appear before national-parliaments. 
95. The creation of a second chamber comprising members of national parliaments has 
been rejected by the Group. 
The European Council and the Council 
96. The Group considers that the Conference must clarify and improve the role of the 
Council as an institution with legislative and executive functions, without detracting 
from other institutions and without prejudice to the institutional balance. The increase 
in the number of States affects the operation of this institution very directly. 
The European Council 
97. The Group considers that the European Council's central role is essential to the Union, 
as the ultimate political impulse and highest expression of the Union's politieal will and 
of its strategic policy formulation. The European Council assumed greater importance 
with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty when the Union acquired external 
policy and internal security responsibilities. The European Council is also the highest 
decision-making authority in the development of Economic and Monetary Union. The 
Group considers the leadership role of the European Council will be even more 
important in future in view of Europe's agenda. 
The Council 
98. Powers: The Group is in favour of maintaining its present functions and strengthening 
its capacity for action both by means of Treaty reforms and by practical improvements 
in the operation. 
Decision-making mechanisms 
* Unanimity and qualified-majority voting: 
99. There is broad agreement in the Group that unanimity should remain the rule for 
decisions on primary law: Article N and Article 0, as well as for establishing the 
system of the Union's own resources and their amount. All such decisions need to 
be ratified by national parliaments. 
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However, a few members have expressed concern about retaining unanimity on 
primary legislation in a Community enlarged to 30 members since such a 
procedure would render decision-making extremely difficult, and could in the 
future leave the Union in a state of paralysis. To resolve that problem, they point 
to the possibility of having some provisions of the Treaty either stipulate unanimity 
for a while, giving way· thereafter to a more flexible decision-making mechanism, 
or stipulate that such a subsequent change would not take place automatically but 
could be adopted under a simplified procedure. The latter possibility is already 
envisaged in ECSC Treaty and for EMU. 
100. In the case of Community legislation, a large majority in the Group is prepared to 
consider making qualified-majority voting the general rule, on grounds of 
efficiency, since it will facilitate decision-making and, according to some reduce 
discrepancies between the state of development attained by the internal market 
(qualified majority) and the policies in the social, fiscal and environmental spheres 
(in which unanimity is often the rule). 
Some members consider exceptions warranted to safeguard sensitive interest; and 
one member sees no case for extending qualified-majority voting on the grounds 
that it would not mean more effective decision-making in comparison with 
unanimity. 
It has been stressed by some members that the extension of qualified-majority 
voting would increase the efficiency of the Union only if its decisions are 
supported by a significant majority of the Union's citizens. In this context, those 
members point out to the need of adequately taking into account of population in 
the decision-making by there-weighting of votes within the Council, and/or the 
adoption of a double significant majority of votes and citizens. Strengthening the 
principles of subsidiarity and adequacy of means have also been mentioned to help 
extension of qualified-majority voting in this context. 
1 01. Novel arrangements steering a middle course between unanimity and 
qualified-majority voting have been mentioned in the Group for Council decisions 
on Title V and VI matters (a super-qualified majority, positive abstention, a 
qualified majority with a minority dispensation or consensus minus one). None of 
these have been explored in depth. However, it would be possible to have 
different decision-making procedures for the Council in such matters if they are 
established in the Treaty, irrespectively of its structure. 
* Threshold for a qualified majority and weighting of votes: 
102. The European Council has decided that the 1996 Conference is to consider the 
question of the present qualified-majority and vote-weighting system, which 
currently operates in accordance with the current Treaty provisions as interpreted 
by the loannina compromise with regard to their practical implementation. The 
Group has been instructed to look into the matter. 
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103. There is a majority in the Group in favour of the 1996 Conference establishing a 
qualified-majority voting system through which the Union will strengthen its 
effectiveness and legitimacy. The Union must be able to take decisions but some 
members insist that it is not simply a matter of assisting the ability to decide. Its 
effectiveness will depend on such decisions having the backing of as many 
European citizens as possible. For this to be the case, the revision should keep the 
qualified-majority threshold at an effective level and such decisions should not 
leave a significant proportion of the people of Europe in a minority. However, 
there is no specific option enjoying broad support in the Group when it comes to 
putting this into practice. 
1 04. Several members point to a gradual deterioration in popular representation in the 
weighting of qualified-majority voting as a result of the under-representation of the 
people of the more populous States and the growing number of less populous 
States in the Union. These members underline that this gradual deterioration feeds 
into decisions on policies which directly affect citizens in an integrated area. 
According to these members this problem seems even more serious in the view 
of next enlargement. 
In the view of some, the answer is a new weighting of votes that takes greater 
account of population. On the other hand, a system of double majority of votes 
and population has been suggested. In this view, for some, decisions should be 
taken by a simple majority of States and population behind them. This implies the 
suppression of different weight in votes for Member States, and of the qualified 
majority voting system. For others, counting on population should not substitute 
but reinforce the qualified majority voting. For these members, besides reweighting 
of votes, the Conference should establish the significant proportion of Union's 
population that should allow decisions by qualified majority system. 
105. In any event, several members have voiced objections to the arguments in support 
of greater account being taken of the population criteria in qualified majority 
voting. Some have pointed out that the entire integration process rests on the 
fundamental principle of sovereign equality of States, with the present voting 
system already representing a concession under that principle. Others have taken 
the view that the present voting takes due account of population, arguing that in 
any case the institution which represents the people is the European Parliament. 
These members also emphasize that the smaller and medium sized Member States 
do not act as a block and that there is little if any prospect of Governments 
representing a majority of the Union's citizens being outvoted. 
One member has stated that the present balance is satisfactory and should be 
maintained; but, since the enlargement will bring into the Union mainly small 
countries, keeping the present formula would weaken the position of the larger 
Member States, and, consequently, the number of votes granted to the last ones 
should accordingly be increased but without retaining a precise proportion between 
votes and population. 
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Organization and working methods 
1 06. Aside from the growing imbalance pointed to by some in the voting mechanism, 
which they believe impairs the legitimacy of Council decisions, a broad majority 
in the Group sees a gra~ual deterioration both in the organization of the Council 
and in its working methods, devised for a smaller number of Member States. Both 
can be improved without revising the Treaties, although certain aspects of them, 
such as the role of the Council Presidency, are dealt with by the Treaty and this 
is therefore discussed as a separate issue. 
Publicity 
The Group points to the need for the General Affairs Council to regain its role of 
general coordination of the Union's affairs, ensuring overall consistency in Council 
actions in all areas of the Treaty. With that end in view, some members of the 
Group have suggested practical improvements, such as the possibility of the 
General Affairs Council meetings being held at two levels: a preparatory level, 
composed of Ministers for European Affairs, and full-member level, which would 
concentrate on the most important issues. The Group also advocates greater 
consistency in the committees paving the way for Council meetings. In this 
context, several members were concerned to maintain the specific roles of these 
committees. A large majority recommends strengthening Coreper in its key role of 
coordinating and preparing for Council meetings in order to ensure their overall 
consistency. 
In addition, the Group recommends that consideration be given to fresh 
approaches to preparatory work for the Council with the next enlargement in 
prospect. The possibility should here be looked into of replacing some stages of 
discussions in working parties by a written procedure. These ideas should be 
given further consideration. 
1 07. The Group notes that substantial progress has been made in making the workings 
of the Council more open. Following the 1993 Council rules of procedure, many 
Council votes are now published, and there has been a number of public Council 
debates. Most recently, the Council decision in October establishes much greater 
access to Council minutes (when the Council is acting as legislator) and minutes 
statements. 
However, the Group agrees that further progress could be made. Several 
members maintain that the Council should meet in public whenever it is acting as 
a legislative authority. Several members in the Group favour extending the Council 
rules of procedure, to provide that Council votes on legislation be made public in 
all cases and not, as at present, unless the Council decides against; and that the 
initial debates on significant legislative questions should all in principle be made 
public. 
Others, while sharing a will for transparency, point out that it is not easy in 
practice to separate the Council's discussions acting as legislator from its 
deliberations as a political institution with executive powers. They emphasize that 
what is involved in practice is a continual, intensive task of negotiation, which 
should not be performed in public if it is to remain genuine. 
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Presidency 
108. The Group highlights the important role of the Presidency and its fundamental 
responsibilities for the conduct of the Council's affairs. The majority in the Group 
takes a positive view of the six-monthly rotating Presidency system under the 
Treaty (Article 146 EC, Article 27 ECSC and Article 116 EURATOM) since it 
fosters a sense of belonging and the urge to excel on the part of those holding 
office. 
However, the present system applied to a 30-member Union would mean that 
each member serves as President only every 15 years. For some there could also 
be problems concerned with the accession of very small States. The Group has 
therefore considered different possible arrangements. One proposal has been the 
idea of a team-Presidency consisting for instance of four member States acting for 
a period of at least 12 months. Within the limits of the present Treaty there are 
practical improvements which must be given more careful study. 
The Commission 
Powers 
109. Exclusive right of legislative initiative: The Group considers that maintenance of 
the Commission's monopoly of initiative is a fundamental aspect of the 
institutional balance of the Community. It will be exercised without prejudice to 
the right of request under the Treaty and the possible inclusion of an obligation to 
reply. 
It is broadly accepted that legislative proposals should lapse at the end of the term 
of the European Parliament if they are not expressely confirmed by the 
Commission. 
Moreover, some members have suggested that the Commission set a time limit to 
some proposals on a case-by-case basis ("sunset clause"): those Commission 
proposals should include the period of validity of the provisions proposed, with a 
date laid down for expire or review, and/or should lapse after a fixed space of 
time, if not adopted by then. 
110. Guardian of the Treaties: The Group is in favour of retaining this role. 
111 . Executive powers: The large majority of the Group is in favour of retaining the 
present system of responsibilities, in which the Commission shares executive 
powers with the Council. One member has put forward the idea of transferring 
executive powers of the Commission to special agencies. The broad majority of 
the Group considers that it is for the Commission as a college to exert its powers 
in full responsibility. 
The Group also agrees that more needs to be done to ensure full and even 
implementation of EC law and obligations. 
112. Powers of the Commission under Titles V and VI: These are dealt with in 
commenting on those Titles of the Treaty. 
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Composition of the college 
113. The Group considers that a suitably constituted college of Commissioners is a 
fundamental aspect of the credibility and legitimacy of the Commission as an 
institution able to lend its proposals overall consistency and able to identify the 
different sensibilities and interests affected by each of its proposals. 
114. In considering the various options for the composition of the college, the Group 
has attempted to identify proposals avoiding a confrontation between States with 
larger and smaller populations, while endeavouring to achieve a result providing 
greater democracy, greater effectiveness and a higher profile for this important 
institution. In the light of these considerations, it identifies basically two possible 
approaches set out hereunder. 
115. One option would be to retain the present system under the Treaty. This 
arrangement has the advantage of ensuring at least a Commissioner per Member 
State, thus fostering their citizens' sense of belonging. Some members of the 
Group have pointed out, that they would have difficulty in supporting any revision 
as a result of which they did not have a Commissioner of their own nationality. 
The drawback of this arrangement, in the view of some, is that an institution 
originally designed for a nine-member college now has 20 members and in a 
30-member Union would have at least 36. The problem posed by such a large 
number of Commissioners is the difficulty of warranting portfolios of any real 
substance in a Commission which is not going to increase proportionally the 
number of its powers. This will give less importance to the members of a college 
which will be not only greater in number but also much more heterogeneous and 
thus likely to be less consistent in its decisions. 
Its advocates, on the other hand, believe that these problems are surmountable. 
An enlarged College can strengthen its internal consistency and collegiality by 
adapting its working methods and, if necessary, its decision-making procedures. 
Its efficiency could be also increased by allowing greater authority for its 
President, and through an increased parliamentary monitoring. In support of their 
arguments, they point out that some Member States' Governments are composed 
of over 36 Ministers. Lastly, they maintain that the Community should not opt out 
of its complexity in as much as it ensures the safeguarding of its diversity. The 
presence of Commissioners of all nationalities is not the simplest course but it 
allows such diversity to be preserved. 
11 6. An alternative option is to ascertain the appropriate number of Commissioners to 
perform the Commission's duties consistently and effectively. They would then 
be fewer than the number of Member States. This option has the advantage of 
visibility and consistency, it restores to the Commission its collegiate nature and 
independence, it avoids proliferation, bringing savings in human and financial 
resources, and it would give the Commission a higher profile, as the Institution 
that safeguards the general interests of the Community. 
Its drawbacks have been pointed out in describing the advantages of the previous 
option: it fails to ensure the presence of Commissioners of all of the Union's 
nationalities at all times. 
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In its supporters' view, this option should not involve any discrimination since the 
Commissioners should be chosen by the President of the Commission (who would 
be chosen by the Parliament, acting on a proposal from the European Council, and 
subsequently invested, together with the entire college, by the Parliament) on their 
merits, from a list of three candidates put forward by each of the Member States. 
This system would make for a higher-quality membership of the college. 
117. Set against these two approaches other possible arrangements have been 
mentioned: 
• 
• 
Some members have put forward as a middle way the option of a 
Commission composed of just one national Commissioner from each of the 
Member States, thus removing the second Commissioner which the five most 
populous States currently have. This would result in a maximum of 
30 Commissioners instead of 36 for a Union of 30 Member States. Other 
members of the Group regard this option as unbalanced and tantamount to 
renationalizing the college, converting it into a kind of Council deciding by a 
simple majority, with a negative effect on popular representation in 
decision-making. This option would only be considered by those members 
if it were accompanied by amendment of the voting system in the college to 
introduce qualified-majority voting for its decisions. For the majority of 
members such a system of voting would strip the Commission of its 
originality and independence. For some members, the option of a 
Commissioner per Member State will not make it possible to maintain the 
present voting system in the Commission. 
Others propose a reduced college in which each Commissioner would 
represent a minimum number of inhabitants, which would result in the 
permanent presence of nationals of the more populous States and rotation for 
nationals of the rest of the Union. Seen in those terms, this arrangement is 
rejected by various members. 
11 8. Another idea that has been put forward is the possibility of the college in future 
being composed of two kinds of Commissioners, seniors members and voting or 
non-voting juniors commissioners. This proposal is, in principle, favourably 
considered by some members as a possible way of enriching or approaching the 
afore mentioned options, and should be given further examination in the 
Conference. 
Accountability of the Commission 
119. A majority in the Group favours making the Commission more accountable to the 
European Parliament. Some members propose the possibility of individual motions 
of censure of Commission members by the Parliament, but others object to this 
on the grounds that such a possibility would undermine the collegiate nature of the 
Commission. Some members advocate establishing procedures to improve the 
accountability of the Commission to the Council. 
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Other institutions and bodies 
Court of Justice 
120. The Group agrees on th~ need to strengthen the Court's role, highlighting the part 
played by the Court in watching over a Community based on the rule of Jaw, in 
ensuring legal uniformity in the interpretation of Community law and in 
guaranteeing the protection of individual citizens' rights. 
A majority of representatives are in favour of stepping up its role in the fields of 
justice and home affairs on grounds of legal certainty, in order to ensure the 
protection of individual rights which might be affected in those fields. A few have 
suggested the possibility of enabling the Court to enforce more swiftly the 
penalties it may impose. 
One member argues, however, that ECJ judgments can lead to consequences that 
are considered disproportionate in their effect. This member suggests that the 
Conference should examine possible limits to member States economic liability 
when a member State has genuinely attempted to comply with Community law 
and the application of national time limits in such cases. This representative also 
suggests that the Conference should consider limits on the retrospective effect of 
judgements and the establishment of a right of appeal. 
A proposal that the Court should speed up its procedures and improve its 
translation facilities was favourably received by the Group. 
The Group has not been able to deepen the valuable ideas put forward by the 
Court in its report. A broad majority in the Group is prepared to recommend 
consideration of the amendment of Article 188 proposed by the Court in order to 
be able to adopt rules of procedure, which other institutions and bodies are already 
able to do. 
121. As regards the Court's composition and number of members, a maJonty of 
representatives think the term of office of Judges should be extended to nine 
years, with no possibility of reappointment. With a view to future enlargement of 
the Union some take the view that the number of Judges, should be fewer than 
the Member States in order to ensure efficiency and consistency. Others take the 
line that all States should have a Judge at the Court so that all legal systems of 
Member States are represented. A middle course put forward is that, for the 
purposes of national participation, not only Judges should count but 
Advocates-General as well. 
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Court of Auditors 
1 22. The Group note the key role of the Court in taking effective action against fraud 
and financial mismanagement of the Community budget. 
Proposals have been put forward to make explicit the duty of States' internal 
official bodies and of national audit boards to cooperate with the Court of Auditors 
and also to make clear its ability to audit the Union's accounts for foreign policy 
and for justice and home affairs. The possibility has been expressed of the 
European Parliament being more directly involved in the appointment of the 
Court's members. Some members have also suggested that it should be granted 
a right of access to the Court of Justice for the protection of its prerogatives. 
The Group makes the point that more effective action against fraud is also and 
primarily a matter for the Member States. 
Committee of the Regions 
123. The majority of the Group underlines the importance of the role played by this 
body representing the regions and local authorities and fostering throughout the 
whole territory of the European Union a further sense of belonging. It is also, 
however, argued by some that, as an innovative acquisition of the .Union, it 
needs to be given time to fullfledge its effectiveness before consideration is given 
to developing it further. 
The major_ity view is that it could be provided with administrative machinery of its 
own, that its consultative functions could be better used and possibly extended 
and that the European Parliament should have the right to consult it. Some 
members argue for it to be given active legal capacity before the Court of Justice 
in order to safeguard its prerogatives and one representative would like such 
capacity to be extended to the bringing of proceedings for infringement of the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
Economic and Social Committee 
1 24. A broad majority points to its role in social dialogue and appreciates its 
contribution as a consultative committee in economic and social matters, the 
abilities of which should be better exploited at the consultative stage in 
preparation for legislative action. One member, however, questions the future role 
of the Committee given the increased use of white and green papers and other 
possibilities for direct consultation. 
B. ACTS, RESOURCES, AND POLICIES 
Article 235 
125. The Group is not in favour of incorporating a catalogue of the Union's powers in the 
Treaty and would prefer to maintain the present system, which establishes the legal 
basis for the Union's actions and policies in each individual case. It is therefore in 
favour of maintaining Article 235 as the instrument for dealing with the changing 
nature of interpretation of the Union's objectives. Some members have suggested 
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incorporating the EP assent requirement in Article 235. 
Hierarchy of acts 
126. The Group has analyzed this question in accordance with the brief contained in 
Declaration No 16 annexed to the Treaty and identified two positions: 
* 
* 
Those who favour establishing a hierarchy of Community acts based on the level of 
their origin source (constitutional acts, legislative acts and implementing acts) point 
out that this classification would render simpler and more transparent the 
application of subsidiarity. The functions of each institution would be clarified by 
such a system of Community law hierarchy: Treaties would be adopted by 
unanimous decision of the Council followed by ratification by national parliaments, 
laws would be adopted on a Commission proposal by co-decision of the Council and 
the Parliament and the Commission or the Member States would be responsible for 
implementing provisions, the former under Council and Parliament supervision. 
Those who are opposed to this system do not deny its clarity, but refute its logic, 
which is based on the idea of separation of powers within a State, since this 
approach would transform the Council into a second legislative chamber and the 
Commission into the European executive. Their view is that the Union h,.as its own 
particular nature which is suited to a characteristic classification of acts: Regulations, 
Directives, Decisions and Recommendations. They feel, however, that within this 
characteristic system it is possible to clarify the functions of each of the institutions 
while maintaining the balance between them. In this context, they recommend a 
return to the original spirit of the Treaty through greater attention to the quality of 
each act and a use of the Directive which is more in line with its genuine purpose. 
It was also pointed out that the introduction of the co-decision procedure has meant 
that the debate on the hierarchy of acts has lost its previous importance. 
Among those in favour of a hierarchy of acts, some stress that directives should be 
retained as best suited means to abide with the principle of subsidiarity. 
Powers of execution (committee procedure) 
127. On this subject, which the interinstitutional "modus vivendi" of 20 December 1994 
identified as one to be dealt with by the Conference, there are the following 
positions: 
* 
* 
* 
Those in favour of a hierarchy of acts resolve this issue by assigning full power to 
the Commission, subject to control by the Council and the European Parliament. 
Those opposed to granting executive power to the Commission because they believe 
it would disturb the balance between the institutions are willing to consider simplified 
procedures which would not undermine the Council's executive functions. 
There is a compromise proposal for a single procedure under which it would be up 
to the Commission, in consultation with national experts, to decide on implementing 
measures under the supervision of the Council and the EP, which could cancel the 
measures and request the application of normal legislative procedures. At least 
one member pointed out that opposition by a minority of States should be sufficient 
to reject any implementing measure. 
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128. In any case, a large majority in the Group is in favour of simplifying the present 
committee procedure, which is already complicated and confused and will not 
survive beyond the next enlargement. The need to improve the quality of the rules 
adopted under these procedures was also emphasized. 
In any event, revision of the 1987 Decision on committee procedure does not require 
reform of the Treaty and therefore consideration must be given to the improvements 
which can be introduced before the Conference. In this context, one member has 
suggested the idea of introducing a standard set of internal rules of procedure to 
apply to all committees. 
Monitoring the implementation of acts 
129. The Group considers that the Commission should make full use of the powers 
conferred upon it by Article 171 regarding penalties for failure to comply with 
Community law. Some propose that Article 171 be amended to enable the Court of 
Justice, at the Commission's request, to impose penalties on Member States in 
default, without the need for the second court case currently required. 
130. Some members suggest that the EP's powers in this area should be strengthened by 
means of Investigative Committees empowered to convene and request explanations 
from Community, and even national, authorities. It was also pointed out that the 
Commission should make periodical reports on procedures of infractions. 
131. On the other hand, a majority suggests making it obligatory for the Commission to 
produce annual reports on the effectiveness of policies implemented. 
132. Some members also propose allowing private individuals more effective means of 
action to appeal against failure to comply with Community legislation. 
Combating fraud 
133. The Group wants the Community institutions to be more effective in combating 
fraud, improving financial control of the Community budget, ensuring value for 
money and full compliance with Community law. 
A large majority believes that the European Parliament and the Court of Auditors 
should make full use of their responsibilities in combating fraud which, according to 
some, could be reinforced. All institutions and bodies must be subject to proper 
control. 
It also must be recalled that often fraud cases appear within the Member States at 
regional and local level. As pointed out in the chapter on Justice and Internal 
Security several members of the Group suggested a harmonized rule in the national 
penal codes punishing fraud against the Community budget. 
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Resources 
134. The 1993 Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and improvement of 
the budgetary procedure provides for examination of these questions on the occasion 
of 1996 Conference. 
Own resources 
135. Most members of the Group do not want the IGC 96 to deal with these questions. 
They point out that there is already another session planned for 1999, the year in 
which the present Financial Agreement expires. All aspects of the system of 
resources should be examined at that time. Any other course of action would 
unnecessarily complicate the agenda for the 1996 Conference and run the risk of 
delaying the European agenda scheduled to follow the Conference. The Community 
has always adopted a stage-by-stage approach and accumulating tasks for the 
IGC 96 would lead to a general debate about the future of Europe which would prove 
unmanageable. 
136. Some members note, however, that the system of own resources is one matter and 
the amounts involved another, and that the Conference is the proper time to lay 
down in the Treaty, if so desired, the legal bases for a new system of the 
Community's own resources and the participation of the Community Institutions in 
these decisions. 
As for possible revision of the system of contributions to the Community budget, 
some members advocate introducing a new revenue system which takes account of 
the relative prosperity of the various Member States, with several of them wanting 
the Conference to reduce the lack of consistency between the EP's powers with 
regard to expenditure and its present very limited role in revenue arrangements. 
Others defend the present system as reasonable. 
137. At least one member is in favour of incorporating multiannual financial programming 
in the Treaty. A clear majority would prefer to keep it outside the main framework 
in the more flexible domain of interinstitutional agreements. 
Budgetary procedure 
138. In addition to the fairly general wish to simplify the procedure (abolition of one of the 
readings), the proposal made by some members to reduce the lack of consistency 
between the EP's budget powers with regard to expenditure and those with regard 
to revenue has already been mentioned. In the case of expenditure, some members 
propose simplifying the procedure by removing the distinction between compulsory 
and non-compulsory expenditure. Most members, are, however, against removing 
the CE/NCE distinction. Some suggest an intermediate approach for improving the 
balance of budget powers between the Council and the Parliament which would 
involve giving the latter some latitude to intervene in CE, perhaps in the form of a 
percentage. 
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Monitoring expenditure 
139. As we saw earlier, a broad majority is in favour of strengthening the role of the 
Court of Auditors in the fight against fraud and establishing closer cooperation with 
national audit bodies. According to some members Ecofin and Budget Council 
should have more control"over spending activities when dealt with in the Council. 
Policies 
140. The general feeling within the Group is that the Community should try to do not 
more but better. 
141. In accordance with Declaration No 1 annexed to the TEU, the Group has analyzed 
the possibility of including the spheres of energy, tourism and civil protection in 
common policies and, although several members consider that specific Community 
action in one or another of those subjects is of great interest, a majority has reached 
the conclusion that it would probably be more appropriate in these spheres simply 
to envisage greater cooperation between the Member States. One member holds the 
opinion that article 3t should be deleted. 
142. Several members think it necessary to incorporate a provision in the Treaty dealing 
specifically with support for the outermost and island regions of Member States of 
the Union. Some members point out that the Treaty should highlight the importance 
of local development. 
143. Some members have suggested extending Article 113 to cover commercial policy 
as a whole and therefore including services and intellectual property. Other members 
recall the importance that they attach to the Opinion 1/94 of the European Court of 
Justice. 
144. Finally, some members have noted that maintaining Article 235 will make it possible, 
when appropriate, to embark on new spheres of Community action while complying 
with the limits of the Treaty. 
145. Some members consider that the requirement of a high level of consumer protection 
should be taken into ~ccount also in other Community policies and that Article 129a 
should be revised accordingly. 
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IV. EXTERNAL UNION ACTION 
146. The profound changes which occurred in Europe at the end of the cold war have 
radically altered the scenario of international relations hitherto operating in the 
world. The threat posed by rival blocks facing each other has receded and has given 
way to new roles of the main actors on the international political scene and to an 
overall more secure, but also more unstable situation. The European Union must 
assume increased responsibilities in this new context and thus has to face new 
challenges confronting it. This requires the Union to give itself the means 
appropriate to more effective and coordinated external action. 
14 7. The next enlargement is clearly a response to the new responsibilities but it in turn 
poses a challenge to the Union. Enlargement will undoubtedly make for political 
stability and security for the people of Europe but it will bring a qualitative change 
to the internal and external dimension of the Union. Preparations must be 
accomplished inter alia by clarifying the objectives and strengthening the instruments 
of the Union's external action. 
148. In evaluating the experience from a complete new Title (V) on Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), introduced by Maastricht into the TEU, the Group has drawn 
the following two conclusions. First, despite the short period of time which has 
elapsed, some positive results, such as the Stability Pact, have been achieved. 
Second, shortcomings in the operation of Title V and problems of a lack of overall 
consistency in coping with the new challenges have been detected. 
The Group does not share, however, a common view of the causes of these 
shortcomings and problems. For some this is partly due to the lack of running-in 
time of a novel part of the Treaty yet to be developed or to the creation of 
excessively high and as yet unfulfillable expectations; for others there is a lack of 
political will and inertia of attitudes; for the majority there is also a structural problem 
of a mismatch between fairly ambitious, albeit somewhat vague, objectives and 
inadequate instruments for achieving them. Still others blame the shortcomings 
mainly on the current functioning of the Institutions and on the inadequate structural 
cohesion of a Treaty organized into "pillars". 
Some members have pointed here to a readily discernible distinction between two 
kinds of Union external action: one working satisfactorily and the other with a long 
way to go. The first is the external dimension of Community policies and the second 
the CFSP. Many members see the real problem with the CFSP as lying in the 
disjunction between the external political and external economic dimensions of the 
Union. They have emphasized the lack of synergy and coordination between the 
first and second "pillars" and the paradox whereby matters of great moment with 
far-reaching economic implications, both for the Member States and for their 
citizens, are decided successfully by a qualified majority under the first "pillar", 
whereas others of less substance and consequence require a consensus under the 
CFSP. According to some, recent practice shows that the current functioning of the 
"pillars" does not make for increased consistency between actions undertaken under 
them but that, on the contrary, there is a risk of spill-over from the second "pillar" 
to the first, which reduces the efficiency of the Union and which could weaken the 
"acquis". Some are equally concerned by the opposite effect. 
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A. GLOBALITY AND CONSISTENCY 
149. In view of the interdependent and global nature of today's world, many members call 
for a global approach to overcome inconsistencies between the external dimension 
of the Community and foreign policy proper. According to them, the weakness of 
Title V lies in the current separation between political, economic and military 
aspects. They highlight a need for greater consistency in all aspects of external 
action so that the Union's political weight matches its economic strength. 
In order that the Union can ensure the member States the influence which it must 
exercise, bearing in mind their collective importance in economic and political fields, 
it is necessary both to make the most of the potential synergies between the 
different strands of external relations, and to ensure the effectiveness of each of the 
elements and of the Union as a whole. 
150. To correct these problems and to facilitate the synergies required, the following 
ideas have been put forward: 
- A majority considers that the Treaty already sets adequate, though somewhat 
general, objectives and that the problem lies in the structural difficulties which 
prevent them from being achieved. This being so, some members seek a more 
specific statement of the Union's fundamental interests, as referred to in 
Article J.1 (2). Their definition in relation to geographical areas has been suggested 
by some. Other members see the need for definition of common interest not 
through a geographical approach, but through common priorities such as 
reinforced diplomatic solidarity between Member States, guaranteeing of external 
frontiers and the upholding and defence of human rights and democracy. 
- A majority of members points to the advantage of international legal personality 
for the Union so that it can conclude international agreements on the subject-
matter of Titles V and VI concerning the CFSP and the external dimension of 
justice and home affairs. For them, the fact that the Union does not legally exist 
is a source of confusion outside and diminishes its external role. Others consider 
that the creation of international legal personality for the Union could risk 
confusion with the legal prerogatives of Member States. 
- The smooth operation of the whole institutional system requires better definition 
of the various instruments. Here, some representatives state that the differences 
between common positions and joint actions should be clarified as this would help 
to strengthen the consistency of the Union's external action. 
- lastly, in order to ensure optimum consistency in Union action, many members 
call for the introduction of a comprehensive set of rules. Some consider that a 
logical solution would be to dispense with the "pillar" structure, but retain specific 
proposal, decision-making and implementation procedures within the Community 
(following the EMU example). Others see a solution in greater cooperation and 
consistency between "pillars", and in structural coordination between the 
Presidency and the Commission. 
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151. In any event, it has been pointed out that decisions with political impact are taken 
in both CFSP and Community matters and that the Council is always involved; and 
that, once a decision has been taken, the Commission is required to take account of 
it in carrying out its executive role, regardless of whether the decision was taken 
under the first or second "pillar". The purpose of the reform is to ensure that Union 
external actions are clearly perceived as forming a harmonious whole. 
For some representatives that idea should be expressly enshrined in the TEU by 
spelling out in Articles J.2 and J.3 that common positions and joint actions are 
binding on the Commission. 
For other members, it should rather be emphasized that decisions under all "pillars" 
are taken within a single institutional framework in which all institutions participate 
and where the European Council provides guidelines. The day-to-day coordination 
of external action in order to ensure consistency between the Community and CFSP 
frameworks is, pursuant to article C, a matter for the Commission and the Council. 
To reinforce this, Article J.S, paragraph 2 might name not only the Council, but also 
the Commission, as having responsibility for ensuring consistency of external action 
decided in both the Community and CFSP frameworks. The necessary coordination 
between the two institutions, to this effect, must be ensured. 
The need for greater consistency should also inform preparations for Council 
proceedings, clarifying the relationship between Core per and the Political Committee. 
In that sense some members consider that Coreper's coordinating and central role 
as the preparatory committee for the whole of the areas within the Council's 
competence should be reinforced in the Treaty. 
B. COMMON FOREIGN POLICY 
152. With a view to rectifying shortcomings in the operation of Title V, the Group 
considered the various stages of the realization of the CFSP, i.e. formulation, 
decision-making and implementation. Unlike the Community decision-making 
process, in the CFSP area it is not easy to distinguish clearly between the various 
stages, so that it would not be realistic to use a rigid structure based on a 
successive distribution of tasks, since they intertwine. From a methodological 
viewpoint, it would nonetheless seem desirable to look at each one of them 
separately. 
The formulation stage: setting up of an analysis unit 
153. Regarding the preparatory stage of common foreign policy, the majority of the Group 
agrees that an analysis, forecasting, early warning system and planning unit should 
be set up. Thus, the necessary follow-up to crisis situations could be ensured from 
the outset; possible response and decision options could be considered and prepared. 
Such a unit could, moreover, encourage a common vision and greater cooperation 
among the Member States. The latter and the Commission should in the unit share 
the information they possess so that correct analyses of the situations may be done. 
In principle, setting up such a body does not necessarily require reform of the 
Treaties. · 
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As regards the unit's composition and location, most representatives advocate 
locating it in the General Secretariat of the Council, with a strengthening of its 
structures. Those in favour of this option point to the merit of abiding by the 
present institutional framework by not creating any new bodies, and highlight the 
advantage of situating the unit at the Council on account of the central role played 
by the States within the CFSP. As stated above, a broad majority of members point 
at the same time to the need to involve the Commission in forecasting and analysis. 
by establishing a close link with the General Secretariat of the Council in order to 
avoid inconsistency between the political dimension and the external economic 
dimension of the Union. For a large majority, it is understood that the unit should 
include Commission staff as well as staff from the national foreign ministries. 
Regardless of the location chosen, certain members see a case for some form of link 
or coordination between the unit and the WEU. 
It is widely considered that. far from developing into a new institution, the analysis 
and forecasting unit ought to be a preparatory body and therefore have no formal 
right of initiative, which could be a source of conflict or confusion of powers 
between Member States, the Council and the Commission. 
Decisions 
1 54. With regard to decision-making procedures. some state that the failure to use 
qualified majority voting is one of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the CFSP, 
which is why more general use should be made of such a procedure in this sphere, 
particularly given the prospect of enlargement. Others take the view that consensus 
and the right of veto are essential in matters which lie so close to the heart of 
national sovereignty and that unanimity does not prevent important decisions from 
being taken. 
As intermediate options. the Group explored ad hoc arrangements such as unanimity 
with "positive or constructive abstention", "unanimity minus one", "super-qualified 
majority". qualified majority with dispensation of the minority, general platforms of 
decisions taken by unanimity to be followed in their specifics by qualified-majority 
voting, in order to overcome the risk of deadlock in a field in which the Union needs 
decision-making capability. It is understood that constructive or positive abstention 
would involve political solidarity and, according to some, also financial solidarity with 
the decision taken. Those ideas should be examined further by the Conference. 
There is widespread agreement on the need to have more frequent recourse to the 
possibilities for majority voting laid down in the TEU. 
It should be commonly agreed whether, and if so, how to provide for the possibility 
of flexible formulae which will not prevent those who feel it necessary to take for 
the Union a joint action from doing so. 
155. The efficiency imperative will succeed only if the legitimacy of decisions in this area 
is assured. Given that in some cases it might not be acceptable for a State to be put 
into a minority, many of those in favour of the adoption of decisions by qualified 
majority favour as a further arrangement the recognition that a fundamental or vital 
national interest may prevent a common position or action. According to some 
members, this approach should be tempered by the need for prior definition of the 
concept of vital interest and the circumstances in which it applies. 
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Implementation: management and administration 
156. Because of the specific nature of the CFSP, instead of implementation, (which is a 
matter for the Member States and/or the Council and - within areas falling within its 
jurisdiction -for the Commission), we should really use the terms management or 
administration, depending on whether we want to highlight internal or external 
aspects respectively. To achieve this, the Group identifies various possible 
approaches: either the CFSP might be personified in the guise of a "Mr or Ms CFSP", 
or through arrangements which keep the central role of the Presidency in the 
external representation and implementation of the CFSP; another possibility would 
be to reinforce the Commission's role and responsibilities in this area. 
Personification of CFSP 
157. In order to find an answer to the problem of stability and continuity in the Union's 
external representation, the Group examined the possibility of embodying the CFSP 
behind the figurehead of a "Mr or Ms CFSP". Three main options were identified: 
158. Some members consider that this function would devolve, at least in time, upon the 
Commission. The advantage would be that it would be better able to ensure 
consistency with external economic measures and to call directly on Commission 
resources and means to implement foreign policy. While situating such a person in 
the Commission, possibly with a special status given by the European Council the 
advocates of this option recognize that CFSP management would, in any case, 
require a method for the Institutions to work in common and an ad hoc system of 
voting within the Council in line with the arrangements outlined above. 
159. For the majority, this would be someone in the Council. They consider that this 
approach is more in keeping with the central role which States have within the 
framework of the Council in relation to the CFSP. Two variants, which are not 
respectively incompatible, have been identified: 
Some members advocate creating a new figure, a High Representative for the 
CFSP, appointed and dismissable by the European Council, and receiving 
instructions directly from it, and from the General Affairs Council. 
Within this variant the High Representative must be clearly subordinate not 
only to the European Council but also to the General Affairs Council and to the 
Presidency. 
Others advocate nomination by General Affairs Council and placing this 
function within the General Secretariat of the Council, with its structures 
strengthened and the duties of Secretary-General raised to high ranking level. 
Those in favour of this option emphasize that it would not require any change 
in the current framework and that it would avoid any danger of conflict with 
the Council Presidency to which it would in any event remain subordinate. 
Some propose that this "Mr CFSP" attends the Commission when it discusses 
matters relating to external action. 
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160. A synthesis option would be that the President of the Council together with the 
Commission, takes direct charge of CFSP affairs assisted by a Secretary-General of the 
Council who would head the analysis and planning unit and have increased functions. This 
option would be even more effective if the Secretary of the WEU and the 
Secretary-General of the Council were one and the same person. 
161. There is no consensus on the personification of CFSP. Many members stress that the 
formula decided upon must allow for a higher profile for the Union without introducing 
additional confusion over functions or creating a conflict between the powers of this new 
personality and those of the Council Presidency, nor fragmenting the unity of the existing 
institutional framework. Lastly, they do not want this "Mr or Ms CFSP" to contribute to 
increased inconsistency between the "pillars". 
162. Various representatives insist that, over and above the alternatives described, the central 
role of the Presidency must be maintained in the external representation and 
implementation of CFSP and should not be impaired through any external representation 
figure. Such is the current approach of the Treaty, although the Union's enlargement and 
growing external responsibilities make it advisable to consider ways of bolstering the 
Presidency by means of better utilization of the Troika or, as some representatives see it, 
by means of some innovative Presidency formula, either in the form of teams or by other 
arrangements ensuring participation, democratic legitimacy and continuity in the exercise · 
of the Presidency. It was also underlined that coordination between the Presidency and the 
Commission must in any case be strengthened and that this should also be done 
structurally. 
Other questions 
163. As regards the financing of the CFSP, there is consensus in the Group on the need to 
establish specific procedures ensuring the availability of the funds necessary for rapid 
action when required. In any event, solidarity in general and, according to many members, 
financial solidarity in particular should underlie financial arrangements and therefore be 
applicable to possible cases of "positive abstention" or "opting out". The view is taken 
by a broad majority that the CFSP should be financed from the Community budget. For 
some members, this would imply the approval by the European Parliament of the broad 
outline of outlays related CFSP. 
164. The majority consider that the role of the European Parliament cannot be the same in this 
area as in Community legislation, since national parliaments do not use the same 
mechanisms of participation in framing and monitoring foreign policy as in their legislative 
work or in domestic control. However, some members think the present Treaty provisions 
should be better developed in practice, centring on the European Parliament's right to be 
informed in this respect. Others think it necessary to go further and involve Parliament 
more closely in determining the broad lines of the CFSP and in controlling the Union's 
external political affairs by means of arrangements in the Treaty ensuring confidentiality. 
Several members point out that the EP should not under any circumstances be given 
powers in this area in which governments conduct their foreign policy without prior 
authorization from Parliament, except in cases of extreme gravity. At least one member 
is against any increase in Parliament's role in this sphere. 
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165. It is not easy to distinguish which of the above options can be achieved by means of 
simple, practical improvements in operation and which of them require amendment of the 
Treaties. In fact it will depend upon the degree of political will achieved at the 
Conference. The creation of an analysis unit does not in principle require amendment of 
the Treaty. According to some, neither does the creation of a personality symbolizing the 
management of CFSP appear to require any institutional change. The question is whether 
the creation of such a personality does or does not in practice require the strengthening 
in the Treaty of consistency between Title V and the other functions of the Union. 
Furthermore, the best practical organization of the Presidency has its limits in Article 146 
of the Treaty. If it is not amended and special arrangements made for CFSP, the single 
institutional framework will necessarily have to be retained for all aspects of the Union. 
The Group recommends a global approach to assess the impact of each of these 
arrangements on the functions of the Union as a whole. 
C. SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY 
Elements for reflection 
166. The new international situation and prospects for enlargement lead to a mote just and 
secure European order but also pose new challenges to the security of the Union. These 
challenges require a collective response to the new risks and crises which can affect 
Member States' security. Their multifaceted nature calls also for a global approach 
ensuring consistency between the various aspects of the Union's external action, based 
on a comprehensive concept of security. 
The Group therefore believes that the Conference could examine ways to further develop 
the European identity, including in the security and defence policy field. This development 
should proceed in conformity with the objectives agreed at Maastricht, taking into 
consideration the Treaty provisions that the CFSP shall include all questions related to the 
security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which 
might in time lead to a common defence. 
1 67. Provisions of the TEU to be revised in 1996 also include those dealing with links with 
WEU, which is an integral part of the development of the Union. On 14.11.95 WEU 
Ministers approved and transmitted to the EU a WEU contribution to the IGC on the 
experience acquired since Maastricht (regarding both WEU's relations with the EU and with 
NATO and its operational development) and on the possible future development of the 
European Security and Defence Identity. In its reflection, the Group has been fully aware 
of this WEU work. 
168. Apart from the classic collective defence of territorial integrity, the cooperation on security 
and defence matters which the new challenges require is also directed at preventing 
conflicts and managing regional crises which stem from a large variety of political, 
economic, ecological, social or humanitarian factors. While both types of task may 
become intertwined in practice, it must also be pointed out that, as we shall see below, 
some Member States of the Union, which are not members of military alliances, wish to 
contribute to European security by participating in humanitarian, peacekeeping and other 
crisis management operations (the so-called Petersberg tasks), but without entering into 
collective defence commitments such as those defined in Art. 5 of the Brussels and 
Washington Treaties. These two facts will have to be taken into account when 
considering future arrangements for European security and defence cooperation. 
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169. In the view of many members of the Group, the gradual development of a European 
Security and Defence Identity agreed by the members of WEU at Maastricht must be given 
fresh impetus in order to establish the mechanisms permitting a European response to such 
crises, including through military operations to supplement the political, economic or 
humanitarian action decided on within the CFSP framework. 
170. The means needed for such European operations must be to hand: 
* Insofar as crises require a response including the use of armed force, fresh impetus must 
be given, according to WEU members, to developing further WEU's operational 
capabilities, which are still inadequate in many areas. This would also require that the 
procedures for making NATO assets and capabilities (including CJTF Headquarters) 
available for operations conducted by WEU be developed further. 
The EU "peace corps" suggested by some members of the Group (see above) could, were 
the idea to be accepted, play a role in this regard. Its relationship with existing or planned 
humanitarian capabilities. including those of WEU. would need to be considered. 
* The question also arises here of the need for greater European armaments cooperation. 
The Group was aware that thought is being given to this question within the Union, WEU 
and the WEAG. The Group discussed possible responses - including the proposed 
European Armaments Agency, the possible revision or even deletion of Article 223, and 
the need for a common arms export policy .. 
1 71. The Atlantic Alliance and the transatlantic link continue to play a fundamental role in 
European security. The Alliance guarantees the collective defence of its members and also 
contributes thro~gh other tasks to the security of the continent. For this reason. the 
Conference will have to take account of the fact that. in the view of NATO members. the 
development of a European Security and Defence Identity should strengthen the European 
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and include a development of Euro-Atlantic relations. 
The prospect of an eastward enlargement implies qualitative as well as quantitative 
changes for the security and defence of the Union. The enlargement of the EU, WEU and 
NATO will proceed autonomously according to their respective internal dynamics and 
processes. Each organization should ensure that their respective processes are transparent 
and mutually supportive of the goal of enhancing European stability and security. 
172. Participation in military operations in the framework of the Petersberg tasks will remain a 
matter for national decision. The majority of members strongly feel that the principle of 
national sovereignty should continue to govern relations between European countries on 
defence matters and that the intergovernmental nature of decision-making on these issues 
should be preserved and be conducted on the basis of consensus. Some representatives 
consider that the consensus rule should not exclude the possibility of European 
supranational bodies playing a certain role in defence matters in the future. Others wish 
the lGC to consider all possible options in this respect, including majority-voting. 
In case present decision-making procedures are preserved, it would seem appropriate in 
the view of some members to introduce some element of flexibility in this sphere. To that 
end, the possibility has been suggested of applying a non-binding principle to the effect 
that, while no one can be obliged to take part in military action by the Union, neither 
should anyone prevent such action by a majority group of Member States. and this without 
prejudice to the required political solidarity and adequate financial burden sharing. 
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173. Some members, while indicating that the range of institutional options identified for future 
EU-WEU relations would be of assistance to the IGC negotiators, saw a need to identify 
at this stage the purposes and principles that should govern developments in this regard. 
In particular, in response to Europe's new security challenges, developing the Union's 
capabilities in such areas as conflict prevention, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations 
was identified as a priority. These members attached importance to the concern that all 
the Member States of the Union, whether or not they are members of a military alliance, 
should be in a position to contribute to the European security through the Petersberg 
tasks. Some members of the Group also welcomed the fact that, in all of the options 
identified below, consideration was given to how to accommodate those partners not in 
a position to enter into Article V type commitments, and that the Group had examined 
ways to address this situation. 
Options for future EU-WEU relations 
174. Working from these general premises and taking note of Declaration 30 of Maastricht, the 
Group agrees on the need to continue improving the relationship between the EU and 
WEU, while fully respecting all Member States' national defence policies. In this context, 
the WEU Contribution to the IGC reaffirms the agreement of all WEU Member States to 
strengthen the EU-WEU institutional and operational links, together with WEU's operational 
capabilities. 
Nevertheless, different views have emerged within the Group (as in WEU) on how this 
relationship should be developed in the future. In this respect, a number of options and 
modalities have been put forward in the Group's discussion, although most representatives 
were open to consider several interrelated options. 
175. One view advocates maintaining full autonomy of WEU in the foreseeable future. 
According to this view, such autonomy allows maximum flexibility for participation by all 
Member States in developing the European Security and Defence Identity and avoids 
weakening the defence commitments within NATO and WEU, taking into account the 
differing memberships of these organizations and the Union. 
In this context, the option of an EU-WEU "reinforced partnership" has been proposed, 
aimed both at establishing closer political (EU/WEU back-to-back Summits) and 
administrative relations (coordination of Presidencies and Secretariats) between the two 
organizations and at developing WEU operational capabilities for crisis management tasks 
to complement NATO, while allowing for participation in such tasks of the widest possible 
range of European States. 
176. Another view advocates a g~eater role of the Union in the Petersberg tasks while at the 
same time preserving WEU as a separate defence organization. The development of 
operational capabilities necessary for the implementation of these tasks would proceed as 
a matter of urgency in view of Europe's new challenges. Two options have been 
mentioned in this context: 
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* An option which would provide for a closer and more formal link between both 
organizations by means of either political or legally binding directives. WEU would be 
subordinate in the Petersberg area to the Union, so as to act as its executive arm. 
* An alternative option would be to fully transfer the Petersberg tasks from WEU to the EU. 
WEU would remain as an organization responsible for territorial defence together with 
NATO. 
1 77. The majority of representatives see the way to the establishment of a genuine European 
Security and Defence Identity as lying in the gradual integration of WEU into the EU, in 
parallel with the development of European operational capabilities. In this way, the 
European defence function (both for crisis management tasks and for the collective 
defence guarantee embodied at present in the Brussels Treaty) would in time be 
incorporated into the single institutional framework of the Union. According to this view, 
EU-WEU integration responds to the logic of Maastricht, would reflect the solidarity 
amongst Europeans (which cannot be solely confined to the economic sphere) and would 
be the best way to achieve coherence between the CFSP and the defence policy, thereby 
allowing for better coordination between the various instruments of crisis management 
(political, economic, humanitarian, as well as military) available for effective action by the 
Union in crisis situations such as that of the former Yugoslavia. In this cont~xt, the idea 
has also been put forward within the Group that the IGC examines the possibility of 
including in the revised Treaty a provision on mutual assistance for the defence of the 
external borders of the Union. 
This view admits various approaches on the timetable and stages for WEU-EU integration: 
* Some regard integration as feasible only in the medium term. They therefore consider that 
the IGC should pursue an "intermediate" option which, while preserving the autonomous 
existence of WEU, would establish measures to promote a EU-WEU institutional 
convergence, with full integration as the final goal. This would be achieved by means of 
some political or legal commitment whereby WEU would be subordinated to the EU in 
matters concerning the operational-military elaboration and implementation of EU decisions 
and actions (Petersberg tasks), so as to act as implementing body of the Union in this 
area, while maintaining the possibility of WEU deciding autonomously its own actions. 
Three possible ways of establishing this commitment have been suggested: A new Article 
J.4 (and a new WEU Declaration) could state that the European Council will address 
general guidelines to WEU, as the organization requested to implement through the 
appropriate military actions the follow-up decisions adopted by the EU at ministerial level. 
Or it could state that the EU will address concrete instructions to WEU, thereby expressing 
its political and operational subordination to the Union. Finally, it could also be envisaged 
that a legally binding EU/WEU agreement be established whereby WEU would be 
committed to implementing decisions of the Union with defence implications. 
* Others consider that the IGC should clearly establish the goal and timetable for a WEU-EU 
merger in the short term (bearing in mind the possibility of denouncing the Brussels Treaty 
after 1998). WEU would thus disappear and the present duplication of structures for 
security (CFSP) and defence in the broad sense CWEU) would be eliminated. 
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The modalities for this integration could be decided on by the IGC or at a later moment. 
One possibility would be to transfer all WEU functions and capabilities from WEU to the 
Second Pillar (defence function within the CFSP); Member States not willing or able to 
enter into a collective defence commitment could opt out of such commitment. Another, 
initially more feasible, modality of integration, would be for the CFSP to take on the crisis 
management functions (Petersberg tasks) but leave the collective defence guarantee to a 
Defence Protocol to which those Member States so desiring would opt in on conditions 
to be agreed. 
Those who advocate the gradual integration of WEU into the EU consider, furthermore, 
that all these modalities could be seen as complementary measures and that the IGC could 
therefore envisage their being carried out either separately or as successive phases of a 
sequential approach, within the framework of an agreed timetable. 
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2. 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
RESOLUTION OF 17 MAY 1995 
ON THE OPERATION 
OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 
WITH A VIEW TO 
THE 1996 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 
- 213-
EU Treaty and Intergovernmental Conference 
A4-0102/95 
Resolution on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view to the 
1996 Intergovernmental Conference- Implementation and development of the Union 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to the Corfu European Council's request to each of the EU 
institutions to produce a report on the functioning of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) , 
having regard to the establishment of a Reflection Group which will help to 
prepare the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) expressly provided for 
in Article N of the Treaty on European Union, and which is to begin its work 
in June 1995, 
whereas, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article N, the 
Union is to 'maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on it', in 
accordance with Article B of the Treaty on European Union, 
whereas the Council and the European Parliament agreed in the context of the 
interinstitutional agreements that certain provisions of the Treaties 
(budgetary procedures, commitology) would be reconsidered at the 1996 IGC, 
having regard to Rule 148 of its Rules of Procedure, 
having regard to the report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs and 
the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence 
Policy, the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, the Committee 
on Budgets, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial 
Policy, the Committee on Research, Technological Development and Energy, the 
Committee on External Economic Relations, the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Citizens' Rights, the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment, the 
Committee on Regional Policy, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection, the 
Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media, the Committee on 
Development and Cooperation, the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal 
Affairs, the Committee on Fisheries, the Committee on the Rules of 
Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities, the Committee on 
Women's Rights, the Committee on Petitions and the Temporary Committee on 
Employment (A4-0102/95), 
A. whereas European integration which, since its very beginnings, has been 
synonymous with peace, political stability and harmonious economic and 
social development for the benefit of all citizens, now faces new 
challenges, which have emerged at the end of the Cold War, as a result of 
the globalization of the economy, damage to the environment, the IT 
revolution and its repercussions on employment and the growing relevance of 
equality between women and men; whereas these challenges call for 
initiatives by the European Union enabling it: 
(a) fully to assume its responsibilities in promoting peace, respect for 
human rights and the democratic stability of the European continent and 
neighbouring regions, especially with respect to everything relating to 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean Basin, 
(b) to become a hub of economically sustainable, socially balanced and job-
creating economic development, in the context of a world economy founded 
upon the same principles, 
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(c) to define the fight against unemployment and marginalization as a 
priority objective of the policies of the European Union, and, 
especially, of Economic and Monetary Union, 
(d) to ensure that its citizens can exercise their rights and freedoms, and 
to contribute to maintaining the security of the individual, while 
safeguarding national and regional cultural identities, 
whereas the Union therefore needs to forge itself an international identity 
based upon a coherent external policy and the instruments necessary for its 
internal policies, 
B. whereas at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference the European Union will 
have to face up to a three-fold institutional challenge: 
the need to tackle a democratic deficit that a growing number of 
European Union citizens find unacceptable, 
the need to redefine the current decision-making processes, which have 
become excessively complex and cumbersome and often inefficient, 
the need to prepare the European Union for future enlargement without 
slowing down the integration process or watering down the progress 
already achieved, 
C. whereas the major deficiencies under the Treaty on European Union are: 
the lack of openness and full democratic accountability of the Council, 
notably when deciding in legislative matters, 
the lack of and failure to implement cohesive and effective common 
foreign and security and justice and home affairs policies, shortcomings 
that are so much the more evident since it is clear that many new 
Community provisions under the first pillar have worked well, 
institutional mechanisms designed for a Europe of 6 members which have 
not been properly adapted since, and which could not simply be 
transposed to a European Union with more than 20 members without a risk 
of paralysis and dilution of the European Union, 
D. whereas the European Union should thus endeavour to achieve general 
improvement in its executive, legislative, budgetary and control functions 
within a single institutional framework, in order for it to become more 
efficient, more responsive to its citizens, and better able to develop the 
necessary policies for the future, 
E. whereas it would not be wise to enlarge the Union without making a number 
of fundamental changes to the Union and to the European Treaties, 
F. whereas the reform of the Treaties requires institutionalization of the 
principle of the 'necessary means', 
2 /PE 190.441 G:\PV SEANC\DEFINITI\ADOPTES\95-05\95-05-17.EN 
Adopts the following guidelines: 
I. OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES OF THE UNION 
1. The European Union will have to reinforce its existing framework of policies 
if it is to respond to economic and political change and to enhance its 
credibility in the eyes of its citizens. To do this it will have to develop 
new policies for the future and to strengthen its existing policies. 
Consolidation of this kind is conceivable only in the perspective of a 
merger of the three pillars and within a single institutional framework. 
A treaty for the citizens of the Union 
2. Unification of the Treaty would make its structure much clearer and more 
logical. In addition, however, the Treaty should be further simplified and 
made more inspiring for its citizens: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
The existing preamble of the Treaty should be rewritten in more 
inspiring language, and the provisions concerning citizens' rights 
should be placed at the beginning of the Treaty. 
The Treaty should provide for a separation between the provisions 
covering the Institutions and those covering the content of 
policies. 
Out-of-date Treaty articles should be deleted. 
The Union must fully implement its new responsibilities 
A. Organizing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which works 
3. There should be a more effective EU foreign policy within the framework of 
the Community pillar, integrating the common commercial policy, development 
cooperation policy, humanitarian aid and CFSP matters, and achieving better 
defined security and defence policies at EU level, with a permanent common 
strategy within the international organizations which have responsibilities 
in this field. In this context, common defence policy should guarantee that 
the borders of the Union and its Member States are safeguarded and enable 
the Union to carry its responsibilities for maintaining and restoring the 
rule of law internationally, ensuring that the Union absorbs the WEU' s 
power. 
(i) It should be possible for a qualified majority of Member States to 
undertake humanitarian, diplomatic or military action which would 
qualify as a 'joint action', with guarantees that no Member State 
should be forced to take part if it does not wish to do so, nor 
should it be able to prevent the majority from taking such action. 
(ii) The Commission should be fully integrated in the definition and 
elaboration of the CFSP, with a right of initiative. It should be 
given implementing power. In order to rectify difficulties that have 
emerged in the field of policy design and formulation, a joint 
Commission-Council planning and analysis unit should be established. 
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(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
Democratic accountability for matters which do not form part of the 
first pillar must be shared between both the European Parliament and 
the national parliaments. Consultation of the European Parliament 
should be obligatory if the Council adopts a common position or 
decision on 'joint action' . The Council should be obliged to provide 
information on such matters and arrangements should be made for such 
subjects to be treated confidentially. 
Article 223 of the Treaty, which prevents any control of sales of 
arms to third countries and the establishment of a genuine common 
arms policy for the Member States, should be deleted. 
A first step towards a contribution to conflict prevention could be 
the establishment of a European Civil Peace Corps (including 
conscientious objectors) with training of monitors, mediators and 
specialists in conflict resolution. 
B. Effective action in the field of justice and home affairs 
4. Decisive progress should now be made in the field of justice and home 
affairs, which should no longer be artificially distinguished from closely-
related policies within the full Community domain. Decisions on asylum 
policy, the crossing of the Member States' external frontiers and checks on 
such crossing, immigration policy and policy on non-Community nationals, and 
action against drug abuse must be progressively brought within the Community 
domain. In order to facilitate the fight against serious cross-border 
crime, EUROPOL should be given the operational power it needs. A more 
broadly based, flexible approach should be brought to bear as soon as 
possible as regards applying the 'passerelle' procedure provided for in 
Article K.9 of the Treaty, extending it, in particular, to cover all the 
areas listed in Article K.1 and providing for the Council to act by a 
qualified majority. Existing restrictions on the Commission's right of 
initiative and implementation should be removed. The roles of the Court of 
Justice, Court of Auditors and European Parliament should be strengthened, 
and the legislator should be able to adopt directives without unanimity 
being required. In view of the gradual integration of the third pillar, the 
Schengen Agreements should be progressively integrated into Union policy. 
C. A more balanced EMU 
5. As regards Economic and Monetary Union, the timetable should be maintained 
and the convergence criteria should not be modified but the monetary policy 
provisions should have their counterweight in reinforced economic policy 
coordination (i.e. in the field of multilateral surveillance and in 
establishing broad economic policy guidelines at EU level) and a clear link 
to Article 2 of the Treaty which implies that all the Union's institutions 
must work to promote' . . . a high level of employment and of social 
protection, the raising of the standard of living and the quality of life, 
and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States'. 
Democratic accountability on EMU matters should be greatly strengthened, 
with a more extensive role for the European Parliament (notably where the 
Treaty provides for the adoption of recommendations or economic guidelines 
by the Council) . In the case of Member States which, while not fulfilling 
the convergence criteria, have nevertheless pursued economic policies in 
line with those criteria and have shown genuine willingness to move towards 
the third stage of EMU, the Union shall give its political backing to their 
efforts and provide all the necessary aid to enable them to achieve those 
objectives; 
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6. Working towards full employment should be an explicit goal of the Member 
States and the Union, and an Employment Committee, endowed with the same 
powers as the Monetary Committee, should be set up. 
D. More rights for EO citizens and improved protection of the fundamental 
rights of all EO residents 
7. Greater substance should be provided for the concept of EU citizenship 
through development of the special rights linked to EU citizenship, notably 
by means of: 
accession of the Union to the Council of Europe's Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; 
a new right of all EU citizens to information on EU matters; 
inclusion of an explicit reference in the Treaty to the principle of 
equal treatment irrespective of race, sex, age, handicap or religion 
(including mentioning the fundamental social rights of workers set out 
in the Charter, enlarging upon them and extending them to all citizens 
of the Union); also incorporation of an article specifically referring 
to a ban on capital punishment; 
bringing together within a single article the economic rights that are 
scattered throughout the Treaty (such as the right to free movement and 
establishment of labour and of the professions) , and reinforcing these 
rights; 
the development of political citizenship, inter alia through measures 
that facilitate participation in political life in a Member State of 
Union citizens residing in that State; 
the strengthening of provisions needed to achieve fully the free 
movement of persons; 
the preservation of Europe's diversity through special safeguards for 
traditional national minorities in terms of human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law; 
the application of the provisions in the Treaty on equal rights not only 
to economic rights but to all aspects of equality for women. 
In addition, the Treaty should contain a clear rejection of racism, 
xenophobia, sexism, discrimination on grounds of a person's sexual 
orientation, anti-semitism, revisionism and all forms of discrimination and 
guarantee adequate legal protection against discrimination for all 
individuals resident within the EU. 
8. In order to develop the means of expression for citizens at European level, 
Article 138a of the Treaty on European political parties must be applied and 
developed. 
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E. An area for cooperation among European peoples 
9. In addition to being a key factor in economic, social, and cultural 
development, cross-border and interregional cooperation helps to forge bonds 
and foster pacific cooperation among the different European countries. The 
Union should therefore establish a Community-wide legal framework to promote 
cross-border and interregional cooperation based on a Community regional 
planning discipline, since this will stimulate European integration and 
ensure that Community policies are implemented more effectively. Cross-
border agreements with third countries, and in particular the Nordic free 
movement agreement, should not be jeopardized. 
The Union must strengthen its existing policies 
1 0. There should be more effective policy-making in a number of other key 
fields: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
The principle of economic and social cohesion should be reinforced 
in the Treaty. 
Social policy should be a core area of EU competence (with 
incorporation of the Social Charter, and an ending of the United 
Kingdom opt-out) and should be better integrated with economic 
policy as a whole. 
Equal opportunities policy should be improved through a redrafting 
of Article 11 9 of the Treaty broadening its scope to cover all 
aspects of employment and social security. 
The energy policy aspects of the ECSC and EURATOM Treaties and other 
energy policy considerations should be integrated within a common 
energy policy framework, helping to ensure overall cooperation with 
regard to security of supply and environmental protection. 
Agricultural policy, as a decisive area of Union policy, should have 
as its objectives ecologically and socially compatible farming 
together with sustainable regional development. 
Agricultural policy should be better integrated with food policy, 
rural development and environmental considerations and be better 
incorporated within the normal budgetary process. 
The Union's powers in the agricultural sector largely evade the 
direct scrutiny of national parliaments and must be subject to 
greater democratic control by the European Parliament; in fact, 
responsibility for agricultural markets and prices policy, and thus 
for farm incomes policy, has long been outside the control of 
national parliaments. 
The objectives of the CAP set out in Article 39 of the Treaty should 
be adjusted to include in particular the concept of 'rural 
development'. 
(vi) Powers in the field of fisheries need to be dealt with independently 
of those in the field of agriculture. The common fisheries policy 
should be re-examined in accordance with the founding principles 
underlying the institution of the common policy, i.e. conservation 
and relative stability. 
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(vii) The existing Treaty articles on environmental policy should be 
strengthened and simplified, so that environmental protection and 
concern for animal welfare and conservation become fundamental 
principles of the European Union and are effectively and fully 
integrated with other EU policies; environmental protection should 
be included in Article 3 of the Treaty as a Union objective. 
(viii) Consumer rights and interests must also be protected to a greater 
extent by laying the foundations for a genuine consumer policy. 
(ix) In the transport sector the Treaty should provide for an integrated 
common transport policy including powers in air traffic control. 
(x) Tourism, in its European aspects, should form a separate and 
distinctive common policy with a separate legal basis and chapter 
in the revised Treaty. 
(xi) The place of the public service within European Union policy 
measures should be affirmed by introducing new articles defining the 
concept and scope of the 'universal service', guaranteeing each 
citizen the right to equal access to services of general interest, 
and ad hoc provisions taking account of the specific nature of 
public service undertakings. 
(xii) The chapter on education, vocational training and youth should be 
strengthened in order to focus attention on the rights and interests 
of children and young people and to provide for account to be taken 
of the consequences that current policies can have on children and 
young people and their families. 
(xiii) External economic policy should be the exclusive competence of the 
Union. 
11. Europe's cultural identity and diversity should be preserved and the value 
of national and regional cultural and linguistic diversity within the 
European Union should be explicitly recognized. 
There should be no restrictions on the number of official or working 
languages of the European Union. 
In view of the multicultural nature of European society, explicit reference 
should be made to the need to promote intercultural dialogue aimed at 
improving mutual understanding and tolerance. 
Clarifying competencies 
1 2. ( i) The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as currently 
laid down in Article 3b of the Treaty, should be maintained and 
correctly applied. 
(ii) Establishment of a fixed list of EU and Member State competencies 
would be too rigid and too hard to achieve. Article 235 should be 
retained, but only used as a last resort and after assent of the EP. 
II. THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNION 
Ensuring the unity of the institutional system 
1 3. It is of central importance that the single institutional framework be 
maintained and reinforced. 
A. Ending dismemberment of the institutional system 
14. (i) The existing Treaties should be unified by means of: 
relevant features of the ECSC and EURATOM Treaties being directly 
incorporated within the unified Treaty; 
foreign and security policy (including defence) and justice and home 
affairs being brought within the Community system, but with specific 
features of the former 'pillars' being retained for certain items 
for a predetermined transitional period; this will mean grouping all 
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the articles of the Treaty concerning foreign policy under a single 
title. 
(ii) The European Union should be given legal personality in its own 
right. 
B. Flexibility within unity 
15. In view of the increasing diversity of the EU, further flexible arrangements 
may well be required in the future, but these: 
should not undermine the single institutional framework, the 'acquis 
communautaire' or the principles of solidarity and economic and social 
cohesion throughout the European Union; 
should not undermine the principle of equality of all States and 
citizens of the Union before the Treaty; 
should not lead to a 'Europe ala carte'. 
16. The European Parliament as a whole will be responsible for exercising 
control over those Union policies which are pursued by a limited number of 
Member States on a temporary basis. 
17. If at the 1996 Conference, despite broad agreement among a majority of 
Member States and peoples of the European Union, it proves impossible to 
reach a positive conclusion owing to failure to reach a unanimous decision, 
consideration will need to be given to proceeding without the minority and, 
possibly, providing for instruments to enable a Member State to leave the 
EU, subject to meeting certain criteria. 
Stronger and more democratic Union Institutions 
18. The 1996 Conference should primarily concentrate not on transferring new 
powers to the EU Institutions, but on clarifying their respective roles, and 
on achieving an appropriate balance between them. 
19. The composition of the EU Institutions will have to be reviewed at the 1996 
Conference if the EU is to be further enlarged, and if the EU institutions 
are to function properly. For each institution, however, the criterion of 
efficiency will have to be balanced against the need to take account of the 
interests of both large and small Member States. The concept of equal 
status for each state guaranteeing that all the Member States can 
participate and be involved in the Union's decision-making process on an 
equal footing must be applied. 
20. The representation and participation of women at all levels in the Union 
institutions should be gradually increased; 
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A. The Commission 
21 . ( i) The Commission's role and independence should be reasserted, in 
particular by maintaining its right of initiative, accompanied by 
the changes already provided for in the Treaty. 
(ii) There should continue to be at least one Commissioner per Member 
State; however, the Commission's structure and composition must be 
adapted to its new tasks and to the needs of enlargement if its 
collegiate responsibility and effectiveness are to be maintained. 
This could be done by: 
a greater presidentialization of working methods; 
an internal restructuring of the Commission. 
(iii) The President of the Commission should be directly elected by the 
European Parliament from among a list of names put forward by the 
European Council. The rest of the Commission should then be put 
together by agreement between the President and the national 
governments before coming to Parliament for a final vote of 
investiture as a college. 
(iv) The European Parliament (like the Council) should be able to request 
compulsory retirement of individual Commissioners, pursuant to 
Articles 157 and 160 of the Treaty. 
B. Council 
22. (i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
The principle of openness should be explicitly stated in the Treaty, 
and detailed implementing mechanisms should be established (where 
the Council is acting in its legislative capacity, its proceedings 
should be public and its agenda binding) . Public access to EU 
documents should be greatly improved. 
Drafts and proposals should be 
they are adopted or handed 
organizations or individuals, 
others. 
accessible to the public as soon as 
over to other bodies, interest 
or published wholly or partly by 
All meetings on proposed legal acts are to be held in public unless 
a specific and duly justified exception is decided by a two-thlrds 
majority. Such exceptions shall be notified together with the 
reasons for them to the European Parliament. 
All documents should be accessible to the public unless exceptions 
are decided by a two-thirds majority in the responsible body. 
The present system of six-month Presidencies of the Council and the 
European Council should be maintained, but there should be greater 
flexibility in their operation. 
Further extension of qualified majority voting is required if the 
European Union is to function effectively. For certain areas of 
particular sensitivity, unanimity will remain necessary, i.e. Treaty 
amendment, 'constitutional decisions' (enlargement, own resources, 
uniform electoral system) and Article 235. 
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The system of voting within the Council may need to be adjusted. 
However, this should not be done on the basis of a 'double majority' 
of States and population, as it is in the Parliament that population 
is represented. Council represents States. A weighted vote 
reflecting the general size of the States should not be strictly 
proportioned to population. 
In any case, the threshold for obtaining a qualified majority should 
be lowered from the very high level of 71% that it is at present. 
C. The European Parliament 
23. (i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
(vii) 
The number of Members of the European Parliament cannot be 
indefinitely increased and should not exceed 700; a common Statute 
for European MPs should be established. 
The European Parliament should give its assent to all nominations 
to the European Court of Justice, to the Court of First Instance, 
to the European Court of Auditors and to the Members of the 
Executive Board of the European System of Central Banks. 
The European Parliament should have equal status with the Council 
in all fields of EU legislative and budgetary competence. 
The European Parliament's role should be reinforced in those areas 
where there is currently inadequate scrutiny at European level, and 
notably in matters relating to the common foreign and security 
policy and to justice and home affairs, as well as in the field of 
EMU. 
The current anomalies in the EP' s standing before the Court of 
Justice should be corrected by giving the EP, like the other 
institutions, the right to request the opinion of the Court on the 
compatibility with the Treaty of international agreements, the right 
to bring cases (not only in order to preserve its own prerogatives) 
and the right to be informed of requests for preliminary rulings 
that have been referred to the Court and to submit observations on 
them. 
The European Parliament must participate in the decision regarding 
its own seat. 
The Commission should be required to respond to Parliament 
initiatives made pursuant to Article 138b, second paragraph. 
24. Democratic control of EU matters would be best achieved by partnership 
between the European Parliament and the national parliaments. The role of 
national parliaments should be reinforced in a number of ways, such as 
through strengthened cooperation between equivalent parliamentary committees 
of national parliaments and the European Parliament, and providing 
opportunities for specialist organs of national parliaments to discuss major 
European proposals with their ministers prior to Council meetings. 
D. European Court of Justice 
25. (i) The European Court of Justice should have the full means to ensure 
respect for EU laws and of the EU institutional balance; its 
competence should also be extended to areas relating to the common 
foreign and security policy, justice and internal affairs and those 
covered by the Schengen Agreement. 
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(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
More flexible internal operating arrangements should be introduced 
to permit the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance to 
face up to the increase in their workload and the prospect of 
enlargement. In this context use should be made of the 
opportunities offered by the increase in the number of judges as a 
result of the accession of new countries in order to create a larger 
number of specialized courtrooms. 
Judges and Advocates-General at the ECJ, and Judges at the Court of 
First Instance, should serve only one, non-renewable term of office 
of 9 years. 
Finally, the conditions for referring matters to the ECJ should be 
enlarged so that each institution of the Union should have the 
possibility (in addition to the means of redress in Article 173) of 
bringing an action in the Court where it considers that its rights 
have been infringed by the failure on the part of another 
institution or a Member State to fulfil a Treaty obligation. 
E. Others 
26. No further increase should be permitted in the existing number of Members 
at the European Court of Auditors, who should serve only one, non-renewable 
term of office of 9 years. The Court should also play its proper role in 
all areas of European Union activity. 
27. The members of the Committee of the Regions to whom Article 198a of the 
Treaty refers must be the elected members of a local or regional assembly. 
Parliament should be able to consult the Committee (as well as the Economic 
and Social Committee) on the same footing as can the Council and Commission. 
28. In order to improve the economic and social cohesion of the European Union 
and to respect the principle of subsidiarity, the role of the Committee of 
the Regions in drawing up policies within its remit should be strengthened. 
III. THE DECISION-MAKING MECHANISMS OF THE UNION 
29. 
The legislative function (legislative acts, international agreements) 
(i) 
(ii) 
There should only be three decision-making procedures, the 
codecision, assent, and consul tat ion procedures. The existing 
cooperation procedure should be abolished. 
The assent procedure should be restricted 
international agreements, enlargement and 
resource. 
to Treaty revision, 
adjustments to own 
(iii) The consultation procedure should be restricted to decisions in the 
field of common foreign policy and security. 
(iv) In all other areas, the codecision procedure should apply. 
30. The codecision procedure should also be simplified. The following changes 
could be envisaged: 
(i) End the procedure when there is agreement between Council and 
Parliament at first reading stage. 
(ii) Drop the phase of intention to reject. 
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(iii) Introduce at the end of the first reading a simplified conciliation 
procedure. 
(iv) Give the Commission the power to propose and put to the vote in the 
two conciliation committee delegations a compromise between the 
conflicting positions. 
(v) Harmonize the majorities required for rejecting the final text 
(regardless of the results of conciliation). 
(vi) Eliminate the possibility for the Council to act unilaterally (by 
reconfirming its common position) in the event of conciliation 
failing to reach agreement. 
31. Serious consideration should be given to the idea of introducing the 
principle of equivalent deadlines for Parliament and Council in their first 
readings on draft legislation. 
32. (i) The volume of draft legislation submitted to the European Parliament 
and the Council should be limited by introducing a certain hierarchy 
of acts. This could be achieved by introducing a new category of 
implementing acts, responsibility for which would lie with the 
Commission where so empowered by the legislative authority. Under 
no circumstances would this new category of acts limit the 
legislative and political control functions exercised by the 
European Parliament. 
(ii) Existing 'commitology' procedures should be simplified. General 
responsibility for implementing measures should be devolved to the 
Commission (which may use an Advisory Committee to help in the 
formulation of the measure, but not type 2 and type 3 Committees, 
which would be abolished) . The Council and Parliament should be 
informed of the measures proposed and should each have the 
opportunity to reject the Commission's decision and to call either 
for new implementing measures or for full legislative procedures. 
33. The articles of the Treaty dealing with international agreements should be 
consolidated, and the respective roles of the Commission and Council should 
be clarified (notably as regards the arrangements for participation by the 
Union in international economic organizations), and the democratic role of 
the European Parliament before, during and after the negotiating process 
should be reinforced, with the assent of Parliament being required for all 
international agreements entered into by the Union (without prejudice to 
the powers of national parliaments) . 
The budgetary function 
34. The budgetary function should be changed so as to respect the following 
principles: 
(i) Budgetary legislation should be rationalized so as to distinguish 
between own resources decisions on the one hand and the Financial 
Regulation and budgetary discipline on the other. The Union's budget 
should be the sole budgetary instrument for the realization of the 
Union's objectives and should allow a prompt response to exceptional 
or unforeseen circumstances. 
(ii) The unity of the budget should be established: the European Union's 
budget should incorporate the European Development Fund, Community 
borrowing and lending, and expenditure under the second and third 
pillars. 
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(iii) Multiannual financial programming should be incorporated in the 
Treaty while maintaining the annual nature of the budget. 
(iv) The budgetary authority should be given responsibility for revenue; 
the European Parliament should be associated with the revenue side 
of the budget by giving it the right of assent. 
(v) The income of the ECB (seniorage income) shall be deemed an own 
resource of the Community; 
(vi) The system of revenue, belonging exclusively to the Union, should 
make it possible for citizens to identify clearly what resources are 
allocated to the Union; it should reflect the financial capacity of 
the Member States, and it should permit the fixing of an overall 
financial ceiling. 
(vii) The procedural distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory 
expenditure should be abolished; i.e. the European Parliament should 
be able to act as an equal partner for all expenditure. 
(viii) The budgetary procedure should be simplified, made more 
transparent and effective; the Commission's preliminary draft 
budget proposals should be the basis for the European Parliament's 
first reading; the democratic principle of the final adoption of 
the budget by the European Parliament must maintained. 
The function of control 
35. Political control within the Union should be reinforced by means of the 
measures proposed in the above paragraphs. 
36. The Treaty should be revised to permit tougher measures to be taken to 
combat fraud and other infringements of EU law, to permit wider-ranging 
investigations within the Member States (by means, for example, of a 
reinforced Article 138c) and to enable dissuasive penal and administrative 
sanctions to be imposed at EU level (with an article to permit 
harmonization directives in the area of relevant penal law, and 
specifically obliging Member States to apply effective, proportionate, 
harmonized and deterrent penalties for breach of Community law). 
37. Where independent agencies and other organizations are entrusted with EU 
tasks they should carry out these tasks, within a framework which ensures 
proper coordination and control at EU level. 
38. There should be increased accountability of the European Investment Bank 
(judicial review by the Court of Justice, monitoring by the Court of 
Auditors, reporting requirement to Parliament and Council). 
IV. THE PROSPECTS FOR ENLARGEMENT 
39. Parliament reserves the right to put forward any proposals which may prove 
necessary in order to take better account of the implications of the 
enlargement including the financial prospects of enlargement and not to 
undermine the principles of competition, cooperation and solidarity which 
have always been fundamental to European integration. 
40. Parliament awaits with great interest the Commission report on the impact 
of common policies in the applicant countries, a report which should give 
rise to practical proposals concerning the adjustments required or even the 
practical scope for applying the policies concerned to those countries. 
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V. FOLLOW-UP MEASURES 
41. There should be as open a debate as possible during the Reflection Group 
phase, including regular public report-back from the Group and the holding 
of a large hearing on the issues at stake in 1996. 
42. The negotiating phase of the 1996 Conference should involve more open 
debate than at previous IGCs, and the role of both national parliaments and 
of the European Parliament should be reinforced: 
(i) A consultative conference of parliaments could meet at the 
beginning and at the end of the revision conference. 
(ii) In order to ensure that the process of revision in 1996 is more 
transparent and democratic, the representatives of Parliament in 
the Reflection Group should stress the need of a decisive change 
in the method of the Treaty revision and of a full involvement of 
Parliament both in the negotiating phase as well as in the 
ratification process; the role of the national parliaments should 
be also reinforced. 
(iii) The interinstitutional conference should lay down the guidelines 
for European Parliament participation in the negotiations. 
43. Parliament should have to give its assent to the outcome of the 
negotiations. 
44. Consideration should be given to holding a Union-wide referendum to ratify 
any Treaty provisions, on the grounds that a collective decision affecting 
the whole of Europe is at stake. As an alternative, Member States could 
agree to hold any national referenda (or their respective parliamentary 
votes) at the same time or within a few days of each other. 
45. The current Article N of the Treaty should be reformed to ensure that the 
European Parliament is put on the same footing as the Commission in being 
able to submit proposals for the amendment of the Treaty. The Treaty 
should be amended to provide for future revisions to be approved jointly 
by Parliament and the Council before being submitted to national 
parliaments for ratification. In addition to forwarding all proposed Treaty 
changes to the parliaments of the Member States and the European Parliament 
for final ratification, the Council must communicate a single, consolidated 
text of the founding treaties at the same time. 
0 0 0 0 0 
Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the 
Commission, the members of the Reflection Group and to the governments and 
parliaments of the Member States. 
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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
RESOLUTION OF 14 DECEMBER 1995 
ON THE AGENDA FOR 
THE 1996 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 
WITH A VIEW TO THE MADRID EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
- 229-
1 (c) B4-1563/95 
Resolution on the agenda for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference with a view 
to the Madrid European Council 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to its resolution of 17 May 1995 on the functioning of the 
Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference- Implementation and development of the Union 1 , 
having regard to the Treaty on European Union and, in particular, Article N 
which provides that the European Parliament must be consulted before the 
convening of an intergovernmental conference, 
having regard to the report of the Reflection Group2 , 
A. whereas the objectives of the process of European integration are peace, 
political stability and guaranteed harmonious economic and social 
development for the benefit of all citizens of the Community, 
B. whereas the European Union must in future secure greater support from the 
general public, make its action more effective and clearly define its 
objectives, 
C. whereas the Treaties, which were initially designed for six countries, 
already no longer function satisfactorily for fifteen Member States, much 
less for an even greater number, 
D. having regard to the new major challenges now facing the European Union, as 
outlined in its resolution of 17 May 1995, 
E. whereas the necessary strengthening of existing policies is conceivable only 
with the prospect of the merger of the three pillars and within a single 
institutional framework, 
F. whereas the Member States will have a heavy responsibility to bear if they 
fail to respond to these challenges and whereas were the conference to be 
a failure or the revision of the Treaties lacking in ambition, the whole 
process of European integration could suffer a serious setback, 
Reflection Group report 
1. Shares the view of the members of the Reflection Group that, to meet the 
challenge of enlargement, substantial reforms are required as well as proper 
implementation of existing European policies, to respond to the growing 
disenchantment and disaffection of European citizens; 
2 
OJ C 1 51 , 1 9 . 6 . 1 9 9 5 , p . 56 . 
SN 520/95, 5.12.1995. 
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2. Considers that the Reflection Group's report highlights the main changes 
required for the future enlarged European Union and welcomes the positive 
role played by Parliament's representatives and by the chairman of the 
Reflection Group in securing the support of a large majority of members for 
the European Union to be deepened as far as possible during the IGC; 
3. Regrets that there is no consensus on the main reforms necessary in the 
Union but welcomes the fact that a large majority supports the main options 
put forward by Parliament, in particular with regard to democracy in the 
Union and the effectiveness of the institutions (extending use of the 
codecision procedure and qualified majority voting), citizenship and 
fundamental rights and with regard to freedom, internal security and 
transparency; 
4. Regrets that the report has a number of major shortcomings and fails to give 
a full and clear answer to vital questions such as the abolition of the 
pillars, particularly in the area of the common foreign and security policy 
and defence policy, the effectiveness of the Union institutions, the 
coordination of the economic policies of the Union and budgetary procedures; 
also regrets the lack of any reference to the cultural impact of the Union's 
policies; 
5. Considers it vital that, on the basis of the 'acquis communautaire' which 
must remain intact, the Union should define clear and precise aims and 
objectives shared by all the Member States which can in no circumstances be 
called into question; 
Appeal to Madrid European Council 
6. Urges the European Council to define a mandate for the IGC which takes 
account of the priorities established by Parliament in its resolution 
referred to above, namely: 
to give political substance to citizenship of the European Union, to 
ensure that citizens and social operators have genuine rights to be 
informed and consulted and real powers of control and to guarantee 
respect for both fundamental rights and human rights; 
to make the institutions of the European Union more effective and more 
democratic (in particular by making greater use of qualified majority 
voting, by simplifying and democratizing Community decision-making 
procedures, which should therefore be reduced to three, i.e. codecision, 
assent and consultation, and by conferring greater responsibilities on 
the European Parliament, in particular by making the codecision 
procedure involving Parliament and the Council the general rule on 
legislative matters); 
to permit the adoption of policies leading towards improved European 
competitiveness, full employment, reinforced economic and social 
cohesion, and enhanced environmental protection; 
to develop a social policy by incorporating into the Treaty the Charter 
on Fundamental Social Rights and the Protocol on Social Policy; 
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to equip itself with the institutional and political resources required 
for the implementation of a proper common foreign and security policy 
for peace-keeping and to ensure a more effective Union presence on the 
international scene; 
to ensure real progress in the fields of justice and home affairs, by 
bringing them within the Community sphere and by using Community 
procedures and institutions, in order to promote, in particular, a 
European asylum policy and to strengthen internal security in the 
European Union by combating crime in the Union and drug trafficking 
effectively; 
to strengthen Community and national instruments for combating fraud and 
maladministration at European Union and Member State level; 
to guarantee real openness and transparency and, to this end, to open 
up the legislative process by providing for Council meetings and votes 
to be held in public where the Council is acting in its capacity as 
legislator; 
to unify and simplify the Treaty and all Community legislation by making 
them easier for the citizens of the European Union to understand; 
to establish in the Treaties a role for public services of general 
economic and social interest, and to develop a universal right of access 
to these services of general interest; 
to clarify the sources of law by establishing a hierarchy of acts; 
7. Proposes that in the period between the Madrid European Council and the 
start of the Intergovernmental Conference technical work on the 
simplification and codification of the Treaties should continue so that the 
conference can begin its substantive work on the basis of a text which has 
already been simplified and codified; 
Treaty revision procedures 
8. Reminds the European Council that the difficulties in securing public 
acceptance at the time of ratification of the EU Treaty prove the need to 
adopt a more open and democratic procedure for the revision of the Treaty; 
9. Undertakes to stimulate public debate so that citizens are involved in the 
process of revision of the Treaty, as it did, for example, by holding a 
public hearing on 17 and 18 October 1995; 
10. Reaffirms its desire for close cooperation with the national parliaments, 
particularly within the framework of revision of the Treaty; 
11. Considers that it should be informed on a regular basis of developments in 
the IGC and involved to the greatest possible extent during both the 
negotiating phase and the ratification process; 
12. Considers it essential to review the operation of the interinstitutional 
conference to make it a forum for genuine cooperation between Parliament, 
the Commission, and the governments of the Member States; 
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13. Considers that the Madrid European Council must adopt the requisite 
arrangements in terms of transparency and access to information and 
appropriate arrangements to ensure the fullest possible involvement of and 
cooperation with Parliament at the Intergovernmental Conference and suggests 
that the best way of achieving this is for Parliament observers to take part 
in the conference; 
14. Considers that if it were invited to send observers to the IGC, their role 
and the arrangements for their participation would have to be clearly 
defined in advance; 
15. Considers that the governments of the Member States must undertake not to 
submit the new Treaty for ratification without having obtained its approval 
and that Article N will have to be amended accordingly at the 
Intergovernmental Conference; 
0 
0 0 
16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, 
the Council, the Commission and the parliaments of the Member States. 
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3. 
COMMISSION 
REPORT OF 1 0 MAY 1995 ON THE OPERATION 
OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 
- 235-
PREFACE 
PREPAruNG EUROPE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
This report by the Commission is its response-to the mandate of the Corfu European Council: 
that the Community institutions review the operation of the Treaty on European Union. It is 
the first stage in a long and delicate process. It takes stock of the operation of an instrument 
that has been in force for only eighteen months. The fact that in the peri.od before the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference the institutions are each reviewing their collective modus 
operandi is welcome. Practical proposals on amendments to the Treaty will follow in flue 
course. 
The 1996 deadline was set in 1991. At that time the Treaty was a bold response to a novel 
situation. Objective analysis shows that it is better than its reputation would suggest. It has 
the merit of setting out a comprehensive approach to European integration, rather than a 
purely economic one. It has enhanced the European Parliament's powers, consolidated the 
Commission's legitimacy, launched economic and monetary union, and generally reinforced 
the Union's capacities. It has mapped out the path to a stronger Union presence on the world 
political scene. 
Acknowledging the Treaty's strengths, however, also permits us to identify its weak points 
and the shortcomings in its implementation. This analysis ~II allow the Commission to 
outline the path it believes should be followed during the Intergovernmental Conference, in 
terms of both form and content: institutional questions, however important in a Community 
governed by the rule of law, should not blind us to the fundamental issues at state. 
' 
Two major challenges for Europe 
The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference will be a key encounter, for Europe and its future. 
The outcom.e will determine the shape of matters European as the 21st century dawns. Two 
factors make this deadline particularly important 
First,· the Union's internal context has changed. The Maastricht Treaty ratification debate 
revealed that there was still a degree of scepticism about European integration. Europe is not 
easy for people to understand; many do not see what it is about. The same problem can also 
arise within an individual country where the citizen may not always realize what policies are 
being followed in his or her name, or why. The distance between the citizen and the place 
where decisions are made, however, means that the problem is more acute in the Union. 
So the first challenge is obvious -- to make Europe the business of every citizen. The 
emergence of open debate, covering all points of view on Europe, is in fact a real 
opportunity : Europe is no longer deciding its future behind closed doors. 
That is why the Commission does not regard the Treaty's objective of a Community closer 
to the citizen as a mere empty formula, but as an overriding principle which guides its 
actions. 
The Commission will be listening to the views of ordinary men and wome~ and focussing 
on ways in which Europe can combat unemploymerit, safeguard the environment and promote 
solidarity. 
Here, as elsewhere, the Commission will try to speak for the general interest. 
The Commission is convinced that the solution to today's problems needs finn action at 
European level. None of our Member States can really tackle the problems of unemployment 
and pollution on its own. Organized crime cannot be resisted by forces which are scattered 
and fragmented; above all, there can be no effective foreign policy without joint action at 
the Union level. 
This does not mean that evezything should be centralized. Subsidiarity involves working out 
the right level for the most effective action, whatever the question concerned. That level may 
be local~ regional, national, European, or in some cases even world-wide. 
The context has altered not only within the Union~' The international context has changed 
even more radically. The historic shock waves of 1989 --on the Union's vezy doorstep-- are 
still reverberating. The upheavals which followed the fall of the Berlin Wall have borne fruit. 
At tremendous cost, the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe have confirmed their 
attachment to the values that are at the very basis of the Union.· The Union, for its part, has 
committed ~tself to accepting these countries. 
Herein lies the second challenge. How are these countries to be welcomed into the Union 
without striking at the foundations of all that has been achieved- in forty years of 
European integration? How, in other words, can we ensure that enlargement will not 
multiply our weaknesses but unite our strengths? How can we enhance our capacity to take 
decisions and to act, when our diversity becomes more pronounced? Enlargement must 
represent a new arrangement worked out with our eyes open. We have to be aware of its 
implications for the institutions and policies of the Union. The Commission is convinced that 
there is an answer to these questions. There is no compelling reason why an endeavour based 
on openness and solidarity should mean weakness and dilution : enlargement and deepening 
are perfectly compatible. 
If these two challenges-- making Europe the business of the citizen and making a success 
of future enlargement -- are to be taken up, we must begin by reminding ourselves of the 
values and successes of European integrativn in the past. 
The achievements of four decades of European integration 
In the 1950s, as the principles which were to lead present to the Treaty of Rome were starting 
to take shape, the war was still in everyone's mind. The deep psychological scars it left 
behind helped create a consensus as to the fundamental objectives of European integration: 
the future would have to be different from the past. 
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The future has indeed turned out to be very different from the past. Europe has been at peace. 
Despite the tragedy of unemployment, and the social exclusion which tears at the fabric of 
our societies today, Europe has since the 1950s been through a wholly- unprecedented period .. 
of development; this should never be overlooked. 
In setting up a Community designed to last indefinitely, equipped with its own institutions, 
enjoying'legal personality, and internationally-represented in its own pame, the Member States 
have given their allegiance to an "organization of states" which is governed . by legal 
provisions particular to the treaties under which it was set up; this makes it fundamentally 
different from the organizations established by traditional international treaties. They have 
pooled their sovereign rights ~d created a new legal order, involving not just the Member 
States themselves but also their citizens, in the specific fields concerned. 
Thus there has sprung up a Community based on law. The states of which it is composed, 
whether big or small, enjoy equal rights and dignity. The Union which brings them together 
respects their different identities and cultures. Those differences do not however stand in 
the way of their ability to take decisions and to act together. That is the fruit of an 
institutional system with many strengths: thanks to the principle of subsidiarity, it strikes 
the proper balance between the Union, the Member States and the regions; it adds a new 
source of legitimacy common to the peoples of Europe; and, lastly, it guarantees the effective 
application of Community law under the review of the Court of Justice. Within this system 
the Commission plays an indispensable role, acting as the driving force through its right of 
initiative and its position as guardian of the Treaty. This right of initiative has to be 
preserved, if the inevitable confusion and lack of overall direction which would result from 
multiple competing sources of initiative is to be avoided. 
This Community is also a Community based on solidarity: solidarity between Member 
States, solidarity between regions, solidarity betv .. -:en different parts of society, and solidarity 
with future generations. The European model forges a fundamental link between the social 
dimension, human rights and civic rights. 
This process of integration and the particular approach which it has followed have been 
keenly watched all over the world. Often, they have served as models for the regional 
groupings now coming into being in every corner of the globe. It can be said that Europe, the 
stage for the two greatest conflicts of the century, has-- in creating the Community -invented 
a new form of government in the service of peace. 
That is the Community's real achievement. Safeguarding it is vital for the states which form 
the European Union today and those which aspire to join it. However, the progress we have 
seen since the 1950s has been made only by dint of constant effort; and the lesson of history 
is that it takes less energy to demolish than to construct, and that no achievement is ever 
final. Merely pointing to past achievements, then, is not enough. 
As always in the successive stages of building Europe, what will be needed is determination 
from the Member States and ~- more and more -- determination on the part of Europe's 
citizens: they must make their voices heard in the ongoing task of European integration which 
concerns them so directly. 
--, 
l 
......... 
A twofold objective: democracy and effectiveness 
As we look at the analysis in the Commission's report, two main elements emerge which will 
have to serve as guiding principles for. the work of the forthcoming Intergoveriunental 
Conference: 
the Union must act democratically, transparently and 
understand; 
in a way people can 
the Union must act effectively, consistently and in solidarity. This is obvious when 
we are talking about its internal workings, but it must also be true in its external 
dealings, where it will have to bring a genuine European identity to bear. 
These, of course, were objectives of the original drafters of the Treaty on European Union, 
but a look at the way the Treaty works in practice shows that a great deal remains to be done. 
The prospect of a Union expanded to include 20 or more Member States further underlines 
that necessity. 
Democracy comprises the very essence of the Union, while effectiveness is the precondition 
for its future. That is why those are the two criteria for assessing how the Treaty is working 
at the moment : and that assessment, in its tum~· will produce the major guidelines the 
Commission will follow at the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference. 
One of the Treaty's Lasic innovations in terms of democracy is the concept of European 
citizenship. The object of this is not to replace national citizenship, but to give Europe's 
citizens an added benefit and strengthen their sense of belonging to the Union. The Treaty 
makes citizenship an evolving concept, and the Commission recommends developing it to the 
full. Moreover, although the task of building Europe is centred on democracy and human 
rights, citizens of the Union have at this stage no fundamental text which they can invoke as 
a summary of their rights and duties. The Commission thinks this gap should be filled, more 
especially since such an instrument would constitute a powerful means qf promoting equal 
opportunities and combatting racism and xenophobia. 
The Commission is delighted that the Union's democratic legitimacy has been strengthened. 
Making the Commission's appointment subject to Parliament's approval has been an important 
step in the right direction. The increase in Parliament's legislative powers is another welcome 
development. 
But as decision-making has become more democratic, it has also become complex to an 
almost unacceptable degree. The twenty or so procedures in use at present should be reduced 
to three-- the assent procedure, a simplified codecision procedure, and consultation. We must 
put an end to the inconsistencies and ambiguities which have so often sparked conflicts over 
procedural matters. 
In addition to democratic control at the level of the Union, we need to find a way to involve 
national parliaments more directly and visibly in controlling and guiding the national choices 
that apply to the Union. 
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More generally, we need t~ disp~ the obscurity which has descended on the Treaties as a 
result of successive additions being superimposed one on another. The time has come to 
simplify matters, drafting the whole text anew to make it more comprehensible. This need 
for transparency is both a practical and a political necessity. 
' . 
In the same spirit of openness, the principle of subsidiarity, which took pride of place in the 
Union Treaty, has begun to change the attitudes of the institutions. Debate on the distribution 
of powers and the grounds for introducing each new proposal is becoming more regular. But 
we must go even further. All too often the concept of subsidiarity is put forward for specific 
or short-term ends as a way of diluting the Union. Yet subsidiarity can also be applied 
positively, to justify measures which are better taken collectively than in isolation. The full 
political significance of subsidiarity, as a commitment by the Member States and the 
institutions to find the best way of serving the citizens of the Union, needs to be underlined. 
The legitimacy of the institutions also needs to be strengthened. In this context, the 
Commission believes that Parliament should have the right to give its assent to any 
amendment to the Treaties. 
Lastly, a particular effort should be focused on making our institutional machinery more 
effective.· In the Commission's view, this means paying special attention to the common 
foreign and security policy and to justice and home affairs. Security at home and abroad are 
indeed legitimate priorities for every citizen. 
The very fact that two different working methods -- the Community approach and the 
in~ergovemmental approach -- coexist in the same Treaty is a source of_ incoherence. 
Experience has confirmed the fears previously expressed on this subject. The single 
institutional framework which was supposed to ensure harmony between the various "pillars" 
of the Treaty has not functioned satisfactorily. The proper lessons have to be drawn. 
The experience of the common foreign and security policy has been disappointing so far, 
although we should be wary of making final judgments after only 18 months of its existence. 
However, the fact is that the possibilities have not been used to best effect, owing to the 
weaknesses of the Treaty as well as over-restrictive interpretation of its provisions. 
The Treaty sought to establish greater consistency between political and economic objectives 
of the Union, but this has not been fully achieved. Adjustments will have to be made so that 
overlap between different instruments does not lead to paralysis. 
The Union must develop a genuine common foreign policy commensurate with its economic 
influence and equipped with effective decision-making machinery; this cannot be achieved 
through systematic recourse to unanimity. 
The Treaty laid the foundation for such a policy, and the forthcoming conference should be 
used to erect an adequate framework for a genuine common security and defence policy, by 
building up the capabilities of the Western European Union and linking it to the existing 
common institutions. 
Cooperation in justice and home affairs has been ineffectual, and not only because of the 
lack of coherence in the institutional framework. The instruments available are inappropriate, 
and the problem is compounded by the cumbersome decision-making process and a complete 
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lack of openness. The Intergovernmental Conference will offer an opportunity to undertake 
a radical overhaul of these arrangements. 
*** 
T~e reflections set out above show that the main issue during the conference will not be 
an increase in the Union's powers. The Treaty of Maastricht added a ~umber of powers 
which make the Union a much more ambitious undertaking than it was in the past. One 
example is economic and monetary union: here the path has been mapped out and there 
should be no renewed discussion on the provisions agreed. The recent turbulence on the 
currency markets merely serves to underline how vital this is. 
The main focus will have to be on ways of improving decision-making mechanisms. The 
increase in the number of states and practical considerations ought naturally to lead to wider 
use of the majority rule~ this will be even more necessary for future enlargements. However, 
it is absolutely vital that we preserve the nature of the Union as a true community of states 
and peoples where there is no unbuilt majority or minority. 
Further enlargement will not only require the Union to strengthen its decision-~aking 
capacity, but will also force us to look more closely at the possibility of different speeds of 
integration. This concept already exists both in the context of economic and monetary union 
and in the system set up under the Schengen Agreement -- although the latter regrettably 
remains outside the Community framework. There is nothing unusual in allowing some 
Member States a longer period to adjust to certain policies. In the Commission's view, 
however, this must be done within a single institutional framework and must centre on a 
common objective. Those states concerned must play their part by not blocking any of their 
partners who wish to move ahead more quickly. 
Permanent exemptions such as that now applying to social policy, which in the last analysis 
have had the regrettable effect of excluding the Social Charter from the Treaty, create a 
problem, as they raise the prospect of an a Ia carte Europe, to which the Commission is 
utterly opposed. Allowing each country the freedom to pick and choose the policies it takes 
part in would inevitably lead to a negation of Europe. 
*** 
These, then, are the Commission's first thoughts on the forthcoming Intergovernmental 
Conference. 
The Commission is proposing a Europe in which the different tiers of authority cooperate 
democratically and effectively to help solve the problems affecting ordinary Europeans. 
We want to see a strong and independent Europe, taking up its rightful place in the world. 
Strength requires internal cohesion. Europe must be much more than the sum of its parts. 
In the new international situation Europe's role as a pole of stability is more important than 
ever. That is what is expected of us, but for the moment -- as war continues to claim more 
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victims· on our continent -- we are unable to provide it. Europe must speak with one voice, 
if major challenges are to be tackled effectively. 
We want to see a Europ~ whose people recognise themselves arid each other, precisely 
-because of their conviction that an active community with shared values is the key to a 
peaceful and prosperous future, and to a more just society for all. 
The Commission will make every effort to fulfil this ambition. It has set itself the task of 
demonstrating the importance and the potential of this goal for ordinary Europeans and 
ensuring that the Member States and the institutions are guided by a common interest. In 
doing so, it will be fulfilling its duty as "guardian of the Treaty!'. 
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INTRODUCTION 
L "Recalling ... the ending of the division of the European continent and the need to create 
. firm bases for the construction of the future Europe, confiiming .. . the principles of· 
liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of rule 
of law, desiring to deepen the solidarity between their peoples. while respecting ... their 
culture ... , desiring to enhance further the democratic and efficient functioning of the 
institutions": these were the aspirations of the signatory States expressed in the Preamble 
to the Treaty on European Union. 
In the preparations for the I 996 Intergovernmental Conference they will serve as 
yar:dsticks to measure the progress made since the Treaty came into force on 
1 November I 993. 
2. The Treaty is an important stage in the process of European integration. It incorporates 
a political dimension which transcends the earlier, essentially economic, approach : 
the European Economic Community established by the Treaty of Rome becomes 
the European Community, and the introduction of Union citizenship symbolizes 
the desire to. exte~d the scope of the Treaty to other aspects of people's lives; this 
is also borne· au~ ·by the strengthening of the principle of ·economic and social 
cohesion. The ·Community is given new powers in areas such as education, culture 
and health. Its powers in the fields of environment, research and social policy are 
clarified or enhanced. At the same time the Treaty enshrines the principle of 
subsidiaritY, which limits Community action to matters where it is more effective 
than action by national, regional or local authorities. 
the Treaty m~rks'a major step forward with the gradual introduction of a genuine 
economic and monetary union, an essential complement to the single market, 
which already constitutes the world's biggest economic unit. 
perhaps the most striking manifestation of the acivance beyond a purely economic 
vision is the addition of' two new forms of cooperation- alongside the European 
Community - so as to form the Union. The first of these is the common foreign 
and security policy, which, although still essentially intergovernmental in nature, 
is intended to go much further than traditional political cooperation. For the first 
time the Treaty mentions the possibility of eventually formulating a common 
defence policy. And then there is more ambitious cooperation in the fields of 
justice and home affairs, in order to enhance domestic security. 
The logical corollary of this progress towards political union is a distinct reinforcement 
of democracy at Community level. The European Parliament's powers are increased by 
its involvement in the approval of the Commission and the greater say it enjoys in the 
legislative process. 
To ensure that the Union's actions in these various areas are coherent, the Treaty 
provides a single institutional framework. Although different arrangements apply in the 
common foreign and security policy and in the fields of justice and home affairs, the 
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traditiol_lal Community instiWtions are Involved: Council, Committee and European 
Parliament · ., 
3. Article A states that the Treaty "marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe". The 1996 conference is evidence of the . 
. intention .to make further progress and the Treaty itself specifies a number of areas 
which will have to be reviewed: · 
Article B calls for a general review of policies and forms of cooperation "with the 
aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the institutions <;>f the 
Community". This amounts to a review of the Treaty's structure. 
. ... . ~ 
the following four specific areas are mentioned in the Treaty: 
the scope of the codecision procedure; 
security and defence; 
energy, tourism and""civil protection; 
the hierarchy of Community acts. 
at meetings held since the Treaty was signed, the European Council has agreed to 
add other items to the list of topics to be considered by the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference: 
the number of Commission members, the weighting of Member States' votes 
in the Council, and the measures required to facilitate the work of the 
institutions and ensure that they operate efficiently; 
appropriate institutional arrangements to ensure that the Union will operate 
smoothly in the event of enlargement to include Cyprus, Malta and the 
countrie~ of central and eastern Europe. 
the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission have also agreed that 
two other matters should be put before the Conference: 
the operation of budgetary procedures, notably as regards the classification 
of expenditure; . 
the arrangements for exercising the executive powers conferred on the 
Commission to implement legislation adopted under the codecision 
procedure. 
4. The Corfu :3uropean Council also addressed the question of how to prepare for the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference. 
A Reflection Group consisting of representatives of Member States' Foreign Ministers 
and of the Commission President and two representatives of the European Parliament 
is to be set up on 2 June 1995. 
In the mean time the institutions are to prepare reports on the functioning of the Treaty 
on European Union as a contribution to the Group's proceedings. 
2 
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The European Council's intention is that tbe Reflection Group should examine and 
elaborate ideas and options for the Intergovernmental Conference "on the basis of the 
evaluation of the functioning of the Treaty as set out in the reports". 
Any such evaluation ~ust bear in mind that the Treaty has only been,in force since 
I November 1993. 
5. In drawing up its report, the Commission has tried to assess whether the Treaty ·has 
lived up to the intentions of its drafters from two points of view: that of democracy and 
openness in the Union, and that of the effectiveness and coherence of the policies 
undertaken. 
Expectations have been strengthened by the intense public debate which accompanied 
the national ratification procedures and subsequently the accession of three new Member 
States. At the forefront of these debates were the same fundamental requirements: 
democratic operation of the institutions; openness in the Union system; and effectiveness 
and coherence in practice. · 
These themes set the main parameters for judging the Treaty. They are in fact mutually 
connected: democracy withers if it does not operate effectively; and effectiv~ness is 
pointless without democracy. Otherwise democracy becomes nothing more than 
technocracy. 
* * 
* 
.., 
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Part One 
Democracy and transparency 
in the Union 
The Community is a "community based on law'~ As its activities expand into more politically 
sensitive areas, the democratic foundations of such a Community need to be strengthened if 
it is to junction properly. 
This is why the signatories to the Treaty expressed their firm attachment "to the principles 
of liberty, democracy, ... human rights and ... the mle of law" and their concern to build an 
"ever closer union among the peoples". 
Consequently, the Treaty has to be assessed primarily in terms of the concept of democratic 
legitimacy. It is this which can consolidate the ord!l1ary citizen's sense of being a part of the 
process of building Europe and which can be used to gauge whether existing institutions and 
procedures - for decision-making and control - provide an adequate . response to the 
requirements of a community based on law (/). 
In the same sense, transparency is a crucial instrument in bringing the Community closer to 
its citizens and in increasing their confidence in its operation, such confidence being a key 
element in any democracy. lhe Treaty sets out to meet this requirement by introducing, in the 
form of subsidiarity, a dynamic and evolutionary principle for the exercise of the Community's 
powers. At the same time and to make the functioning of the Union more transparent, it has 
spawned mechanisms for giving access to information and engendered a requirement for 
clearer legislation(//). 
5 
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· I. HEIGHTENING THE SENSE OF BELONGING TO THE UNION 
AND ENHANCING ITS LEGITIMACY . 
6. One of the main "Parts" into which the TreatY is divided is on European citizenship, a 
new and meaningful concept (A). The Treaty enhances the legitimacy of the institutions, 
particularly -by extending the powers of the European Parliament (B) and bringing in 
new rules on decision-making (C). It also improves the machinery for judicial and 
budgetary control (D). 
A. EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP 
7. In the Treaty on European Union, the Member States instituted a form of citizenship for 
"every person holding the nationality of a Member State" for the purpose of 
"strengthen[ing] the protection of [their] rights and interests". 
The Treaty thus established a direct political l~?k between the individual citizen and the 
European Union, in a way which brings them closer together. This is a new concept 
with scope to become a real motivating force within the Union .. 
Articles 8a to 8e of the Treaty list a number of special rights enjoyed by the citizen -
the right to vote and stand as a candidate in European and municipal elections wherever 
he or she lives, the right to travel and reside wherever he or she wishes, and entitlement 
to diplomatic and consular protection wherever he or she may be. Any citizen also has 
the right to petition the European Parliament and to apply to the Ombudsman. 
The European citizenship established by these provisions is a developing concept, as the 
Treaty allows for the po~sibility of extending citizens' rights via a procedure involving 
a unanimous vote of the Council and ratification by each Member State. So far no use 
has been made of this possibility. 
Over and above citizens' rights, certain fundamental rights not mentioned in the Part of 
the Treaty dealing with citizenship but incorporated into the common provisions 
(Article F(2)) make explicit reference to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. Respect 
for these fundamental rights is expressed as a binding obligation on the Union. The 
Commission has asked the Council for authorization to start negotiations for the 
accession of the Community to the European Convention on Human Rights; however, 
the Council has asked the Court of Justice for its opinion on whether accession would 
be compatible with the Treaty. , 
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1. The ri&ht to freedom of movement and residence 
8. Citizens of the Union have not been given general rights of freedom of movement and -· 
residence; the ~ercise-of~ese rights is subject to the ·"lin_Uts and conditions" laid down 
by. Community law. 
9. The Union citizen's right to freedom of movement must therefore be seen in the context 
of the establishment of the "area without internal frontiers in which the free movement 
of ... persons ... is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty" (Article 7a, 
.added by the Single European Act). 
It has not yet proved possible, however, to meet the target of setting up an ar~ without 
frontiers for individuals, as no agreement has been reached on the security measures 
which are recognized as being necessary, both for abolishing the internal frontiers and 
for·harmonizing the systems of checks at external frontiers. 
Similarly, when it comes to ··the right of residence, the Treaty refers back to a 
complicated series of directives setting out the often restrictive conditions to which each 
category of person is subject. The Commission has undertaken to condense these 
directives into a single, simplified instrument in 1995, a task whjch will be complicated 
by the disparities between the legal bases and decision-making procedures laid down in 
the existing instruments, which vary according to the category of person covered. 
10. The weakness of the resulting system is that although the principle of freedom of 
~ovement and residence is established, its practical application is in some cases linked 
' -to directives which are still not complete and in others depends on the introduction of 
accompanying measures either in areas governed by the Treaty establishing the 
European Community or in the fields of justice and home affairs of the Treaty on 
European Union. · 
In practice, therefore, the Treaty has made no improvement at all on what went before. 
As freedom of movement and residence are rights of the individual, ordinary citizens' 
expectations can only have been disappointed. 
2. The right to vote and stand for election 
11. All citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals are 
now entitled to vote and stand as candidates in municipal elections and elections to the 
European Parliament. As a result, practical arrangements had to be unanimously adopted 
by the Council by certain deadlines: the end of December 1993 in the case of elections 
to the European Parliament and the end of December 1994 for municipal elections. 
12. Notwithstanding the shortness of the deadlines, as well as the great difficulty and the 
sensitivity of the subject, these time limits were respected. The adoption of the directive 
on European elections and its speedy transposition into national law by the Member 
States gave Europe's citizens the right to vote and stand for election in their country of 
residence in time for the elections to the European Parliament in June ·1994. 
8 
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The directive on voting in municipal elections, adopted with certain derogations on.· 
i9 December 1994, has to be transposed into national law by the end of 1995. 
13. The introduction of these rights is a real step forward, though that assessment needs to 
be tempered in view of the limited use made .of the entitlements a~ the European 
el~tions in June 1994. The attached tables (Annex l) show that participation by the 
citizens concerned varied between 2% ·and 35% depending on the Member State . · 
involved. The differences were due, among other things, to voting· conditions, variations 
in the way the elections were publicized, and the fact that the right was a ne~ one .. 
3. Diplomatic and consular protection 
14. A citizen of the Union is now entitled to ask the diplomatic or consular authorities of 
other Member States for protection when his or her- own Member State is ·not 
represented in a country outside the Union. 
This new right is not one to be overlooked, as there are many cases where Member 
States are not represented. European citizens can often find themselves in a country 
where their own country has no embassy. There are only four countries, in fact, where 
all the Member States are represented - China, the United States, Japan and Russia - and 
conversely there are seventeen countries where only two Member States are represented. 
15. "Rules" governing the practical implementation of this entitlement were to be 
established by 31 December 1993 between the Member States themselves, and 
cooperation between diplomatic and consular missions was also to be improved in 
accordance with Article 1.6. 
Under these circumstances it is extremely difficult for the Union's institutions to 
ascertain to what extent this right of the citizen is being put into effect. Apart from ad 
hoc bilateral contacts such as those which took place when European citizens were 
evacuated from Rwanda in June 1994, only "guidelines" have been adopted through the 
old political cooperation machinery in place before the Treaty entered into force. 
16. There are, however, provisos attached to putting this new right into practice. The 
"guidelines" which are supposed to bring it about are merely non-binding instructions. 
They are also incomplete, as they only deal with consular protection, moreover without 
covering all the fields listed in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In 
particular, these "guidelines" have received little publicity, so that by and large the 
citizens of the Union are unaware of them. Lastly, there is no clear indication of how 
a citizen can avail him- or herself of this right to protection. 
4. The right to petition Parliament and apply to the Ombudsman 
17. The citizen's right to petition the European Parliament now appears in the Treaty, having 
hitherto been available under Parliament's Rules of Procedure. There have been no 
significant changes as regards how often or in what circumstances it can be exercised. 
Applying to the Ombudsman gives members of the public another way of reacting ·to 
\vhat they consider unfair actions by administrative bodies This right is confined to 
coinpl~nts concerning instances of maladministration by Community i~stitutions. In 
other words, it does not apply to analogous situations in the Member ·states, and from 
the .outset rules out any overlapping with the fu_nctions of nation~ ombudsmen. 
-· 
The regulations and conditions governing the peiformance of the Qmb~dsnian•s· duties .. 
were laid down by the Euro~ Parliament· after corisultation of the ~~ssion;. and 
approved by the Council. Although the Ombudsman was supposed to be appointed "after -
each election of the European Parliament for the duration of its term of offiee", the · 
regrettable fact is that the appointment has still not been made, for procedural reasons 
connected with Parliament's Rules of Procedure. 
5. Overall assessment 
18. Generally speaking, the introduction of the concept of Union citizenship, which does. not 
replace but is in addition to national citizenship, carries immense potential. Its purpose 
is to deepen European citizens' sense of belonging to the European Union and make that 
sense more tangible by conferring on them the rights associated with it. 
The most noteworthy and visible application of the concept is the right to vot~ and stand 
as a candidate in European and municipal elections. However; the ambitious notion 
written into the Treaty has not yet produced measures conferring really effective rights: 
the citizen enjoys only fragmented, incomplete rights which are themselves subject to 
restrictive conditions. In that sense, the concept of citizenship is riot yet put into practice 
in a way that lives up to the individual's expectations. 
* * 
* 
B. THE INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO THE DEMAND FOR 
LEGITIMACY 
19. The Union is underpinned by a complex and novel institutional balance. This relies 
primarily on interaction and cooperation between the European Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission. 
The signatories to the Treaty sought to respond to the greater requirement for legi-timacy 
which resulted from the substantial increase in the responsibilities conferred on the 
Union. It was therefore natural that the Member States and their peoples be better 
represented in the institutions. 
20. The European Council's role as the setter of guidelines and the Council's sphere of 
operation have therefore been extended to take in all the Union's new areas of activity. 
The legitimacy of the Commission's work as promoter of the general interest of the 
Community and as guardian of the Treaty has been accentuated, particularly through the 
approval procedure 
10 
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As for the European Parliament, it has been given a considerably larger role to play both 
in the legislative field and in its supervisory functions. 
There are, moreover, further provisions of the Treaty· intended to give the Union a 
, firmer grounding in demoaacy, be it through the establishment of the Committee.ofthe 
Regions, through the consolidation of the role of the Economic and Social Committee 
or through the involvement of national parliaments. 
1. The role of the European Council and the Council 
21. In the case of the European Council, the Treaty strengthens and enshrines existing 
practices. It is given a central position in the Union since it is to ~provide the Union 
with the necessary impetus for its development and ... define the geneial political 
guidelines thereof" (Article D). The Treaty also requires the European Council to report' 
to the ·Euroi>ean Parliament on eaeh of its meetings, and annually on the progress. · 
achieved by the Union. ' 
Its -role as a provider of impetus bas been confirmed in recent practice, and it is the 
·setting in which the internal and external strategies of the Union come together. In the 
context of economic and monetary union, in particular, its role is to debate the main 
guidelines for economic policies, and the decision to move on to the third stage will be 
taken by qualifi~.Dl~jority by the Heads of State or Government meeting in Council. 
. . 
22. The Council, meanwhile, has been given a pivotal decision-making function in the fields 
of common foreign and security policy and cooperation on justice and home affairs. Its 
role is essential 'in the Community decision-making process. 
2. The Commission 
23. The length of the Commission's term of office has been set at five years, in line with 
the life of the European Parliament. 
The Treaty gives it a right of initiative, shared with the Member States, in the fields of 
common foreign and security policy and in certain matters covered by justice and home 
affairs; it is fuliy associated with the work in all these areas. In the monetary field, this 
right is shared with the future European Central Bank in several articles. 
Together with the Coun9il, the Commission is responsible for making sure there is 
consistency in all the Union's external activity. Its exclusive right of initiative in 
Community matters is confirmed on the understanding that, in line with the principle 
of subsidiarity, it is answerable for how it exercises that right. Its role as guardian of 
the Treaty in Community matters is also confirmed. 
24. The chief Treaty innovation concerning the Commission is the complete overhaul of the 
procedure for appointing it. The European Parliament has to be consulted on the choice 
of President, and must then officially approve the Commission before it can take up its 
duties. 
1 l 
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This new procedure was applied for the first time at the beginning of the present 
Parliament On 21 July 1994 it gave its assent to the name put forward for President of 
the Commission. 
Parliament then held individual hearings for each of the nominee$ for the posts of 
Members. The Treaty makes no ~ress provision for the principle of such hearings, but 
they were held in Parliament's committees at the beginning of January 1995. Parliament 
did not vote on the nominees individually, a sign of its respect for the principle that the 
· Commission ·exercises collective responsibility. Parliament approved the names by a 
large majority on 18 Janwuy. 
25. In the Commission's view, the new approval procedure has proved a highly convincing 
exercise. Not only does it give the Commission a firm grounding of legitimacy; it also 
serves to encourage greater dialogue between the two institutions. It also generates 
public interest. However, the process clearly takes too long, having lasted nearly seven 
months in all. 
3. The European Parliament 
26. The tasks of the European Parliament have been very substantially increased, both 
through its power to approve the Commission (see above) and through the greater part 
it now plays in the legislative process (see below). · 
In the context of econo~ic and monetary union Parliament is consulted on the 
appointment of the President of the European Monetary Institute and of the President 
and Executive Board members of the European Central Bank. 
Parliament has also been given new supervisory powers, a part to play in the fields of 
common foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs, and the right to ask 
the Commission to make proposals. 
1:2 
A greater role for the European Parliament 
I. A direct political role 
- appointment of the Commission 
. gives an opinion on the choice of President; 
~ approves the Commission as a ·bpdy. 
-powers of supervision over the Union's activity 
. temporary committees of inquiry; - ' 
. consideration of petitions;_ 
. appointment of an Ombudsman;_ 
. increased powers of budgetary control. . 
- role in relation _to common foreign and security policy and justice and home 
affairs: 
. right to be informed and consulted; 
. power of recommendation. . 
- right to ask Commission to make proposals 
2, Role in the decision-making process 
- as re~ards /e~islation: 
_ codecision with the Council (in fourteen areas); 
. assent (in four areas); · 
- a<; regard<; international agreements: 
. advisory opinions on all agreements except trade agreements; 
. assent to : -association agreements; 
- agreements setting up a special institutional framework; 
- agreements haviqg "appreciable implications for the budget"; 
- agreements amending an act adopted by the codecision 
procedure. 
(a) Parliament's new supervisory powers 
27. Temporary Committees ·of Inquiry, a traditional instrument for the exercise of 
parliamentary control, have been provided for bY. Article 138c of the Treaty. They may 
be set up by Parliament at the request of a quarter of its members. 
Parliament's powers of inquiry are not confined to the activity of the Community 
institutions: they may be exercised in relation to the actions of Member States where 
they are responsible for executing. and implementing the Community's policies. A 
Committee of Inquiry may not, on the other hand, consider matters which are sub 
judice. 
On 20 December 1994 Parliament, the Council and the Commission agreed on the 
practical arrangements for giving effect to these powers. 
Parliament has not so far availed itself of these provisions. 
- ... -.· ;~ ·, 
28. The Treaty gives the European Parliament greater powers of ·control over the · 
implementation of the budget, particularly as regards the power tO give a disch8rge. -
Here, the Commission is, among· .other things, required ~ submit all necessacy 
information and take all appropriate steps to act on Parliament's observations. The neW -· 
provisions have been applied without any significant prOblems arising. 
(b) Parliament's role in common foreign and securiU J!Oli9 and in the fielils of 
iustice and home gffairs 
29. Where the common foreign and security policy is concerned, the European Parliament . 
acts in accordance with three procedures laid down by the Treaty: it has to be consulted 
on the main aspects; it has to be kept regularly informed; and it may ask questions of 
the Council or make reconupendations to it (Article J. 7). In other words,. Parliament 
plays a role similar to that of national parliaments in relation to national foreign policy. 
Putting these provisions_ into practice, however, has created difficulties and given rise. 
to dis~repancies in interpretation. In particular, Parliament conside~ that consultation 
should take place before any important decision is taken, and should be formalized. The 
Council, on the other hand, takes the view that its President's appearance before the 
relevant committee of Parliament and the report annexed to the European Council's 
conclusions constitute the consultation necessary. 
30. With regard to justice and home affairs, Article K.6 of the J'reaty allows Parliament a 
role similar to the one it plays in relation to the common foreign ana seCurity policy; 
the same problems of interpretation have arisen. 
It is not certain that the situations are the same: since queStions in the area of justice 
and home affairs are likely to have a direct effect on indiviuals' basic rights and public 
freedoms, they actually warrant a greater degree of parliamentary control especially 
where binding legal instruments are involved. · 
(c) The right to request a proposal 
31. The Treaty empowers Parliament to request the Commission to submit a proposal for 
a Community act (Article l38b), a right the Councii already enjoys under Article 152. 
Such requests do not require the Commission to put forward a proposal, but, under the 
code of conduct recently concluded with Parliament, the Commission will take the 
greatest possible account of them. 
Parliament has twice made use of this provision, in respect of preventing and remedying 
damage to the environment and of making hotels safe against fire. These requests are 
being considered by the Commission. 
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4. The Committee of the Re:ions 
( 
32. The Treaty set up a Committee of the Regions, a body responsible for representing 
regional and.local authorities in the Union (Articles 198a to 198c). This body is a new 
and. importaDt element in the closer relations being established between the Union and 
regional and local authorities. Most of the Committee's members are local or regional 
elected representatives. ,_ 
The Committee of the Regions must be consulted on matters involving edueation, 
culture, public health, trans-European networks and economic and social cohesion. 
Consultation is optional in all other fields. The Committee may also issue opinions on 
its own initiative "where it considers that specific regional interests are involved". 
The Committee held its first session on 9 and 10-March 1994, and has been working 
steadily .since then: 42 opinions have been issued, including 16 in compulsory 
consultation cases, 15 in optional cases and 11 on its own initiative (see Annex 2). 
It has been consulted on an optional basis on a number of important ~atters, such as 
the information society, and has itself decided to evaluate the regional consequences of 
the reform of the common agricultural policy. 
33. To date the Committee has been able to give its views without holdirig up the 
decision-making process, despite the spread-out timing of its sessions. In their substance, 
the opinions have always reflected regional or local feelings and have attached great 
weight to compliance with the subsidiarity principle. However, its own-initiative 
opinions, such as that relating to clearance of the accounts of the common agricultural 
policy, suggest that it may be running the risk of cas~ng its net too wide. 
5. The Economic and Social. Committee 
34. The Treaty consolidates the role of the Economic and Social Committee and its advisory 
function, responding as it does to the growing need for greater involvement of the 
various categories of economic and social activity. More specifically, it provides that 
the Committee can now issue opinions on its own initiative. 
The Committee can make a real contribution by expressing the views of individual 
citizens through the intermediary of their economic and social representatives, and 
making these views available to the other institutions. 
6. RelatiOns between the institutions and national parliaments 
35. Two declarations on the role of national parliaments are attached to the Treaty. 
The first recognizes the importance of encouraging "greater involvement of national 
parliaments in the activities of the European Union". To this end, it emphasizes the 
commitment of the governments of the Member States to ensuring that national 
15 
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parliaments receive Commission proposals for legislation in good time fo~ infoi.mation 
or possible ex~nation. It also calls for contacts between national parliaments and the 
European Parliament to be stepped up. 
The second "invites the European Parliament and. the national parliaments to meet as 
· necessary _as a ConferenCe of the Parliaments (or 'assises'). The Conference ... will be 
consUlted on the main features of the European Union." · 
36. When the Treaty was being ratified, several Member States changed their internal 
procedures or praCtices to enable their national parliaments to play a bigger role: 
In any. e~ent, the notification to or examination by national parliaments of proposals for 
Community fegislatiori by national parliaments is basically a m~er for national rules 
or constitutional practices. These vary considerably and, while some parliaments 
consider that they should focus attention on the broad outlines of European policy, 
others pat the stress on monitoring· legislative activity. 
37. 1n·practice, the number of meetings between different bodies belonging to the national 
and European parliaments has risen from 20 or so in 1992 to 44 in 1993. Regular 
meetings also take place between presidents or speakers of parliaments. A conference. 
of bodies specializing in European affairs in the Assemblies of the Community 
(COSAC) meets regularly. The last such meeting, held in February, rejected proposals 
to set up a new chamber consisting of representatives of the national parliaments. 
·On the other hand, the possibility of convening a Conference (or •assises') of 
·parliaments has not been used since the one sitting IJ.eld in Rome in December 1990. 
38. The difficulties experienced in ratifying the Treaty in certain countries showed how 
important it is to involve the national parliaments in the work of European integration. 
16 
Under the Treaty, national parliaments are already called upon to act in the cases set out 
in the following table: · 
.Role of national parliaments under the Treaty.-
I. Constitutional ratification 
. Amendments to the Treaty 
. Accession of new Member States 
2. Approval of acts 
In the Union framework: 
. Ratification of conventions in the fields 
of justice and home affairs 
. "Communitarization" of action in certain 
areas of justice and home affairs (as 
specified in Article K.1(1) to (6)) 
In the Community framework: 
. Additions to citizens' rights 
. Uniforp1 procedure for election of 
Members of the European Parliament 
. Decision on own resources 
. Ratification· of conventions 
3. Implementation of Community law 
. Transposal of directives 
ArticleN 
ArticleO 
Article K.3(2)(c) 
Article K.9 
Article 8e 
Article 138(3) 
Article 201 
Article 220 
Article 189 
The national parliaments are thus implicated in some of the most important decisions 
in the life of the Union. They wish to become more involved, however. 
The Commission considers that such developments should be sought in the part natio:tal 
parliaments can play, in accordance with the internal rules of each Member State, both 
in shaping the position of each Member State in the Council and in monitoring the 
implementation of Union decisions at national level. 
7. Overall assessment 
39. The Treaty set out to confer greater legitimacy on the institutional framework of the 
Union. 
l7 
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To this end it has Strengthened Parliament's powers, both in the legislative process and 
with regard to monitoring-the .implementation of Community policieS. Similarly, the ... 
establishment of the-Committee of the Regions and the growing involvement of national 
parliaments go some way to answering the calls. for greater participation by citizens' 
representatives, these representatives coming from various· political ·levels in the 
Member States. 
Nor has legitimacy been strengthened at the expense of Member States' interests, since 
the Council and the European Council have been given the dominant role in developing 
the new, ~ost politically ~ensitive areas of activity, such as economic and monetary 
union, common foreign and security policy and cooperation in justice and home affairs. 
Last be not least, the equilibrium of the institutional triangle has been preserved: with 
the strengthening of the Commission's legitimacy through the new procedure_ for 
appointing it; the fact that its power of initiative is maintained; and that that power has 
been extended to cover some of the Union's new fields of activity. 
Any assessment of the institutional response to the requirement for legitimacy has 
therefore to be positive. However, there has also to be a reservation concerning the 
weakness, not to say the absence, of democratic control at Union level in the fields of 
activity where the intergovernmental process still holds sway. 
* * 
* 
C. THE NEW RULES OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
40. The Union's decision-making rules and procedures should also serve to make the 
instituti~ns more democratic and help them operate more effectively. The Commission 
remains the starting point of the decision-making process; the powers of the European 
Parliament were increased, however, in particular by introducing the codecision 
procedure and extending the scope of the cooperation and assent procedures; and 
finally, the use of qualified-majority voting in the Council was extended to new areas. 
Implementing measures are the natural corollary of the legislative activity referred to 
above. The Commission plays an important role in this field, in partnership with 
national government departments. 
I. Legislative. and implementing procedures 
(a) Codecision procedure 
41. Under the codecision procedure, Parliament and the Council adopt legislative 
instruments by joint agreement. It applies in a number of important fields, such as the 
intemal market. 
18 
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The main features of this complex procedure are its two readings, the procedure for 
conciliation iQ the event of disagreement between the Council and Parliament and the 
possibility of outright rejection by Parliament (diagram in Annex 3). 
Its field of application is outlined in Annex 4. 
42. Application of the codecision procedure so far is summarized in the following table: 
CODECISION PROCEDURE 
Commission proposals 
formally adopted: 
without conciliation 
after conciliation 
not accepted by Parliament: 
rejected at third reading 
(proposal for a Directive on voice telephony) 
rejected after agreement in the Conciliation Committee 
(proposal for a Directive on biotechnology) 
Procedures completed: 
instruments adopted 
instruments rejected 
124 
33 
18 
15 
2 
I 
1 
35 
33 
2 
43. Contrary to certain fears resulting from !~.; complexity and its length, the codecision 
procedure has worked well so far. Decisions have been taken fairly quickly as a result 
of a good working relationshi .> between the institutions. This has included an 
interinstitutional agreement on the operation of the Conciliation Committee, signed on 
21 October 1993. 
A study of the proposals presented by the Commission since the Treaty came into force 
shows that the average length of the procedure lidS been less than 300 days. This 
assessment will, however, need to be refined by examining results over a longer period. 
In two cases the procedure failed to produce a decision: 
in the first, relating to voice telephony, no agreement was reached after the 
conciliation procedure and Parliament rejected the draft Council Directive because 
of its provisions on implementing (committee) procedures~ 
in the second, relating to biotechnology, agreement was reached in the 
Conciliation Committee, but Parliament rejected the agreement and the proposal 
in plenary session 
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(b) Cooperation procedure 
· 44. The cooperation procedure was established by the Single European Act. The Council 
has the finai say, but Parliament is involved in the legislative process - it holds two 
readings and may propose amendments to the Council's common position. The scope 
of the cooperation procedure was extended by the Tre::tty to important fields such as the 
common transport policy and certain aspects of economic and monetary union 
(Annex-5). 
(c) Consultation procedure 
45. The consultation procedure, whereby Parliament gives its opinion on Commission 
proposals, has existed since the Communities were founded. Its scope has gradually 
been reduced with the introduction of the cooperation and the codecision procedures. 
Nevertheless, it still covers important fields such as the common agricultural policy, 
taxation and certain aspects of economic and monetary union. 
(tl) Assent pr-ocetlure 
46. Under this procedure Parliament may give or withhold its agreement on the instrument 
laid before it but may not ·amend it. It is applied to a wide variety of instruments (table 
at Annex 6): 
International agreements 
Under the Single European Act, association agreements require Parliament's assent. 
Article 228 of the Treaty, as amended at Maastricht, extended its use to agreements: 
establishing a specific institutional ·framework and organizing cooperation 
procedures; 
having important budgetary implications for the Community; 
entailing amendment of an instrument adopted under the CQdecision procedure. 
Legislation 
The Treaty extended the assent procedure to certain areas of legislation - citizenship, 
specific tasks of the European Central Bank and amendments to its Statutes, the 
Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. 
Other fields 
The Single Act introduced the assent procedure for Treaties of Accession. Under 
Article 138 of the Treaty, as amended at Maastricht, Parliament's assent is also required 
in a field which concerns it directly - the establishment of a uniform electoral 
procedure. 
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Application of the assent procedur~ up to the present is summarized in the following 
table: 
ASSENT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Proposals 32 
(of which 20 were launched before I. I I. I 993) 
Procedures completed: 7 
international agreements 5 
accessiOn I 
legislation (Cohesion Fund) 1 
47. The extension of the assent procedure strengthened Parliament's powers. It should, 
however, be remembered that: 
differences of interpretation remain concerning its application to international 
agreements, particularly as regards the concept of "important budgetary 
implications" (e.g. the fisheries agreement with Greenland); 
the procedure is ill-adapted to the legislative field, since Parliament may only 
accept or reject the instrument laid before it; 
finally, the Commission considers that Parliament's assent should be required for 
amendments to the Treaty. 
(e) The bud~et procedure 
48. Parliament, the Council and the Commission have signed two political agreements 
aimed at improving the application of certain aspects of the budget procedure, which 
was not amended by the Treaty: 
the interinstitutional agreement of 29 October 1993 on budgetary discipline and 
improvement of the budgetary procedure, which lays down the financial 
perspective for 1993-99 and establishes, among other things, an ad hoc 
consultation procedure for compulsory expenditure (the amount of which is fixed 
by the Council) as opposed to non-compulsory expenditure (over which 
Parliament has the final say); 
the interinstitutional declaration of 6 March 1995 on the inclusion of financial 
provisions in legislative instruments, which applies to legislation concerning 
multi annual programmes. The declaration makes a distinction between instruments 
adopted under the codecision procedure, in which the overall budget allocation is 
a "privileged" target for the budgetary authority, and those which are not subject 
to the codecision procedure, in which the overall budget allocation merely acts as 
a guide. 
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(f) Voting procedure in tlte Council 
49. The Single European Act extended the _scope of qualified majority voting in the 
Council, and it is undoubtedly an effective tool in the decision-making process. This 
trend was continued with the Maastricht Treaty and qualified majority voting now 
applies to most new fields of actiVity- e.g. visas (from 1996), education, vocational 
training, public health, consumer protection, trans-European networks and development · 
cooperation. It also applies to some areas of economic and monetary union and to the 
environment and social policy. - · 
Nevertheless, many articles of the Treaty still proyide for decisions to be adopted by 
unanimity (list at Annex 7). 
(g) Implementing measures 
50. Legislative activity requires a large number of implementing measures, mos~ of which 
are adopted by the authorities in the Member States. Responsibility for implementing 
measures is sometimes conferred by the Council on the Commission, however. 
At present the detailed rules for the adoption of these implementing measures are 
governed by a Council Decision dating from -1987 which provides for seven different 
procedures in which committees of experts from the Member States are assigned an 
advisory role. In some cases, where there is disagn~ement bet\¥een a committee and the 
Commission, the final decision is taken by the Council. 
51. Since the codecision procedure was written into the Treaty, Parliament has felt that the 
Council should no longer have sole power to delegate or intervene in the task of 
implementing measures adopted under the codecision procedure, but that Parliament 
should also be involved. It was because of this disagreement with the Council that, for 
'the first time, Parliament rejected a proposal at third reading - the proposal for a 
directive on voice telephony. 
To avoid further cases of stalemate, on 20 December 1994 the institutions agreed a 
modus vivendi which will apply until the matter is reviewed at the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference. 
52. The Commission has consistently refused to propose one of the seven types of 
committee procedure (the "IIIb" procedure) which it considers illogical since it can lead 
to a situation where no decision is taken. With this reservation, the Commission 
believes that the implementing procedures operate satisfactorily and present no major 
obstacles to actual implementation, as the following figures suggest: 
Total number of committees in existence 
. of which, committees able to block decisions 
Of several thousand opinions adopted over the last three years 
. decisions referred back to the Council 
cases where no decision was taken 
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about 200 
30 
6 
0 
Furthennore, these procedures have the definite advantage of more closely involving 
national government departments; these bear most of-the responsibility for applying 
Community measures in practic"!. 
2. Overall assessment 
Although the system of legislative and implementing procedures has functioned 
relatively well on the whole, it does have three major weaknesses: 
the continuing divergence between legislative procedures and the budget 
procedure; 
the complexity of the decision-making system; 
the lack of logic in the choice of the various procedures and the different fields 
of activity where they apply. 
53. The divergence between legislative procedures and the budget procedure comes out in 
a variety of ways: 
parliament ·has a tendency to use the qudget as a means of pushing through 
measures which should come under the legislative procedure; conversely, the 
Council tends to use legislative channels to adopt financial commitments which 
should be dealt with under the budget procedure. 
Such conflicts could be defused by bringing the powers of the budgetary authority 
and the legislative authority closer together. 
in common foreign and security policy and in cooperation on justice and home 
affairs, the Treaty introduces a new source of tension as it provides for operational 
expenditure to be financed either by the Member States or from the Community 
budget. If the Council decides that the Community budget is to be used, the 
budget procedure must be observed. This is a potential source of conflict if 
Parliament and the Council do not agree on the measure to be financed. 
the classic example of this divergence concerns the common agricultural policy: 
Parliament adopts the general budget, of which roughly half is devoted to this 
policy, on whose substance Parliament is, however, only "consulted". 
54. The Union's decision-making system, which was relatively simple at the outset, has 
become much more complex over the last twenty years with the introduction of a 
complicated budget procedure, the cooperation, codecision and assent procedures and 
special provisions for economic and monetary union, common foreign and security 
policy and justice and home affairs. The system has been developed by adding a 
succession of new layers, without taking a clear overall approach. The Union now has 
more than twenty different decision-making procedures (Annex 8). 
This situation, coupled with the complexity· of some of the procedures (e.g. the 
cooperation, codecision and budget procedures), renders the Union's modus operandi 
extremely obscure. The codccision procedure is imprecise on a number of points, 
notably on the purpose of the conciliation procedure when Parliament has indicated its 
intention to reject a measure and on Vvhclher conciliation is confined to the amendments 
'. ~- --...-
rejected by the CounciL Moreover, the very complexity of the procedure would warrant 
a simplification, in particular at the second ·and third reading stages. . 
The proliferatio11 of procedures also hanns the internal operation of the Union, because 
, it encourages conflict over legal bases. Institutions may tend to choose a particular legal 
base not because of the substance of the measure in question but because of the 
decision-making procedu!e which applies. Such conflicts slow down the whole process 
and can lead to actions in the Court of Justice, which should be avoided if at all 
possible. 
Finally, two ob~ervations slu:>uld be made on the way in which implementing measures 
(committee procedures) operate at present: 
first, the wide variety of procedures availa~le leads all too often to protracted and 
sometimes theoretical discussion on which procedure to use in each case; this 
slo~s down the legislativ~ process; 
second, these measures do not operate with a particularly high degree of openness. 
55. There is no apparent logic in the correlation between the various procedur~s and 
different fields of activity: 
three different procedures apply in the three equally important sectors of 
agricultural policy, transport and the internal market (the consultation, cooperation 
and codecision procedures respectively); 
fields which are closely linked, such as transport and certain aspects of 
trans-European networks, are subject to different procedures (cooperation and 
codecision respectively); 
several differe~t procedures may apply within a single policy area; the most 
obvious examples are·. the environment, research, and economic and social 
cohesion. 
One common source of difficulties is that, under the Treaty, the unanimity rule has been 
maintained in many cases without any consistent underlying principle. Thus, in the 
fields of both research and culture, there is a combination of codecision between 
Parliament and Council, together with unanimity in Council, even though this 
disproportionately increases the risk of stalemate. 
56. The legislative processes need to be radically simplified, with reference to the concept 
of a hierarchy of acts, a matter which the Treaty has placed on the agenda of the 
Intergovernmental Conference. Simplification of decision-making in budgetary matters 
is also needed to ensure genuine interinstitutional cooperation. 
* * 
* 
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D. THE REVIEW FUNCTION 
1. Judicial review 
57. From the outset, the Court of Justice has had the essential task of seeing that the rule 
of law is observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaties. 
In particular it must ensure .that the effect given to Community law does not engender 
any discrimination or jeopardize the attainment of the Treaties' objectives. It must also 
secure uniformity in the interpretation of Community law by the national courts which 
have to apply it. 
It is thanks to the decisions of the Court of Justice, and its dialogue with nationat courts, 
that the internal market has been consolidated, that the common policies have been 
encouraged, that the Community's identity has been affirmed, and that discriminatory 
and nationalistic temptations have been resisted. 
(a) Reinforcement in the Community context 
58. The main changes wrought by ·the Treaty are as follows: 
the existence of the Court of First Instance is formally confirmed and the 
Council's power to confer new jurisdiction on it is now excluded only as regards 
preliminary rulings; 
at the Commission's request the Court of Justice has the power to impose lump 
sum or penalty payments on a Member State which has had judgment given 
against it for failure to discharge its obligations but has still not complied with the 
judgment; 
under economic and monetary union, the Governing Council of the European 
Central Bank exercises the review powers normally conferred on the Commission 
if the infringements are committed by a central bank. 
59. The new possibilities offered by the Treaty for transfer of jurisdiction to the Court of 
First Instance have not been used so far. 
Nor have the new provisions for fining Member States. In July 1994 the Commission 
informed the Member States that it planned to make use of these provisions, and to say 
so in Article 171 letters and reasoned opinions, sent out in cases of failure to comply 
with Court decisions finding that infringements had been committed. 
(b) Judicial review in the context of the comnwn foreign and security policy 
60. The interpretation and application of Treaty provisions in this· area are beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (Article L). The Court enjoys jurisdiction only in 
those exceptional cases where a decision taken by the common foreign and security 
policy procedures might run counter to a provision of a Community Treaty. 
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61. However, as joint actions under the common foreign and security policy begin to 
proliferate, this absence of judicial revie~ procedures could pose a problem, should 
individual rights be affected. · 
(c) Judicial review in the context of justice and home affairs and judicial 
cooperation 
62. The interpretation and application of Treaty provisions in this area are also beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (Article L). 
This n~eans that neither the European Parliament nor the Commission can enforce their 
rights to .be consulted, informed or fuiJy associated, as the case .may be. Moreover, 
neither ~e Member States nor the institutions can act to , se~ure compliance with 
obligations imposed by decisions that have been taken. 
In addition, as regards the legal· instrume~ts used m justice and home affairs 
cooperation: 
jurisdiction can be conferred on the Court in relation to conventions, but only for 
interpretation and dispute settlement; it is not possible to confer jurisdiction to 
review an instrument's conformity with the Treaty, with general principies of law 
or with the higher norms of, say, the European Convention on Human Rights or 
the Geneva Convention on the Status ofRefugees, even though the Treaty articles 
on justice and home affairs refer explicitly to them; · 
no jurisdiction can be conferred on the Court in.Iespect of common positions and 
joint actions, although they can affect individuals' rights and duties (as in the case 
of the joint action adopted on 30 November 1994 on travel facilities for 
schoolchildren with non-Union nationalities residing in a Member State). 
2. Budgetary and financial review 
63. The Treaty raises budgetary discipline (Article 201a) and sound financial management 
(Article 205) to the status of principles; hence its first reference to the Financial 
Controller. The Commission must be sure that resources are available in the budget to 
pay for whatever measures it proposes or carries out. 
The Commission accordingly tests all its activities and procedures against the· main 
parameters of sound financial management- objectives, cost-effectiveness and ex ante 
and ex post evaluation. 
The Treaty likewise strengthens the role of the Court of Auditors and emphasizes the 
·fight against fraud (Article 209a). 
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(a) The Court o{Auditors 
64. The Treaty removes the Court of Auditors from the category of "other bodies", where -· 
it was .placed at the time of its establishment in- 1975,-and raises it to full institution 
status (Article 4). This underlines the Union's desire to give the ~urt of Auditors 
greater authority and to strengthen the role of financial management in Community life. 
The Treaty also requires the Court to provide Parliament and the Council _with a 
' statement of assurance as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity 
of the underlying transactions'. This it did for the first time in relation to the accounts 
and balance sheet for 1994, which were sent to the budgetary authority and the Court 
of Auditors on 28 April last. 
65. The special reports of the Court of Auditors are now acknowledged to be valuable input 
for Parliament's debates on the discharge to be given to the Commission for its · 
' execution of the budget. The Essen European Council recognized the value of these . 
reports and urged the Council, the other institutions and the Member States to act 
resolutely on them. 
By and large, cooperation between the Commission and the Court of Auditors has been 
intensified and streamlined since the Court's role was stren_gthened. 
(b) The fight against fraud 
66. In the fight against fraud against the Community's financial interests, the changes 
wrought by the Treaty are designed to meet the legitimate concern of taxpayers, 
Member States and the Community-institutions that fraud be combatted more vigorously. 
The· Treaty expressly assimilates the Commtmity's· financial interests to national 
interests, requiring ~e Member States to take the same protective measures - at criminal 
law and in other contexts - as they take for their own interests. The Commission is to 
report to the Council by the end of 1995 with an evaluation of what the Member States 
have done to discharge this duty. 
The Commission has also established an Advisory Committee for the Coordination of 
Fraud Prevention which provides a forum for dialogue with the Member States on 
protecting the Community's financial interests. 
67. The efficient protection of the Community's financial interests requires an appropriate 
system of administrative and criminal controls and penalties in the Member States. Two 
proposals have been put forward - one for a regulation on administrative controls and 
penalties and the other for a convention on criminal penalties. Neither has yet been 
adopted. 
68. Substantial interests are at stake, but the new legal weapons supplied by the Treaty 
hardly measure up to them. There are two paradoxes. 
The first is this: Council measures to control expenditure and combat fraud require a 
unanimous vote, whereas a qualified majority is enough for it to act as the budgetary 
authority and determine expenditure and revenue levels. 
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'. 
The need for unanimity is the ~hief expianation for the time taken to enact anti-fraud 
measures, and it threatens to dilute their impact. There is a further complication in that 
some aspects of the fight against fraud are matters for cooperation in the fields of justi,ce 
and home affairs. 
The second paradox is that the Commission alone is liable in respect of budget 
execution whereas the management of appropriations is very often decentralized (e.g. 
common agricultural policy, Structural Funds). Power and accountability do not go 
together, therefore; this makes the introduction of effective control measures and greater 
awareness on the part of Member States all the more necessary. 
3. Overall assessment 
69. The review function - both judicial and financial -was modified solely in order to seek 
greater efficiency. 
Regarding judicial review, the basis has been laid for a stronger role for the Court of 
Justice and the Court of First Instance, at least in Community matters proper. The Court 
of Justice, for instance, can order a Member State to pay a financial penalty where it 
fails to give effect to a judgment against it for failure to discharge its duties under 
Community law. However, the Court is really not involved. in common fqreign and 
security policy; and in justice and home affairs, where vital personal rights and 
freedoms can be affected, not only does the Court have a very minor role, but the 
limited potential offered by the Treaty has not yet been used. 
The changes made in matters of financial control are directed towards securing better 
protection of the Community's financial interests. The responsibilities of the 
Commission, Parliament and the Court of Auditors in the management and execution 
of the Community budget have accordingly been spelled out. The benefits are only now 
beginning to be felt. On the other hand, at least the need to combat fraud has been 
acknowledged. The main responsibility here lies :with the Member States, which must 
offer the same protection to the Community's financial interests as to their own. The 
Community as such has but limited legal bases and instruments for fighting against 
fraud. It urgently needs more. 
* * 
* 
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II. MORE TRANSPARENCY. 
70. A Union that is closer to the people has to be a Union where decisions are easier to 
comprehend, whose actions are better justified, whose responsibiliti-es are clearer, and 
whose legislation is more accessible. 
The principle of subsidiarity has been explicitly set out in the Treaty, with the aim of 
reinforcing the legitimacy of acts adopted by the Union as well 3:5 clarifying the exercise 
of powers as between the Union· and the Member States {A). 
At the same time the Treaty requires the institutions themselves to become more 
transparent and more accessible (B). 
This desire for transparency and accessibility rruses the question of the 
comprehensibility of the Treaty itself (C). 
A. CLARIFYING THE EXERCISE OF POWERS: THE SUBSIDIARITY 
PRINCIPLE 
71. The spirit of subsidiarity is older than the Treaty: the concepts of the directive, of 
mutual recognition and of partnership reflect a previous preoccupation with it. 
However, its insertion in the general provisions of the Treaty, and the definition given 
there, add enormously to its significance. 
At a time when the Union's powers were being considerably extended, the signatories 
of the Treaty used the reference to subsidiarity to make clear that these powers must be 
exercised in a way which respects the different levels of decision-making capacity 
within the Union, the Member States and the regions. They also emphasized that 
whatever the Union does must be in proportion to the objectives pursued. The aim was 
to ensure that tasks are properly distributed and the Union itself more easily 
understandable. 
72. Without waiting for the Treaty to come into force, the Commission demonstrated very 
early the importance it attached to the principle of subsidiarity. It regards it not only as 
~ legal principle but as a guiding axiom for its conduct. 
In October 1992 it accordingly presented Parliament and the Council with its views on 
the effect to be given to the principle. It set out its view of the scope of the areas in 
which powers are shared, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 3b, as 
distinct from the areas where the Union has exclusive powers. In December 1992 it 
went on to present the Edinburgh European Council with a list of items of legislation 
proposed or in force which it considered might be reviewed in the light of the 
subsidiarity principle. It was asked to report each year to Parliament and the European 
Council on the application of the principle. 
The Edinburgh European Council adopted an overall approach to the application of the 
subsidiarity principle by the Council. 
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Parliament made· its contribution with a November 1992 resolution seeking an 
interinstitutional. agreement and an April 1994 resolution on adjustments to existing 
legislation. 
On 25 October 1993 Parliament, the Council and the Comlllission conclud~ an 
interinstitutional agreement on the procedures for implementing the subsidiarity 
principle. 
73. At the European Councils in December 1993 and December 1994, the Commission 
presented its initial reports. They can .be summed up as follows: 
.(a) Regarding the preparation of new or planned legislation: 
- every new Commission initiative is now preceded by a review in terms of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, With the result that there have been fewer but 
better targeted initiatives in 1993 and 1994 (Annex 9); 
- the Commission has withdrawn or reviewed a variety of proposals already 
before the Council and Parliament; all the commitments given at Edinburgh 
have been met, with one exception (animals in zoos); it has also reviewed a 
.number of proposals no{ on the Edinburgh list. · 
(b) Regarding the revision of existing legislation, the Commission began ~ review of 
whole families of instruments identified at Edinburgh and launched a substantial 
consolidation and simplification programme. It has in some cases gone beyond 
what was on the programme agreed. 
(c) The Commission is open to all suggestions ·regarding both future legislation and 
the revision of existing legislation. It is keen to receive such outside opinion, as 
is clear from the increasing frequency of its Green and White Papers and other 
forms of public consultation. 
It is also open to dialogue with Member States which ask for it. On 10 June 1994, 
for instance, it replied to a German memorandum on subsidiarity by announcing 
the withdrawal of two proposals and the amendment of nine others. 
In its work programme for 1995 the Commission reiterated its determination to 
meet the requirements of subsidiarity and announced that the number of new 
proposals would decline. They would concentrate on what really mattered, having 
regard to the principle of subsidiarity. 
74. In fact, the Union institutions have a set of instruments which equip them to put into 
practice together the principle of subsidiarity. If they do not apply the principle in a 
systematic and coherent way, their efforts will not bear fruit. 
75. In practice, however, coherence is difficult to achieve, for each Member State will have 
its own view of what subsidiarity is all about, and the position will be different in 
different areas of endeavour. The desire to protect individual interests still means that 
excessively detailed instruments are enacted, flying in the face of the search for clarity 
and simplicity that subsidiarity implies. The fact that the Member States do not have the 
same concept of Vvhat subsidiarity means should not be an obstacle to further work 
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together on it; but it does reinforce the notion that subsidiarity is rather a practical 
obligation for day-to-day behaViour. 
* * 
* 
B. ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND CLARITY OF LEGISLATION 
76. Openness and transparency are inherent in democracy and citizenship. Declaration 
No I 7 annexed to the Union Treat)' sets it out in solemn tenns: ' The Conference 
considers that transparency of the decision-making process strengthens the democratic 
nature of the institutions and the public's confidence in the administration .. .'. The 
debates surrounding ratification of the Treaty and the referenda in Denmark, France and 
Ireland revealed the need for more openness and transparency in Union business. 
The Birmingham, Edinburgh and Copenhagen European Councils underlined this need. 
The referenda, and the accession of new Member States which are particularly a~ached 
to transparency and closeness to the citizen, have highlighted the need for a genuine 
policy to bring the Union nearer the citizen and strengthen his and her involvement and 
trust in the decision-making process. 
1. Transparency in the institutions' business 
77. Parliament is by its very nature accessible to the public. The other institutions have 
made great efforts to meet the requirement for more openness and transparency. 
Together with Parliament they signed an interinstitutional declaration on democracy, 
transparency and subsidiarity on 25 October 1993. The main measures are as follows : 
(a) The Council 
78. The Council changed its Rules of Procedure on 6 December 1993. Its debates are still 
held behind closed doors but exceptions are now provided for, notably in the form of 
open debates and publicity and explanations of Member States' votes. 
79. With regard to open debates, the Council will hold a six-monthly public debate on the 
Presidency's programme. Other public debates are possible on major issues of 
Community interest and major legislative proposals. The decision to proceed in public 
is taken case by case and by unanimous vote. So far there have been 22 public debates 
(Annexes 10 and 11). 
Open debates have tended to be about subjects on which a consensus existed. Requests 
for open debates on other subjects have failed to secure the required unanimity. The 
Council is now reconsidering the unanimity rule in this respect. 
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80. With regard to publicity and explanations of votes, voting outcomes are made public 
when the Council is acting as a legislative body, unless it decides otherwise. The 
exception has never been applied and the question of abolishing it is being considered. 
Explanations of vote~ can also be made public.· 
(b) The Commission 
8 I. The Commission has decided to publish its work programme, its legislative programme 
and certain of its proposals and to step up its consultation processes. · 
It publishes its work programme and legislative programm~ in the Official Journal. Its 
legislati~e programme indicates what consolidation exercises are planned and what 
future legislative proposals might give rise to extended consultations (33 of the 
I05 legislative proposals announced in the 1994 programme). · 
In late I 992 it decided to publish some of its proposals in the Official Journal in the 
form of summaries with details of where those interested can obtain documents and 
react to them. This procedure has had limited use so far. 
82. The Commission regularly consults interested circles by means of Green and White 
Papers. 1 This helps it ascertain whether legislation is r~ally needed and, if so, in what 
form. It published six Green and White Papers in 1993 and nine in 1994 and plans 23 
in 1995. · 
2. Simplifyin2 and streamlining legislation 
83. Simplifying Community and national legislation is designed to make the texts more 
accessible and easier to understand. Measures taken to modernize, simplify and 
streamline Community legislation fall into four categories: 
recasting legislation - bringing several separate instruments into one while also 
making amendments on matters of substance; 
simplification - repealing obsolete, superfluous or unduly detailed provisions; 
consolidation - bringing several existing instruments and amendments to them 
together in a single instrument, without changing the substance; 
drafting improvements. 
(a) Recasting 
84. In 1993 the Commission, in its subsidiarity review exercise, launched a programme for 
the recasting of existing legislation. It pinpointed a series of areas for initial treatment, 
foremost among them the legislation on the right of residence and on pharmaceuticals. 
Green Papers arc rcflc\.ion documents for discussion: White Papers set out general proposals on 
an issue. 
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(b) Si111j!lification 
85. As part of the same subsidiarity review exercise, the Commission is working on the-. 
simplification of several families of legislation, notably on enVironmental and food 
matters. It has also set up a group of independent experts to examine the impact on 
employment and competitiveness of Community and national IegisfatioO, with a view 
to possible streamlining and simplification. 
(c) Consolidation 
86. This is a valuable tool for making it easier for those to whom the law applies to 
ascertain their rights and duties. 
Of the 15 consolidation instruments announced in the 1993 and 1994 programmes, eight 
have so far been proposed, and many other proposals are scheduled for 1995· 
(Annex 12). ' 
The delays are due to legal and language difficulties and to teething troubles with the 
computer system set up by the Publications Office. An interinstitutional agreerpent of 
20 December 1994 has established" an accelerated modus operandi for Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission. 
(d) Draftinf improvements 
87. In every country in the world legislation is difficult to grasp because it is produced by 
experts using technical language. In the Community context, the problem is compounded 
by the fact that legislation is the fruit of negotiations, and ambiguities may be the price 
to be paid for agreement. 
In June 1993 the Council responded to the request made by the Edinburgh European 
Council by agreeing on guidelines to improve the drafting of Community legislation. 
3. Access to documents 
88. Access to the institutions' documents is a vital means of increasing transparency and 
stimulating dialogue. The Council and the Commission have worked hand in hand at 
two levels. 
First, on 6 December 1993, they approved a code of conduct regarding unpublished 
documents held by the Council and the Commission. It establishes the broad principle 
of general access to documents, subject to exceptions to protect public or private 
interests and the smooth operation of the institutions, determines how requests for 
documents will be processed and within what time-limits, and provides appeal 
procedures against refusal. 
The two institutions subsequently adopted implementing decisions. The Commission, 
for instance, circulated guidelines to its staff and issued a user guide for the general 
public. 
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Of the 260 requests received by the Commission, 53.7ro have been accepted, 
17.911A have been rejected and 28.4% have been treated as invalid (Annex 13). 
89 .. These measures are still in their infancy and it is too early to analyse in depth their 
effectiveness. Nevertheless, it is clear that the principle of access to information is now 
undisp~. The b3;Sic instruments are in place, and a review of the code is planned after 
two years' experience. 
* * 
* 
C. THE COMPREHENSIBILITY OF THE TREATY 
90. The ratification debates revealed the acuteness of a problem that the Treaty's authors had 
not pereeived: is the Treaty comprehensible at all? 
The complexity of European integration, the fruit of layer upon layer of hesitant 
advances and comp~omises, is reflected in the complexity of its legal instrume~ts. 
The fact that even before the Treaty was signed there were separate legal entities 
(European Economic Community, European Coal and Steel Community, European 
Atomic Energy Community) with their separate bases and instruments governed by 
separate Treaties was already a source of confusion. 
The Union Treaty further complicated matters by adding a new structure that modifies 
and amplifies the earlier ones while at the same time provoking new ambiguities with 
provisions of the old Treaties being neither taken over nor repealed. The net result is 
that the Union's b~i"c treaties are very difficult to read and understand, which is hardly 
likely to mobilize public opinion in their favour. 
The Commission considers that, without compromising the acquis communautaire, the 
three Communities and the Union should be merged into a single entity, as should the 
Treaties, while a number of other instruments should also be consolidated. 
* * 
* 
D. OVERALL ASSESS:MENT 
91. Because of the growing general awareness of the need for more openness in the exercise 
of powers by the Community institutions, the principle of subsidiarity was written into 
the Treaty and now guides the institutions' behaviour and action. It determines not only 
the need for action but also its intensity. 
The Commission applies this principle both to direct its initiatives and to evaluate the 
need for legislation -both future and existing- as well as its proportionality to the aim 
in view. The results of its application are to be found in the appreciable drop in the 
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number of new proposals and in the withdrawal or amendment of existing instruments. 
Despite the tangible results already achieved, the principle nevertheless needs further 
development in order to overcome the diffi.culties often caused by differences in-· 
Member States' viewpoints, traditions and interests. 
92. Openness and transparency are designed to help the public to grasp the deeision-making. 
process and require that Community legislation "be made more Comprehensible. 
It is too early to judge the effectiveness of the tools provided. As things stand, the 
public's expectations are far from satisfied. A great d~ remains to be done, especially 
in the Council, which must be more open in its legislative function. The Community's 
efforts will be to no avail, however, if the national authorities for their part do not 
ensure transparency in the transposal and application of Community legislation. 
Transparency is particularly wanting in justice and home affairs cooperation, which 
affects the Union's internal security and closely concerns individual rights. 
* * 
* 
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Part Two 
Effectiveness and consistency 
of the Union's policies 
The European Union was created primarily as a means of progressing beyond the 
Communities, essentially economic in nature, towards an all-embracing stntcture capable of 
"assert[ing] its identity on the international scene" (Article B). The idea behind the Treaty 
was thus to found the Union by grafting new policies and new forms of cooperation (the 
common foreign policy and cooperatio11 in the fields of justice and home affairs) onto the 
existing Communities. 
It was not po~:<>ible to extend the Union in this 11:'ay without even greater recourse to the 
two-track approach, which involves both supranational integration and intergovernmental 
cooperation The price is greater complexity. In these circumstances, increasing efficiency 
means ensuring there is a degree of consistency between the differe/lt pillars. That is the 
iutention behind the Treaty's "single institutional framework", designed to ensure "the 
consistency and the continuity of ... activities" (Article C). 
177e following analysis will therefore examine the effectiveness of each of the Union's new 
powers in practice, and the degree of consistency between different areas of activity Hlifh 
different types of administrative machinery. · 
In the case of internal fields of activity (economic and moneta1y union and cooperation in 
the field of justice and home affairs), where the most important changes are largely unrelated 
to each other, the analysis will concentrate on the ability to decide and act(/). 
An assessment of consistency is however essential for matters relating to the Union's external 
activities, because of the interaction bet1-reen the economic and political arenas. The Union's 
lack of a legal personality in its Oli'/1 right makes it indispensable to have a measure of 
consistency between the activities of the Member States and the Community, which are the 
only subjects of international law (II). 
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I. INTERNAL POLICIES 
93 _ The most important new internal feature is. the introduction of economic and monetary 
union, The Treaty also reinforces certain Community policies and opens up some areas . 
~~oow. · 
The other major change is the addition of a new title on cooperation in the fields of 
justice and home affairs. This brings a form of hitherto rather inconsistent 
intergovernmental cooperation within the scope of the Treaty : and its single 
decision-making framework, and extends its scope quite considerably (B). 
A. AREAS OF COMMUNITY ACTIVITY 
1. Economic and monetary union 
The irrevocable commitment to a common monetary policy and ·a single currency can 
be seen as the last piece needed to complete:.the single market and is undoubtedly one 
of the Treaty's most significant advances. -The main elements at this stage are as 
follows: 
Multilateral surveillance (Article 103) 
94. Before the Treaty, coordination of national economic policies was only a general 
principle set out in various articles, with the creation of the Moneta.Iy Committee as the 
only institutional provision. All the arrangements for coordinating economic policies 
were fixed by secondary legislation. 
In the light of the experience acquired in the application of this legislation, and in the 
operation of the European Monetary System, strengthened procedures have been 
introduced by the Treaty. Multilateral surveillance is undertaken in the context of broad 
guidelines for economic policies and of the functioning of economic and monetary 
uruon. Express provision is made for recommendations to be addressed to Member 
States. 
95. As a result, the new Treaty provisions contribute to addressing the issue of convergence 
and to securing consensus on appropriate policies for the Community_ The Council 
monitors the broad economic policy guidelines when it adopts the new guidelines for 
the following year. The surveillance procedure thus has a direct impact on national 
policies, but it is too early to make a detailed assessment. 
Nevertheless, the level at which these issues have been discussed has both focused 
attention on the question of convergence and underlined the importance of proper 
surveil lance. 
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. Excessive deficit procedure. (Article I04c) 
96. The excessive deficit procedure puts pressure on Member States to pursue budgetary-· 
policies with a view to fulfilling the convergence criterion (Article 109j) during the · 
second stage of economic and monetary uriion, and to maintain the respect of this 
criterion in the third stage, when ·additional measures will be available. · 
To ·complete ~e procedure a regulation.has been adopted which lays down detailed 
definitions and rules for reporting the government deficit and debt figures to ·the 
Commission by the Member States. 
97. The first application of the procedure, in 1994, went fairly-smoothly. Following the 
opinions of the Commission, the Council considered in September that ten Member 
States were in excessive deficit; the recommendations to correct ·these situations were 
agreed in October and adopted formally in November. For these Council decisions, the 
Commission fully used its right of initiative, favouring a strict application of the 
procedure, while the C~uncil broadly supported the Commission's recommendations and 
decided without unreasonable delay. 
The recommendations concerning excessive public deficits can be made public by the 
Council if it wishes to penalize any failure to act on them. The public is informed when 
the Council decides, on a recommendation from the Commission, which are the 
countries with excessive deficits. Some Member States have even wanted to make the 
recommendations public to explain to public opinion the reasons for the extra efforts 
they were being required to make. 
The European Parliament is informed by the Commission and the Council. The 
Commission makes a point of letting Parliament-know at a very early stage the reasons 
why it is recommending that the Council declare Member States' deficits excessive. 
Mter two years' operation it can be concluded that the multilateral surveillance 
procedures have strengthened the coordination of economic policies. They have 
significantly improved the involvement of national parliaments. 
Movements of capital (Articles 73b to 73g) 
98. The amendments concerning capital movements came into effect at the start of 1994. 
Previous liberalization measures adopted as directives, as well as the introduction of 
further provisions governing capital movements and payments to and from non-member 
countries have now been raised to Treaty level. 
It is too early for a complete assessment of how these provisions have operated in 
practice. However, an indication of their operation can be found in the first report by 
the Monetary Committee on capital movements and payments. 
Secondary legislation and setting-up of the European Monetary Institute 
(Articles I09e and I09f) 
99. Secondary legislation. The Member States have, for the most part, brought their own 
legislation into line with the rules laid down in the Treaty, e.g. no lending from the 
central banks to the public authorities and no special access to financial institutions for 
the public sector. These provisions are enforced jointly by the Commission (in respect 
of the Member States) and the Institute (in respect of the central banks). Every Member 
State has had to alter its regulations and practices to comply with the· new rules. 
Furthennore, a number of Member States have already ~ken steps towards making their 
central banks independent as required by the Treaty. 
Lastly, the Treaty provides that the Institute must be consulted by the authorities in the 
Member States on any new regulation they wish to introduce. The details of how this 
consultation will work in practice have already been worked out and most of the 
Member States have enacted adequate implementing measures. 
I 00. Setting-up oft he European Moneta/y Institute. The Institute was established, as planned, 
on 1 January 1994 and a President has duly been appointed. The headquarters of the 
Institute and of the future European Central Bank will be in Frankfurt. Despite a 
number of teething troubles, the Institute has lost no time in starting work, 
concentrating on: 
better coordination of monetary policies; 
preparations for stage three; the Institute must decide on the regulatory, 
organizational and logistical fran1ework by the end of I 996 to enable the 
European System of Central Banks to carry out its work in stage three. 
10 l. In the eighteen months since implementation began, the provisions regarding the various 
stages of economic and monetary union have been implemented swiftly and efficiently. 
While Parliament has voiced some criticism of the role attributed to it in connection 
with multilateral surveillance, the measures regarding economic and monetary union 
have complied with the procedures and the timetable set down for it. 
The results achieved by measures to put stage two of economic and monetary union into 
practice have demonstrated not only the flexibility of the mechanism but also the 
credibility of the various institutions, such as the Council (responsible for improving 
surveillance and co-responsibility) and the Commission and the European Monetary 
Institute (whose respective responsibilities have, with practice, become quite clear). The 
Union can face the future with confidence, particularly with regard to the timing of 
stage three and the gradual coordination of economic policies. The recent upheavals on 
the foreign exchanges makes it all the more necessary to keep to the timetable. 
2. The areas strengthened 
The Treaty has made changes - some of them quite radical - to both content and 
decision-making. procedures in certain policy areas, e.g social policy, economic and 
social cohesion. rese(!rcll. environment and trans-European nctv,·orb 
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(a) St?cial policy (Articles 117 to 125 and Protocol No 14) 
102.- The purpose 'of the Treaty is 'to promote evenly distributed and lasting economic and _: 
s~at progress. Althpugh no significant changes were made to the social-policy 
provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community, eleven Member States 
(now fourteen) concluded an agreement on social policy that forms an int~gral part of 
the Treaty. The agreement provides the Community with the means of making progress 
on the social front at the same pace as in other areas, particularly the economy. 
The agreement is the first case of a Community regime where one Member State does 
not share the others' objectives. 
It extends the Community's powers to new areas (Annex 14) and enhances the 
importance of social dialogue in the legislative process. 
\Vhile the Agreement does introduce qualified-majority voting to a significant number 
of new areas, there are many areas left in which unanimity is required. 
I 03. The Agreement institutionalizes and attaches greater significance to consultation 
between t?e two sides of industry. It helps the Commission in assessing whet_her 9r not 
it should go ahead with Community initiatives and enables the t~o sides of industry to 
influence the content of proposals. Organizations representing both employers and 
employees at European level now meet regularly on a flexible basis. 
The two sides also play a fundamental role in the implementation of Community 
social-policy directives - a task which may be entrusted to them with the agreement of 
the Member State in question. 
The Agreement also enables traditional relations to be established within the 
Community framework. At the joint request of both sides, the Council, acting on a 
proposal from the Commission, can adopt a decision for the implementation of these 
agreements. This provision has not yet been used. 
I 04. Social policy is thus now governed by: 
Title II of the Treaty on European Union and 
the Agreement enabling fourteen Member States (all except the United Kingdom) 
to legislate at European level. 
Choosing between the two sets of rules can be problematic: so far, the Commission has 
assessed case by case whether or not to use the Agreement as the legaL basis for 
proposals. In general, it uses the Agreement only when it is impossible to obtain the 
support of all fifteen Member States. In the field of health and safety at work, where 
decisio~s are taken by qualified majority, the Commission tends to use the Treaty in 
preference to the Agreement. 
Thus far, the Agreement has been used only occasionally, e.g. for a Directive on 
informing and consulting workers in Community-scale companies and groups of 
companies and a resolution on the outlook for social policy. 
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105. While the Agreement on social policy can be seen as another step towards a European 
social policy for all citizens of the Union, it is n~greitable that not all Member States 
are involved because it rather blurs the Union's image with respect to social policy and-· 
creates the potential for disputes over distortions of competition. · 
(b) Economic and social cohesion (Articles 130a to 130e and Protocol No 15) 
I 06. The Treaty certainly enhanced the importance of economic and social cohesion, by 
turning it into an essential rorollaiy of an open, border-free European market and 
economic and monetary union: 
the principle of solidarity with the Union's poorest regions has been strengthened 
by the fact that economic and social cohesion embraces a number of common 
policies, which are supposed-to contribute to it (e.g. environmental policy, 
trans-European networks); 
' 
the practical expression of this solidarity has also been bolstered by the 
establishment of a Cohesion Fund for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain; an 
additional protoGol on cohesion increased the weight attached to the· relative 
prosperity of the Member States in determining the contributions to the system 
of own resources. 
. . 
107. The Regulation on the.Cohesi~n Fund, adopted on 16 May 1994, enabled the Union·to 
launch straightaway major new programmes in the four countries concerned. These 
programmes are concerned with integrating these countries into the trans-EurQpean 
transport networks and improving the quality of the environment (in particular for 
waste-water disposal and water quality). 
The provisions in .the Treaty strengtheni"ng the instruments of economic and social 
cohesion over and, above the Cohesion Fund have not affected the way in which the 
Fund is implemented in· practice. These other instruments are largely dependent on 
Structural Fund regulations, revised before the entry into force of the Treaty. 
108. The Commission is ofthe vi~w th·at the application of the structural policies to promote 
cohesion could be improved by: 
development of the partnership between the Union, the Member States, the 
regions and local authorities (in an appropriate way in each Member State), with 
the involvement of the two sides of industry; 
effective financial control and assessment of projects financed by the Structural 
Funds. Neither is satisfactory at the moment owing to the confusion over who is 
responsible for what. This undermines faith in the concept of financial solidarity 
in the Union and in its openness. 
(c) Research and teclmo!ogical development (Arr;c/es 13Qf to J30p) 
109 The most significant reform in this field was introduced by the Single Act The changes 
introduced by 1he Union Treaty amounted to no more than fine tuning 
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First, the_ Treaty legitimizes research in fields such as medicine and the environment not 
warranted by the objective of increased industrial cOmpetitiveness alone. 
It highlights the . need for policy coor<lination between Member States and with the 
C<:>mmunity, though it does not create an instituti~nal framework for this. 
In October 1994 the Commission presented a communication entitled "Research and 
Technological Development- Achieving Coordination through Cooperation". This is 
currently with the Council. · -
II 0. The framework programme is adopted by the codecision procedure. This means that the 
European Parliament is now closely involved in decisions on the overall thrust of policy 
and general priorities, rather than simply being consulted on the details of individual 
programmes. Unanimity is, however, still required for the adoption of the framework 
programme. 
Despite the unwieldiness of a procedure combining codecision with unanimity, adoption 
of the Fourth Framework programme was completed in only ten months, thanks to an 
exceptional set of circumstances: all the institutions were aware of the disruption to 
Community projects that could result from a failure to take all the necessary decisions 
by the end of I 994. Parliament's eagerness to reach an agreement before the European 
elections also played an important part. 
However, the body of legislation prescribed by the Treaty, covering both the framework 
programme and the individual programmes, is still too cumbersome. For example, more 
than twenty legislative decisions had to be taken to implement the framework 
programme. 
(d) The environment (Articles J30r to 1301} 
I 11. The Treaty elevated environmental action to the status of a policy, reflecting the 
increasing importance of environmental issues. It expanded on the principles and 
guidelines for environmental measures and gave formal recognition to the principle of 
prevention, the need for a high level of protection and the idea that other Community 
policies should take account of environmental considerations. 
In addition, four Member States now have access to Community support from the 
Cohesion Fund for environmental projects. 
1 I 2. The Treaty has made the decision-making procedure more efficient by replacing 
unanimity with qualified majority voting in the Council in most cases, and the need 
merely to consult Parliament with the cooperation procedure. The procedure has not 
been made more simple, however: in some cases, the codecision procedure is used, 
while in others the Council must reach a unanimous decision, after consulting 
Parliament. 
Nor did the Treaty clear up the grey area between this procedure and the procedure for 
the single market. Thus there is still uncertainty as to whether the codecision procedure 
(Article l OOa) or the cooperation procedure (Article 1 00s) should be used for certain 
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proposals. These problems have kept on emerging, particularly in relation to successive 
proposal~ on waste. 
Thus, while the Tr~ty !Dade some major improvements to an environment policy which 
is still in need of further development, it also created new complications as far as legal 
bases and the clarity of the decision-making procedure are concerned. · 
(e) Trans-European networks (Articles 129b to 129d) 
113. The introduction of the concept of trans-European networks is the Treaty's response to 
a basic realization: with the removal of internal borders and cooperation with . the 
countries of central and eastern Europe, projects to develop transport, energy and 
telecommunications networks can no longer be viewed purely in national terms; they 
must also form part of a coherent European strategy. 
The Treaty therefore provides for the possibility of coordinating national decisions on 
the basis of overall European plans, and special funding from the Community budget 
to promote synergies between national projects. 
114. Stepping up the pace of work on trans-European networks is one of the objectiv.es laid 
down by the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment. Both the 
Commission and Parliament have made a considerable effort to ensure that the overall 
plans for· road, rail and inland-waterway transport networks are adopted as quickly as 
possible. However, the efforts made in these areas to select European priority projects 
and to mobilize the funds required to make them viable must be actively pursued. 
Moreover, Member States have proved unwilling to abandon their national preferences: 
witness the uneven distribution of the various categories of public funding made 
available through European instruments. 
3. Other new areas of activity 
115. In line with the preoccupations of several Member States, the Treaty conferred 
decision-making powers on the Community in a number of areas, many of them directly 
related to the everyday lives of its citizens, e.g. visa policy (Articles I OOc and I OOd), 
education, training and youth policy (Articles 126 and 127), culture (Article 128), public 
health (Article 129), consumer protection (Article 129a) and industry (Article 130). 
In most cases, the Treaty aims to encourage cooperation between the Member States. 
Sometimes, it expressly rules out harmonization of national provisions (education, youth 
and training). Either unanimity or majority support is required, depending on the 
importance of the measures in question, with no clear link to the decision-making 
procedure (culture and industry). 
116. Since only limited use has so far been made of these new provisions, a detailed 
assessment is not possible. That in no way reduces the possible future importance of 
Community measures, adopted by a majority and aimed at encouraging cooperation. 
European measures look set to play an increasingly significant role in the areas referred 
to above, as can be seen from the Leonardo and Socrates programmes, adopted using 
the nevv legal bases. 
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B. COOPERATibN IN THE FIELDS OF JUSTICE AND HO~ AFFAIRS 
117. Cooperation on justice and home affai~ is one of the fonns of action assigned to the 
Union to "supplement" the European Communities. The very fact that it was included · 
in the Treaty, under Title VI, .was a major innovation, making a sharp contrast with 
earlier intergovernmental cooperation in this area, which was very haphazard, produced 
little in the way of results and operated largely behind closed doors. Its incorporation 
within the institutional framework of the Union will, in principle, now make consistency 
and continuity of action possible. 
More effective cooperation is long overdue. The repeated conclusions of European 
Councils and the sensitivity of public opinion on issues such as immigration or 
international crime suggest that there is a strong desire for cooperation in these areas. 
118. The institutional and legal arrangements for cooperation on justice and home affairs lie 
somewhere between the classical Community model and simple intergovernmental 
cooperation, which c6ntinues to be the predominant element. . 
the Commission and the European Parliament have some part to play, though less 
so than in the Community field. 
the initiative rests with the Member States, but the Commission also has the right 
of initiative in some areas. 
new legal instruments (common position, joint action, conventions drawn up by 
the Council) have been introduced. 
normally disputes in this area cannot be referred to the Court of Justice, but the 
Council may make provision for this in certain areas. 
a procedure exists to transfer certain kinds of action to the Community. 
recourse to Community financing is possible. 
1. Results 
119. So far the Council has made very little use of the new instruments of Title VI: 
it has riot adopted a single common position; 
it has adopted joint action in ~o cases, one on travel facilities for school pupils 
from non-member countries resident in a Member State, the other on extending 
the field of action of the Europa! Drugs Unit; 
it has adopted the text of a Convention on simplified extradition subject to the 
consent of the persons concerned. 
On ·the other hand it has adopted some fifty recommendations, resolutions or 
conclusions (Annex 15), in other words using the old instruments available before the 
Treaty. 
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Clearly,_ then, there is a.marked preference on the Council's part for the traditional, 
non-binding instruments of intergovernmental cooperation. 
As for the substance, practically all the topics dealt with flow from the impetus given 
by the Luxembourg European Council (June I 991 ). In this respect the Treaty- has had 
-no _significant innovative impact. 
2. Operational assessment 
120. Considering the results described above, the immediate question that arises is whether 
the ·legal jnstruments and working methods for cooperation in the -fields _of justiee and 
home· affairs are adequate. 
Essentially, those instruments and methods are the same as for Title V (common foreign 
and security policy). Yet the two fields are utterly different. Foreign policy mainly has 
to deal with fluid situations, whereas justice and home affairs frequently involves 
legislative action which, because it directly affects individual rights, requires legal 
certainty. 
(a) Problems connected with tlze fecal instruments used 
121. The legal instruments of Title VI have tended to be ineffective because of the factors 
described below : 
there is some disagreement between the MembeJ States over the nature and effect 
of common positions and joint action. In particular there seems to be no 
consensus on whether they are mandatory or not, except where they contain 
explicit obligations. 
the adoption and implementation of conventions is a slow and complicated 
business. First, they have to be ratified by the Member States, but no binding 
deadlines apply (the Dublin Convention on asylum, signed on 15 June 1990, has 
still not entered into force for want of ratification by the required number of 
States). Second, the chosen formula for the act by which a convention is adopted 
(an unspecified "act" of the Council) tends to reduce the Council's role to a 
m1mmum. 
above all, the fact that unanimity is required for all areas covered by Title VI has, 
as expected, proved to be a major source of paralysis, either preventing any action 
or decision at all or reducing the decision taken to the lowest common 
denominator. Conventions nevertheless may provide for the adoption of 
implementing measures by a two-thirds majority in the Council (Article K.3), but 
this option remains unused. 
The unanimity requirement is probably the main reason why Title VI has proved 
ineffective. On 10 March 1995, for instance, it proved impossible to reach 
agreement on anything more than a resolution on the question of the minimal 
procedural guarantees for granting asylum, even though the Brussels European 
Council in October 1993 had called for a joint action. The same problems arose 
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with family reunification and admission for the purposes of employment. Here it 
was more an exercise of reproducing the eXisting rights in the Member States than 
of bringing them into line., The only convention adopted so far (on extradition) __ 
also· represents a minimal compromise, taking over only part of the initial 
proposal. 
lastly there is in general no monitoring of any action adopted as regards. its 
implementation or interpretation. 
That is perhaps normal for non-mandatory acts, but rather more· surprisingly also 
applies in the case of joint action, common positions and conventions. 
Conventions, it is true, may be made subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice in the event of disputes between the Member States or differences of 
interpretation. It has so far proved impossible to obtain the unanimous agreement 
necessary to do this, however. The nine conventions currently under discussiort 
are being held up by this problem in particular. 
(b) Problems connected with tlte methods used 
The methods by which Title VI operates also caii for certain observations. 
_ 122. The initiative for action, which, before the Treaty, rested solely with the Council 
Presidency, has heen: extended to all the Member States and, except in criminal, 
customs and police matters, to the Commission. 
However, this option has only been used once· by a Member State not holding the 
Council Presidency and twice by the Commission. 2 In practice, therefore, proposals and 
initiatives still emanate p~marily from the Presidency, as in the past. 
To begin with, at least, the Commission·has preferred to make its contribution by way 
of broad communications (on immigration and asylum; on the plan to combat drugs), 
whose main value is precisely their comprehensive overview of both Community action 
and cooperation between the Member States. 
123. There are also problems regarding the transparency of initiatives and consultation of the 
European Parliament. 
The Commission has regularly published its initiatives in the Official Joumal and sent 
them to the European Parliament for information; in those cases the Presidency has also 
consulted Parliament. 
2 TI1e United Kingdom proposed joint action for the protection of t11e financial interests of t11e 
Conununities. 
The Commission proposed a convention on controls on persons crossing the external frontiers of 
the Conununity and a convention on the protection of the financial interests of the Communities. 
Thus t" o proposals concerning the protection of the financial interests of the Communities have 
been tabled. by the United Kingdom and the Commission. The '''o proposals were examined in 
parallel_ which "as probably an additional factor slo"·ing do\\ n progress So far all that has 
emerged is a Council resolution. 
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The Treaty, however, does not impose any blanket obligation to consult the European 
Parliament on legislative proposals. Successive Presidencies liave failed to consult it on 
initiatives of their own, including major ones such as the Europol Conventio~. In 
matters that touch so closely on the lives of Union citizens that would appear to be a 
serious flaw. 
· 124. Finally, operational stru~res in the two fields in question extend over five negotiating 
levels (Council. Coreper, Article K.4 Committee, steering groups, working parties), 
rather than the usual three found in the Community context. 
In implementiryg the Treaty ii was felt ·unnecessary to modify working methods 
substantially, with the result that the new structures were simply superimposed on those 
that already existed: the K.4 Committee is thus descended. from the group of 
"coordinators" set up at Rhodes and the three steering groups are descended from the 
'Trevi group" of senior officials and the groups on immigration and judicial 
cooperation. The result is a re~~ duplication of technical work by the working parties 
and the steering groups, and of arbitration by the K.4 Committee and Coreper. 
·_,;,,..,-- ~ ·.-
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ASYLUM 
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JUSTICE/HOME AFFAIRS 
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(Formerly: Group of Coordinators) 
STEERING GROUP STEERING GROUP STEERING GROUP 
Immigration/Asylum Police/customs cooperation Judicial cooperation in 
(Formerly: Ad hoc (Formerly: TREV/1975-CELAD(drugs)- civiUcriminal matters 
Group on Immigration, GAM (mutual assistance) (Set up under European 
1986) Political Cooperation) 
I I I 
Working parties Working parries Working parties 
IMMIGRATION VISAS EXTERNAL FALSE EXTRADITION CRIMINAL BRUSSELS TRANS-
POLICY FRONTIERS PAPERS LAW CONVENTION MISSION 
OF ACTS 
TERRORISM POLICE FIGHT EUROPOL DRUGS OJSTOMS 
COOPERATION AGAINST COOPERATION 
ORGII.-
NIZEO 
CRIME 
Obviously this multi-tier structure, in which those at some levels are unfamiliar with 
Community negotiating methods, does not facilitate the necessary search for 
compromise and makes it too easy to refer matters to the next level above. 
125. The Treaty lays down that operational expenditure relating to cooperation on justice and 
home affairs may continue to be charged direct to the Member States or may be 
charged to the Community budget, if the Council so decides unanimously. 
The appropriations entered in the 1994 budget remained unused and those entered in 
the 1995 budget have not yet been called on either. So far expenditure has been 
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charged direct to the Member States (th~ main item being the Europol Drugs Unit). In 
complete contrast to foreign policy, where the same arrangements apply, the option o_f 
charging expenditure to the Community budget has not been exercised as it has proved · 
impossible to secure unanimous agreement of the very principle of using the. 
Community budget in this area. 
- 3; The interface with the Community sphere 
Lastly, there have inevitably been some problems regarding the interface with the 
Community sphere. 
(a) DeltUlrcation between Community matters and the fields of justice and 
home affairs 
126. "The obscure clarity" of the dividing line between Community matters and the areas 
covered by Title VI has neither made decision-making any easier nor encouraged 
openness. 
The difficulties inherent in the Treaty's "pillar" design have come home to roost: 
Article K.l states that the aim is to achieve "the objectives of the Union, in particular 
the free movement of persons, ... without prejudice to the powers of the European 
Community". However for the purposes of completing the single market and removing 
border· controls, the free movement of persons is already a Community objective. 
Furthermore, whereas Community CC!mpetence centres on the objectives, Title VI gives 
an exhaustive list of the areas regarded as matters of common interest for cooperation 
in the fields of justice and home affairs. These two different approaches are difficult 
to reconcile in order to make practical headway. 
This overlap poses problems as regards the content of many instruments. This is the 
case for the joint action on travel facilities for schoolchildren from non-member 
countries, which is moreover- as1he Commission has (.Xpressly stated- a Community 
. . 
matter. The same problem arises with the proposed convention on controls on persons 
crossing external frontiers. Visa policy offers a good example of the complications 
arising from the existence of several "pillars". The list of non-member countries whose 
nationals require a visa is laid down in a Community regulation, while the conditions 
for the issue of visas are to be decided through intergovernmental cooperation. 
(b) The possibility of using the "bridge" (Article K.9) 
127. The possibility of using the .. bridge" provided by the Treaty to apply Community rules 
to certain areas covered by Title VI could be one solution to these problems. However, 
the procedure laid down is cumbersome: it requires the Member States' unanimous 
approval and ratification in accordance with their respective national constitutional 
prOVISIOnS. 
- -
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In November 1993 the Commission, in line with -its obligationS flowing from the 
Treacy, sent a report to the Council on the possibility of applying Article K.9 to asylum; 
However, since the report was presented immediately after the Treaty came into effect, 
the Commission did not formally propose·making use· of the bridg~. The Council has 
agreed to review this question in 1995. · · 
* * 
* 
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II. EXTERNAL POLICIES 
128. The establishment of a common foreign and security policy and the consolidation of 
various fields of Community external activity by the Treaty reflects ~e Community's 
detemifnation to assert "its identity on the international scene" on two fronts-
Community action (A) and ~ntergovernmental cooperation (B). 
A. AREAS OF C01\1MUNITY ACTIVITY 
1. Development cooperation (Articles 130u to BOy) 
129. The inclusion in the Treaty of provisions on development cooperation was both a 
culmination and a starting point: 
a culmination in that the Treaty consecrated thirty years of Community action 
in favour of developing_ countries; · 
a starting point in that, faced with. sweeping international changes and the 
challenges created by new and interdependent factors (drugs, migration, 
terrorism, AIDS, etc.), the Treaty lays the bases for more dynamic, more 
coordinated and more complementary action by the Union. . 
By laying emphasis on greater coordination, the Treaty has helped to improve the 
effectiveness of the whole. Nevertheless, coordination still falls short of the ideal. 
Indeed, it works very much in one direction. More precisely, the Member States very 
rarely set out their own bilateral aid policies at meetings in Council bodies. This 
situation is harmful ~o the developing countries, since it diminishes the effectiveness 
of aid, and to the Member States in that it encourages "free rider" behaviour and 
prevents economies of scale. This reveals the limitations of voluntary coordination, 
which become all the more conspicuous as the number of Member States increases. 
130. To obtain an effect of scall and make the Union's development policy as a whole more 
visible, more credible and more influential - particularly in comparison with other 
donors - it is essential to combine all individual efforts, by ensuring that the policies 
and activities of the Union and its Member States are complementary and transparent. 
However, despite real differences, consensus does exist regarding the following three 
principles: 
the primary aim of the search for complementarity is to increase the 
effectiveness of cooperation; 
the most appropriate instrument in this respect is coordination; 
the search for complementarity must leave room for further developments. 
The concept of multiannual programmes may be interpreted variously. Does it mean 
decisions taken by the Council in the context .of, for example, cooperation with the 
Mediteminean countries or Asia? Or does i~ as the Commission maintains, mean the 
regular adoption by the Council of multiannual "comprehensive prognlmmes" defining 
objectives and means which apply both to the Community and to the Member States 
in development matters? 
Such programmes can now be adopted by a qualified majority: this is a step forward. 
They should open the way for the establishment of medium-term strategies for each 
country .and i~volving the .concentration of resources on agreed priority objectives. 
2. Sanctions against non-member countries (Article 228a) 
131. The purpose underlying the introduction of this provision is to adapt the letter of the 
Treaty to what over the last few years has become Community practice when applying 
politically motivated economic sanctions. Formal recognition of the practice by 
Article 228a was intended in principle to allow practical Community sanctio~s to be 
imposed by qualified majority once a preliminary decision to break off or curtail 
economic relations has been taken in the common foreign and security policy context. 
132. It must be said, however, that this intention has not been satisfied in practice and that, 
from an operational point of view, the procedure has not been improved. 
Because of the unanimity rule required for the adoption of common positions, certain 
of these have affected the content of sanctions. The procedure for the adoption of 
sanctions against Haiti was particularly significant in this respect: the refusal of one 
Member State to ~i.mtenance the imposition of financial sanctions by the Community, 
·on the basis of a qualified-majority decision in accordance with the Treaty, in practice 
obliged the Community to confine itself to traditional economic sanctions. Thus, the 
contagious effect of the political-cooperation-style intergovernmental process, already 
manifest in the past, has continued. The common foreign and security policy bodies 
tend to act as the real centre of gravity in the implementation of the new provisions. 
The measures have remained confined mainly to trade in goods and services and the 
suspension of air links. The scope of Article 228a, which relates to "economic 
relations", goes beyond trade policy proper. The provision can therefore encompass all 
services, including those which do not fall within the scope of Article 113. 
The Council has placed a broad interpretation on the need for a prior common position 
or joint action- each executive act has had to be preceded by a new common position. 
Consequently, the possibility of directly adopting executive measures by qualified 
m3:jority has remained a dead letter. 
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In practice, therefore, there has been a duplication of the number of Council acts, any 
Community regulation being, as it were, ••replicated" and conditioned, from the point 
of view of both its activation and its substance, by a decision taken in the external 
policy context. 
As for the imposition of financial sanctions by qualified majority, this has hitherto only 
been done for the sanctions against Bosnia-Herzegovina and the prohibition on making 
payments under contracts caught by the embargo against Haiti. 
3. Common commercial policy (Articles 110 to 116) 
(a) . Chanees 
133. The changes introduced by the Treaty, except for the removal of Article 116, are both 
few in number and limited in scope. They comprise: 
the repeal of Articles Ill (transitional period), 114 (manner of concluding 
trade agreements) and 116 (cooperation within international economic 
organizations); · 
in Article 113: 
insertion of a reference to international organizations as parties with which 
trade agreements may be concluded under Article 113, 
introduction of a reference to Article 228 as regards the method of 
concluding trade agreements, and 
deletion of the reference to the transitional period; 
in Article 115, deletion of the reference to the transitional period; 
the various provisions of Article 228, which has become a general framework 
provision for international agreements. 
(b) Practice 
In practice, the Treaty has not solved the main problems confronting the Community 
in the conduct of a consistent and effective commercial policy. Furthermore, various 
new problems have arisen. 
Scope of Article 113 
134. On the strength of earlier rulings of the Court of Justice, the Commission has always 
placed a dynamic interpretation on this article. More recent rulings now make this 
interpretation obsolete: the Court has explicitly limited the scope of Article 113 to trade 
in goods and extended it only as regards cross-border provision of services and, in the 
field of intellectual property, to the implementation of protective measures at borders 
against imports of counterfeit goods. 
135. This interpretation raises questions as to whether the commercial policy is adapted to 
the new international trade situation and whether it is effective. It favours the tendency 
which has developed in the Council of multiplying the legal bases for international 
trade agreements, thereby adding to the complexity of decision-making procedures. 
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The common commerci~l policy and the new realities in international trade 
·Services currently accoUht for 25% of total world trade, but the proportion is constantly_ 
iticreasing, as is th~ proportion of products Covered by intellectual property rights. 
·Furthermore, the boom in direct investment abroad constitutes a new variable, which· 
has a complex relationship With trade : the replacement of traditi~nal -trade by 
production abroad_ is closely connected with an effect of stimulating trade .. 
The Community's trading partners have adapted easily to the change in the structure of 
international trade. This is reflected by the establishment of the World· Trade 
Organization, in which the multilateral agreements on trade in goods and services and 
rules for the protection of intellectual property rights are brought together. Given that 
the· Commimity is the world leader as regards both trade .in services and direct 
investments abroad, the structure of Community law has manifestly been overtaken by 
commercial reality. 
Implications for effectiveness 
In the services field, the existence of extensive shared powers threatens to delay the 
conclusion of agreements by the Community because of the time needed ~o c~mplete 
national ratification procedures. 
Where intellectual property is conce!Jled, the Member States taken individually 
obviously do not have the economic or political weight wielded, for example, by the 
United States to compel other countries to put an end to_ infringements of intellectual 
property rights. This handicap is aggravated by the/fact that the Member States cannot 
resort to the sanctions weapon in the area of trade in goods, which falls within the 
Community's field of competence. Yet only this weapon really acts as a deterrent 
against partners which still have a traditional export structure. 
The Treaty indirectly assigns certain powers to the Community in the field of 
investment promotion (Articles 73a to 73h). These cannot be exercised effectively while 
the Member States continue to conclude bilateral treaties on investments. The 
relationship between trade and investments is particularly significant in the context of 
agreements with the Eastern European countries, which tend to make access to their 
goods for markets conditional on the volume of investment and vice versa. 
From the point of view of trade protection instruments, the scope of the new trade 
barriers regulation, which was adopted as part of the implementation of the Uruguay 
·Round agreements, could be seriously affected. To the extent that it is based on 
Article 113 alone, the application of the Community instrument could be contested, 
with regard to certain infringements of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) not relating to cross-border services and counterfeit goods. 
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Consequently, the Community risks losing the main benefit of the World Trade 
Organization's integrated dispute settlement system, and specifically of the __ 
cross-retaliation mechanism whereby violations of agreements on services and 
-intellectual property can be met by sanctions in the goods field. 
Deletion of Article Il6 
136. Article 116 required the Member States to cooperate so as to coordinate their own · 
measures within international organizations with those of the Community. The Article 
could therefore be used in areas where powers were shared. 
The disappearance of this article from the Treaty does not remove tl:lls requirement On 
the contrary, the Court has ruled that the duty to cooperate and coordinate is incumbent 
on the Community and the Member States by virtue of Article 5 of the Treaty, both in 
the negotiation and in the conclusion and implementation of agreements in areas of· 
shared competence. It is a legal obligation arising from' the need for the Community to 
act as one on the international scene. Although the Court has not defined the means of 
acting to this effect, practical cooperation or coordination measures could be ~ased on 
the basic provisions governing Community competence, in conjunction with Article 5. 
Such measures should be mandatory where the field covered by the international 
organization or agreement in question involves exclusive Community competence, since 
when they are linked. to national competence and in the absence of coordination, 
Community competence cannot be exercised effectively. This solution is of particular 
importance for the possible implementation of the compensation and cross-retaliation 
mechanisms of the World Trade Organization. 
Interface between the common commercial poi-icy and the common foreign and security 
policy 
137. This problem has already been addressed in relation to economic sanctions. 
It also arises in connection with export controls. Consequently, the integrated system 
for the control of exports of dual-use goods3 has been adopted by two simultaneous 
Council instruments - a Community regulation establishing a Community system for 
the control of exports of dual-use goods, and a decision adopting a common position 
under the common foreign and security policy. 
This duplication of instruments was undoubtedly not necessary from a legal point of 
view. Moreover, the list of goods which are subject to the control system appears in the 
decision taken under the common foreign and security policy and not in the Community 
regulation. Being subject to the unanimity rule, it will be difficult to amend. 
Dual-usc goods· goods \\hich can be used for both CJVJIJan and n111Jtary purposes. 
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Interface between the commercial policy and justice and home affa!rs cooperation 
138. The negotiations relating to the· movement of persons now in progress at the World 
Trade Organization in the context of the General Agreement on Trade in Services-· 
(GATS) are having to contend with an additional diffiCulty. The K.4 Committee, set up 
- · · in the context of cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, recently presented 
a draft Council text concerning the entry of workers from non-member countries into 
the Community; this also covers the provision of services. In other words, the key 
provisions for the negotiations in progress will be drawn up in a context where 
unanimity is required and where trade considerations are unlikely to be the primary 
concern. 
4. Shared competence 
139. The foregoing serves to highlight the increasing extent of shared competence. The 
co.existence of Community powers with powers enjoyed by the Memher States implies 
the involvement of both the Community institutions and the national authorities. As 
stated by the Court on three occasions, this should make unitary international 
representation all the more imperative. · 
It must be said that such unitary international representatioq, which is :1 c~mdition sine· 
qua non for the effP-etiveness of external action and which guaf.antees lasting cohesion, 
most notably within the internal market, is not guaranteed by the current provisions of 
the Treaty. 
140. In fact, institutional practice shows that existing coordination is inadequate. Indeed, it 
has only a few positive elements. This is the case, for example, of the Cor.:1munity's 
full participation, albeit without member status, in .the United Nations Commission on 
Sustainable Development. This shows that the Member States are prepared to cease 
acting in isolation where it is acknowledged that there is a common interest. The 
conclusion of the negotiations for the Treaty on the European Energy Charter is another 
example. 
By contrast, recent trends reveal increasing difficulties for such coordination. The 
persistent deadlock over the International Labour Organization provide one example. 
Similarly, deciding the respective responsibilities of the Community and the Member 
States often gives rise to differences, as witnessed by the dispute concerning the 
agreement on the respect by deep-sea fishing vessels of conservation measures -
concluded under the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations -which 
the Commission has now referred to the Court. 
These latter examples contradict the principle of consistency enshrined in Article C of 
the Treaty. Such practices imply a danger that the Community decision-making 
mechanisms \~viii in practice become conditional on unanimity. 
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A coordination procedure giving practical expression to the need for unitary- external 
action m accordance with Article C of the Trea1y is therefore both indispensable and_ 
urgent if a dilution of the acquis communautaire on the international scene is to be 
avoided .. 
* * 
* 
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B. THE CO:MMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
141. The Union is faced by new and rapidly evolving external challenges. To traditional and 
still-valid preoccupations, such as tenitorial defence, have to be added the possible 
effects on the Union's stability· and security of changing patterns of economic activity, 
populadon movements driven both by'wlrest and by economic attraction, and cultural 
changes- including those arising from militant religious awareness. 
The Treaty includes a common foreign and security policy the better to equip the Union 
to confront ·these multifaceted challenges, by providing it with a full range of 
possibilities with which to act, and thus ensure the well-being and security of its 
peoples. · 
142. This irr.porrant exi.ensio;t tc tl1e responsibilities of the Union is organized differently 
from the Community's traditional activities. The fact that the Treaty created a separate 
"pillar" (Title V) and gave it a clear intergovernmental character implies that this policy 
was seen both as an important development and as one of considerable sensitivity. It 
should also be seen in a longer-term perspective. 
On the one hand, it is hardly a novelty that the Community and the Union have an · 
interest in such matters. The new provisions of the Treaty were not developed in 
isolation, but constructed on the back of at least forty years of debate and more than 
twenty years of .direct practice. 
On the other hand, most Member States have long since accepted arrangements 
modifying their capacity to act alone in this area, despite the fact that foreign policy 
and security - much more than the economy - are thought to touch the most sensitive 
ways in which the nation state finds expression. 
1. The new provisions 
(a) · The changes made 
143. The fram~work of European Political Cooperation -launched in the early seventies -
was relatively light, dire~ted at achieving consultation and coordination, which in 
practice did not commit the Member States. Decisions were made by consensus. It 
proved to work in a low-key, pragmatic and flexible way, promoting understanding and 
tolerance of others' positions. However, there was rarely the will to act together and 
maximize the Community'~ influence. It suffered, moreover, embarrassing failures to 
agree en important occasions. 
144. The Treaty's new framework is not drastically altered from that applying for the last 
£Wenty years, but the coverage has been ~xtended, the type of possible initiatives 
formalized, and the obligation on Member States to align their policies made more 
explicit. The novel aspects can be summarized as follows: 
6 ~ _) 
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Inclusion within the Union framework Activities in this area now fall under 
the authority of the European Council and a single institutional framework, -· 
albeit with.specific procedures.applying. The Commission is associated with 
all aspects of work and alongside the Member States has the right to make 
proposals. With the Council, it is supposed to ensure coherence.~etween the 
various aspects of the Union's external activities. 
The definition of the instruments available .. These comprise: 
common positions (Article J.2) intended to make cooperation m·ore systematic 
an~ coordinated. Member States have to follow and uphold these. 
joint actions (Article 1.3) under which both national· and Community 
resources (of all sorts: manpower, know-how, finance, material, etc.) are 
directed to achieving the ·concrete objectives adopted. These joint actions also 
commit Member States. While the adoption of these actions requires 
unanimity, the precise way they are put into practice may be settled by 
qualified majority. Operational expenditure on such action may be charged 
to the Community budget and national budget (Article J.ll). 
The inclusion of security (Article 1.4 and Declaration No 30), including the 
setting-up of a common defence policy leading possibly to common defence. This 
comprises the inclusion of Western European Union as an integral part of the 
development of the Union and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of 
the Atlantic Alliance. 
The definition of various practical measures. These include the strengthening of 
the Council secretariat, and of its cooperation with the Commission; the 
involvement of national diplomatic missions and Commission delegations in 
implementing the decisions taken under the common foreign and security policy~ 
the possibility of making operational expenditure from the Community budget; and 
improvements in the consultation and information of the European Parliament. 
(b) Putting into practice the new provisions 
145. Since the entry into force of the Treaty i'l November 1993, there has been a 
considerable intensification of work on foreign policy and· security issues. This 
intensification has developed over a relatively short period of time, when the 
administrative support in the Union institutions has also lJ.ad to be reorganized. 
The Council secretariat dealing with these matters has beeil reinforced by increasing 
from one to two the number of <'fficials seconded from each Member State; these are 
matched by an equivalent number of Council officials; new procedures of cooperation 
between the Council secretariat and the CommissioP- have had to be developed; and 
security clearances both for individuals and for procedures have had to be worked out. 
. :- ... · ... ~. 
-.;.'. 
Western European Union has moved from London to Brussels. Its Permanent Council, · 
which now meets weekly, facilitates the necessary contacts with the European Union 
and NATO and promotes the development of wEU's· operatipnal Capabilities. The-· 
Council has a Planning Cell, mandated to plan for specific operations. 
' . 
The Commission has transformed its limited staff dealing with European I_»olitical 
. Cooperation into a new Directorate-Genefal for External Political Relations (DG lA). · 
The initial structure and responsibilities of this Directorate-General were revised at the 
end of 1994. 
146. Eleven common positions have been adopted (Annex 16). The great majority concern· 
economic sanctions, covering Libya, Sudan, Haiti (two) and forme~ Yugoslavia (four). 
This reflects changes introduced by new articles in the first pillar which provide that 
ecOnomic sanctions can only be adopted following formal common positions. 
The other common positions concern the Union's general objectives and priorities 
towards Rwanda and Ukraine, plus one on Rurundi. 
147. The joint actions undertaken (Annex 17) concerned former Yugoslavia, support for the 
Middle East peace process, the definition of a Stability Pact in Europe, support for 
democratic · transition in South Africa, preparation of the conference on the 
Non-Proliferation T~~iy, the control of dual.:.use goods, anti-personnel mines and the 
sending of observers t.<? the Russian elections. These eight subjects have been covered 
by sixteen joint actions (six different phases of humanitarian aid to former Yugoslavia, 
and two each on the administration of Mostar and the Stability Pact). 
148. With regard to the common security policy, work was already under way before the 
entry into force of the Treaty, on initial subjects of joint actions: Organization for 
Security and Cooperatim-, in Europe, arms control, non proliferation, and the economic 
aspects of securitY. Three joint actions mentioned above concern security - the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, anti-personnel mines and the control of dual-use goods (see also 
paragraph 137).' 
In 1992 the Council established a security policy working group, which started with the 
analysis of common interests in security matters and has now turned to operational 
tasks, such as aspects of integrating central European and Baltic states, the definition 
of the Union's relationship with Western European Union, and reflections on a common 
armaments policy. 
Also in 1992, Western European Union's Council defined its tasks as being primarily 
humanitarian/rescue, peacekeeping and peacemaking in nature. NATO in 1994 
supported the strengthening of a European pillar via Western European Union and 
endorsed the concept of combined joint task forces, i.e. separable but not separate 
military capabilities. 
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2. Operational assessment 
(a) A :eneral remark · 
-149. Getting the common foreign and security policy under way h_as be_en a laborious 
process. Changes had to be made in administrative support. Moreover, Member States~ 
recognized (Declaration No 28) the importance of reducing the overlap between various 
intergovernmental committees and ensuring practical cooperation between institutions. 
There is little sign of movement on the former, and work still needs to be done on the 
latter. Unnecessary delays have result~d, and this has on occasion reduced the 
effectiveness ~f the policY. adopted. 
150. It is not easy to measure success in this area, especially in view of the limited 
experience so far. Nevertheless, the enhanced degree of cooperation and coordination 
has removed at least some of the incoherence previously evident in the actions of the 
Member States. The value of this should not be underestimated. However, the aim of 
a substantial improvement has not been achieved. 
No doubt, this new machinery can in time be made to function more effectively, but 
some difficulties nevertheless appear to be structural. Member States have ·adopted 
common objectives in the field of foreign affairs and security; it is far from clear that 
they have provided the means to achieve them. 
(b) Decision-makin~ 
151. The most immediately significant feature of this part of the Treaty is the formalizing 
of "joint actions". Member States no longer simply coordinate and align their positions, 
but also aim to act In concert, and in concrete ways_ Two characteristics stand out from 
the joint actions decided so far: 
How their scope shrinks, between the mandate handed down by the European 
Council and what is finally undertaken. Part of the explanation lies in the practical 
rule of unanimity, together with differing interpretations of how the relevant 
Treaty provisions can be put into effect. 
How their nature varies, from ad hoc operations such as the observation of 
elections (Russia, South Africa) to the regulatory (control of double-use goods and 
anti-personnel _mines), and from diplomacy (Stability Pact, Non-Proliferation 
Treaty) to the practical deployment of substantial resources (humanitarian aid in 
Bosnia, the administration of Mostar, Palestinian police). 
152. In preparing the entry into force of the Treaty, the Council saw joint actions as the key 
instrument, backed up by common positions for day-to-day matters. This distinction has 
not been followed in practice. 
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The result is confusion about the role of the different instruments. "Positions" can 
extend to cover both fundamental orientations and concrete actions. "Actions" can be_. 
limit¢ to ad hoc diplomatic or administrative measures.-
While, the full range of flexibility offered by the different instruments should be 
explored· - especially as early experience has shown some procedures, such as the 
definition of a joint action, to be tortuous and bureaucratic - this confusion contributes 
to the impression that the common foreign and security policy lacks coherent form. -
153. This confusion over form is compounded by the fact that Member States do not use the 
Treaty fully with regard to procedure. In addition to the specific provision 
(Article J.3(2)) for qualified-majority voting in certain circumstances, they agreed that 
they would, wherever possible, "avoid preventing a-- unanimous decision where a 
qualified majority exists in favour of that decision" (Declaration No 27). Similar 
wording existed in the main text of the Single European Act. 
The only instance of these provisions being applied came with the recent joint action 
concerning anti -personnel mines. 
154. Unanimous voting, even where the Treaty allows qualified-majority voting, is one of 
the problems of foreign and security pollcy and one of the reasons why it is so 
ineffective. 
Reliance on unanimity and on "declarations" were features of European Political 
Cooperation. Unanimity and declarations continue to predominate (the latter at the rate 
of roughly two per week, despite not being specified in the Treaty). Confusion over the 
proper roles of the new policy instruments can only encourage this reversion to 
previous - ineffective - practice. 
(c) The connection between the pillars 
155. The pillars of the Treaty are· not isolated structures, but have to be connected if the 
Union as a whole is to function. These connections have given rise to financial and 
legal difficulties which hinder the proper implementation of decisions. 
156. The Council has recently adopted common positions intended to provide an overall 
framework for the Union's future relations with specific countries. As such, they include 
references to Community matters. Such overall positions are useful since they promote 
coherence in the Union's external relations.4 
The Conmlission is aware of tllis need and has accordingly sent the Council communications 
co\·ering the .first and second pillars. 
The Commission has pursued an integrated policy regarding the pre-accession strategy for the 
countries of central and eastern Europe. and policy with regard to the fom1er SoYiet Union. the 
Mcditcmncan. the Middle East and Japan. It docs so in Yiew of its responsibilities. "·hjch put it 
111 a position to present a comprchensi\·c picurc of all these issues. 
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However, such general positions raise problems for maintaining clear distinctions 
between powers and procedures under the Community Treaties and those under Title V 
ofthe Union Treaty. MeaSures taken under Title V, including common positions, are ... 
not only politically binding but also legally binding on Member States. But action to 
achieve the Community's objectives must, legally speaking, be taken under the 
Community Treaties. The Union Treaty contains no clear provision for resolving these 
problems of interconnection between pillars. 
The Commission has worked with the Council to try and define a modus vivendi 
concerning common positions covering both pillars. The practical benefits of this modus 
vivendi still ·have to be demonstrated .. 
This is not a theoretical discussion. The case of dual-use goods (mentioned in 
paragraph 137) is a good illustration of the serious drawbacks: insistence on superfluous 
or unsuitable instruments, procedures inevitably coloured by the search for unanimity 
and finally the subjection of these goods to an obscure and partly non-Community legal 
arrangement. 
157. Expenditure on common foreign and security policy operations can be charged either 
to the Community budget or to Member States (Article J.11 ). The latter appear. to be 
generally oriented to charging expenditure to the Community budget, raising the 
potential question of spending priorities. Of the total operational expenditure allocated 
to joint actions, roughly three quarters has been charged to the Community budget and 
one quarter to the Member States. In the Community budget, expenditure on the 
administration of Mostar was specifically charged to the common foreign and security 
policy item; other significant expenditure, such as on humanitarian aid or the 
Palestinian police force, has been charged to various items of the development and 
·cooperation budget. 
Normal budgetary procedures apply, which means that Parliament can have the last 
word on expenditure decided by Council in the field of common foreign and security 
policy. Negotiations on an interinstitutional ~greement concerning such expenditure 
have made little progress. The main stumbling block is the arrangements for 
consultation. In the mean time, the budget appropriations concerned have been frozen 
in the reserve and must be transferred on an ad hoc basis before they can be used. 
The hybrid structure of the Treaty, with decisions under one pillar requiring funding 
under another, has introduced an additional source of conflict. The complexity of the 
present system gives rise to procedural debates instead of debates of substance. 
158. These budgetary and legal difficulties are symptomatic of a Union constructed in 
pillars. Each has its own rules and procedures governing the powers of the institutions 
involved; these reflect real or presumed differences in the nature and state of 
development of the polis;ies involved. A particular initiative can require action 
coordinated under different pillars. In these cases, the rules and procedures of one pillar 
can affect the way the rules and procedures of the other operate. For instance, the 
general rule of unanimity in the second pillar can influence the method of adoption of 
the related Community measures and could even reintroduce a unanimity requirement 
for matters for which the Treaty provides for a qualified majority. 
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This conflict inevitably hinders constructive cooperation and effectiv~ implementation, 
for each of the institutions is fearful that its own role, and the proper functioning of a 
part of the Treaty with which it is particularly associated, will be subverted. The-·. · 
impossibility of legal review of action under the second pillar compotinds this mutual 
mistruSt.. · · · · 
The Commission· has tried ~o play its part in resolving these difficulties. All the 
institutions should cooperate in seeking practical arrangements which respect the spirit 
of .the Treaty and avoid attempts to establish "linkages" between instruments or 
procedures belonging to different pillars. A guiding principle should be the respect of 
the acquis communautaire to which the Treaty ..made ex~licit reference (Article C). 
(d) Western European Union 
I 59. If the interaction between the pillars of the Union itself has given rise to difficulties, 
another connection which has not operated satisfactorily is that between the Union and 
Western European Union, which is an integral part of the development of the European 
Union. The connection has been used rarely and with limited success. · 
There are different schedules for the respective presidencies, although these are now 
of the same length. Moves are now being made to harmonize them. Western European 
Union is usually represented at NATO meetings, but very rarely indeed at meetings of 
the Council of the European Union. 
The exchange of documents and the cross-participation of secretariats in meetings needs 
to be improved. 
An informal joint reflection group on armaments has been set up. 
160. In practical terms, the use made of Western European Union so far in joint actions 
under the common foreign and security policy has been limited to the provision of a 
policing contingent for the administration of Mostar. 
The 1994 NATO summit indicated that the Alliance was prepared to make its forces 
available to Western European Union for operations by the European allies under the 
common foreign and security policy. Translating this principle into reality was made 
more difficult by a number of practical and political problems which need to be 
resolved rapidly. 
It should be added that the creation of Eurocorps and other multinational corps are 
promising experiments with a view to an integrated, multilateral force answerable to 
Western European Union and/or NATO. 
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· 161. Western European Union is supposed to complement the common foreign and security 
policy by providing an additional military element, jUst as the Community complements 
it in providing a supplementary economic element The security and defence dimension 
of the common policy has yet to take effective shape. 
The subject is of course a sensitive one for all Member States, in different ways, but 
a ·clearer consensus is urgently required on the long-term role of Western European 
Union and its position vis-a-vis the Union. 
3. The need for ueater effectiveness 
162. Member States bring· to the common foreign and security policy a wide range of 
capacities and of practices and instruments with which to give effect to it. 
Successive presidencies have tended to regard the common foreign and security policy 
as something which can be used in addition to national policies, rather than the reverse. 
Only through greater continuity will the policy take on sufficient form and cohesion to 
become effective and make its full contribution to fostering stability and security. 
163. One prerequisite for effectiveness is better and earlier analysis of external developments 
over the long, medium and· short term. It is important to get a complete view of any 
problem, and to arrive at a common assessment, on the basis of all the information 
available. Only then can the Union decide how best to act. 
In contrast to other areas of policy, the power to make proposals is shared between all 
the Member States, as well as with the Commission. This makes it even more important 
to ensure effectiveness by guiding, expressing and arguing for the common interest. The 
changing troika is ill-adapted to thi-s task. 
This lack of effectiveness is felt not only in internal decision-making, but also in the 
external representation of the Union. Non-member countries have difficulties in 
distinguishing clearly the responsibilities of the different parts of the Union, and the 
legal status and powers of each; this is compounded by the constantly changing 
composition of the troika. In negotiations, therefore, confidence has constantly to be 
rebuilt, and assessments remade: this can only make these negotiations more difficult. 
Within the Union, moreover,' the lack of continuity means that the public is rarely 
aware of which body or individual is representing its interests, and this can only 
contribute to a certain sense of alienation vis-a-vis the Union. 
164. Better common backgroun2 analysis, better decision-making and clearer representation 
of the Union will all contribute to giving substance to the common foreign and security 
policy. They will have to become practical realities if the policy is to make real 
progress. 
165. The definition of a common foreign and security policy and its inclusion in the Union 
structure are real steps forward, although comparison with the degree of integration in 
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economic tenns underlines how unbalanced progress has been. Developing a fully 
effective policy is nevertheless a time-consuming process, for it involves building up 
familiarity, practice and confidence. Time is not on the Union's side, however, and._ 
public opinion expects more. 
Member States have been working t~ether in this area for more than twenty years.· 
There are important precedents concerning the willingness of the majority of Member 
States to decide on even the most sensitive subjects on a jointb3;5is. 
. . 
These various considerations all indicate that further development of the current 
framework for the common foreign and security policy is desirable and possible. 
C. OVERALL ASSESSl\ffiNT 
-* * 
* 
166. The Treaty gives both the Council and the Commission responsibility for ensuring the 
consistency of the Union's external activities as a whole. The experience of the last 
three years leaves much to be desired as regards the degree of consistency actually 
achieved. This poses a problem .which is both political and institutional. 
167. In today's world, the various elements of external policy are cl?sely interconnected. 
The Union is the world's largest trading entity. It is also one of the largest providers 
of funds for the developing countries and one of the biggest financial contributors to 
several continuing processes - the Middle East peace process, humanitarian aid in 
former Yugoslavia, etc. Finally, with the establishment of economic and monetary 
union, it will become one of the most important monetary areas in the world economy. 
Given that its external activities are conducted through two parallel channels -
traditional Community negotiation and the mechanisms of the common foreign and 
security policy - it is doubtful whether the Union can derive the full benefit and 
influence which it might normally expect from this situation. 
168. This difficulty, which is inherent in the existence of separate 11pillars", is aggravated on 
the institutional level by various shortcomings of the Treaty and by the lack of shared 
conviction in its application: 
First, the coexistence of the Union, without a legal personality, and the 
Community has generated confusion in the minds of non-member countries and 
several international organizations. 
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Whereas the outside world had become accustomed to the idea of a single entity 
behaving as such even when competence was shared between the Community and---
the Member States, the functional duplication of Union and Community has 
greatly disturbed our partners and raised doubts in their minds as to the 
Community's ability to commit itself internationally. 
In more practical terms, simultaneous recourse to Community instruments and to 
those of the common foreign and security policy has inevitably created difficulties. 
The link between foreign policy and economic sanctions, for which a satisfactory 
solution was ultimately found before the Treaty entered into force, has hardly been 
. improved by the insertion of Article 228a. If anything, this has served to make 
procedures more unwieldy. · 
Lastly, the scrapping qf Article 116 has deprived the Community of a useful 
instrument for coordination of the Member States' positions in international 
negotiations where, alongside exclusive Community competence, the Member 
States continue to have competence in connected fields. Replacing this ~ide with 
the mechanisms of the common foreign and security policy (Article 1.2) is clearly 
not a move in the right decision. In the light of Court of Justice Opinion l/94, the 
Commission takes the view that it should be possible to ensure the necessary 
coordination on the basis of the relevant basic provision of the EC Treaty. The 
views of the institutions still have to move closer together on this point. 
However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that opinions differ on the need for 
a common discipline in the field of external action and on the instruments 
necessary to implement it. Several real cases have highlighted this lack of shared 
conviction. 
However, the Court of Justice has underlined on several occasions the need for 
"close cooperation" between the Cqmmunity and its Member States in the fields 
of shared competence. The Commission's appeals for such coordination have so 
far met with little response. In the recent past, there has even been a tendency to 
revert to autonomous behaviour, fed by doubts concerning the actual extent of 
exclusive Community competence, or even concerning the basis of Court rulings. 
169. All these phenomena are wonying to the Commission in that the increasing lack of 
discipline as regards respect for the Community's external responsibilities threatens over 
time to undermine the internal market. 
* 
* * 
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I 70. The Treaty on European Union is composite in nature. It was initially intended to 
introduce economic and monetary union, as a complement- to the single market. 
Consideration of further steps towards political union then became unavoidable, in 
response to the major upheavals that struck Europe at the tum of the. decade. The 
Treaty undoubtedly shows signs of these mixed origins. 
Notwithstanding the confusion and the fears that were created, together with a 
background of economic difficulties, the Treaty was endorsed by the peoples and 
parliaments of first twelve and then fifteen different countries. This would suggest that 
it represents a suitable point of balance. 
The Treaty on European Union is innovative: it lays the foundations for a real union 
and contains the essential components of a unique political edifice. 
The finding of this report is that the Treaty is good in parts. 
171. On some essential points the Treaty has produced substantial benefits: 
economic and monetary union has entered the second stage on schedule. Here the 
Treaty is not just a series of statements of principle· but a set of instructions for 
the introduction of a single currency by the tum of the century. The credibility of 
this grand venture is now established. The recent upheavals on the foreign 
exchanges, far from calling it into question, make it more necessary than ever . 
Economic and monetary union is also an example of individual Member States 
advancing at their own pace towards an agreed objective. 
the Union has functioned more democratically, mainly because of the enhanced 
role played by the European Parliament. Its approval of the Commission 
strengthens the Commission's legitimacy. The new codecision procedure has 
proved operational and effective, in conjunction with qualified-majority voting in 
the CounciL It contains the principal ingredients of a balanced legislative regime. 
172. The Treaty also has its shortcomings, which are of various kinds: 
(a) Some are probably not too serious because they may be the result of the 
unavoidable running-in period of a Treaty which has not long been in force. These 
would include certain shortcomings of the new, and indeed promising, concept of 
Union citizenship: implementation has been far from complete and contrasts sharply 
with the expectations generated. 
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Some of the limitations of the foreign and security policy can also be placed in the 
· 5ame category, this policy requiring more effective decisi9n-making, and a more-· 
visible representation of the Union in' the outside world, as well as the development 
of concerted practices, the ability to analyse situations jointly, and systematic 
searching for the common interest 
(b) Other, inadequacies are the result of the failure to apply the Treaty. These have 
nothing to do with the Treaty itself, which has potential that has no~ been -
exploited either by the Member States or by the institutions. For instance, the 
. ·possibility which exists of taking decisions by qualified majority in areas covered 
by intergovernmental cooperation is unused. 
I_-., 
The common foreign and security policy is the flagship area in which this) 
regrettable phenomenon ha.S deyeloped. The loss in terms of impact and identity on 
the international scene is considerable and the cost in public opinion far too high. 
The conclusion this suggests is disturbing: minimalist interpretation or the refusal 
to make use of ali the possibilities of effective action is subverting the true 
spirit of the Treaty. 
(c) The Treaty also has some real structural weaknesses. 
The many different types of procedure which exist - the result of successive 
compromises - detract from the effectiveness of decision-making, make the Treaty 
difficult to understand, and make it unclear ~ho is responsible for what The 
complexity of the Treaty's structure and of its decision-making systems, together 
with the general lack of transparency, are obvious handicaps. 
The agreement on social policy between fourteen Member States is a dangerous 
precedent for the operation and cohesion of the Union in that all the Member States 
do not share the same objective. 
The serious inadequacies of the provisions on justice and home affairs also belong 
to this category: neither the legal instruments provided nor the administrative 
structures set up appear capable of satisfying the need for coordination in this area. 
173. The Commission therefore has to express two concerns: 
- first, the less-than-convincing experience with intergovernmental cooperation under 
the second and third pillars suggests that there can be no question of trying to 
accommodate further enlargements with the present arrangements for their 
operation; 
- moreover, it is not certain that the Treaty has actually brought the Union closer to 
the general public: the subsidiarity principle has in some instances been used for 
other than its intended purpose, and there is still a shortage of openness in the fields 
of justice and home affairs. 
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174 .. The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference will be the opportunity to make the necessary 
adjustments. But until the Treaty has been amended, its provisions will continue to-· 
apply and the Commission Will remain its guardian. 
-
For the moment, it has to be applied to the best possible effect. Each Member State, 
and each institution, can help to improve the operation of the existing system by 
rediscovering the will and the imagination that constructiv~ collaboration implies. 
This is the spirit which the Commission would like to see prevail, both in the 
application of ·the Treaty provisions and in ·the · preparation of the 1996 
Intergovernniental Conference·. 
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II ANNEX! II 
ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT- JUNE 1994: 
PARTICIPATION OF NON-NATIONAL VOTERS1 
Potential voters among Non-national voters 
non:..national residents registered 
Belgium 47I 000 24 000 (5, I %) 
Denmark 27 042 6 719 (24,85 %) 
Germany I 369 863 80 000 (5,84 %) 
Greece 40 000 628 (1,57 %) 
Spain I72 466 24 227 (I4,05 %) 
France I IOO 000 47 632 (4,35) 
Ireland ca. 17 000 6 000 (35,29%) 
(excluding UK nationals) (excluding UK nationals) 
Italy 99 IOO 2 000 (2,02 %) 
Luxembourg I05 000 6 907 (6,58 %) 
Netherlands I60 000 I5 000 (9,37 %) 
Portugal . 30 5I9 715 (2,34 %) 
United Kingdom ca. 400 000 7 755 (1,94%) 
(excluding Irish nationals) (excluding Irish nationals) 
ELECTIONS TO THE EuROPEAN PARLIAMENT- JUNE 1994: 
NON-NATIONAL CANDIDATES 1 
Non-national Union Candidates elected 
candidates 
Belgium I8 
Denmark I 
Germany 12 I 
Greece 5 
Spain I 
France· 5 
Ireland 1 . 
Italy 2 
Luxembourg 8 
Netherlands 2 
Portugal 0 
United Kingdom 2 
Estimated. Source Member States 320 
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-.II ANNEX 2 - . -·II 
OPINIONS GIVEN BY THE COMI'ITEE OF THE REGIONS 
Commission Title Consultation Session 
Document 
COM(93) 69 IDA Network Obligatory - May94 
COM(93) 347 ISDN Network Obligatory May94 
COM(93) 453 Europe against AIDS Obligatory May 94 
COM(93) 523 Youth for Europe III Obligatory May 94 
COM(93) 685 Energy networks Obligatory May 94 
-
COM(93) 699 Cohesion Fund Obligatory April 94 
COM(93) 708 Socrates Programme Obligatory May 94 
COM(94) 62 Community grants for trans- Obligatory May94 
European networks 
COM(94) 83 Action plan to combat cancer Obligatory Sept 94 
COM(94) 106 Trans-European transport network Obligatory Sept 94 
COM(94) 107 European high-speed train network Obligatory Sept 94 
COM(94) 202 Programme Promotion, Obligatory Nov 94 
information, education, training, 
public health 
COM(94) 223 Action Drug Dependence Obligatory Nov 94 
COM(94) 264 Year of lifelong learning 1996 Obligatory Nov 94 
COM(94) 356 ARJANE-Kaleidoscope 2000 Obligatory April 95 
COM(94) 413 AIDS prevention Obligatory April 95 
-Commission Title Consultation Session 
Document 
COM(93) 575 Asssessment of the effects of Optional May 9:4_ 
projects on the environment 
COM(93) 576 Green Paper consumers Optional May 94 
COM(93) 645 Energy and cohesion Optional Feb 95 
\ 
-COM(94) 36 Quality of bathing water Optional Sept 94 
COM(94) 38 Right to vote and eligibility Optional Sept '94-
COM(94) 46 .. Co:qununity initiatives Optional May 94 
.. 
COM(94) 61 Community initiative urban areas Optional May 94 
COM(94) 82 Community initiative textile and Optional May94 
clothing industry Portugal 
COM(94) 96 Green Paper Programme industry Optional Sept 94 
audiovisual policy 
COM(94) 145 Green Paper mobile and personal Optional Sept 94 
communications 
COM(94) 207 Integrated Programme SME Optional Feb 95 
SEC(94) 279 Northern Ireland peace process Optional April 95 
COM(94)319 Industrial competitiveness Optional April 95 
COM(94) 333 White Paper Social Policy Optional Nov 94 
COM(94) 347 Towards a European information Optional Feb 95 
society 
--
Commission - ' Title Consultation Session 
Document 
COM(93) 700 White Paper on Growth, Initiative Sept 94 
-
Competitjveness and Employment 
--
COM(94) 117 Reform common organization of Initiative Nov 94 
the market in wine 
·-Bovine Somatotropin (BST) Initiative Nov 94 
Clearance of accounts EAGGF Initiative Feb 95 
Rural tourism Initiative Feb 95 
COM(94) 234 Combating drugs Initiative April 95 
COM(94) 300 Workers' rights - Initiative .April 95 
Transfers of undertakings 
COM(94) 413 AIDS prevention Initiative April 95 _ 
Mountain regions Initiative April 95 
Review of Maastricht Treaty Initiative April 95 
SEC(94) 1863 Trans-european airport network Initiative April 95 
-- _~: 
THE CO-DECISION PROCEDURE 
Article 189b of the Treaty on European Union 
P~l by <l>c: Commi><io<> 10 !he 
ECHQPe~n P.>tfi>menc ~nd <he Coun?'· 
1
·- -- --------··----·---·--·--
- P,tf;..,..,nl op;n<on. J 
l 
Thc Council. by qwlofo<:d .,..ja<ily. 
nubftshes ~ common ~;<;oo. • 
~rJi~ment ~m;~ th~ com~ 
P<>Solioo of •he Counc.t. 
P.;u1•.amen(.. l,.. ~n .ab-"...oh.ne ~j04'•fY. 
expfC'SS~ it'S •m~tion 10 re,eo the 
common pos,t;on 
' . 
1be Cov:xit c.2n conv-ene :h~ Concifi-
~~~on Commi::ce. lh,s •s nude vp of chc 
m.cmbe~ o( ~~ Covnc•l or the1t tepte-
s.cnt.lO•"'("S 41nd of d"~e s-ame number of 
tcp•~ent.at•'-'e'S from ~rl,.ame-nt. 
Patl•2~nt. by .;n .ot~1 ... te ~joti~y. 
confitms rt1 ceiea•on of~~ common 
po'Si!~. T~ •ms1ru~nt fs chus not 
.Kce;:ncd'. N. th•s St..!ge '"' 1hte ptoce-
clure P.:~rli.ot~f\1 an pr~e .a~nd-
11'loCnts {sec ught~nd s~ o( this 
d•.2gr.am). 
T~ CovN:it. by c:v.aloft~ 
mJijortty. ~~~ ~tl•4· 
mem·~ .o~m.endt'l'\ef'lts' 
nd xk>pcs the i~tl'\lment 
J 
The Concil·.a~~ 
Commin~t<e~ 
pg~P•rlio..,.,..and 
«>uooI. by .absoi<JI~ 
~nd QU~Iifd nujori'Y 
~;..,ry.~•he 
iC"''Sl:f'Vfn<e~.l(OC"H!.oft~ 
t\NO ittStitutton-5 doc-s 
t\Ot agr«,. dloe iOS11'\.ltnoent 
~ nol~«eptt"d. 
324 
P:ul•amem. by ~n 
~b-s.olvce m.a,ottty. 
P·~~ ~mend~l\. 
The Covnc.l d<><o> .-.o: 
.awro.-e P.lt1 • .amcnc·s 
.amendtT".-en1s Jn.e 
Counc:tJ p,C1tdC'f't. 
in <onfunotOn ....,;,h 
the Pte~•<:k-M of 
patl·~~(. <Qnve~ 
the Con<'•'at•oo Com-
mtu~ The Comm;s~loo 
ta"-<t-S ~n "' t~ wo•1.:. 
The Coun<; J.iiPP<O'Io<"S 
.14tnend-
mouslyand 
nSltumenl. 
Parft.a~t 
rn(!'n1Su~oi 
~""'""' 
~ 
TheC on.c;(i:uion 
docs nol 
~The 
byqu:oli(~ 
<onfum~ 
positk>o,. 
robl<: with 
~<>pr-o­
rliamem_t 
Commtnee: 
n::ach :og 
Council r=y, 
m.ojori!Y. 
<oci1mora 
whcr-.::opPI· 
""'" pos<:d by"" 
J, 
P.>r1i>~ by on 
.>bsolu<., nujo<i<y, 
t<iects ""' proposol 
The propos.>( Is 00( 
thc-n~<:d. 
~ANNEX 4 -.. 11 
SCOPE OF CODECISION PROCEDURE 
- Artide 189b EC 
1. Codecision and qualified-majority voting in the Council 
Article 49 
Article 54(2) 
Article 56(2), second sentence 
Article 57(1) and (2), 
third sentence 
Article 66 
Article 100a 
Article 100b 
Article 126 
Article 129 
Article 129a 
Article 129d 
Article 130s(3) 
2. Codecision and unanimity 
Article 128 
Article 130i 
free movement of workers 
right of establishment 
idem 
idem 
services 
internal market 
idem 
edueation (encouragement measures) 
health (encouragement measures) 
consumers 
trans-European networks (guidelines) 
environment: general action programme 
Culture (encouragement measures) 
Research (framework programme) 
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II ANNE~_s II 
SCOPE OF COOPERATION PROCEDURE 
· Article 189c EC 
Article 6 
Article 75(1) 
Article 84 
Article 103(5) 
Article 104a(2) 
Article 104b(2) 
Article 1 05a(2) 
Article 125 
Article 127 
Article 129d 
Article 130e 
Article 130o 
Article 130s(l) and (3) 
Article 130w 
Article 118a 
Article 2(2) 
non-discrimination on the basis of nationality 
transport 
transport 
rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure 
arrangements for applying Article 104a(1) 
arrangements for applying Article 1 04 
hrumonization measures on the circulation of coins 
Social Fund 
vocational training 
trans-European networks (except guidelines) 
economic and social cohesion, decision 
research, implementation of programmes . . 
environm~t, aCtion and implementation of programmes 
development cooperation 
social policy 
agreement on social policy (between 14 Member States) 
annexed to the Protocol n • 14 
-·:· .-·· 
-..;. 
,, ANNE~-~ ,, 
ASSENT <?F THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT(") 
Scope · 
·Article 8a(2) 
Article 105(6) 
Article 1 06( 5) 
Article 130d 
Article 138(3) 
Article 228(3) 
Article 0 Treaty on 
European Union 
citizenship 
specific tasks of the European Central Bank 
amendments to the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks and the European Central Bank 
Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund 
uniform electoral procedure (Parliament acts by a majority of its 
component members) 
certain international agreements 
accession of new Member States 
(") Except in the case of accession and the case or the uniform electoral procedure_ 
where the Parliament :Jets by an absolute majority of its component members. 
Parliament's assent is attained by an ~1bsolutc majority or the \'Otcs c;1s1. 

- ... ,;,.~ ' 
LIST OF PROVISIONS REQUIRING UNANIMITY IN THE COUNCIL 
EC Treaty 
Article 8a 
Article 8b 
Article 8e 
Article 45(3) 
Article 51 
Article 57(2) 
Article 73c 
Article 93 
Article 99 
Article 100 
Article I OOc 
Article 1 03a 
Article 104c(l4) 
Article 105(6) 
Article 106(5) 
Article 1 09(1) and ( 4) 
Article 1 09f(7) 
Articles 109k(5) and 
1091(4) and (5) 
Article 121 
Article 128 
Article 130 
Article l30b 
Article 130d 
Article 130i and o 
Article 130s 
Article 136 
Article 13 8(3) 
Article 145 
Article 151 (2) 
Article 157(1) 
:\nick 1 S<J 
right of movement and residence save as otherwise 
provided in the Treaty 
right to vote in EP and municipal elections 
additional rights of citizenship 
compensatory aid for imports of raw materials 
social securitY (coordination of arrangements) 
amendment of principles laid down by law 
governing the professions in a Member State 
measures which constitute a step back as regards 
liberalization of capital movements 
- State aid 
taxation 
approximation of laws for the common market 
where Ahicle I OOa is not applicable 
- list of countries whose nationals require visas 
(until 1996) 
- financial assistance for a Member State and 
economic measures in the event of severe 
difficulties 
excessive deficits 
tasks for the European Central Bank 
- amendments to the Statute of the European System 
of Central Banks 
- agreements on an exchange-rate system 
- European Monetary Institute 
- Economic and Monetary Union: institutional 
prOVISIOnS 
- social security for migrant workers: assignment to 
the Commission of powers for implementation of 
common measures 
- culture 
- industry 
- specific action outside the Structural Funds 
- Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund 
- adoption of the framework research programme 
and setting-up of joint undertakings 
- certain environmental provisions 
- overseas countries and territories 
- adoption of a 1:miform electoral procedure for the 
European Parliament 
- conferral of implementing powers 
- appointment of the Council"s Secretary-General 
- alter~nion of the number of Members of the 
Commission 
- n(ln-rcplaccmcnt or~~ ivkmbcr or the Commission 
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Articles 165 and 166 
Article 168a(2) and (4) 
Article 188 
Article 188b 
Article 189a 
Article 189b(3) and c(d) and (e) 
Article 194 
Article 198a and b 
Article 201 
Article' 209 
Article 217 
Article 223 
Article 227 
Article 228(2) 
Article· 235 
Articles 238 and 228(2) 
-.~'-
increase in members of the Court of Justice and 
Advocates-General 
increase in actions heard by Court of First Instance 
and approval of Rules of Procedure 
amendment of Title III of the Statute of the Court 
of Justice and approval of Rules of Procedure 
Court of Auditors: appointment of members 
amendment of a Commission proposal 
second reading in codecision and cooperation 
procedure 
appointment of members- of the Economic and 
Social Committee 
Committee of the Regions: appointment of 
members and approval of Rules of Procedure 
provisions relating to the own resources system 
Financial Regulations 
rules governing languages 
trade in arms 
overseas territories 
conclusion of certain agreements 
objective of the Community without provision for 
the necessary powers 
association agreements 
Common foreign and security policy (ref. declaration No 27 annexed to the TEU) 
Article J.3 in conjunction 
with Article J.8 
Article J.2(2) in conjunction 
with Article J.8 
Article J.ll 
Justice and horne affairs 
Article K.3 (in conjunction 
with Article K.4) 
Article K.8 
Article K.9 
Protocols (ref. Article 239) 
Articles 12 and 45 
(see Article 165 EC) 
Article 41 (1) 
Article 2(3) and Article 4 
Article 6 
Final provisions or TU J 
;\r tick 0 TU J 
- adoption of joint action 
defining of common positions 
decision to charge operational expenditure to the 
Community budget 
adoption of common positions, or joint action 
charging of operational expenditure to the 
Community budget 
crossover to Article 1 OOc 
Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice 
- Protocol No 3 (Statutes of the European System of 
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank 
- Agrecmem on social policy (between 14 Member 
States) annexed to the Protocol n ° 14 
- Protocol No (i on the convergence criteria referred 
to in ,'\rtick 1 09_j EC 
:ICL'l'S"inrl or 11\ .. '\\ Mcmh-:r Sl:i!L'S 
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.ANNEX8 
MAIN DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES PROVIDED FOR IN THE 
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 
EC Treaty' 
In the first eight cases, legislation is always enacted on a Commission proposal. 
I. Assent and unanimity (5 cases) · 
Citizenship (Art. 8a(2)) 
Structural Funds + Cohesion Fund (Art. 130d) + consultation of Economic and Social 
Committee (ESC) and Committee of the Regions (CoR) · 
Certain international agreements (Art. 228(2) (second sentence) and (3) (second 
subparagraph)) 
Final provisions (accession; already provided for in Single Act) (Art. 0 of the Treaty 
on European Union) 
Uniform electoral procedure (Art. 138(3))2 
2 .. Codecision and qualified majoritv (12 cases) 
Free movement of workers (Art. 49) + consultation ESC 
Right of establishment (Art. 54) + consultation ESC 
" " (Art. 56 , second sentence) 
" " (Art. 57) 
Services (Art. 66) 
Internal market (Art. IOOa) +consultation of ESC 
" (Art. IOOb) +consultation of ESC 
Education (Art. 126 - except Recommendations) +consultation of ESC and CoR 
- Environment (Art. 130s(3) - first subparagraph)+ consultation of ESC 
Trans-European networks, guidelines (Art. 129d) +consultation of ESC and CoR 
Health (Art. 129 - except Recommendations) + consultation of ESC and CoR 
Consumer protection (Art. 129a) + consultation of ESC 
The Court of Auditors, European Central Bank (ECB). European l\·1onetary Institute (EMI), 
Monetary Committee, Economic and Financial Commincc. Economic and Social Committee (ESC) 
and Committee of the Regions (CoR) arc mentioned where the Treaty requires them to be consulted. 
Except for ;Jcccssion and the uniform electoral proccdur.:. wiK'IC Parli;-tment·s assent requires an 
:Jb~olute m:1jority of Mcmhers, assent is given by ab:;olutc lll:l.JOI ity or the votes cast. 
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3. Codecision and unanimitY (2 cases) 
- Culture (except Recommendations - Art. I 28) + consultation of CoR 
- Research (Framework Programme, Art. 130i) 
4. Cooperation (15 cases) 
- Non-discrimination (Art. 6) 
· Transpoz:t (Art. 75(1) + 84) +consultation of ESC 
- Social (Art. 118a) +consultation of ESC 
- Social (Protocol (14 Member States)- Art. 2(2)) 
Social Fund (Art. 125) +consultation of ESC 
- Vocational training (Art. 127) + consultation of ESC 
- Trans-European networks (other measures- Art: 129d) +consultation of ESC and CoR 
- Economic and social cohesion (implementing decisions - Art .. 130e) + consultation of 
ESC and CoR 
- Research (implementation of programmes, Art. 130o) + consultation of ESC 
- Environment (Art. 130s(l), end of 130s(2) and second subparagraph of 130s(3)) 
- Development cooperation (Art. 130w) 
- Multilateral surveillance (Art. 103(5). 
- Application of prohibition of privileged access (Art. 104a(2)) 
- Application of prohibition of assuming commitments and of overdraft facilities (Art. 
1 04b(2)) 
Coins (Art. 105a(2)) +consultations of ECB 
5. ·Simple consultation with unanimity in the Council (14 cases) 
- Citizenship (Art. 8b) 
- Citizenship - ratification by Member States (Art 8e) 
- Right of establishment (Art. 54(1)) +consultation of ESC 
- Transport (Art. 75(3)) + consultation of ESC 
- Taxation (Art. 99) + consultation of ESC 
- Harmonisation of legislation (Art. 1 00) + consultation of ESC 
- Visas (Art. IOOc(l)) 
- Social (Protocol (14 Member States) - Art. 2(3)) + consultation of ESC 
- Cohesion (Art. 130b) + consultation of ESC and CoR 
- Research (Art. 130o -first paragraph) +consultation of ESC 
- Environment (Art. 130s(2)) +consultation of ESC 
- Industry (Art. 130(3)) +consultation of ESC 
- Financial Regulation (Art. 209) + opinion of Court of Auditors 
- Agreements pursuant to Article 228(2) (second sentence) and 228(3) (first subparagraph) 
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6. Simple consultation With qualified majority in the Council (5 cases) -
- Common agricultural policy -(Art.. 43(2)) 
- Visas (Art. 100c(3)) - · 
- Research (specific programmes Art. 130i(4)) +consultation of ESC 
- Agreements pursuant to Article 228(2) (first sentence) and (3) (first subparagraph) 
- Rules for application of protocol on excessive deficit (Art 104c(l4), third subparagraph) 
7. No consultation with unanimity in the Council (3 cases) 
- Social (Protocol (14 Member States)- Art. 4) 
- Culture (Recommendations, Art. 128(5)) 
- MeasureS appropriate to the economic situation (Art. 1 03a(l )) 
8. No consultation with qualified majority in the Council (5 cases) 
- Education (recommendation -Art. 126(4), second indent) 
- Health (-recommendation- Art. 129(4), second indent) 
- Commercial policy-' (Art. 1 13(4)) 
- Social (Proto~o( U_4 Member States) - Art. 4) 
- Agreements pursual!t to Article 113(3) (Art. 228(3)) 
9. Council qualified ma1ontv. report from Commission. opm10n of the Monetary 
Committee. opinion and recommendation from Commission. having considered 
observations of Member States concemed3• 
- Excessive deficits (Art. 104c(6)). 
10. Council (two thirds majority, excluding the votes of the Member States concerned) 
and recommendation from Commission. 
- Excessive deficit procedure (Art. 104c(13). 
11. Council qualified majority. on recommendation from European Central Bank (ECB). 
or Commission after consulting ECB. 
Exchange rate policy (Art. 1 09(2)). 
·1 ht: following pmC<:OUICS do !Wl take.: int•l :lCCOlllll the lllllltitudc of dt1T~'IC!ll COI1Sllllali<lll val iatinns 
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12. Council qualified majority, opinion of Commission, and consultation ·of Monetary 
Committee 
Protective measures- Stage 2 of EMU (Art. 109i(3)). 
13. Council qualified majority (draft), recommendation from Commission, report to 
European Council, conclusion European Council, and information of European 
Parliament. 
- Coordination of economic policy of Member States (Art. 103(2)) 
14. Council qualified majority, proposal from Commission, consultation of ECB and 
of the Economic and Financial Committee, President of Council shall inform EP. 
Composition of Economic and Finandal Committee (Art. I 09c(3)) 
15. Council unanimity (of those states without derogationt proposal from Commission, 
consultation of ECB 
- Introduction of ECU as the single currency and related measures (Art. 109 l (4)) and 
implementation of art 109 K (2) provisions by (art 109 I (5)). 
16. Council unanimity (except for natural disasters). proposal from Commission, 
President of Council informs European Parliament 
- Severe economic difficulties (Art. 1 03a(2)) 
17. Commission and European Monetary Institute report to Council, opinion of EP, 
assessment by Council, and decision by Council meeting in Heads of State or 
Government composition 
- Entry into stage 3 in 1997 (Art. 1 09j(3)) 
- Entry into stage 3 in 1999 (Art. 109j(4)) 
18. Council qualified majority. consultation of European Parliament discussion of 
Council meeting in Heads of State or Government composition after proposal from 
Commission. 
- Abrogation of derogation (Art. 1 09k(2)) 
.......... 
19. Council qualified majority on recommendation of ECB after consulting EP &~d 
_ Commission 
Implementing measures provided-for by statute of ESCB (Art. 106(6)), this same 
- . 
procedure: limits and conditions unlier which the ECB can ·impose fines etc. {Art 108 
a(3)). 
20. Cotincil qualified majority, recommendation of ECB. consultation of Commission, 
assent of European Parliament 
- Technical modification of statutes of ESCB (Art. I 06(5)). 
21. Council unanimity. on recommendation from ECB after consulting European 
Parliament 
- Exchange rates of ECU with non-Community currencies (Art. I 09(1 )). 
22. Council unanimity on recommendation from Commission after consulting ECB and 
European Parliament. 
- Exchange rates of ECU with non-Community currencies (Art. 109(1)). 
* * * 
* * 
* 
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Common foreign and security policy 
The Council always decides on a proposal either from the Member States or from the 
Commission (J.8 (3)). 
I. European Council, unanimity 
- Principles and general guidelines for common foreign and security policy (Art. J. 8(1)) 
2. Council, unanimity without consultation of European Parliament (3 cases) 
- Common positions (Art. J.2 (2) and 1.8) 
- Joint actions (Art. 1.3 and Art. 1.8(2)) 
- Operational expenditure (Art. 1.11) 
3. Council, qualified majority without consultation of_ European· Parliament "(2 cases) 
- Measures to implement joint actions pursuant to Art. 1.3(2), first subparagraph (~rt. 
J.8(2) 
- Procedural questions pursuant to Art. 1.3(2), second subparagraph (Art .. 1.8(2)) 
4. Consultation and information of European Parliament 
- The Council Presidency consults Parliament on the main aspects and fundamental 
options of the common foreign and security policy (Art. J.7, first subparagraph). 
- The Council Presid~ncy and the Commission inform Parliament of common foreign and 
security policy developments (Art. 1.7, first subparagraph). 
* * * 
* * 
* 
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'' 
Justice and home affairs 
~ . . 
In matters covered by points (1) to (6) of Article K.l (K.3(2), first indent) and Article K.9, 
the Council decides on a proposal either from the Member States or from the Commission. 
In matters covered by points (7), (8) et (9) of Article K.l, the Council decides o·n a 
proposal from the Member States . (Art. K.3(2), second indent). 
I. Council, unanimity (5 cases) 
- Common positions (Art. K.3(2)(a) and K.4(3)) 
- Joint actions (Art. K.3(2)(b) and K.4(3)) 
- Conventions pursuant to Art. K.3(2)(c) (Art. K.4(3)) (subject to ratification by the 
Member States) 
- Operational expenditure (Art. K.8(2)) 
- Decisions to apply Art. I OOc (Art. K.9) 
2. Council, qualified majoritv (2 cases) 
- Possibility of taking measures to apply joint actions (Art. K.3(2)(b)). 
- Measures to apply conventions pursuant to Art. K.3(2)(c) (two-thirds majority unless 
provided otherwise) 
. ' 
3. Consultation and information of Parliament 
- The Council PresideQ.cy consults Parliament on the main aspects of justice and home 
affairs activities (Art. K.6, second subparagraph) 
- The Council Presidency and the Commission inform Parliament of work done on justice 
and home affairs (Art. K.6, first subparagraph) 
* * * 
* * 
* 
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........-;;., ANNEX9 
Number of proposals for principal legislation 
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* = forecast from Commission work programme for ~995 (COM(95)26 final) 
1990: 1 85 1993: 75 
1991: 111 
1992: 89 
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1994: 51 
1995: 52* 
AU 
European Commission 
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~ - ANNEX 10 -·· ,, 
PUBLIC DEBATES IN THE COUNCIL, BY PRESIDENCY 
-
PRESIDENCY TERM NUMBER 
I) Danish 1st half 1993 9 
2) Belgian 2nd half I 993 4 
3) Greek 1st half 1994 3 
4) German 2nd half 1994 2 
5) French 1st half 1995 4 
(to date) 
S38 
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II ANNEX 11 .,,, 
PUBLIC DEBATES IN THE COUNCIL 
I. Danish· Presidency (9) . 
COUNCIL DATE ITEM 
1. General affairs 1.~.1993 Presentation of Danish Presidency's 
vvork prograrnr.ne 
2. General affairs 1.2.1993 Opening of accession negotiations 
3. Agriculture 10.2.1993 Proposal on agricultural prices and 
related measures for 1993/94 -
Presentation by the Commission 
.. 
4. Economic and financial 15.2.1993 Presentation of Danish Presidency's 
affairs vvork programme on economic and 
financial matters 
5. General affairs 5.4.1993 Opening of negotiations with Norway 
6. Internal r.narket 5.4.1993 Sutherland report 
7. Social affairs 6.4.1993 Employment situation 
-
8. Industry 3.5.1993 Industrial competitiveness and 
environr.nental protection 
9. Dev~lopment cooperation 25.5.1993 Run-up to 2000 
II. Belgian Presidency ( 4) 
COUNCIL DATE ITEM 
1. General affairs 19.7.1993 Presentation of Belgian Presidencyos 
vvork programme 
2. Economic and financial 13.9.1993 Presentation of Belgian Presidency o s 
affairs work programme on economic and 
financial matters 
3. Internal market 11.11.1993 Strengthening the competitiveness of 
small businesses and craft trades and 
developing employment in the 
Com-munity 
4. Environment 3.12.1993 Green paper on civil liability 
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III. Greek Presidency (3) 
COUNCIL ·DATE ITEM 
I. General affairs 7.2.1994 Presentation of Greek Presidency's 
workprograrnrne 
2. Economic and financial 14.2.1994 Presentation of Greek Presidency's 
affairs work programme in economic and 
financial matters 
3. Agriculture 21.2.1994 Proposals on agricultural prices and 
related measures for 1994/95 -
Presentation by the Commission 
IV. German Presidencv (2) 
COUNCIL DATE ITEM 
I. Economic and financial 11.7.1994 Presentation of German Presidel).cy's 
affairs work programme in economic and 
financial matters 
2. General affairs 18.7.1994 Presentation of German Presidency's 
work progranm1e 
V. French Presidencv (4) 
COUNCIL DATE ITEM 
1. Economic and financial 16.1.1995 Welcome for new Member States and 
affairs presentation of French Presidency's 
work programme in economic and 
financial matters· 
2. General affairs 23.1.1995 Presentation of French Presidency's 
work programme and tribute to 
Jacques Dclors 
3. Economic and financial 20.2.1995 Presentation of Commission's work 
affairs programme in economic and financial 
matters 
4. Agriculture 21.2.1995 Proposals on agricultural prices and 
related measures for 1995/96 -
Presentation by the Commission 
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II ANNEX 12 II 
STATE OF PLAY ON CONSOLIDATION 
SINCE THE EDINBURGH EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
,Instrument Commission groru;!sals State of Qlay 
!.Directive 67/548/EEC COM (93) final- 2l.I2.1993 Parliament - Legal Affairs 
Dangerous substances and Committee: favourable opinion at 
COM (94) 103 final- I2.04.I994 first reading- 02.02.1995 
(amended consolidation proposal) Council - Working Party -
meeting: 06.07.I994 
2. Directives 74/561/EEC, COM(93) 586 final- 16.12.I993 Parliament -
74/562/EEC, 771796/EEC - favourable opinion: 20.04. I 994 
Access to occupation 
3. Directive,711307/EEC COM (93) 712 final - 25.01.1994 Parliament 
Textile names - Legal Affairs Committee: 
favourable opinion at first reading 
- 02.02.1995 
4. Directive 72/276/EEC COM (93) 713 final - 24.0LI994 ·Parliament 
Textile fibres -Legal Affairs Committee_;_ 
-
favourable opinion at first reading 
- 02.02. I 995 
5. Directives 72/464/EEC and COM (94)355 final- 03.10.1994 Parliament - Legal Affairs 
79/32/EEC Committee: favourable opinion -
Excise duties on tobacco products 02.02.1995 
6. Regulations (EEC) 1408171 and Deferred to 199 5 
574/72 
Social security for migrant workers 
7. Directive 76/768/EEC Cosmetics Deferred to I 995 (suspended in 
1994 following judgment by 
Court of Justice of25.01.1994-
Case C-219/91 
8. Regulation 805/68/EEC COM (94)467 final -03.1 LI994 Parliament - Legal Affairs 
Beef and veal: common Committee : favourable opinion -
organization of the market 02.02.1995 
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9. Regulation 136/66/EEC 
Oils and fats: common 
organization of the market 
10. Directive 77/93/EEC 
STATE OF PLAY ON CONSOLIDATION 
(continued) 
Consolidation has been abandoned 
in favour of recasting 
Draft prepared in nine official 
Harmful organisms :- vegetable - languages. Proceedings held up 
products pending Finnish and Swedish 
versions. 
11. Directives 66/400/EEC; Draft prepared in nine official 
66/401/EEC; 66/402/EEC; languages. Proceedings held up 
66/403/EEC; 69/208/EEC; pending Finnish and Swedish 
70/457/EEC; 70/458/EEC versions. 
Seeds and seedlings 
12. Directive 77/780/EEC etc Deferred to 1995 
Banking legislation 
13. Directive 77/143/EEC Consolidation has been abandoned 
Roadworthiness testing in favour of recasting 
14. Directive 85/3/EEC COM (93) 679 final- 15.12.1993 _Parliament: favourable opinion at 
Road vehicles first reading 15111194 
Council - Working Party -
meeting : 12.12.1994 
15.Directive 64/432/EEC COM (93) 698 final- 07.0l.l994 Parliament: favourable opinion , 
Cattle and pigs: health policy 19.04.1994 
Council- Working Party 
meeting: 26-27.04.1995 
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-II ANNEX13 
RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR ACCESS TO COMMISSION DOCUMENTS 
· (Situation at 22.03.1995) 
II 
-
The table sets out the percentages of cases in which documents requested were supplied or withheld.and 
requests treated as ineligible.* It shows that the Commission allowed access as requested in more than 
half of all ca5es and withheld documents in less than a fifth. · 
1. 
2.· 
3. 
* 
Documents supplied: 
Documents withheld: 
Grounds given 
Public interest 
Private interest 
Business secrets 
Commission financial interests 
Confidentiality requested by the person or 
Member State that supplied the information 
Confidential discussions 
Documents of committees whose proceedings are confidential 
Multiple grounds given 
Ineligible requests: 
Doc~ments already published 
Documents not from the Commission 
Request not specific enough 
Non-existent documents 
22 out of 260 requests received are still being processed. 
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53.7% 
3.1% 
0% 
2.1% 
0% 
1.1% 
5.6% 
2.4% 
3.6% 
28,4% 
14.7% 
11.2% 
1.1% 
1.4% 
II ANNEX 14 II 
SUMMARY TABLE 
CHIEF LEGAL BASES FOR SOCIAL POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS 
PROTOCOL N. 14 ON SOCIAL POLICY 
QUALIFIED MAJORJTY POSSIBLE 
(Art. 2(1)) 
improvement of the working environment to 
protect the health and safety of workers 
working conditions 
infonning and consulting workers 
equal opportunities - labour market and treatment 
at work 
integratio_n of persons excluded from the labour 
market 
UNANIMITY (14) REQUIRED (Art. 2(3)) 
social security and social protection for workers 
protection of workers in the event of termination 
of employment contract 
representation and collective defence of workers' 
and employers' interests, including 
co-determination 
conditions of employment of nationals of 
non-member countries residing lawfully in the 
Community 
financial contributions for promotion of 
employment and job-creation 
EXPLICITLY OUTSIDE COMMUNITY POWERS 
(Art. "(6)) 
remuneration 
right of association. right 1\) stnkc, right to impose 
lock-outs 
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ECTREATY 
QUALIFIED MAJORJTY POSSIBLE 
Art. 49: free movement of workers 
Art. 54: right of establishment 
Art.57: mutual recognition of qualifications 
Art. 125 (new): ESF (implementing 
decision) 
Art. 127 (ne'Y): vocational training 
Art. I 18a: health and safety at work 
Art. IOOa, Art. 43: agriculture, Art.75: 
transport 
UNANIMITY (15) REQUIRED 
Art. 51: social security (measures needed for 
free movement) 
Art. I 00: internal market 
Art. I 30d: tasks, priority objectives and 
organization of Structural Funds 
. 
Art. 235 
INSTRUMENTS ADOPTED IN THE-
FIELDS OF JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAffiS 
Joint actions 
SUBJECT AdoQtion 
/ 
Decision 941795/IHA on a joint action_ 30.11.1994 
adopted by the Council on,the basis of Council JHA 
Article K.3(2)(b) ·of the Treaty' on European 
Union concerning travel facilities for school 
pupils from third countries resident in a 
Member State 
Joint action 95/73/JHA concerning the 10.3.1995 
Europol Drugs Unit on the basis of Article Council JHA 
K.3(2)(b) of the Treaty on European Union 
Convention 
SUBJECT Ado12tion 
Convention on simplified extradition procedure l 0.3.1995 
between the Member States of the European Council JHA 
Union 
Resolutions 
SUBJECT Ado12tion 
Resolution on the interception of 29/30.11.1993 
telecommunications Council JHA 
Resolution on fraud on an international scale - 29/30.11.1993 
protection of the financial interests of the Council JHA 
European Union 
Resolution on limitations on admission of 20.6.1994 
third-country nationals to the Member States Council JHA 
for employment 
Resolution relating to the limitations on the 30.11.1994 
admission of third-country nationals to the Council JHA 
Member States for the purpose of pursuing 
activities as self-employed persons 
Resolution on the legal protection of the 6.12.1994 
financial interests of the Communities Council JHA 
Resolution on the admission of third-country 30.11/1.12.1994 
nationals to the territory of the Member States Council JHA 
of the EU for study purposes 
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~ANNEX IS ,, 
Publication 
OJ L 327, 19.12.1994 
I 
OJ L 62, 20.3. I 995, p. I 
Publication 
OJ C 78, 30.3.1995 
Publication 
Press release I 0550/93 
(Presse 209) 
Press release I 0 5 50/93 
(Presse 209) 
Press release 77 60/94 
(Presse 128-G) 
Official transmission to 
European Pari iament 
Press release 1132l/94 
(Presse 252-G) 
OJ C 355, 1--1.12.1994 I 
I 
Official transmission to 
European P<trl iamcnt 
Press release 1 I ~::21 /9-1 
(hesse 252-(;) 
Resolutionpn minimum guarantees for asylum 9.3.1995 
procedures Council JHA 
5354/95 ASIMM 70 
Recommendations 
SUBJECT AdoQtion Publication 
Fight against money laundering 29/30. I I. I 993 Press release 10550/93 
Council JHA (Presse 209) 
Recommendation on the responsibility of 29/30. I 1.1993 Press release I 0550/93 
organizers of sporting events Council JHA (Presse 209) 
Recommendation on environmental crime 29/30.11.1993 Press release 10550/93 
Council JHA (Presse 209) 
Recommendation on the organization of a 6.5.1994 Press release ·1 0550/93 
training modu_le on the operational analysis of Council (Presse 209) page 9 
cnme Development 
Recommendation for the exchange of 30.11/1.12.1994 Press release 11321/94 
infonnation on the occasion of major events or Council JHA (Presse 252-G) 
meetings 
-
Recommendation concerning the adoption of a 30.11/1.12.1994 Press release 11321/94 
standard travel document for the expulsion of CouncilJHA (Presse 252-G) 
third-country nationals 
Council Recommendation on a specimen 30.1 III. I 2.1994 Official transmission to 
bilateral readmission agreement between an Council JHA European Parliament 
EU Member State and a third country 
Council Recommendations (5) on the fight 29/30.11.1993 and Press release 10550/93 
against trade in human beings for the purposes 20.6.1994 (Presse 209-G) 
of prostitution Council JHA. 
Decisions 
SUBJECT AdoQtion Publication 
Transmission to the European Pari iament of 20.6.1994 Decision to transmit to 
documents on international organized crime CouncilJHA European Parliament 
- Counci I recommendations and report of the Letters 5917/591 8 of 
ad hoc working party 13.7.1994 
EDU/Europol 20.6. I 994 Press release 7760/94 
Appointment of l'v1r Storbeck as coordinator of Council JHA (Presse 128-G) 
the Europol Drugs Unit, extension of the term 
otlicc of l'v1r !3ruggemann as caretaker Jcputy 
c<Jordin;Jtnr until the end of 199-1 
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.: 
EDU/Europol Staff 30.1111.12.1994 Press release ll321194 
Appointment from 1.1.1995 fot: th~ years or Council JHA (Presse 252-G) 
until the entry into force of the Convention of 
two assistant coordinators and two members of · 
the Steeiing Committee 
. Statements 
SUBJECT AdoQtion_ Publication 
FinanCing of terrprism -· Press releaSe 10550/93 
(Presse 209) 
Statement on extradition ' Press release 10550/93 
(Presse 209) 
Conclusions 
SUBJECT AdoQtion Pubtication 
Conclusions on racism and xenophobia 29/30.11.1993 Press release 10550/93 
Council JHA (Presse 209) 
Conclusions on international organized crime 29/30.11.1993 Official transmission to 
CounciiJHA European Parliament 
Conclusions on the application of Article K.9 20.6.1994 Press release 77 60/94 
of the TEU to asylum policy Council JHA (Presse 128-G) 
Text on evidence in the context of the Dublin 20.6.1994 Press release 7760/94 
Convention Council JHA (Presse 128-G) 
Form of laissez-passer for the transfer of an 20.6.1994 Press release 7760/94 
asylum applicant from one Member State to Council iliA (Presse 128-G) 
another 
Procedure for drawing up joint reports on the 20.6.1994 Press release 7760/94 
situation in third countries Council JHA (Presse 128-G) 
CIREA - Distribution and confidentiality of 20.6.1994 Press release 7760/94 
joint reports on the situatioP. in certain third Council JHA (Presse 128-G) 
countries 
Standard form for detennining the State 20.6.1994 Press release 7760/94 
responsible for examining an application for Council JHA (Presse 128-G) 
asylum 
Conclusions on the Commission 20.6.1994 Press release 7760/94 
communication on immigration and asylum Council JHA (Presse 128-G) 
Conclusions on conditions for the readmission 31.10.1994 Press release 10314/94 
of persons who are illegally resident in a Council General Affairs (Presse 219-G) 
Member State but who hold a residence permit 
for another Member State (Article 8(2) of the 
draft Extemal Frontiers Convention) 
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Enlarged and strengthened relations with third 30.11/l.l2.1994 Press release 11321194 
countries, in particular the countries of Central Council JHA · (Presse 252-G) 
and Eastern Europe / 
- ex~hanges _of infonnation in the area of --· 
international sports events . 
Conclusions ofth_e ·Eu Council on the 30.11/1.12.1994 Official transmission to 
operating procedures and development of the Council JHA European Parliament 
Centre for Information, Discussion and Press release 11321194 
Exchange on the crossing of frontiers and (Presse 252-G) 
immigration (CIREFI) 
Conclusions on the implementation of 30.1111.12.1994 Press release 11321194 
Article K.5 of the TEU: Council JHA (Presse 252-G) 
- expression of common approaches in 
international organizations and conferences 
Conclusions concerning a contribution to the 30.1111.12.1994 Press release 11321/94 
development of a strategic plan of the Union Council JHA (Presse 252-G) 
to combat customs fraud in the internal market 
Conclusions on relations with third countries in 30.1111.12.1994 Press release 11321194 
the JHA field Council JHA (Presse 252-G) 
Racism and xenophobia. Adoption of the 10.3.1995 
contribution of the JHA Council Council JHA 
Other 
SUBJECT Ado~tion Publication 
1994 programme of joint surveillance 21/22.2.1994 Press release 5044i94 
operations on air and ~ea t'raffic Council iliA (Presse 24-G) 
Guidelines for joint reports on third countries 20.6.1994 Press release 7760/94 
Council JHA (Presse 128-G) 
Second report on CIREA's a~tivities 20.6.1994 Press release 7760/94 
Council JHA (Presse 128-G) 
List of honorary consuls already empowered to 20.6.1994 Press release 7760/94 
issue visas who, as a transitional measure, will Council JHA (Presse 128-G) 
be empowered to issue unifonn visas (viz. 
certain honorary consuls of Denmark and the 
Netherlands who are to qualify for this 
exemption from the rule precluding honorary 
consuls from having power to issue unifonn 
visas) 
Assessment of the tenorist threat; document 20.6.1994 Press release 7760/94 
relating to the internal and external threat to Council JHA (Presse 128-G) 
Member States of the Union 
Interim report to the Council on money 20.6.1994 Press release 7760/94 
laundering Co unci I J I-IA (Presse 128-G) 
Guidelines for the training of instructors 30.11/1.12.1994 Press release 11321/94 
L_ Council JI·IA (Prcssc 252-G) 
" !~' • ·: 
. ~ ... _ 
~-. 
European Council report on the 30.11/1.12.1994 Press release 1132 J/94 
implementation of the action plan in the field Council JHA (Presse 252-G) 
of Justice and Home Affairs in December 1993 
-
EDU/Europol activities report · 9/10.3.1995 Press.release 5423/95 
( 1.1.1994/31.12.1994) CouncilJHA (Presse 69-G) 
EDU/Europol work programine 9110.3.1995 Press release 5423/94 
(January to June 1995) CouncilJHA (Presse 69-G) 
Strategy to combat drugs 9/10.3.1995 Press release 5423/94 
Council JHA (Presse 69-G) 
Report on organized . crime in the European 9/10.3.1995 Press release 5423/94 
Union in I 993 Council JHA (Presse 69-G) 
~ustoms strategy at external frontiers 9/10.3.1995 Press release 5423/94 
' Council JHA (Presse 69-G) 
22.11.93 
2. Sudan 
15.03.94 
3. Haiti 
30.05.94 
14.10.94 
4. Ex-Yugoslavia 
13.06.94 
10.10.94 
10.10.94 
23.01.95 
5. Rwanda 
24.10.94 
6. Ukraine 
28.11.94 
7. Burundi 
24.03.95 
--.. 
1!:=11 =ANNE=X=l6 ====::!.111 .. 
COMMON POSillONS ADOPTED 
{Article J.2 of the Treaty) 
Reduction of economic relations with Libya. 
Embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment for Sudan. 
Reduction of economic relations with Haiti. 
Tennination of the reduction of economic relations with Haiti. 
Prohibition of the satisfaction of the claims referred to in para.9 of UN Security 
Council resolution 757. 
Suspension of certain restrictions on trade with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro): 
Reduction of economic and financial relations with those parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
under control of Bosnian Serb forces. 
Prorogation of the suspension of certain trade restrictions with the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 
Objectives and priorities of the EU towards Rwanda. 
Priorities and objectives of the EU towards the Ukraine. 
Burundi 
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1. Ex: Yugoslavia 
08.11.93 
. 20.12.93 
07.03.94 
16.05.94 
27.07.94 
12.12.94 
12.12.-94 
06.02.95 
JOINT ACTIONS ADOPTED 
(Article 1.3. of the Treaty) 
ANNEX 17 
Support for the convoying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Supplementary. 
Extending the application of the 8.11.93 decision. 
Adapting and extending the application of the 8.11.93 decision. 
Supplementary. 
Extending the application of the 08.11.93 decision. 
Continued support for EU administration of Mostar. 
.supplementary (Mostar). 
2. Russian Parliamentary Elections 
09.11.93 Dispatch of a team of observers. 
3. South Africa 
II 
06.12.93 Support for the transition towards a democratic and multiracial South Africa. 
4. Stability Pact 
20.12.93 Inaugural conference. 
14.06.94 Continuation. 
5. Anti-personnel mines 
Limitation on production, distribution, etc. 
6. Middle East Peace Process 
19.04.94 Support for the process. 
7. Non-proliferation 
25.07.94 Preparation for the 1995 conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
8. Dual-use g:oods 
19.12.94 Control of exports of dual-use goods. 
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COMMISSION 
COMMISSION POSITION OF 6 DECEMBER 1995 
ON THE REFLECTION GROUP REPORT 
- 353-
354 
IP/9511352 
Brussels, 6 December 1995 
Intergovernmental Conference 1996: Commission reacts to Westendorp report 
The Reflection Group set up by the Corfu European Coundl to help prepare the 
ground for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference has adopted its report and made 
it public. 
The Commission is glad the Group has completed its task of identifying the points to 
be covered by the Conference and putting forward its members• suggested solutions. 
The Commission hopes that the Conference will offer a veritable answer to the 
challenges ahead of the Union, notably in the enlargement context. 
The Commission was represented on the Reflection Group. It firmly supports all the 
general ideas in the report. There are some areas (employment, the environment, 
etc.) that will be dealt with in substance at the Conference, and this the Commission 
welcomes. The Commission will also insist on adherence to common objectives and 
the single institutional set--up, though the question of greater fleXibility will have to be 
investigated in view of the wider diversity within an enlarged Union. 
The Commission also welcomes the general agreement reached on the priority to be 
given to achieving Economic and Monetary union on the terms and within the 
timetable set by the Maastricht Treaty, which remain unchanged. 
In view of its attachment to openness, the Commission is setting out beiON the main 
positions which it will be taking on matters on which members of the Reflection Group 
diverged. 
Acting in accordance with Article N of the Treaty, the Commission will give its detailed 
formal opinion on what it expects of the Conference of Representatives of the 
Member states before it opens. 
1. The citizen and the Union 
Matching what the Union can offer with what the dtizen expects of it is one of the 
Commission's constant concerns. There are several Wfr./S of going about this: 
- promoting Europe's values. The Commission is among those who believe that 
the Treaty should state these values dear1y and that the Union should guarantee 
them, either by acceding as such to the European Human Rights Convention or 
by enacting its own Bill of Rights. In any event, there are some values that must 
be expressed dear1y, such as equal rights for women and men, non-
discrimination, and the outlawing of racism and xenophobia: 
- freedom and security. The Commission agrees with the general view that the 
Union is not up to scratch in justice and home affairs cooperation. 
There are obvious remedies: 
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- a stronger role for the European Parliament; 
- more extensive judicial review by the Court of Justice; 
- qualified majority decision-making to be the rule; 
- better legal instruments than the current joint actions, common positions and 
intematiooal conventions. 
The Commission's view is that the simplest way of achieving all this would be to 
use Canmunity institutions and procedures while acknowledging that the 
intergovernmental model may be the most suitable for judicial and police 
cooperation; 
- a more open Union. The Commission feels the time has come to treat access to 
information as a right of the Union citizen. It is ready to make every effort to boost 
democracy at all levels. National Parliaments should be provided with information 
as and when they need it. 
The Canmission also considers that the Treaty itself could be made far easier to 
read through consotidatioo and simplification of the existing texts. Work on this 
should canmence without delay. 
2. Operation of the Union and preparation for enlargement 
The institutioos exist to achieve the Union's objectives. The way they operate needs 
reviewing with the twofold aim of raising their general efficiency and preparing for a 
situation in which a substantially larger number of Member states will be involved. 
This entails simplifying the Union set-up, making it easier to understand and giving 
it more effective decision-making machinery: 
- the European Council is a vital component of the machinery for taking the really 
big decisions and should continue to function as the source of general guidance; 
- the current legislative and administrative decision-making processes need radical 
simplification. There should be no more than three legislative procedures -
codecision in simplified form, which should be the standard procedure, the assent 
procedure and the simple consultation procedure. Canmission implementing 
measures also need to be simpler and more transparent, the possibility of ex post 
review by the Council and Parliament being preserved; 
- qualified-majority decision-making has proved its worth as a dynamic means of 
engendering the compromises that are needed. The prospect of enlargement 
makes it essential that this procedure be the norm; 
- the composition of the institutions will have to evolve with enlargement to bring the 
dual aims of effectiveness and representativeness within reach. But the specific 
nature of each institution must be preserved. 
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3. External action 
There are two problems with the Unionls external action: 
- lack of coherence between the political, economic and defence aspects; 
- shortcomings in decision-making and organization on the spedfically diplomatic 
front. 
If these problems are to be solved, there will have to be a real display of political will 
by the Member States. 
The Commission is accordingly proposing: 
- a dear definition of the objectives of the Unionls external policy; 
- better preparation of dedsion-making via an analysis and forecasting unit 
combining the departments concerned in the Member States, the Council and the 
Commission, and possibly in \IVEU. This innovation, of course, would be 
meaningful only if the Member States were willing to share the information 
gathered by their own diplomatic services; 
- more effident decision-making in the common foreign and security policy by 
doing 8Niay with the routine need for unanimity; 
- implementation of foreign policy in general by the duo of Commission and 
Council Presidents, backed up by systematic coordination facilities. External 
relations could then function as a coherent, cootinuous whole. 
The Commission further believes that the Union should ad on the undertakings given 
when the Union Treaty was signed regarding security and defence. 
*** 
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4. 
COURT OF JUSTICE AND 
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE 
COURT OF JUSTICE REPORT OF MAY 1995 ON 
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 
- 359-
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!. NOTICES 
Report of the Court of Justice on Certain Aspects of the Application of the Treaty 
on European Union 
INTRODUCI10N 
1. The European Council, meeting at Corfu on 24 and 25 June 1994, decided 
to set up a Study Group to prepare for the work of the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference provided for under Article N(2) of the Treaty on European Union. It 
invited the institutions, before the Study Group begins its work on 1 June 1995, to 
draw up reports on the operation of the Treaty on European Union. 
2. In responding to that request, the Court of Justice must reconcile its concern 
to provide a useful contribution to the work of the Group v.ith the duty of 
discretion incumbent upon it as a judicial institution. 
Under the revision procedure laid down by the Treaties, it is essentially the 
Member States who have the task of drawing up and approving such amendments 
as are deemed necessary to meet the requirements of a Union which is, necessarily, 
always in a state of evolution. In that contex"t, the Court's duty is to indicate what 
is needed. or indeed indispensable, to allow the judicial system of the Union to 
continue carrying out its task effectively. It is of the utmost importance that the 
Union, based on the principle of the rule of law, should possess a system of courts 
capable of ensuring that that rule is observed. 
This report will therefore concentrate on the judicial system and will touch 
on other aspects only in so far as they may have implications for its operation. 
After first outlining the role of the judicature v.ithin the framework of the 
Union, the Court's report will deal with the application of certain provisions of the 
Treaty on European Union, and submit observations on prospective amendments 
affecting or likely to have repercussions on the judicial system. 
I - THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN THE EUROPEA.I\' UNION 
3. The Union, like the European Communities on which it is founded, is 
governed by the rule of law. Its very existence is conditional on recognition by the 
Member States, by the institutions and by individuals of the binding nature of its 
rules. 
The Court of Justice, which is charged with ensuring that in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed, is responsible for 
monitoring the legality of acts and the uniform application of the common rules. 
The Treaties, the protocols annexed to certain conventions between Member 
States, and certain agreements concluded by the Communities with non-member 
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States, confer various kinds of jurisdiction upon the Court. It is called on to rule 
on direct actions brought by the Member States, by the institutions and by 
individuals; to maintain close cooperation with national couru ~nd tribunals 
through the preliminary ruling procedure; and to give opinions on certain 
agreements envisaged by the Communities. The Court thus carries out tasks which, 
in the legal systems of the Member States, are those of the constitutional courts, 
the courts of general jurisdiction or the administrative courts or tribunals, as the 
case may be. 
In its constitutional role, the Court rules on the respective powers of the 
Communities and of the Member States, and on those of the Communities in 
relation to other forms of cooperation within the framework of the Union and, 
generally, determines the scope of the provisions of the Treaties whose observance 
it is its duty to ensure. It ensures that the delimitation of powers between the 
institutions is safeguarded, thereby helping to maintain the institutional balance. 
It examines whether fundamental rights and general principles of law have been 
observed by the institutions, and by the Member States when their actions fall 
within the scope of Community law. It rules on the relationship between 
Community law and national law and on the reciprocal obligations between the 
Member States and the Community institutions. Finally, it may be called upon to 
judge whether international commitments envisaged by the Communities are 
compatible with the Treaties. 
A5 regards the remainder of the Court's jurisdiction, the setting up of a two-
tier system for all actions brought by natural or legal persons, which are now dealt 
with by the Court of First Instance subject to the possibility of an appeal to the 
Court of Justice, has undoubtedly afforded greater protection to individuals and has 
enabled the latter to devote itself more fully to its essential task of ensuring the 
uniform interpretation of the law, under conditions which preserve the quality and 
efficiency of the judicial system. 
4. The Court considers it indispensable, if the essential features of the 
Community legal order are to be maintained, that the functions and prerogatives 
of its judicial organs be safeguarded in the forthcoming process of revision. The 
success of Community law in embedding itself so thoroughly in the legal Irfe of the 
Member States is due to its having been perceived, interpreted and applied by the 
nationals, the administrations and the courts and tribunals of all the Member States 
as a uniform body of rules upon which individuals may rely in their national courts. 
Even before there was the idea of citizenship of the Union, the Court had inferred 
from the Treaties the concept of a new legal order applying to individuals and had 
in many cases ensured that those individuals could exercise effectively the rights 
conferred upon them. 
Any decision affecting the structure of the judicial system must therefore 
ensure that the courts remain independent and their judgments binding. Were that 
not to be the case, the very foundations of the Community legal order would be 
undermined. 
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By virtue of Artide L of the Treaty on European Union, the Court of 
Justice has, for all practical purposes, no jurisdiction over activities of the Union 
which fall within the spheres of common foreign and security policy and of 
cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs.1 In that regard, the attention 
of the Intergovernmental Conference should be drawn to the legal problems which 
may arise in the long, or even the short, term. Thus, it is obvious that judicial 
protection of individuals affected by the activities of the Union, especially in the 
context of cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs, must be guaranteed 
and structured in such a way as to ensure consistent interpretation and application 
both of Community law and of the provisions adopted within the framework of 
such cooperation. Further, it may be necessary to determine the limits of the 
powers of the Union vis-a-vis the Member States, and of those of each of the 
institutions of the Union. Fina1ly, proper machinery should be set up to ensure the 
uniform implementation of the decisions taken. 
5. It is obvious that the need to ensure uniform interpretation and application 
of Community law and of the conventions which are inseparably bound up with the 
achievement of the objectives of the Treaties presupposes the existence of a single 
judicial body, such as the Court of Justice, which can give definitive rulings on the 
law for the whole of the Community. That requirement is essential in any case 
which is constitutional in character or which otherwise raises a question of 
importance for the development of the law. 
II- THE APPLICATION OF THE TREATY ON El.JROPEAN Ul\10N 
6. As far as the Court of Justice is concerned, the effect of the amendments 
introduced by the Treaty on European Union has to date been only limited. The 
reasons for that are, firstly, that the Treaty has only recently come into force and, 
secondly, that a certain period is bound to elapse ber-Neen the introduction of 
procedures or the implementation of provisions, and their repercussions in terms 
of litigation. 
7. At a formal level, the amendments required by the Treaty on European 
Union have been made to the EC Statute of the Court and to the ..Rules of 
Procedure both of the Court of Justice and of the Court of First Instance. The 
amendments to the Statute were approved by the Council, at the request of the 
Court, by decision of 22 December 1994.2 The Court of Justice adopted the 
amendments to its Rules of Procedure on 21 February 1995, following approval by 
the Counci1.3 The Court of First Instance adopted the amendments to its Rules 
1- In its order of 7 April 1995 in case C-167$4 Grau Gomis and Others, not yet published 
in the ECR, the Court held that it had no jurisdiction, in the context of a preliminary 
ruling, to interpret Article B of the Treaty on European Union. 
2- OJ 1994 L 379, p. 1. 
3 - OJ 1995 L 44, p. 61. 
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of Procedure on 17 February 1995, following approval by the Council and with the 
agreement of the Court of Justice.• 
8. At a practical level, as yet the first innovation to have borne fruit to any 
appreciable extent is the one whose implementation depended on the Court itself, 
namely the new version of Article 165(3). Under that provision, the Court of 
Justice may now assign any case to a Chamber unless a Member State or an 
institution which is a party to the proceedings requests that the case be heard in 
plenary session. Whilst cases raising fundamental issues are still heard in plenary 
session, the Court makes regular use of this new possibility in cases which 
previously had to be heard by the plenary. This has probably contributed to the 
shortening of the length of proceedings revealed in the most recent statistics.5 
That achievement has been made possible by the attitude of the Member States 
and the institutions, which have confined to exceptional cases their requests that 
the Court sit in plenary session. 
9. As regards the other Treaty amendments of direct concern to the Court, one 
action has been brought under the new version of Article 173(1) of the EC Treaty, 
for annulment of a measure adopted by the European Parliament and the Council 
in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 189b of the EC Treaty.6 
The new version of Article 173(1) of the EC Treaty, which endorses the 
solution provided by the Court's case-law7, namely that an action for annulment 
may lie against measures adopted by the European Parliament intended to have 
legal effects vis-a-vis third parties, has also formed the basis for a recent action 
brought by the Council.8 
Similarly, the European Parliament, whose right to bring an action for 
annulment of an act of the Council or the Commissirm in order to safeguard its 
prerogatives had already been recognized9 and indeed exercised on a number of 
occasions before the Treaty on European Union entered into force, has been able 
4 - OJ 1995 L 44, p. 64. 
5 - Between 1993 and 1994, the average length of proceedings for direct actions before the 
Court of Justice went from 22.9 months to 20.8 months; for preliminary rulings from 20.4 
to 18.0 months; and for appeals from 19.2 to 21.2 months. The last figure is due in 
particular to the relative increase in the number of Jpyeals in the field of competition, 
which are often long and complex, compared with those in Community staff cases. 
6 - Case C233/94 Germany v ParliAment and Council. 
7- Case 294/83 w Verts v ParliAment [1986] ECR 1339. 
8- Case C-41/95 Council v ParliAment. 
9- Case C-70!88 ParliAment v Council [1990] ECR I-2041. 
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to bring three further actions for annulment10 on the basis of the new version of 
Article 173(3) of the EC Treaty, which endorses the previous case-law. 
The Court has not heen called upon to apply the other amendments relating 
specifically to the judiciai system of the Union. That is true, for example, of the 
new version of Article 171 of the EC Treaty (and of the corresponding provision 
of the Euratom Treaty), which enables the Commission to bring an action before 
the Court of Justice seeking imposition of penalties on a Member State which bas 
failed to comply with a judgment finding that it had infringed the Treaty; similarly 
there have been as yet no cases concerning the European Monetary Institute or 
pursuant to the last subparagraph of Article K.3(2)(c) of the Treaty on European 
Union, which allows attribution of jurisdiction to the Court of Justice in respect of 
the interpretation and application of conventions concluded within the framework 
of cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs.11 
As regards the new version of Article 168a of the EC Treaty (and the 
corresponding provisions of the ECSC and Euratom Treaties), which makes it 
possible to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance to hear and determine 
certain classes of action or proceedings brought by the Member States or the 
institutions, with the exception of questions referred for a preliminary ruling, the 
Court of Justice considers that the possibility of applying that provision can only be 
evaluated in the light of experience gained from exercise by the Court of First 
Instance of the jurisdiction recently transferred to it to hear and determine actions 
brought by individuals.12 
10. Some of the other amendments introduced by the Treaty on European 
Union have already given rise to cases currently pending before the Court of 
Justice. 
These include the principle of subsidiarity embodied in Article 3b of the EC 
Treaty,13 the new provisions relating to movement of capital in Articles 73b to 73h 
10- Case C-21/94 Parlwment v Council, Case C-271194 Parlwment v Council and Case C-303/9~ 
Parlwment v Council. 
11- The only convention of that type yet signed, the Convention on simplified extradition 
procedure between the Member States of the European Union, drawn up by Council Act 
of 10 March 1995 (OJ 1995 C 78, p. 1) does not give any jurisdiction to the Court of 
Justice. 
12- Council Decision 931350/Euratom, ECSC. EEC of 8 June 1993 (OJ 1993 L 144, p. 21) and 
Council Decision 94/149/ECSC. EC of 7 March 1994 (OJ 1994 L 66, p. 29). 
13 - Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council and Case C-233/94 Germany v Parlwment and 
Council. 
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of that Treaty14 and certain of the new legal bases introduced into the EC 
Treaty.15 
III- POSSIBLE REVISION OF PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
11. The development of the Community legal order has been to a large extent 
the fruit of the dialogue which has built up between the national courts and the 
Court of Justice through the preliminary ruling procedure. It is through such 
cooperation that the essential characteristics of the Community legal order have 
been identified, in particular its primacy over the laws of the Member States, the 
direct effect of a whole series of provisions and the right of individuals to obtain 
redress when their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for which a 
Member State is responsible. To limit access to the Court would have the effect 
of jeopardizing the uniform application and interpretation of Community law 
throughout the Union, and could deprive individuals of effective judicial protection 
and undermine the unity of the case-law. 
But that is not all. The preliminary ruling system is the veritable 
cornerstone of the operation of the internal market, since it plays a fundamental 
role in ensuring that the law established by the Treaties retains its Community 
character with a view to guaranteeing that that law has the same effect in all 
circumstances in all the Member States of the European Union. Any weakening, 
even if only potential, of the uniform application and interpretation of Community 
law throughout the Union would be liable to give rise to distortions of competition 
and discrimination between economic operators. thus jeopardizing equality of 
opportunity as between those operator.; and consequently the proper functioning 
of the internal market. 
One of the Court's essential tasks is to eilSure just such a uniform 
interpretation, and it discharges that duty by answering the questions put to it by 
the national courts and tribunals. The possibility of referring a question to the 
Court of Justice must therefore remain open to all those courts and tribunals. 
- -
It is true that the effectiveness of the preliminary ruling procedure, which 
from a technical point of view is merely a step in the national proceedings, depends 
on the time it takes. If it takes too long. national courts may be discouraged from 
submitting questions for a preliminary ruling. The Court is aware of the need to 
reduce further the time taken to deal with such questions and would stress in that 
connection that the recent transfer to the Court of First Instance of all direct 
actions brought by individuals should make it possible to obtain a significant 
14 - Case C-163!94 Min.isterio Fiscal v Sanz de ura, Case C165f)4 Min.isterio Fiscal v D£o.z 
Jimenez, C-250$4 Min.isrerio Fiscal v Kapanoglu, Case C-294$4 Min.isterio Fiscal v 
Quin.tanilha and Case C-20!95 Ministerio Fiscal v Weg. 
15 - Case C-268$4 Ponugal v Council and Case C-271!94 Parliament v Council. 
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reduction in the ti~e taken for other types of p:-oceedings, in particular references 
for a preliminary n\ling. 
The Court is currently exam1mng further measures to increase its 
productivity. It should be pointed out in that regard that for cases of great 
importance - particularly constitutional or economic importance - it is hardly 
possible, or even desirable, to speed up the proceedings before the Court. For 
cases of lesser importance, however, procedural simplification may certainly be 
envisaged and could have beneficial effects. The measures necessary for that 
purpose fall within the framework of the Statute of the Court and its Rules of 
Procedure, or are pure matters of practice, and do not require any amendment to 
the Treaties. 
12. In view of the considerable period of time which elapsed before its Rules 
of Procedure were adapted in line with the Treaty on European Union (it was not 
possible to adopt the necessary amendments until February 1995), the Court 
considers that the rule in Article 188(3) of the EC Treaty (and in the corresponding 
provisions of the other Treaties), which requires the unanimous approval of the 
Council for any amendment to those Rules, should be relaxed. Thus, the Court ->': 
might be authorized to adopt its Rules of Procedure without the approval of the 
Council or, if the Member States felt it indispensable to retain the right to be 
consulted, such approval might be deemed to be given on expiry of a specified 
period in the absence of amendments by the Council to the Court's proposal. A 
similar amendment would need to be made to Article 168a( 4) of the EC Treaty 
and to the corresponding provisions of the other Treaties concerning the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court of First Instance. 
13. In its requests submitted to the Council following the introduction of a two-
tier court system. the Court of Justice has already stressed that such a system is not 
appropriate for preliminary ruling procedures both because it would be likely to 
lead to unacceptable procedural delays and because it would raise problems as to 
the authority of judgments given at first instance and as to identification of the 
parties entitled to lodge an appeal. The Court's jurisdiction to give preliminary 
rulings cannot be split up on the basis of pre-established criteria relatifig te the 
subject-matter of the case or the status of the referring court, which might .-:~'' 
jeopardize the consistency of the case-law, or on the basis of a flexible system of 
case-by-case referrals from the Court of Justice to the Court of First Instance, 
which might run counter to ce:-~::m conceptions of the 'lawful judge' (juge legal). 
14. The Court has been informed of certain proposals, first, for amending 
Article 173 of the EC Treaty and the corresponding provisions of the other 
Treaties to allow the European Parliament to bring actions for annulment without 
having to establish an interest and, second, for giving the Parliament the right to 
request the Court's opinion on an international agreement envisaged by the 
Community, in accordance with Article 228(6) of the EC Treaty. It is, of course, 
for the Intergovernmental Conference to decide what action is to be taken on those 
proposals. The Court wishes to point out that there should be no technical 
objection to such amendments and that, as regards the procedure for obtaining 
opinions, it has already allowed the Parliament to submit observations in 
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connection with requests made hy Member States, the Council or the Commission. 
However, the Court doubts whether it would be appropriate to remove to the 
judicial arena disputes which could just as satisfactorily be settled at a political 
level, given the mechanisms provided for that purpose. 
15. The Court has begun to reflect on the future judicial structure of the Union. 
The organization of the judicial system will in any event depend on political 
decisions as regards developing the process of union among the peoples of Europe 
and as regards the prospects of further enlargement. 
At the present stage of development, the Court feels that the structure of 
the judicial system should not be altered. In particuiar, there seems to be no need 
to amend Article 168a of the EC Treaty and the corresponding provisions of the 
other Treaties with regard to the allocation of tasks between the Court of Justice 
and the Court of First Instance. A more detailed assessment cannot be made until 
it has become possible to evaluate the capacity of both Courts to deal satisfactorily 
with the volume of litigation assigned to them. In any case, the obvious need to 
maintain an efficient court system means that the number of courts should not be 
· .:-· · increased unless there are objective reasons for doing so, particularly since the 
national courts are called upon to play a central role as the courts with general 
jurisdiction for Community law. 
However, if closer integration is achieved in certain fields, with a 
concomitant increase in the volume of litigation, it might be that, in the longer 
term, it would be desirable for the Chambers of the Court of First Instance to 
become specialized or perhaps for new specialized Community courts to be 
established. Once the principle of the two-tier system is accepted, there is a certain 
logic in having the vast majority of direct actions dealt with by one or more courts 
of first instance and in subjecting certain appeals to the Court of Justice to a 
filtering system. Increasing the number of courts would be unlikely to endanger the 
unity of the case-law provided there is still a supreme court to ensure uniformity 
of interpretation through appeals or preliminary rulings as the case may be. 
16. With regard to the prospects of enlargement of the Union, the Court v.ishes 
to draw the attention of the Intergovernmental Conference to the problem of 
maintaining the link between the number of Judges and the number of Member 
States, even though the Treaties do not provide for any link between nationality 
and membership of the Court. 
In that regard, two factors must be balanced. 
On the one hand, any significant increase in the number of Judges might 
mean that the plenary session of the Court would cross the invisible boundary 
between a collegiate court and a deliberative assembly. Moreover, as the great 
majority of cases would be heard by Chambers, this increase could pose a threat 
to the consistency of the case-law. 
On the other hand, the presence of members from all the national legal 
systems on the Court is undoubtedly conducive to harmonious development of 
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Community case-law, taking into account co1'Jcepts regarded as fundamental in the 
various Member States and thus enhancing the acceptability of the solutions arrived 
at. It may also be considered that the presence of a Judge from each Member 
State enhances the legitimacy of the Coun. 
Finally, it should be noted that the question of the number of Judges arises 
in a completely different way in the Court of First Instance, which normally sits in 
Chambers and whose decisions are subject to an appeal to the Court of Justice. 
17. The Court does not intend to express any opinion with regard to the 
procedure for the appointment of its members or the term of their appointment, 
beyond those aspects which concern the preservation of its independence and its 
functional efficiency. 
The Court stresses that the procedure for appointment laid down by the 
Treaties and the practice generally followed in renewing the terms of office of its 
members have satisfactorily ensured its independence and the continuity of its case-
law. The Court would not, however, object to a reform which would involve an 
extension of the term of office with a concoi1Utant condition that the appointment 
be non-renewable. Such a reform would provide an even firmer basis for the 
independence of its members and would strengthen the continuity of its case-law. 
Provided that the fixed term of appointment of each member were calculated from 
the time of taking office, such a solution would also have the advantage, over time, 
oflimiting the operational inconveniences regularly suffered by the Court's activities 
as a result of the partial replacement rule. 
However, without needing to express an opinion at this stage on the other 
proposals which have been put forward, the Court considers that a reform involving 
a hearing of each nominee by a parliamentary committee would be unacceptable. 
Prospective appointees would be unable adequately to answer the questions put to 
them without betraying the discretion incumbent upon persons whose independence 
must, in the words of the Treaties, be beyond doubt and v.ithout prejudging 
positions they might have to adopt with regard to contentious issues which they 
- would have to decide in the exercise of their judicial function. 
18. The Court would like to put forward once again the suggestion, already 
raised during the preparations for the Treaty on European Union, that Article 
167(5) of the EC Treaty (and the corresponding provisions of the ECSC and 
Euratom Treaties) should be amended to allow the Advocates General as well as 
the Judges to take part in the election of the President of the Court from among 
the Judges. The basis for that proposal lies in the fact that the status of Advocate 
General is identical to that of Judge; without prejudice to their specific function, 
they are members of the Court in the same way as the Judges. As such, moreover, 
they have the same responsibilities with regard to administrative decisions and are 
concerned in the same way with the functioning of the institution. Since the 
President organizes the business and directs the administration of the Court, it 
would be perfectly logical for the Advocates General to take part in the election 
together with the Judges. It is evident that the President, who directs the hearings 
and deliberations of the Court sitting in plenary session, can be chosen only from 
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among the Judges. The Advocates General would thus l:>e entitled to vote but not 
to stand for election. 
IV- REPERCUSSIONS ON THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF CERTAIN 
AMENDMENTS ENVISAGED 
19. The Court is aware that the Intergovernmental Conference is called upon 
to examine problems of a constitutional nature, such as changes in the 
nomenclature of acts and the introduction of a hierarchy of norms, together with 
the introduction into the Treaty of a catalogue of fundamental rights in keeping 
with the democratic nature of the Union, which renders the protection of human 
rights an essential element of European construction. Whilst it is not for the Court 
to express a view on the desirability of such refcrms, it nevertheless notes that they 
have important aspects which will necessarily have repercussions on the system of 
judicial review. 
20. In the first place, if a catalogue of fundamental rights were to be introduced 
into the text of the Treaty, the question would arise as to the mechanism for 
reviewing observance of those rights in legislative and administrative measures 
adopted in the framework of Community law. 
In the exercise of its present jurisdiction, the Court already examines 
whether fundamental rights have been respected by the legislative and executive 
authorities of the Communities and by the Member States when their actions fall 
within the field of Community law. In doing so, it draws on the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States and on the international instruments 
relating to the protection of human rights in which the Member States have 
cooperated or to which they are parties, in particular the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The Court would not, therefore, be taking on a new role in 
reviewing respect for of such fundamental rights as might be provided for in the 
Treaty. It may be asked, however, whether the right to bring an action for 
annulment under Article 173 of the EC Treaty (and the corresponding provisions 
of the other Treaties), which individuals enjoy only in regard to acts of direct and 
individual concern to them, is sufficient to guarantee for them effective judicial 
protection against possible infringements of their fundamental rights ariSing from 
the legislative activity of the institutions. 
21. Secondly, if the Intergovernmental Conference were to decide to revise the 
nomenclature of the acts of the institutions and possibly to establish a hierarchy 
amongst those acts, it would be essential to take account of the consequences which 
such changes would have for the system of remedies, in particular the right of 
individuals to bring actions for the annulment of such acts. 
22. It would be premature to formulate any more detailed observations but, in 
view of the fundamental importance of those matters for the judicial protection of 
individuals, the Court wishes to be involved at the appropriate moment in any 
process of reflection. 
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23. Finally, in the Court's opinion, the forthcoming process of revision might 
provide an opportunity for codifying and streamlining the constitutive Treaties. 
The multiplicity of Treaties forming the constitutional basis for the law of the 
Union, of which one (the ECSC Treaty) expires in July 2002, the sometimes 
artificial compartmentalization entailed by the system of three pillars, the survival 
of many superseded or obsolete provisions, and a numbering system which uses 
both letters and figures, all run counter to the need for transparency and put 
citizens of the Union in an unsatisfactory position from the point of view of legal 
certainty. 
• * • • • 
24. The Court has confined itself, at the present stage, to expressing 
observations of a general nature concerning, essentially, the judicial sphere. The 
Court reserves the possibility of submitting to the Study Group its observations on 
the reports of the other institutions in so far as they concern the judicial system or 
include proposals likely to have repercussions on it. Furthermore, the Court would 
like to be associated in an appropriate manner with the preparatory work prior to 
the revision of the Treaties. In any event, the Court must be consulted should the 
Intergovernmental Conference intend to amend the Treaty provisions relating to 
the judicial system. 
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Contribution of the Court of First Instance for the Purposes of the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference 
I - DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNITY COURTS 
Since it was set up in 1989, the role and jurisdiction of the Court of First 
Instance have been progressively extended. Under Council Decisions 93/350 of 8 
June 199316 and 94/149 of 7 March 199417, it has acquired general jurisdiction to 
hear and determine at first instance all direct actions brought by natural and legal 
persons; in addition, it has received jurisdiction in completely new areas under 
Regulation No 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings18, 
under Regulation No 40/94 on the Community trade mark19 and under Regulation 
No 2100/94 on Community plant variety rights20• The Treaty on European Union 
has paved the way for an acceleration of that process ~ith the amended version of 
Article 168a, which makes it possible to give jurisdiction to the Court of First 
Instance to hear and determine all actions, whether brought by natural or legal 
persons or by institutions or Member States, with the exception of questions 
referred for a preliminary ruling under Article 177. Finally, jurisdiction to hear and 
determine actions brought by natural and legal persons relating to the European 
Central Bank, and disputes involving its staff, has already been conferred on the 
Court of First Instance by the abovementioned Council Decisions. 
The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance is thus much wider now than 
when it was set up as a Community court. Further extension can, moreover, be 
envisaged on the basis of the present version of Article 168a and is likely to be 
implemented progressively, particularly in fields where one and the same measure 
may be challenged simultaneously before the Court of Justice and before the Court 
of First Instance, depending on the standing of the applicant. That situation leads 
to problems of coordination between the two Courts, particularly in the fields of 
State aids and anti-dumping measures, which could be resolved by giving the Court 
of First Instance jurisdiction to hear and determine all actions of those types, 
regardless of the standing of the applicant. 
The extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, cour!ed _""ith 
::';·:: a constant progression in the amount of traditional litigation, has led to a very 
considerable increase in the number of cases brought each year before the Court 
of First Instance, with a more than fourfold increase since 1990. Concurrently, over 
16- OJ 1993 L 144, p. 21. 
17- OJ 1994 L 66, p. 29. 
18- OJ 1989 L 395, p. 1. 
19- OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1. 
20- OJ 1994 L 227, p. 1. 
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the same period, the numbers of cases decided by the Court of First Instance and 
pending before it have increased to a very considerable extent. 
That trend towards an appreciable increase in the number of cases brought 
before the Court of First Instance is set to become even more pronounced in the 
future. As a result, a growing proportion of Community litigation wi]] fa]] to be 
dealt with by the Court of First Instance and the number of cases to be decided by 
it will exceed, as it has already exceeded, the number brought before the Court of 
Justice. 
Moreover, the volume of Jitiga tion on Community trade marks alone, the 
effects of which will very soon be felt with some 100 cases expected to be brought 
by the second half of 1996, will grow sharply, to exceed 400 cases a year, from 1997 
onwards. Other more or Jess similar areas of litigation, such as plant variety rights 
or industrial designs, will be added in the near future. 
Independently of the new jurisdiction conferred on the Court of First 
Instance, a considerable increase can be seen in the volume of cases already falling 
within its jurisdiction, particularly those which require close examination of complex 
facts as, for example, in the fields of competition proceedings, State aids and anti-
dumping measures. That increase is no doubt simply a consequence, at least in 
part, of the establishment of a two-tier system within the Community judicature and 
the resulting improvement in the conditions under which cases are dealt with. 
II- MEASURES TO ENSURE TIIE PROPER ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE 
In order to respond to that situation, it is essential that measures be taken 
to ensure that the Community courts can operate properly in a rapidly changing 
context. If they were not, the Court of First Instance would soon no longer be able 
to ensure the proper administration of justice in the best possible manner and to 
perform the task for which it was set up, namely to improve judicial protection for 
individuals and to alleviate the case-load of the Court of Justice. In the absence 
of any such measures, the increased volume of Community litigation would result 
in a lengthening of proceedings under conditions likely to jeopardize the protection 
of individuals. 
To that end, the Court of First Instance has already tzken a number of steps 
to adapt its internal operational arrangements in order, interalia, to rationalize the 
number, structure, organization and working methods of its chambers and to 
shorten the time taken for oral procedures and the length of judgments. In 
addition, with the approval of the Council, it bas amended its Rules of Procedure 
to allow an increasing number of cases to be dealt with by a chamber of three 
judges. Further measures simplifying the procedure before the Court of First 
Instance, with a particular view to streamlining, simplifying and clarifying the way 
in which cases are prepared for hearing, will shortly be submitted to the Council. 
The Court of First Instance is aware that it is not only judicial procedure 
whose efficiency has an impact on the protection of individuals. It is particularly 
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attentive to certain ideas which are aimed at improving the Community decision-
making process in certain fields at an earlier stage and which could prevent 
litigation arising and thus reduce the number of cases brought. 
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the operational imperatives of 
the Court of First Instance are such that it will not be possible to cope with the 
increase in vo:ume of Community litigation solely by recourse to such modifications, 
which are bound to remain limited in scope, and that its role as court of general 
jurisdiction at first instance will necessarily affect not only its operating methods but 
also its structure and composition. 
The debate which has opened up in recent years in that regard has 
engendered a number of ideas on which the Court of First Instance feels it should 
make its views known to the Intergovernmental Conference. 
In the first place, the Court of First Instance feels that some of those ideas 
- in particular the establishment of new courts on a regional or specialized subject-
matter basis - are unlikely to provide a solution to the problems faced and should 
not, therefore, be retained. 
With regard to the creation of 'regional courts', this Court has already 
expressed its conclusion that, at the present stage in the Community's development, 
such a solution would be of no relevance or interest and would be extremely 
costly.21 That assessment is still valid, particularly since a juxtaposition of several 
parallel courts would be likely to jeopardize the unity and consistency of 
Community case-law and would necessarily entail a considerable increase in the 
cost of the administration of justice. 
As regards the idea of setting up specialized courts, the Court of First 
Instance would point out that such a solution, which would entail considerable 
administrative and budgetary costs and does not really seem compatible with the 
concept of a Community judicature of general jurisdiction, does not appear 
desirable since it might jeopardize the unity not merely of that judicature but of its 
case-law. The same reservation would not, however, apply to the setting up, if 
-necessary, of specialized chambers within the Court of First Instance. 
The Court of First Instance wishes, on the other hand, to draw the attention 
of the Intergovernmental Conference to a number of options which might be 
envisaged as a solution to the problems arising out of the increasing volume of 
Community litigation and which might be implemented either as alternatives or 
concurrently. 
First, there are a number of measures which would be more especially 
suitable for implementation in specific areas which give rise to a large volume of 
21 - 'Reflections on the Future Development of the Community Judicial System', a document 
drawn up by the Court of First Instance in December 1990 to report on its views to the 
Intergovernmental Conference whose deliberations were to lead to the Treaty on European 
Union. 
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litigation but do not generally require decisions on particularly complex or 
important questions of law. These include the appointment of assistant 
rapporteurs, the hearing of cases by a single judge and the specialization of 
chambers. 
The appointment of assistant rapporteurs, which would require no more 
than an amendment to the Statute of the Court of Justice, would have the 
advantage of leaving responsibility for deciding the case with the judges while at the 
same time allowing research and drafting tasks to be carried out, under the 
responsibility of the court, by an expert of proven competence whose status would 
be transparent and who would be appointed in the light of his or her particular 
qualifications and specialization in a specific field. The presence of such an expert 
would be apparent in the course of proceedings, which would be an obvious 
safeguard for the parties, and he or she could be present during the Court's 
deliberations, which would offer a considerable advantage over the assistance 
provided by the judges' traditional associates, such as legal secretaries. 
The introduction of the possibility of having cases dealt with by a single 
judge in certain fields would offer considerable advantages in terms of the Court's 
productivity and procedural efficiency. It would be possible to draw on the 
experience of similar systems in the courts of many of the Member States. It must 
of course be stressed that if a single judge were to sit alone in certain types of case, 
it would have to be possible for that judge to propose that the case be referred to 
a chamber if he or she considered that it was of particular importance. 
Alternatively, such a solution might be restricted to cases which a chamber, after 
an initial examination. decided did not present any particular difficulty. Recourse 
to a single judge might indeed be partict·larly effective if it were combined with the 
use of assistant rapporteurs in certain areas of technical specialization, especially 
where the judicial phase is preceded by a compulsory pre-litigation procedure in 
which individuals' interests receive appropriate protection. That solution could be 
achieved simply by an amendment to the Decision of 24 October 1988 establishing 
the Court of First Instance. 
In the same context, mention may be made of the gains in productivity 
which could be expected from the setting up of specialized chambers for litigation 
of a repetitive kind. Setting up such chambers would make it possible to reap the 
advantages of specialization in certain series of actions, should the need be felt at 
a future stage, without thereby incurring the disadvantages which would necessarily 
ensue for the Community judicial system from the establishment of independent 
specialist courts or the appointment of specialist judges to the Community courts 
of general jurisdiction. A specialization of chambers falls within the scope of the 
Court's internal organization and can be implemented on the basis of the existing 
rules. 
The Court of First Instance considers, however, that all those measures will 
not be sufficient to enable it to cope with the increasing number of actions with 
which it will be faced. Without at present putting forward any specific proposals 
in that regard, the Court of First Instance wishes, therefore, to draw the attention 
of the Intergovernmental Conference to the fact that an increase in the number of 
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judges will inevitably have to be envisaged. In that regard, account must be taken 
of the fact that the Court of First Instance sits almost exclusively in chambers 
composed of three or five judges, so that an increase in its overall membership 
would not give rise to any operational difficulties. An increase in the number of 
j":.1dges would make it possible to form a greater number of chambers and deal with 
a greater number of cases, and constitutes the most effective way of dealing with 
the increase in litigation. Again, such an increase could be achieved simply by an 
amendment to the Decision of 24 October 1988. 
Since all the above solutions can be implemented without any amendment 
to the Treaties, the Court of First Instance merely wishes to mention them at the 
present stage. It will submit, at the appropriate time, reasoned proposals through 
the channels and procedures provided. 
Ill - JUDGES' TERMS OF OFFICE 
Various proposals have been made in the past to amend the rules governing 
the appointment of the judges. 
It is not for the Court of First Instance to put forward specific proposals in 
that regard, but the attention of the Intergovernmental Conference should be 
drawn to certain aspects of the problem which have not always been taken into 
consideration. 
Continuity in the membership of the Court of First Instance is of 
fundamental importance for the proper administration of justice. The replacement 
of a judge inevitably entails not only disruption in the scheduling of proceedings but 
also the loss of considerable investment in terms of both the time and the effort 
required of each new judge to adapt to the specific nature of work in a Community 
court. It is therefore essential that the relevant provisions allow the judges to cany 
out their functions for a sufficient length of time. 
At present, the rules provide for appointment for a normal term of six years, 
-with a partial renewal of membership at fixed dates every three t,ears_ and 
··=··-- replacement for the remainder of the predecessor's term if a judge leaves before 
the expiry of his or her term of office (Article 7 of the EC Statute of the Court of 
Justice). The effect of those provisions is that six years is the longest period for 
which an appointment can be made, subject, of course, to renewal. In addition, as 
a result of the system of fixed dates for renewals, some members of the Court of 
First Instance are appointed for a considerably shorter initial term - much too short 
in the light of the requirements of continuity in the work of the Court and the 
effort of adaptation demanded of the new judge. 
The Court of First Instance feels that it would be helpful to amend those 
provisions so that every judge, regardless of his or her date of appointment, will 
always be appointed for a sufficient length of time. 
The present system of renewable appointments does, however, appear the 
best suited to the specific requirements of the way in which the Court of First 
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Instance operates. Renewal ensures the continuity in the exercise of the judicial 
function required by the nature of the litigation which the Court has to deal 
. h 22 Wlt • 
Finally, the Court of First Instance wishes to draw the attention of the 
Conference to the fact that any projected intervention by the Parliament in the 
procedure for appointing judges should be confined to the initial appointment, for 
the obvious reason that it cannot extend to a review of the manner in which judicial 
functions have actually been carried out. Any such intervention by the Parliament 
should be solely for the purpose of ascertaining whether the prospective nominees 
possess the qualifications required by the Treaty in order to exercise their 
f . 23 unctions. 
IV - APPROPRIATE REFERENCE TO THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE 
IN THE TREA 1Y 
The Treaty mentions the Court of First Instance only in Article 168a, with 
the wordc; 'A Court of First Instance shall be attached to the Court of Justice .. .', 
which derive ultimately from those of the Single European Act by which the 
Council was empowered to set up a new court. It must nevertheless be asked 
whether that formula can still be considered satisfactory today. 
It seems contrary to the need for clarity and transparency in the provisions 
of the Treaty that Article 4, which lists all the institutions and organs of the 
Community, should make no reference to the Court of First Instance. The failure 
to mention the Court of First Instance, which is now an integral part of the 
Community's judicial system, constitutes all the more serious a lacuna in that, 
unlike the organs mentioned in Article 4(2). the Court exercises decision-making 
powers. 
The Court of First Instance therefore '"ishes to point out to the 
Intergovernmental Conference that it might be desirable to make good that 
omission in the present version of the Treaty by inserting into Article 4 an 
-appropriate reference to the Court of First Instance, thus making it clear. tha! the 
22 - In this regard, the report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs of the European 
Parliament 'on the role of the Court of Justice in the development of the European 
Community's constitutional system', drawn up by Mr Willi Rothley and submitted on 13 
July 1993, stresses that there is no need, for the mo.nent, to change the way in which the 
members of the Court of First Instance .ue appointed (PE 155.441/fin.). 
23 - In this regard, it should be borne in mind that the working document of the Committee 
on Institutional Affairs of the European Parliament on the 'composition and appointment 
of judicial organs and of the Court of Auditors', prepared by Mr Brendan Donnelly and 
submitted on 19 January 1995 (PE 211.536) likewise stresses that any new procedure ' 
should ensure that any parliamentary scrutiny avoids political considerations and 
concentrates entirely on verifying the qualifications required of office-holders in Articles 
167 and 168a of the Treaty, namely that a nominee can demonstrate his or her 
independence and that they have held high judicial office or can otherwise show 
outstanding legal abilities.' 
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Community's judicial system is a two-tier system. Such a result might be achieved, 
for example, by inserting a provision to the effect that, within the Court of Justice 
as an institution, a Court of First Instance assists that Court in carrying out the 
tasks assigned to it, within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the Treaty. 
Such an amendment to Article 4 would in no way alter the present institutional 
structure as laid down by the Treaty. 
In that context, a change in the name of the Court of First Instance might 
be envisaged, as some have proposed. The Court is well a\_Vare that the name 
•Court of First Instance• does not correspond in reality to the role it plays within 
the Community judicial system. On the one hand, its decisions on questions of fact 
are final and, on the other hand, it hears and determines appeals against decisions 
taken by quasi-judicial authorities. At the present stage, however, the Court of 
First Instance will not put forward any proposal for a change in its name, which is 
now familiar in the relevant legal circles. 
'Ihis bulletin is issued by the Court's Information Service (L-2925 Luxembourg) to 
provide rapid information on the woric or the Court. However, it is only the text of the 
judgments and opinions published in the European Court Reports that is authentic. 
'Ihis information may be reproduced provided that the sourr:e is acknowledged. 
Original version: French 
Completed on: 24 May 1995 
Catalogue No: DX-AC-95-015-EN-C 
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COURT OF AUDITORS 
REPORT OF MAY 1995 
TO THE REFLECTION GROUP 
ON THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 
- 383-

INTRODUCTION 
0.1. The European Council, meeting in Corfu on 24 and 25 June 1994, decided to set 
up a "Reflection Group" with the task of preparing the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) provided for by Article N(2) of the Treaty on European Union. At 
the same time it invited the Community Institutions to draw up reports on the operation 
of the Treaty on European Union. 
0.2. In the presentation of this report, the Court of Auditors wished in particular to 
highlight the inadequacies, the imperfections or the shortcomings of the present system 
for the management and control of Community funds which need to be remedied. It 
also wished to make more specific proposals for amending the Treaties or raise more 
general questions to which the IGC will have to give the appropriate answers. 
1. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK WITIUN WHICH THE COURT OF 
AUDITORS OPERATES WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Audit of the Union's finances by the Court of Auditors 
1.1. The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty has enabled the construction of 
Europe to enter a new stage, marked by the advent of the European Union, which was 
followed by several significant changes, amongst which were the election of a new 
European Parliament, the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the Union and 
the appointment of a new Commission. At the same time, the necessary instruments 
were created and equipped with considerable fmancial resources for the purpose of 
achieving the twofold objective of carrying out the enlargement of the Union and 
respecting the commitments ~sing from the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, 
especially as regards economic and social cohesion, the financing of trans-European 
transport networks and increased fmancial aid to the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent Statesct). 
1.2. The objective of financial and budgetary instruments is to ensure that policies 
which were formerly attributed to the Community and are now assigned to the Union 
are implemented as effectively and economically as possible. The Commission is 
responsible for the most efficient use or, according to the terms of the Treaty, the 
"sound fmancial management", of European public funds and the resources needed to 
develop Community activities. It is also responsible for accounting, in a spirit of 
democracy - this latter need is felt more and more pressingly - for the execution of 
fi Thus the European budget alone has been multiplied by 2.7 in ten years, rising from 
28 800 Mio ECU in 1985 to 79 800 Mio ECU in 1995. These are large sums, which have been 
given to the Union so that it may achieve the objectives that have been assigned to it in new fields 
and/or promote new policies or deal with its ori2inal objectives, such as in the field of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. 
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these policies, whether included in the budget or not, and is the body responsible for 
implementing ihe budget and managing a number of non-budgetary financial 
instruments. 
1.3. The Court of Auditors' duty is to act as the external auditor of European public 
finances and to do so quite independently. The Member States conferred full 
institutional status upon the Court in the Maastricht Treaty, thus placing it on an equal 
footing with the "auditee".They also entrusted it with the new task of henceforth 
submitting to the European Parliament and the Council of the Union a Statement of 
Assurance (SOA) concerning the reliability of the accounts and the legality and 
regularity of the underlying transactions. This task is additional to the Court's normal 
work, which consists of producing Annual Reports and Special Reports and making 
observations on certain matters or giving opinions on specific questions at the request 
of other institutions, and/or opinions which must be delivered before the legislative 
authorities approve any provisions of a financial nature. 
The Court's position within the institutional balance 
1.4. In a system where the legislative and executive functions are shared between 
several institutions, the Court's status has developed in step with the evolution of this 
interinstitutional balance. For example, when the Treaty of Brussels took force on 22 
July 1975 it established a system for sharing budget-related responsibilities between the 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission which required, as a corollary, the creation 
of an independent control body, the Court of Auditors. 
1.5. Under the discharge procedure, the Court draws up Annual Reports and Special 
Reports on sound financial management, which then support, and form the basis for, 
the discussions held between the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament, 
with the latter taking the fmal decision as to whether to grant discharge to the 
Commission or withhold it. The Court's participation in the legislative procedur~ 
concerning financial and budgetary matters takes the form of detailed opinions delivered 
before any legislative text containing financial provisions is approved, in particular 
concerning the Financial Regulation and texts relating to the making available of own 
resources. 
1.6. The amendment of the status of the Court and the extension of the range of tasks 
assigned to it are part of an overall enlargement, under the Treaty of Maastricht, of the 
powers and responsibilities conferred on the Institutions in budgetary and financial 
matters. These involve budgetary discipline in particular, which is to be exercised by 
the CommissionO at the same time as it implements the budget in accordance with the 
principle of sound fmancial managementC), and measures taken by the Member 
tl Article 201(a) of the EC Treaty. 
ll Article 205 of the EC Treaty. 
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States to combat fraud affecting the Community's financial interests(4). For the same 
purpose, the European Parliament may ask the Commission to give explanations on 
matters concerning budget implementation or the operation of the fmancial control 
systems(5). For its part, the Commission does its best to follow up the European 
Parliament's observations, and reports to it on the measures taken f). Fraud, waste and 
inefficient management must be combatted as vigorously as possible: this objective was 
made explicit in the Maastricht Treaty and was vigorously reasserted at the meeting of 
the European Council held in December 1994 in Essen and by the Commission 
President, Mr. Santer, when he addressed the European Parliament in January 1995, at 
the time of the investiture of the new Commission. Mr. Santer stressed the need to 
make the necessary efforts to combat fraud against the Community's fmancial interests 
through both the management methods of the Institutions, especially the Commission, 
and national administrations, and by all parties in the matter of strengthening controls 
designed to prevent fraud. 
The Court's priorities within the framework of the IGC 
1. 7. (a) Optimum external control requires certain responsibilities to be clarified, 
including in particular the Court's audit tasks, a matter which is dependent on certain 
appropriate measures being taken, e.g.: 
- the field of application of the Court's audit powers should be clarified in areas 
which are not, or are only partly, covered by the inadequately explicit 
provisions of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the logic of 
this Treaty as a whole, it is important for the Court to be officially recognized 
as the Court of Auditors of the Union; 
- it should be possible for the Court to institute legal proceedings, whenever it 
is prevented from carrying out its tasks satisfactorily. From the point of view 
of the SOA in particular, bearing in mind the importance of this new task, it 
is essential that the Court be granted the right of direct access to the Court of 
Justice in order to safeguard its prerogatives; 
- the Court should be automatically entitled to audit all revenue and expenditure 
managed on behalf of the Community. 
(b) In the field of Community management and the protection of its finances, the 
main question is that of improving the current system of internal control, particularly 
as regards the implementation of the budget: the Court established as much several 
years ago during its on-the-spot and documentary audits. The current model laid down 
by the Financial Regulation has revealed its limitations and shortcomings when it comes 
fi Article 209 of the EC Treaty. 
fi Article 206(2) of the EC Treaty. 
fi Article 206(3) of the EC Treaty. 
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to making those responsible for the management of Community public funds answerable 
for their actions. It 1s therefore appropriate to carry out an examination of the sort this 
matter warrants in preparation for the 1996 IGC. This examination should also look at 
the desirability of developing a system at Community level which will be more 
effective in making budget managers and financial officers more responsible and which 
could lead to the implementation of a strengthened procedure by which authorizing 
officers, Financial Controllers and accountants who are at fault may be punished with 
pecuniary penalties, i.e. the adoption and establishment of a specific structure of 
budgetary and fmancial discipline. 
2. SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE COURT OF AUDITORS' RESPONSffill.ITIES 
AND TASKS . 
Control of the second and third ''pillars" (CFSP and JHA) 
2.1. Since the Court is not mentioned in Article E of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), it is proposed that it should be referred to along with the other Institutions, 
which would actually mean amending the TEU. 
2.2. This is proposed because the Court is in fact required to audit expenditure incurred 
under the second and third "pillars" which is chargeable to the budget of the European 
Communities. The expenditure involved is administrative expenditure in all cases 
(Articles J.ll, paragraph 2, first sub-paragraph, and K.8, paragraph 2, first sub-
paragraph, TEU), as well as operational expenditure if the Council decides to charge 
it to the European Communities' budget (Articles J.ll, paragraph 2, second sub-
paragraph, first indent, TEU). 
2.3. The Court has also been approached about the possibility of controlling expenditure 
chargeable to Member States on a sliding-scale basis (e.g. the Europol budget), and has 
even been called upon to audit such expenditure (1994 expenditure, Mostar). In addition 
to these cases and when expenditure relating to projects carried out within the "pillars" 
remains directly chargeable to the national budgets and is controlled independently by 
the national audit authorities, the Court could be assigned a role, whilst respecting the 
control powers vested in those authorities. 
The Court's external control tasks and access to the Court of Justice 
2.4. When the Court audits the Community's finances it considers the legality and 
regularity of the revenue and expenditure and examines the soundness of the financial 
management, after which it makes its findings public. The TEU also conferred upon the 
Court the new task of submitting to the European Parliament and the Council an annual 
"Statement of Assurance concerning the reliability of the accounts and the legality and 
regularity of the underlying operations" (SOA). The first SOA, concerning the 1994 
budget, will be submitted at the end of 1995. 
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2.5. The extensive controls necessary to carry out these tasks satisfactorily require the 
Court to be given the opportunity fully to exercise the right accorded to it under the 
terms of Article 188 C, paragraph 3, EC, (and the corresponding provisions of the 
ECSC and Euratom Treaties) of being given all of the information that it needs to carry 
out its controls, regarding both revenue and expenditure. This right must be respected 
if the Court is to help to safeguard the Community's financial interests in any 
meaningful way. 
2.6. It is therefore suggested that the Court, in accordance with its status as an 
Institution, should also be given the means to ensure that its rights and prerogatives in 
this respect are interpreted and upheld by the Court of Justice. To this end, a new 
Article 180(a) and a paragraph 5 to Article 188(c) could be added to the EC Treaty. 
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Auditing funds managed on behalf of the Communities 
2.7. A large share of the Community's funds is not managed by the Commission but 
by other bodies acting on behalf of the Community. This situation may nevertheless not 
be allowed to result in the Community Institutions losing control over the management 
of these funds. 
2.8. As far as the Court is concerned, there is the important matter of obtaining access 
to the information it needs for audit purposes. Article 188(c), paragraph 3, EC, does not 
cover the matter of access to information held by bodies which manage funds on behalf 
of the Communities, are independent of the Member States and were not set up by the 
Communities. The same also applies to bodies set up by and managing funds for the 
Communities whose constituent instrument does not provide for control by the Court. 
2.9. The Court considers that, given this lacuna and in the light of the volume of funds 
concerned, there should be explicit provision in the Treaty for access to the information 
concerned in the cases envisaged in 2.8. It is therefore proposed that Article 188 (c)(3) 
should be amended so that "bodies which manage items of revenue and/or expenditure 
on behalf of the Community" are explicitly mentioned as bodies which must accept 
documentary controls or on-the-spot audits and should also communicate any document 
or information needed by the Court to discharge its duties. 
Consultation of the Court 
2.10. The Court takes part in the legislative process by giving Opinions on certain draft 
regulations. It must be consulted in the cases covered by Article 209 EC and may be 
consulted in other cases. 
2.11. As far as compulsory consultation is concerned, the Court considers that 
Article 209 EC should be used as the legal basis for all legislation intended to lay down 
new financial regulations or to derogate from the Financial Regulation. 
2.12. As regards optional consultation, this possibility could be better exploited in the 
sense that the Court could be systematically consulted on any draft legislation which, 
on bases other than Article 209, affects the Community's budgetary and financial 
mechanisms, especially regarding control. It is thinking, for example, of the draft 
regulation on the protection of the Community's financial interests, on which it was not 
consulted. 
3. SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BUDGET 
Fighting fraud 
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3.1. Fraud against Community funds is likely seriously to undermine the credibility of 
the Union. Fighting fraud is therefore a primordial task for each of the Institutions and 
Member States. 
3.2. In order to carry out anti-fraud measures successfully, a legal framework is first 
indispensable. Such a framework must define the Community's responsibilities and those 
of the national authorities and must lay down effective procedures and balanced means 
for repressing fraud. The Court of Auditors is pleased to see that efforts are being made 
to introduce new legislation in this field and it hopes that they will create a satisfactory 
legal framework. 
3.3. When it audits the legality and the regularity of Community revenue and 
expenditure, the Court has a role to play in fighting fraud, both by preventing it thanks 
to its external auditor role, by detecting cases of presumed fraud when it audits the 
accounts and the underlying transactions, and also when it audits the operations of those 
administrative authorities that, side by side with the judiciary, are primarily responsible 
for fighting fraud against Community funds. It should however be stressed that the 
Court's effectiveness in fighting fraud is a direct function of the resources available to 
it and of the ease and degree of directness of its access to all the data it needs to 
inspect during the audits: it ought, where necessary, to be able to obtain access to these 
by an order of the Court of Justice (see 2.4 - 2.6 above). 
Responsibility for implementing the budget 
3.4. The Court believes that it must stress, without prejudice to the important system 
of shared management between the Commission and the Member States, that Article 
205 EC states that the Commission is solely responsible for the implementation of the 
budget. In this respect, the Court observes that the principle of subsidiarity, important 
as it is, is sometimes wrongly cited in order to shift that responsibility from the 
Community to the national level. 
3.5. The Court must also direct the reader's attention to an aspect of the 
implementation of the budget which receives too little attention, namely the question 
of recovering unwarranted payments. It has observed that in the past too few concrete 
results have been achieved int his field. 
3.6. The question of responsibility for the implementation of the budget is also too 
important for the manner in which that responsibility is discharged not to be 
accompanied by detailed rules on the responsibility of the individuals whose task is to 
implement the budget in their daily work. The Court, however, has observed that there 
are significant legislative loopholes regarding the internal control systems, as well as 
the responsibility of authorizing officers, Financial Controllers and accounting officers -
although such matters are specifically dealt with in Article 209 EC. Cases where a 
financial official may be held responsible are only vaguely defined in the Financial 
Regulation and the procedures for bringing people to account have proved ineffective. 
This has resulted in a very limited number of cases in which errant officials have been 
disciplined or required to make up deficiencies from their own pockets. The system 
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encourages the feeling in the minds of authorising officers that they are not in fact 
themselves responsible for what they do, thanks to the guarantee offered in their support 
by the prior approval of the Financial Controller. This latter official, in tum, might be 
less inclined to submit expert reports to his Institution('), in particular concerning the 
application of the principle of sound financial management, in respect of expenditure 
for which he had already indicated ex ante approval. 
3.7. It follows from this that, in order to make good these shortcomings, the following 
amendments to the legislation are more necessary than ever: the context and extent of 
the responsibility of authorising officers, Financial Controllers and accounting officers 
must be defined in detail; the Institutions must be required to check the way in which 
individual responsibilities have been discharged; a strengthened procedure for 
sanctioning authorising officers must be introduced at Community level and, if 
necessary, a specific structure for supervising budgetary and financial discipline could 
be introduced: such a structure, which might offer the option of direct recourse to the 
Court of Justice, could establish the pecuniary responsibility of errant officials and 
punish them. As the Court already possesses the power of enquiry, it could play a part 
in such a structure. 
4. ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT OF AUDITORS 
4.1. In the experience of the Court of Auditors, which is organized and acts in 
accordance with the principle of collective responsiblity, as laid down in the Treaties, 
the consecutive increases in the number of its Members from 9 to 15 have not in any 
way affected the efficiency of its work. On the contrary, the Court of Auditors has 
found the increases in the number of its Members as a result of the successive 
enlargements very welcome because in practice they have been accompanied by an 
increase in the Institution's work-load. For example, the most recent increase has· 
coincided with the Court of Auditors' new task of providing an SOA, with the increase 
in the budget and with the introduction of new Community policies, all of which has 
considerably increased the Court of Auditors' workload. 
4.2. Moreover, when the Court of Auditors was established on 18 October 1977 it was 
decided that reappointments or replacements of Members would occur on a regular, 
cyclical basis (first after 4 years, then 2 years, then after a further 4 years), pursuant to 
Article 206 of the former EEC Treaty. However, this system has not functioned since 
1989, in particular because of delays in the procedure for appointing Members. 
Consequently, Members are now replaced according to a different timetable. 
4.3. As this new situation poses, inter alia, considerable problems for the election and 
the period of office of the President of the Court of Auditors and for the institution's 
work programme, it is proposed that, by analogy with the provisions which apply to the 
fi Cf. Art. 40 of Reg. No 3418/93 laying down implementing procedures for the 
Financial Re!!ulation. 
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Members of the Court of Justice and after a transitional period to be determined by the 
political authorities, half of the Members should be replaced on a given date every three 
years. 
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5. OTHER PROPOSED ADAPTATIONS 
Auditing of the· ECSC 
5.1. The fonner Article 78 F ECSC distinguished between the auditing of administrative 
revenue and expenditure (paragraph 1) and the auditing of other revenue and 
expenditure (paragraph 5). As the new Article 45 C ECSC lays down, in paragraph 1, 
that the Court of Auditors shall examine the accounts "of all revenue and expenditure 
of the Community", paragraph 5 of the same Article, which still refers to the other 
revenue and expenditure, has become superfluous. It is therefore proposed that 
paragraph 5 of Articlt: 45 C should be deleted. 
The reference in the Treaties to the status of the Members of the Court of Auditors 
5.2. For the sake of rationality and simplicity in the harmonization of the Treaties, it 
is proposed that the status of the Members of the Court of Auditors should be defined 
by Article 154 EC (and Articles 29 ECSC et 123 EAEC) and that, at the same time, 
Article 188 B (8), EC should be repealed (and Articles 45 B (8) ECSC and 160 B (8) 
EAEC). 
The composition of the budget 
5.3. It is proposed that the Court of Auditors should be mentioned along with the other 
Institutions in Article 202(4) EC, which concerns the separate parts of the budget (and 
in the corresponding Articles in the ECSC and EAEC Treaties). The Treaties would 
thus reflect the institutional reality. 
6. FOLLOW -UP OF THE WORK OF THE "REFLECTION GROUP" AND OF THE 
IGC 
6.1. During the "Reflection Group" stage, the Court would like to be involved in the 
most appropriate way in the follow-up of the work of the "Reflection Group", either by 
being given observer status - if such a status should be created - or through the creation 
of a stable form of liaison which would enable it to monitor the work, so as to be 
informed as accurately as possible, and be given copies of all discussion papers. During 
the actual IGC, the Court would like to be given copies of all documents relating to its 
activities that will be submitted to the Ministers, or to their representatives, so that it 
may, where appropriate, make its own views on the subject known. 
6.2. Generally speaking, the Members of the Court of Auditors are prepared to make 
any contribution that may help to improve the entire system of control of the Union's 
finances available to the "Reflection Group" and to the Conference throughout the 
period of its work. Moreover, the Court reserves the right to submit its own 
observations on reports or observations made or submitted by other bodies, to the extent 
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that such reports or observations directly or indirectly concern the status and powers of 
the institution, or, more generally, the system of control of Community finances. 
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ANNEX 
AMENDMENTS TO THE TEXT OF THE TREATIES 
which may result from the observations made 
by the Court of Auditors in its report 
PRESENT TEXT PROPOSED AMENDED TEXT COMMENTS 
The audit of the 2nd and Jrd piUars 
Article E TEU: Article E TEU: Mention of the Court in Article E of the TEU wit11 
the other Institutions (see 2.1 - 2.3 of the report). 
"1be European Parliament. the Council, t11e "The European Parliament. the Council, the 
Commission and tlle Court of Justice shall exercise Commission (. .. ) tlle Court of Justice and the Court 
their powers under the conditions and for the purposes of Auditors shall exercise tlleir powers under the 
provided for, on the one band, by the provisions of t11e conditions and for the purposes provided for, on t11e 
Treaties establishing tlle European Communities and of one hand, by tlle provisions of tlle Treaties 
the subsequent Treaties and Acts modiying and establishing the European Communities and of tlle 
supplementing tllCm and, on the other hand, by t11e subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying and 
other provisions of this Treaty." supplementing tllem and, on the other hand, by tlle 
oilier provisions of tllis Treaty." 
' 
The audit powers of the Court of Auditors and access to the Court of Justice 
Article 180(a) EC: Provision for tlle Court of Auditors to refer disputes 
to tlle Court of Justice: 
"The Court of Justice shall have iursidiction in - new article l80(a) EC; 
disl!utes concerning such rights and l!rerogatives - addition of a paragraph to Article l88(c) EC (see 
as have been conferred on the Court of Auditors 2.3 - 2.6 of the report) 
by this Treaty". 
Article l88(c)(5), EC: 
"Any infringement of the rights and l!rerogatives 
of the Court of Auditors may be l!laced by the 
latter before the Court of Justice. If the Court of 
Justice finds that an infringement has occurred1 
the J!!:rsons res~nsible shall take such stel!s as 
may be necessary to comi!IY with the Court of 
Justice's rulint'· 
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PRESENT TEXT PROPOSED APPENDED TEXT COMMENTS 
The audit of the bodies which manage funds on behalf of the Communities 
Article 188(c)(3) EC: Article 188(c)(3) EC: Explicit recognition in the Treaty of the Court of 
Auditors' option of obtaining information from 
"3. The audit shall be based on records and, if "3. The audit shall be based on records and, if bodies that manage funds on behalf of the 
necessary, perfonned on the spot in the other necessary, performed on the spot in the other Community (see 2.7 - 2.9 of the report). 
institutions of the Community and in the Member institutions of the Community, on the premises of 
States. In the Member States the audit shall be carried an! bod! which manages revenue and/or 
out in liaison with the national audit bodies or, if these exP!;nditure on behalf of the Communit! and in 
do not have the necessary powers, with the competent the Member States. In the Member States the audit 
national departments. These bodies or derpartments shall be carried out in liaison with the national audit 
shall infonn the Court of Auditors whether they intend bodies or,' if these do not have the necessary powers, 
to take part in the audit. with the _competent national departments~ These 
bodies or derpartments shall infonn the Court of 
'The other institutions of the Conununity and the Auditors whether they intend to take part in the 
national audit bodies or, if these do not have the audit. 
necessary powers, the competent national departments, 
shall forward to the Court of Auditors, at its request. The other institutions of the Community, any body 
any document or information necessary to carry out its that manages revenue and/or exl!£nditure on 
task." behalf of the Community and the national audit 
bodies or, if these do not have the necessary powers, 
the competent national departments, shall forward to 
the Court of Auditors, at its request. any document 
or information necessary to carry out its task." 
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PRESENT TEXT PROPOSED AMENDED TEXT COMMENTS 
The audit of the bodies which mange funds on behalf of the Communities 
Article 188(b)(3) EC: Article 188(b)(3) EC: Renewal of the Members' appointments on a fixed 
date, once every three years (see 4.2 and 4.3 of the 
"3. TI1e Members of the Court of Auditors shall be "3. The Members of the Court of Auditors shall be report) 
appointed for a term of six years by the Council, appointed for a term of six years by the Council, N.B.: The same proposal applies to Articles 45(b)(3) 
acting unanimously after consulting the European acting unanimously after consulting the European ECSC and 160(b)(2) EEAC. 
Parliament. Parliament. 
. 
However, when the first appointments are made, four The Members shall be J!artialii renewed once 
Members of the Court of Auditors, chosen by lot, shall ever! three Iears on a fixed date. The number of 
be appointed for a term of office of four years only. Members concerned shall be alternativeii eight 
and seven. The transitional measures needed to 
The Members of the Court of Auditors shall be introduce this s:t:stem of (!artial renewal shall be 
eligibile for reappointment. ado(!ted hi the Council1 acting unanimousii after 
consulting the Court of Auditors. 
TI1ey shall elect the President of the Court of Auditors 
from among t11eir number for a term of three years. The Members of the Court of Auditors shall be 
The President may be re-elected." eligibile for reappointment. 
They shall elect tile President of tile Court of 
Auditors from among their number for a term of 
three years. The President may be re-elected." 
Auditing the ECSC 
Article 45(c)(5) ECSC: Article 45(c)(5) ECSC: Deletion of paragraph 5 of Article 45(c) ECSC (see 
5.1 of the report). 
"TI1e Court of Auditors shall also draw up a separate ( ... ) 
annual report stating whether the accounting, oilier 
than that for the expenditure and revenue referred to in 
paragraph I, and the fmancial management relating 
thereto, have been effected in a regular manner. It 
shall draw up this report witllin six months of the end 
of t11e financial year to which the accounts refer and 
shall submit it to the Commission and the Council. . 
ll1e Commission shall forward it to the European 
Parliament." 
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PRESENT TEXT PROPOSED AMENDED TEXT COMMENTS 
Reference in the Treaties to the status of the Members of the Court of Auditors 
Article 154 EC: Article 154 EC: Mention of the President and Members of the Court 
of Auditors in Article 154 EC with the Members of 
"The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority, "The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority, the other Institutions (see 5.2 of the report). 
determine the salaries, allowances and pensions of the determine the salaries, allowances and pensions of N.B.: The same proposal applies to Articles 29 
President and Members of the Commission, and of tlte the President and Members of tile Commission, and ECSC and 123 EAEC. 
President, Judges, Advocates-General and Registrar of of tile President, Judges, Advocates-General and 
the Court of Justice. It shall also, again by qualified Registrar of the Court of Justice, as well as of the 
majority, determine any payment to be made instead of President and Members of the Court of Auditors. 
remuneration." It shall also, again by qualified majority, determine 
any payment to be made instead of remuneration." 
Article 188(b)(8) EC: Article 188(b)(8) EC: Deletion of Article 188(b)(8) EC 
N.B.: The same proposal applies to Articles 45(b)(8) 
"The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall (. .. ) ECSC and 160(b)(8) EAEC. 
determine the conditions of employment of the 
President and Members of the Court of Auditors and 
in particular their salaries, allowances and pensions. It 
shall also, by tlte same majority, determine any 
payment to be made instead of remuneration." 
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PRESENT TEXT PROPOSED AMENDED TEXT COMMENTS 
The composition of the budget 
Article 202 fourtlt QaragraQh1 EC: Article 202 fourtlt QaragraQh1 EC: Mention of the Court of Auditors in Ute fourth 
paragraph of Article 202 with the other Institutions 
"The expenditure of the European Parliament, the "The expenditure of the European Parliament. the (see 5.3 of the report). 
Council, the Commission and the Court of Justice shall Council, the Commission, ( ... ) the Court of Justice N.B.: The same proposal applies to Articles 78(a) 
be set out in separate parts of the budget. without and the Court of Auditors shall be set out in fifth subparagraph ECSC and Article 175, fourtlt 
prejudice to special arrangements for certain common separate parts of the budget. wiU1out prejudice to paragraph, EAEC 
items of expenditure." special arrangements for certain common items of 
expenditure." 
Article 78{1}1 second subQaragraQh1 ECSC: . Mention of the Court of Auditors in Article 78(1), 
Article 78{1} second subQaragraQh ECSC: second paragraph ECSC, along with the other 
"The administrative expenditure of the Community Institutions. 
shall comprise the expenditure of the High Authority, "The administrative expenditure of the Community 
including that relating to the functioning of the shall comprise the expenditure of tlle High 
Consultative Committee, and that of the Eruopean Authority, including that relating to tlle functioning 
Parliament. Ute Council and the Court of Justice." of tlle Consultative Committee, and tllat of tlle 
European Parliament. tlle Council, ( ... )tlle Court of 
Justice and the Court of Auditors.". 
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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
OPINION OF 22 NOVEMBER 1995 
ON THE 1996 INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 
AND THE ROLE OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
- 401 -
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Following the entry into force of the TEU, the ESC has held wide-ranging discussions 
on its aims as an advisory body, on how it may best advance its role, and also on strengthening the 
links that it maintains between the process of European integration and citizens' groups. 
In April 1995 the Bureau adopted a document (CES 273/95) on the role of the 
Committee. The first part gives an overview of Europe's future; the second part deals with the 
following proposed changes to the Treaty. These are the results of the detailed discussions held at the 
ESC. 
This Opinion was drawn up, following extensive discussions, by the Ad Hoc Group 
set up by the Bureau. The members of the Group were: 
President: 
Rapporteur: 
Co-Rapporteurs: 
Members: 
Carlos FERRER (ESC President) 
I 
Giacom.ina CASSINA 
Manuel CAVALEIRO BRANDAO (President of Group I - Employers) 
Tom JENKINS (President of Group ll - Workers) 
Beatrice RANGONI MACHIAVELLI (President of Group ill - Various 
Interests) 
Andre LAUR (ESC Vice-President) 
Klaus BOISSEREE (member of Group lli) 
Bent NIELSEN (ESC Vice-President) 
Jean PARDON (President of the Section for Economic, Financial and 
Monetary Questions) 
The Committee will continue this consideration of its aims in the short and longer 
term in order to make changes to- and heighten- its representativeness. The goal of its assessment 
will be to help tackle the major issues facing European society, including job creation, in order to 
further the European social model and reshape society by fully involving citizens' groups in the 
European venture. 
* 
* * 
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On 23 November 1995 the Economic and Social Committee, acting under the third 
paragraph of Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an Own-initiative Opinion on: 
The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference: the role of the Economic and social 
Committee. 
The Bureau's Ad Hoc Group on the 1996 IGC and the role of the Committee was 
instructed to prepare the ESC's work on the subject. The Rapporteur was Mrs CASSINA. 
At its 330th Plenary Session (meeting of 23 November), the Committee adopted the 
following Opinion by a large majority, with 2 abstentions. 
* 
* * 
II. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 
1. In discharging its consultative duties and, inter alia, through the use of its right of 
initiative, the ESC has often guided and even encouraged the Commission to draft proposals to 
respond to the changing needs of European society. The Commission's concern that the "pre-
legislative" phase should be more fully prepared has led it to step up consultations, not only with the 
social partners and national authorities, but also in many cases with organizations representing specific 
interests and even private individuals. The Committee is therefore prepared to work together with the 
Commission in organizing consultations prior to the submission of proposals. 
In order both to help make the consultative phase preceding the legislative process 
more transparent, and to consolidate its own consultative work, the ESC proposes the addition of the 
following paragraph after the first paragraph of Article 198: 
2. 
"The Commission should consult the Committee before it takes any decisions on 
matters of relevance to the interests represented on the Committee. " 
Within the framework of the strengthening of democracy and the re-balancing of roles 
between the institutions, the Committee considers that the possible increased use of the co-decision 
procedure will require stronger consultative powers to meet society's expectations more fully. The 
ESC is also ready to perform its advisory duties with regard to the European Parliament. 
The ESC L.'lerefore requests that it be empowered, where appropriate, to contribute 
to the procedure laid down by Article 189b, at the second reading stage. The ESC Rapporteur for the 
proposals dealt with under this procedure could attend meetings of the Conciliation Committee as an 
observer. 
CES l 312/95 1/PM/CH/ym/ss 403 .. ./ ... 
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The following sentence should be added to the end of Article 189b(4): 
"The Economic and Social Committee shall attend the Conciliation Committee's 
proceedings as an observer. " 
As a body representing economic and social interest groups directly involved in the 
establishment of Economic and Monetary Union, the ESC is closely monitoring this complex process, 
particularly through reports and Own-initiative Opinions on EMU itself and, in particular, on its 
socio-economic impact on European society. 
The ESC requests that its consultative work be made more effective by recognition 
of its right to be informed under the procedures for multilateral surveillance of the economic policies 
of the Member States. 
In the final paragraph of Article 103(2), the words "and the Economic and Social 
Committee" should be added after "shall inform the European Parliament". In the second.oparagraph 
of Article 103(4), the words "and shall inform the Economic and Social Committee" should be added 
after "multilateral surveillance". 
4. The ESC has made a firm commitment to promoting the Citizens' Europe, while 
calling for it to be underpinned by a transparent legal framework, and for specific measures to be 
taken to achieve it. 
The ESC therefore requests that in Article 8a(2) the words "and the opinion of the 
Economic and Social Committee" be added after "of the European Parliament". Similarly, in 
Article 8b(l) the words "and the Economic and Social Committee" should be added after "the 
European Parliament", and in the second paragraph of Article 8e, the words "and the Economic and 
Social Committee" should be added after "the European Parliament". 
5. The Committee has always taken account of the cultural dimension of the integration 
process in its Opinions. The cultural aspect has implications for other policies (and vice-versa); these 
implications necessarily concern the Committee when European society is involved. 
The ESC therefore requests that it be consulted on EU cultural policy. 
In the first indent of Article 128(5), the words "the Economic and Social Committee 
and" should be inserted after "consulting". 
6. The Single Market Observatory, set up with the support of the European Parliament, 
should be incorporated into the ESC's institutional tasks. 
The following paragraph should be inserted at the end of Article 197: 
CES 1312/95 1/PM/CH/ym/ss 404 .. ./ ... 
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"An observatory shall be established to analyze, review and report on the operation 
and further development of the internal market. " 
The ESC has done substantial work in developing contacts with its natural discussion 
partners in third countries. In many cases, it has promoted socio-professional dialogue, sometimes 
even before the Commission has taken any action, and on each occasion with positive results for 
dialogue and cooperation in the broad sense between the EU and third countries. 
The ESC requests that this important function be institutionalized in all the Association 
Agreements. The ESC also requests that it be consulted on applications for accession. 
In the first paragraph of Article 0, "and the Economic and Social Committee" 
should be added after "the Commission". 
8. The Council consults the EP on policies concerning cooperation in the fields of justice 
and home affairs. The ESC advocates a higher profile role for the EP in these policies, even if they 
are not put on a Community-wide footing. Most of these policies have a significant impact on citizens, 
European society and its constituent organizations. For this reason, the ESC is directly concerned. 
The ESC requests that it be briefed on these policies in order to be able to act, under 
its right of initiative, on a more concrete basis and with maximum transparency in its relationships 
with the Council and the Commission. 
The first paragraph of Article K.6 should be amended by adding the words "and the 
Economic and Social Committee" after "the European Parliament". 
9. With due regard for the principle of subsidiarity, the ESC considers that any decision 
to broaden the European Union's powers to act must always be shared by the citizens and by 
organized society. 
The ESC feels that- insofar as Article 235 is retained- the co-operation procedure 
should be used, and that consultation of the ESC should also be mandatory. 
10. By diversifying its consultative role, the ESC has successfully responded to the 
demand for greater representation arising from the development of the integration process, and to the 
diversity of European society. This should be reflected in the Treaty. 
The ESC proposes, therefore, that Articles 193 to 198 be amended as follows: 
10.1. An amendment to Article 194, 2nd paragraph: The ESC's term of office should be 
aligned with that of the EP and the Commission (5 years). 
10.2. The fourth paragraph of Article 194 should be deleted. 
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10.3. The Council's and Commission's role in convening the ESC should be abolished: In 
the third paragraph of Article 196, the text following "its chairman" should be deleted up to the end 
of the Article. 
10.4. The second paragraph of Article 197 should be deleted, since the development of the 
integration process and of the ESC, combined with the autonomy it enjoys in determining its Rules 
of Procedure, have rendered the list contained in this paragraph incomplete and obsolete. 
10.5. An amendment to Article 198, 3rd paragraph, to ensure that Opinions are followed 
up, by adding the following sentence: "The institutions which are assisted by the ESC shall inform 
it of the follow-up to the opinions issued." This information might, for example, be supplied by 
means of publication in the Official Journal. 
11. The specification in Article 193 of the categories of economic and social activity to 
be represented is unsatisfactory, as it has remained unchanged since the ESC was first formed. The 
list of categories should be updated to take account of the major changes which have (aken place 
during the last forty years in economic activity and in the pattern of employment together with those 
changes which are currently taking place as a result of, for example, the "information revolution". 
12. With successive amendments to the Treaty, the ESC has secured greater 
responsibilities and autonomy. This has come about because the ESC has always succeeded in taking 
stock of its mission, its experiences and its prospects, and in gearing its work to the complex 
requirements of the consultative function within the integration process. Another factor has been the 
ESC's ability to commit itself to representing rapidly-changing socio-professional interests, above and 
beyond the basic role assigned to it in the Treaty. 
The ESC therefore declares that it is "de facto" an Institution with an advisory role 
and requests that the 1996 IGC grant it "de jure" institutional status with all that this entails, in 
particular the right to bring an action before the Court of Justice, as laid down in the first paragraph 
of Article 175. With this in mind, the ESC proposes the following amendments: 
12.1. In Article 4(1), "an ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE" should be added 
after "a COURT OF AUDITORS". 
12.2. Article 4(2) should be deleted. 
12.3. The first paragraph of Article 193 should be replaced as follows: "The Economic and 
Social Committee in its capacity as an advisory body, shall assist the institutions which exercise 
legislative powers where this Treaty so provides." 
* 
* * 
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Ill. THE PROPOSALS IN CONTEXT 
N.B. TEU Articles are reproduced in the order in which they are mentioned in the Report. 
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I Current text of the TEU I ESC Proposal I 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COM:MITTEE 
(1) Article 198, 1st paragraph Article 198, 1st paragraph 
The Committee must be consulted by the Council The Committee must be consulted by the 
or by the Commission where this Treaty so Council or by the Commission where this 
provides. The Committee may be consulted by Treaty so provides. The Committee may be 
these institutions in all cases in which they consulted by these institutions in all cases in 
consider it appropriate. It may issue an opinion on which they consider it appropriate. It may issue 
its own initiative in cases in which it considers an opinion on its own initiative in cases in 
such action appropriate. which it considers such action appropriate. The 
Commission should consult the Committee 
before it takes any decisions on matters of 
relevance to the interests renresented on the 
Committee. 
PROVISIONS COMMON TO SEVERAL INSTITUTIONS 
(2) Article 189b(4) Article 189b(4) . 
The Conciliation Committee, which shall be The Conciliation Committee, which shall be 
composed of the members of the Council or their composed of the members of the Council or 
representatives and an equal number of their representatives and an equal number of 
representatives of the European Parliament, shall representatives of the European Parliament, 
have the task of reaching agreement on a joint shall have the task of reaching agreement on a 
text, by a qualified majority of the members of the joint text, by a qualified majority of the 
Council or their representatives and by a majority members of the Council or their representatives 
of the representatives of the European Parliament. and by a majority of the representatives of the 
The Commission shall take part in the European Parliament. The Commission shall 
Conciliation Committee's proceedings and shall take part in the Conciliation Committee's 
take all the necessary initiatives with a view to proceedings and shall take all the necessary 
reconciling the positions of the European initiatives with a view to reconciling the 
Parliament and the Council. positions of the European Parliament and the 
Council. The Economic and Social Committee 
shall attend the Conciliation Committee's 
nroceedings as an observer. 
CES 1312/95 I/PM/CH/ym/ss .. ./ ... 
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Current text of the TEU ESC Proposal 
ECONOMIC POLICY 
(3) Article 103(2), final paragraph 
[The European Council shall, acting on the basis 
of the report from the Council, discuss a 
conclusion on the broad guidelines of the 
economic policies of the Member States and of the 
Community (Art. 103, second paragraph). 
On the basis of this conclusion, the Council shall, 
acting by a qualified majority, adopt a 
recommendation setting out these broad 
guidelines. The Council shall inform the European 
Parliament of its recommendation. 
(3) Article 103(4), 2nd paragraph 
Article 103(2), final paragraph 
The European Council shall, acting on the basis 
of the report from the Council, discuss a 
conclusion on the broad guidelines of the 
economic policies of the Member States and of 
the Community. 
On the basis of this conclusion, the Council 
shall, acting by a qualified majority, adopt a 
recommendation setting out these broad 
guidelines. The Council shall inform the 
European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee of its recommendation. 
Article 103(4), 2nd paragraph 
The President of the Council and the Commission The President of the Council and the 
shall report to the European Parliament on the Commission shall report to the European 
results of multilateral surveillance. The President Parliament on the results of multilateral 
of the Council may be invited to appear before the 
competent committee of the European Parliament 
if the Council has made its recommendations 
public. 
surveillance and shall inform the Economic and 
Social Committee. The President of the Council 
may be invited to appear before the competent 
committee of the European Parliament if the 
Council )las made its recommendations public. 
CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNION 
(4) Article 8a(2) 
[Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, subject to the limitations and 
conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the 
measures adopted to give it effect. (Article 8a 
(1))] 
The Council may adopt provisions with a view to 
facilitating the exercise of the rights referred to in 
paragraph 1 ; save as otherwise provided in this 
Treaty, the Council shall act unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after obtaining 
the assent of the European Parliament. 
CES 1312/95 1/PM/CH/ym/ss 
Article 8a(2) 
The Council may adopt provisions with a view 
to facilitating the exercise of the rights referred 
to in paragraph 1; save as otherwise provided in 
this Treaty, the Council shall act unanimously 
on a proposal from the Commission and after 
obtaining the assent of the European Parliament 
and the opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee. 
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Current text of the TEU 
(4) Article Sb(l) 
Every citizen of the Union residing in a Member 
State of which he is not a national shall have the 
right to vote and to stand as a candidate at 
municipal elections in the Member State in which 
he resides, under the same conditions as nationals 
of that State. This right shall be exercised subject 
to detailed arrangements to be adopted before 
31 December 1994 by the Council, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission 
and after consulting the European Parliament; 
these arrangements may provide for derogations 
where warranted by problems specific to a 
Member State. 
(4) Article Se, 2nd paragraph 
[The Commission shall report to the European 
Parliament, to -the Council and to the Economic 
and Social Committee before 31 December 1993 
and then every three years on the application of 
the provisions of this Part. This report shall take 
account of the development of the Union. 
(Article 8e, 1st paragraph)] 
ESC Proposal 
Article Sb(l) 
Every citizen of the Union residing in a 
Member State of which he is not a national shall 
have the right to vote and to stand as a 
candidate at municipal elections in the Member 
State in which he resides, under the same 
conditions as nationals of that State. This right 
shall be exercised subject to detailed 
arrangements to be adopted before 31 December 
1994 by the Council, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee; these 
arrangements may provide for derogations 
where warranted by problems specific to a 
Member State. • 
Article Se, 2nd paragraph 
On this basis, and without prejudice to the other On this basis, and without prejudice to the other 
provisions of this Treaty, the Council, acting provisions of this Treaty, the Council, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission unanimously on a proposal from the 
and after consulting the European Parliament, may Commission and after consulting the European 
adopt provisions to strengthen or to add to the Parliament and the Economic and Social 
rights laid down in this Part, which it shall Committee, may adopt provisions to strengthen 
recommend to the Member States for adoption in or to add to the rights laid down in this Part, 
accordance with their respective constitutional which it shall recommend to the Member States 
requirements. 
CES 1312/95 I/PM/CH/ym/ss 
for adoption in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements. 
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Current text of the TEU ESC Proposal 
CULTURE 
(5) Article 128(5), first indent Article 128(5), first indent 
5. In order to contribute to the achievement of the 5. In order to contribute to the achievement of 
objectives referred to in this Article (culture}, the the objectives referred to in this Article 
Council: (culture), the Council: 
- acting in accordance with the procedure -
referred to in Article 189b and after consulting 
the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt 
incentive measures, excluding any 
harmonization of the laws and regulations of 
the Member States. The Council shall act 
unanimously throughout the procedure referred 
acting in accordance with the procedure 
referred to in Article 189b and after 
consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, 
excluding any harmonization of the laws and 
regulations of the Member States. The 
Council shall act unanimously throughout 
the procedure referred to in Article 189b; 
to in Article 189b; 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
(6) Article 197, final paragraph 
[Economic and Social Committee . . . specialized 
sections . . . agricultural and transport sections .. . 
terms of reference of specialized sections .. . 
subcommittees ... etc.] 
The Rules of Procedure shall lay down the 
methods of composition and the terms of reference 
of the specialized sections and of the 
subcommittees. 
Article 197, fmal paragraph 
[Economic and Social Committee . . . specialized 
sections ... agricultural and transport sections .. . 
terms of reference of specialized sections .. . 
subcommittees ... etc.] 
The Rules of Procedure shall lay down the 
methods of composition and the terms of 
reference of the specialized sections and of the 
subcommittees. 
An observatory shall be established to analyze. 
review and report on the operation and further 
development of the internal market. 
FINAL PROVISIONS (TITLE VII) 
(7) Article 0, first paragraph 
Any European State may apply to become a 
member of the Union. It shall address its 
application to the Council, which shall act 
unanimously after consulting the Commission and 
after receiving the assent of the European 
Parliament, which shall act by an absolute 
majority of its component members. 
CES 1312/95 I/PM/CH/ym/ss 
Article 0, first paragraph 
Any European State may apply to become a 
member of the Union. It shall address its 
application to the Council, which shall act 
unanimously after consulting the Commission 
and the Economic and Social Committee and 
after receiving the assent of the European 
Parliament, which shall act by an absolute 
majority of its component members. 
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Current text of the TEU ESC Proposal 
PROVISIONS ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS 
(8) Article K.6, first paragraph Article K.6, first paragraph 
The Presidency and the Commission shall The Presidency and the Commission shall 
regularly inform the European Parliament of regularly inform the European Parliament and 
discussions in the areas covered by this Title. the Economic and Social Committee of 
discussions in the areas covered by this Title. 
GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS (Part Six) 
Insofar as the Article is retained 
(9) Article 235 Article 235 
If action by the Community should prove If action by the Community should prove 
necessary to attain, in the course of the operation necessary to attain, in the course of the 
of the common market, one of the objectives of operation of the common market, one of the 
the Community and this Treaty has not provided objectives of the Community and thi.B Treaty has 
the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting not provided the necessary powers, the Council 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from 
and after consulting the European Parliament, take the Commission and after consulting the 
the appropriate measures. European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee take the appropriate measures. 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
(10.1.) Article 194, 2nd paragraph Article 194, 2nd paragraph 
The members of the Committee shall be appointed The members of the Committee shall be 
by the Council, acting unanimously, for four appointed by the Council, acting unanimously, 
years. Their appointments shall be renewable. for five years. Their appointments shall be 
renewable. 
(10.2.) Article 194, 4th paragraph 
The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall DELETE 
determine the allowances of members of the 
Committee. 
(10.3.) Article 196, 3rd paragraph Article 196, 3rd paragraph 
The Committee shall be convened by its chairman The Committee shall be convened by its 
at the request of the Council or of the chairman. 
Commission. It may also meet on its own 
initiative. 
(10.4.) Article 197, 2nd paragraph 
In particular, it shall contain an agricultural DELETE 
section and a transport section, which are the 
subject of special provisions in the Titles relating 
to agriculture and transport. 
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Current text of the TEU ESC Proposal 
(10.5.) Article 198, 3rd paragraph Article 198, 3rd paragraph 
The opinion of the Committee and that of the The opinion of the Committee and that of the 
specialized section, together with a record of the specialized section, together with a record of the 
proceedings, shall be forwarded to the Council proceedings, shall be forwarded to the Council 
and to the Commission. and to the Commission. The institutions which 
(11.1.) Article 4(1) 
are assisted by the ESC shall inform it of the 
follow-up to the opinions issued. 
Article 4(1) 
The tasks entrusted to the Community shall be The tasks entrusted to the Community shall be 
carried out by the following institutions: carried out by the following institutions: 
- a EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 
- a COUNCIL, 
- a COMMISSION, 
- a COURT OF JUSTICE, 
- a COURT OF AUDITORS. 
(11.2.) Article 4(2) 
The Council and the Commission shall be assisted 
by an Economic and Social Committee and a 
Committee of the Regions acting in an advisory 
capacity. 
(11.3.) Article 193, first paragraph 
An Economic and Social Committee is hereby 
established. It shall have advisory status. 
- a EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 
- a COUNCIL, 
- a COMMISSION, 
- a COURT OF JUSTICE, 
- a COURT OF AUDITORS 
- an ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
COMMITTEE 
DELETE 
Article 193, first paragraph 
The Economic and Social Committee, in its 
capacity as an advisory body, shall assist the 
institutions which exercise legislative powers 
where this Treaty so provides. 
Done at Brussels, 23 November 1995. 
The President 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
Carlos FERRER 
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The Secretary-General 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
Simon-Pierre NOTHOMB 
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OPINION OF 20 APRIL 1995 
ON THE REVISION OF 
THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 
- 415-
FORWARD 
With an eye on the lengthy process which lies ahead for reforming the Treaty on 
European Union, the Committee of the Regions has thought fit to submit its own contribution. 
The present interim paper, setting out our current thinking, will be forwarded to the 
European Parliament, the Council of the Union, the European Commission and the Reflection Group. 
It should allow the Committee of the Regions very soon to launch, with these institutions, the talks 
necessary for its political activity in the context of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. 
The COR's Assembly will be able to take account of the results of these 
interinstitutional talks throughout its work on the reform of the Institutions. 
In July, a paper will be drawn up on the developments needed to create a positive 
momentum with the European Parliament and the other institutions. 
The present paper is thus not definitive, but merely represents a point of aeparture. 
The Committee of the Regions calls on the European Parliament and the other EU 
institutions to inform it of any proposals affecting the Committee of the Regions' powers that might 
win the COR's support. 
* 
* * 
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A. EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
The revision of the Maastricht Treaty 
The Maastricht Treaty is a further milestone on the road towards European 
integration. It opens up new areas of Union activities whilst at the same time strengthening a number 
of existing areas and paving the way for a reform of the institutional machinery in order to increase 
efficiency and democratic legitimacy. 
The Maastricht Treaty is the first occasion on which a European constitutional text 
has included mechanisms for regional and even local participation in the drawing up of Union 
policies. Moreover, by declaring subsidiarity to be a fundamental principle, the Maastricht Treaty 
limits Union activities to fields where efficiency requires supranational action; indeed it defines the 
Union, under the second paragraph of Article A, as one "in which decisions are taken as closely as 
possible to the citizen". 
Article N of the Maastricht Treaty stipulates that an Intergovernmental Conference 
shall be convened in 1996 to examine the revision of certain Treaty provisions. This reflects an 
awareness that a short-term review of the Treaty is desirable, partly because of the innovative nature 
of some of its provisions and partly because of the profound changes facing the Union, particularly 
those stemming from its continuous expansion through the accession of new Member States. 
At the Corfu summit held in June 1994 the European Council decided to set up a 
Reflection Group to prepare for the Intergovernmental Conference, inviting not only the Commission 
and Parliament, but more generally all the other institutions and bodies forming part of the 
Community's institutional machinery, to draw up reports and forward their comments to the 
Reflection Group. 
As part of this process the Committee of the Regions, in its capacity as the body 
representing European regional and local authorities, considers that it would be appropriate to make 
a contribution to the revision of the Treaty in those areas falling within its remit. These areas will be 
analyzed later on in this Opinion. 
Scope of the Committee proposals 
The composition and functions of the Committee of the Regions are such that its remit 
is limited to regional and local issues. Its experience, and particularly that of the regional and local 
authorities represented on it, can therefore be brought to bear solely on Union policies affecting the 
powers and essential interests of "sub-state" levels of government and is naturally confined to the 
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institutional channels which enable these levels of government under the Maastricht Treaty to 
participate in the European decision-making process. 
The Committee of the Regions has also only recently become part of the institutional 
make-up of the European Union and thus lacks the extensive experience of the Parliament, 
Commission and Council. Nor is there any Treaty provision which requires the Committee's 
participation in the institutional reform process. 
Controversy surrounds the extent of the reform. Some institutions are intent on using 
the Intergovernmental Conference to revise the Treaty in depth with the aim of consolidating a future 
Union of more than twenty members, whilst the Member States themselves would seem to be more 
inclined to concentrate on those aspects whose revision is explicitly provided for in the Treaty, 
seeking to bring about a number of additional changes designed to improve the functioning of Union 
institutions on the basis of the experiences of the last few years. 
The Committee of the Regions, which is a central pillar of democratic legitimacy in 
the Union, must not only support amendments designed to improve the functioning of the system, but 
must also lend support to any changes aimed at adapting it to an enlarged Union. The political 
function and composition of the Committee of the Regions give it the authority to express its views 
on the revision of the Treaty as a whole, enabling it to participate on a permanent basis in the 
consultations of the Reflection Group and at a later date in those of the Intergovernmental Conference 
itself. This Opinion along with the appended resolution - drawn up on the basis of the fourth 
paragraph of Article 198c of the EC Treaty conferring on the Committee the right to draw up 
Opinions on its own initiative- constitute the Committee's specific contribution to the Treaty review 
process. This contribution should focus on aspects that are of direct concern to the Committee of the 
Regions. 
The Maastricht Treaty also provides an extremely solid platform from which to call 
for improvements in regional and local participation in the Union. When Article N of the Treaty 
speaks of revision, it points out that this will be carried out in accordance with Articles A and B. The 
second paragraph of Article A in tum specifies that one of the objectives is to "create an ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the 
citizen". It therefore goes without saying that the formulation of the subsidiarity principle, and the 
deepening and improving of mechanisms for regional and local participation, are an integral part of 
the philosophy underlying the revision of the Treaty. 
For all of these various reasons the Committee of the Regions has confined its 
proposals on reform to the following aspects of the Treaty: 
the principle of subsidiarity, 
CdR 136/95 (document revised on 3 July 1995) ES/ AG/PM/ym .. . I ... 
418 
.-
- 3-
the system for instituting proceedings in the Court of Justice against acts by the institutions, 
the Committee of the Regions. 
It is also proposed that regional and local involvement in the policies of the Union 
be stepped up and that consideration be given to further developing the concept of European 
citizenship and cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs. 
The principle of subsidiarity 
The principle of subsidiarity implies that the public authorities do not take action when 
this can be done adequately and effectively by citizens. The principle also introduces the concept of 
gradation, i.e. higher levels of government act only when lower levels cannot do so satisfactorily. 
Subsidiarity in general, and subsidiarity within the process of European integration in particular, 
strengthens: 
democratic legitimacy, inasmuch as it avoids the creation of an excessively ~entralized 
European power disconnected from the problems of ordinary citizens, the closeness of the 
Union to its citizens being one of the basic components of this legitimacy, 
transparency, since it encourages a clear-cut allocation of functions between various levels 
of government, making it easier for the citizen to identify areas of action appropriate to each 
level, 
efficiency, since it presupposes that powers are exercised at the most appropriate level of 
government. 
The Committee of the Regions, reiterating the position of its own members and that 
of the Assembly of European Regions and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions, thus 
warmly welcomes the inclusion of the principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty. It 
nevertheless regrets that the concrete formulation of the principle of subsidiarity in Article 3b of the 
EC Treaty does no more than lay down a criterion for the exercise of shared powers between the 
Union and the Member States. 
The Committee of the Regions believes that the principle of subsidiarity needs to be 
looked at both in terms of its formulation in the Treaty and in terms of its applications, viz: the prior 
examination of new legislation; the examination of existing legislation; the analysis of the case for 
undertaking new policies or activities; subsequent monitoring by the Court of Justice. We believe in 
particular that the Committee of the Regions must be more deeply involved in monitoring application 
of the principle of subsidiarity and must be brought into the heart of the work done by the 
Commission in this area. 
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Despite this, the scope of this Opinion and the appended resolution is restricted to the 
revision of the Treaty so that we shall be looking only at those aspects requiring constitutional 
changes at the same time. The Committee of the Regions, acting within the framework of its Special 
Commission for Institutional Affairs and taking into particular consideration a) the resolution at the 
Plenary Session of 15 November 1994 and b) the Opinion of the Commission for Regional 
Development, Economic Development and Local and Regional Finances on the "Application of the 
principle of subsidiarity in the European Union", will nevertheless also be taking appropriate action 
to ensure that progress is made on those aspects of subsidiarity which are not to be found in the 
Treaty and so are not covered by the appended resolution. 
On the constitutional front, the Committee proposes a new formulation of Article 3b 
that defines the principle of subsidiarity not only as a criterion for exercising shared powers between 
the Union and the Member States, but also as a criterion for sharing powers and responsibilities 
among all levels of government participating in the European Union; the Committee also calls for 
appropriate mechanisms that enable it to institute proceedings in the Court of Justice in the event of 
infringements of subsidiarity affecting the powers of regional and local authorities. 
Listing the powers of the Union and of Member States will make it easier to apply 
the principle of subsidiarity. The Committee of the Regions therefore urges the institutions of the 
Union, on the occasion of the revision of the Treaty, to initiate negotiations to establish a clear 
demarcation between the powers of the Union and those of the Member States. The Committee in turn 
calls upon the Member States to apply the principle of subsidiarity on their own territory, i.e. with 
regard to their own regions and local authorities. 
The system for instituting proceedings in the Court of Justice 
In the case of annulment proceedings, Community procedures confer on the 
Commission, Council and Member States the general right to bring actions, whereas the Parliament 
and European Central Bank may only bring actions to protect their prerogatives. Other natural or 
legal persons have to demonstrate that a legal act affects them directly and individually - which in 
practical terms means that decisions (e.g. sanctions) are applicable to specific parties since in other 
cases it is very difficult to provide proof. With some modification the same procedure applies to 
proceedings in the event of failure to act, i.e. when Union institutions have infringed the Treaties by 
neglecting to take action. 
The Committee of the Regions and its constituent members are in an extremely weak 
position in respect of this system. The nature of the subsidiarity principle coupled with the lack of 
direct effect make it impossible to appeal against an act or a failure to act of a Union institution in 
breach of the above principle, insofar as the plaintiff has to provide proof that he has been directly 
and individually affected. Consequently, the Committee and its constituent members find themselves 
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in practice in a situation where they are unable to defend themselves - something which is contrary 
to the spirit of Community law. 
The Committee of the Regions thus considers it necessary to propose that, in the case 
of annulment proceedings, as provided for under Article 173 of the EC Treaty, the Committee should 
be accorded the same special right to bring actions as the European Parliament and the European 
Central Bank. In the case of the Committee of the Regions, action could also be taken in order to 
defend the principle of subsidiarity. This would enable the Committee to fight legal provisions which, 
by infringing the principle of subsidiarity or demonstrating other violations, are prejudicial to the 
functions and powers of the Committee of the Regions and its constituent members. 
Moreover, the legislative activities of the Union are of particular concern to regions 
endowed with legislative powers. The Committee therefore proposes that such regions also be granted 
the right to institute proceedings for the purpose of defending their powers. 
In the case of proceedings for failure to act, as provided for under Article i75 of the 
EC Treaty, the Committee considers it equally necessary to be accorded the same right to bring 
actions as the institutions. Being accorded the status of an institution (a proposal made elsewhere in 
this report) would in fact resolve the problem and obviate the need to amend the above-mentioned 
Article 175. 
The Committee of the Regions 
The Maastricht Treaty makes it possible for the fist time for regional and local 
authorities to participate, in an advisory capacity, in the European Union's decision-making process. 
Such participation is channelled through the Committee of the Regions which, by virtue of its 
composition and functions, helps to bring the Union closer to the citizen, thereby reinforcing the 
Union's democratic legitimacy - both of which are basic objectives of the Treaty. 
Through Opinions addressed to the Council and Commission, members of the 
Committee of the Regions make a contribution to refining Community legislation, representing as they 
do the points of view of the authorities responsible for actually implementing the legislation in a wide 
variety of fields. In this way they undeniably help to make European policies more effective. At the 
same time, the constant flow of detailed information stemming from the Committee of the Regions' 
commitments enables local and regional bodies in the Member States to influence the European 
policies of their respective central governments. 
Despite this, the place occupied by the Committee of the Regions within the 
institutional machinery and its role in the decision-making process do not allow it to properly reflect 
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the contribution it makes, through its composition, to strengthening democratic legitimacy and 
bringing the Union closer to the citizen. 
The Committee considers that its position and powers need to be strengthened in the 
following areas: 
Institutional position 
Article 4 of the EC Treaty defines the Committee of the Regions as a body which 
assists the Council and the Commission in an advisory capacity. 
The nature and political legitimacy of regional and local authorities, their decisive, 
overall contribution to the process of European integration, and the role assigned to them in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity (which sees them as two of the political power-sharing 
levels in the Union), require that the Committee which brings them together and represents them in 
. 
the Union should be recognized as an institution in its own right. 
The Committee furthermore believes that it should be free to draw up its own Rules 
of Procedure without having to submit them for approval to the Council of Ministers. 
Composition 
According to Article 198a of the EC Treaty the Committee consists of representatives 
of regional and local authorities. The democratic legitimacy of which the Committee is guarantor, 
however, demands a more explicit reference to the political mandate and political legitimacy of its 
members and to the fact that they are appointed on the recommendation of the authorities they 
represent. 
Structure 
The Committee of the Regions should be able to establish its structure and organize 
its work in keeping with its own specific character and objectives. 
Organizational and budgetary autonomy 
The Committee needs its own independent administration and its own separate budget. 
The protocol appended to the Treaty, which refers to a common organizational structure with the 
Economic and Social Committee, should therefore be deleted and the appropriate budget decisions 
taken. The Committee should be guaranteed sufficient means to be able to fulfil its function, which 
is destined to grow in importance in the future. 
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Powers 
The Maastricht Treaty states that the function of the Committee is to respond to 
requests for Opinions from the Council and Commission, with mandatory consultations limited to the 
five areas laid down in the Treaty. The Committee may nevertheless expand its scope for action by 
making use of the right of initiative granted to it under the Treaty. 
The Committee considers that its consultative function needs to be strengthened, firstly 
by providing for consultations by the European Parliament as well as by the Council and Commission, 
and secondly by extending mandatory referrals to Community policies administered by regional or 
local authorities in all, or in a significant number of Member States. It is surprising, for example, that 
there is no consultation of the Committee of the Regions in policy areas such as agriculture, transport, 
social policy, research and technological development, development cooperation, vocational training, 
protection of the environment, industry, energy, or consumer protection. Thirdly, without seeking 
to make Committee Opinions binding, their influence on the decision-making process should be 
. 
stronger, which means requiring the institutions to justify before the Committee any decision not to 
follow the recommendations contained in the COR's Opinions. 
The Committee also wishes to be more closely associated with initiatives of the 
Commission, cooperating with this institution at the various stages of producing concrete legislation, 
legislative programmes or White and Green Papers. The Committee's cooperation would, by 
definition, be confined to practical areas falling under the jurisdiction of local and regional authorities. 
The policies of the Union 
The Treaty of Maastricht extends the Union's sphere of competence to new areas of 
activity which at national level are frequently handled by the regions and in some cases also by the 
local authorities. This same phenomenon is likewise apparent with some of the Community's 
traditional policies. 
The Committee considers that in these areas it is necessary not only to make 
consultation of the COR mandatory, but also to offer recognition, in keeping with the principle of 
partnership, of the contribution regional or even local authorities can make to the policies in question. 
Cooperation with regional and local authorities in these areas of Union activity should therefore be 
envisaged. 
Such cooperation would mean in practice that European Union measures and 
provisions with clear-cut implications for the economies of regions and local areas are properly 
evaluated before being applied. 
CdR 136/95 (document revised on 3 July 1995) ES/AG/PM/ym . . ./ ... 
423 
- 8-
The Committee believes that the need to promote cross-border and interregional 
cooperation between regional and local authorities should be the principle of spatial planning and spelt 
out in the Treaty in the interests of strengthening economic and social cohesion. 
The Committee furthermore believes that it is important to recognize and take 
practical account of the need for greater coordination of Community policies with a major impact on 
urban areas, whilst strictly adhering to the principle of local autonomy as enshrined in the Council 
of Europe's Charter of Local Autonomy. 
As a key component of the Union's democratic legitimacy and a body of crucial 
importance in bringing the Union closer to the citizen, the Committee of the Regions also considers, 
in the light of the experiences gained by its members, that the revision of the Treaty should be seen 
as an opportunity for deepening Community cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs (the 
third pillar and in particular the right of asylum and immigration) as well as for developing the 
concept of European citizenship, by incorporating a list of fundamental citizens' rights in the Treaty . 
. 
* 
* * 
B. RESOLUTION 
HAVING REGARD TO the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht, and more particularly 
TEU Article N in relation to Articles A and B, 
HAVING REGARD TO the conclusions of the European Council held in Corfu in June 1994, and 
more particularly the references to the preparatory work of the Intergovernmental Conference to be 
held in 1996, 
HAVING REGARD TO the resolution on subsidiarity adopted at the Plenary Session of this 
Committee on 15 November 1994, and the resolutions of the Assembly of European Regions on 
6 September 1990 and 22 January 1993, and of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions 
on 3 December 1992, 
HAVING REGARD TO the resolutions and reports on the principle of subsidiarity and on the 
Committee of the Regions, adopted by the various institutions of the European Union, 
HAVING REGARD TO the Council of Europe's Charter on Local Autonomy, 
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HAVING REGARD TO the preparatory work undertaken by the Commission and European 
Parliament with a view to drawing up reports for the Reflection Group, and in particular the draft 
Opinions of the Committee on Institutional Affairs of the European Parliament, 
WHEREAS the setting-up of the Committee of the Regions and the introduction of the principle of 
subsidiarity help to reinforce the democratic legitimacy of the European Union, bring the Union closer 
to the citizen and highlight the role of the regions and local authorities in the construction of Europe. 
WHEREAS the concrete regulation of these mechanisms in the Treaty nevertheless needs to be 
improved if regional and local authorities are to play a more adequate, more effective role in the 
European Union, 
WHEREAS it is desirable to reinforce the regional character of certain policies and introduce elements 
that will also guarantee compliance with the principle of municipal autonomy, 
WHEREAS regional and local authorities have a fundamental interest in issues connected with 
immigration and asylum, and whereas they are of the fundamental conviction that the concept of 
European citizenship, as formulated by the Treaty, needs to be clarified and strengthened, 
WHEREAS the Maastricht Treaty, in keeping with Article N, is to be revised at an Intergovernmental 
Conference in 1996, and whereas a decision has been taken to set up a Reflection Group to start work 
on preparations for this Conference in June 1995, 
WHEREAS the Committee of the Regions can and must make a contribution to this revision, and 
whereas it should, by virtue of its composition and function, limit this contribution to improving the 
mechanisms in the Treaty for local and regional participation: 
1. Requests that the formulation of the principle of subsidiarity in Article 3b of the EC 
Treaty contain an explicit reference to regions and local authorities and proposes, to this effect, that 
the second paragraph of Article 3b be worded as follows: 
"The Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, or by the regional and local authorities endowed with 
powers under the domestic legislation of the Member State in question". 
Requests that, in order to facilitate application of the principle of subsidiarity, the 
respective powers of the Union and of the Member States be clearly defined so that the European 
Union acts within the limits of the powers expressly conferred on it by the Treaty and in compliance 
with the principle of subsidiarity. 
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2. Requests that the Committee of the Regions and regions endowed with legislative 
powers be given the right to initiate annulment proceedings, and proposes that the third paragraph of 
Article 173 of the EC Treaty be amended to read as follows: 
3. 
"The Coun shall have jurisdiction under the same conditions in actions brought by the 
European Parliament, the European Central Bank and the Committee of the Regions 
for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives. It shall also have jurisdiction in 
actions brought by the Committee of the Regions against violations of the principle 
of subsidiarity, and in actions brought by the regions whose legislative powers may 
be affected by a regulation, directive or decision". 
Requests that the Committee of the Regions likewise be granted the right to initiate 
proceedings for failure to act, and realizes that this can be achieved without having to amend 
Article 175 of the EC Treaty if the Committee of the Regions is granted the status of an institution. 
The COR proposes that, in the event of not being accorded the status of an institution, the first 
paragraph of Article 175 should be amended to read as follows: 
"Should the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission, in infringement of 
this Treaty, fail to act, the Member States, the other institutions of the Community 
and the Committee of the Regions may bring an action before the Coun of Justice to 
have the infringement established". 
4. Requests that the Committee of the Regions be made an institution and accordingly 
proposes that Article 4 of the EC Treaty be worded as follows: 
"1. The tasks entrusted to the Community shall be carried out by the following 
institutions: 
a EUROPEAN P ARLIAMENF 
a COUNCIL 
a COMMISSION 
a COURT OF JUSTICE 
a COURT OF AUDITORS 
a COMMIT7EE OF THE REGIONS. 
Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this 
Treaty. 
2. The Council and the Commission shall be assisted by an Economic and Social 
Committee acting in an advisory capacity ". 
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5. Requests that the political mandate and political legitimacy of COR members be spelt 
out and to this effect proposes that the first paragraph of Article 198a of the EC Treaty be reworded 
to read as follows: 
"A Committee, hereinafter referred to as the Committee of the Regions, consisting of 
representatives appointed on the recommendation of regional and local bodies, who 
have a mandate from the electorate or are politically accountable to an Assembly 
elected by direct universal suffrage, is hereby established with advisory status". 
6. Calls for a strengthening of the powers of the Committee to organize its own work 
and consequently requests that the second paragraph of Article 198b be worded as follows: 
"It shall adopt its own Rules of Procedure. " 
7. Calls for full organizational and budgetary autonomy vis-a-vis the Economic and 
Social Committee and consequently proposes a departure from Protocol No. 16 on the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, appended to the Maastricht Treaty. 
8. Requests that the consultative function of the Committee be strengthened and 
consequently proposes: 
that consultation of the Committee of the Regions be explicitly provided for not only in those 
areas already laid down under the present Treaty but also where consultation of the Economic 
and Social Committee is provided for, as well as under the first paragraph of Article 130w 
of the EC Treaty dealing with development cooperation policy, the second paragraph of 
Article 8e of the EC Treaty dealing with citizenship of the Union, and Article 94 of the EC 
Treaty dealing with state aid; 
that, as far as the consultative function is concerned, Article 198c of the EC Treaty, as 
amended by the Maastricht Treaty, should be worded as follows: 
"The Committee of the Regions shall be consulted by the European Parliament, by the 
Council or by the Commission where this Treaty so provides and in all other cases 
in which these institutions consider it appropriate. 
The European Parliament, the Council or the Commission shall, if it considers it 
necessary, set the Committee, for the submission of its opinion, a time-limit which 
may not be less than one month from the date on which the chairman receives 
notification to this effect. Upon expiry of the time-limit, the absence of an opinion 
shall not prevent junher action. 
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It may issue an opinion on its own initiative in cases in which it considers such action 
appropriate. 
The opinion of the Committee, together with a record of the proceedings, shall be 
forwarded to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the Commission. In the 
event of disagreement with the Committee's opinion, these institutions shall inform the 
COR of the reasons for their position". 
9. Urges that the Committee of the Regions be allowed to cooperate with the 
Commission when the latter takes initiatives and proposes that a new paragraph be added to 
Article 198c reading as follows: 
"The Committee shall offer the Commission its cooperation and advice in drawing up 
legislative programmes and Green and lWzite Papers, and in preparing other 
initiatives in respect of policies affecting the powers of regional and local 
authorities". 
10. Urges that when European Union policies have a bearing on regional or local powers, 
especially in respect of spatial planning, the right of Member States under the Treaty to cooperate and 
participate should be extended to regional and, where appropriate, local authorities. 
11. Requests that, in the interests of strengthening economic and social cohesion, the 
Treaty should encourage cross-border and inter-territorial cooperation and proposes the following 
addition to the second paragraph of Article 130a of the EC Treaty: 
12. 
"Through its activities it shall promote the cross-border and inter-territorial 
cooperation of regional and local authorities" 
Urges that a provision be incorporated in the Treaty underlining the desirability of 
improving the coordination of Community policies with a major impact on urban areas, and calls for 
the principle of local autonomy, as defined in the Council of Europe's Charter on Local Autonomy, 
to be enshrined in the Treaty. 
13. Urges the Intergovernmental Conference to make progress on Community cooperation 
in the fields of justice and home affairs for the benefit of European citizens. 
14. Urges that the revision of the Treaty be seen as an opportunity to clarify for ordinary 
citizens the responsibilities and powers exercised within the European Union and trusts that this will 
lead to the adoption of a basic text defining: 
the fundamental rights of European citizens; 
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the objectives of the European Union; 
the bodies of the European Union; 
the powers of these bodies. 
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15. Instructs its Chairman to forward this Resolution to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the Commission and the Reflection Group set up to prepare the Intergovernmental 
Conference. 
Done at Brussels, 21 April 1995. 
The Secretary-General 
of the 
Committee of the Regions 
Dietrich PAUSE 
CdR 136/95 (document revised on 3 July 1995) ES/AG/PM/ym 
The Chairman 
of the 
Committee of the Regions 
Jacques BLANC 

